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Abstract
In prior literature it has been argued that there exists a tension between balancing
investments in Exploration for new organisational knowledge against the Exploitation
of current stocks. It is argued that over time firms tend towards an ever increasing
focus upon Exploitation to the exclusion of investments in Exploration. It is argued
that this bias is in part due to the causally complex feedback loops between
Exploration activities and financial performance. The tendency for Exploitation to
drive out Exploration activities over time is argued to pose a serious threat to firm's
long term prosperity and survival.
This thesis first reviews and interprets the diverse literature on the tension between
Exploration and Exploitation. This interpretation of prior work highlights that
Exploitation is not a single process, but rather two: incremental Development of
current stocks of knowledge and Appropriation of a return from those stocks through
use and sale in the marketplace. It is argued that the classic tension between
Exploration and Exploitation is intermediated by the process of Devlopment, which
seeks to convert new organisational knowledge into forms amenable to appropriation
of a financial return, in addition to making incremental improvements to current stocks
of organisational knowledge. It is argued that the tension between these three processes
only exists in the short term. In the long term the success of each process is dependent
upon the other two. It is argued, however, that in the long term it is difficult sustain
individual efforts to extend the firm's knowledge stocks through Exploration,
Development, or efforts to Appropriate a return through use, due to the existence of
three antagonistic processes that impede each of these three processes individually.
These antagonists are Core Rigidities, Slow Rate of Learning and Imitation by
competitors. Through the literature review insights are offered into how management
can suppress these antagonistic processes.
Chapters Three and Four empirically study the phenomena of Exploration and
Exploitation of organisational knowledge in the context of the UK therapeutics
biotechnology sector. In Chapter Three an in-depth case study of a leading firm,
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Ceiltech, is undertaken. From this case it is argued that contrary to prior literature it is
possible for a firm to maintain a balance between Exploratidn and Exploitation beyond
the short term. It is shown that Ceiltech's Exploration activities can be linked directly
to the financial renaissance of the firm between 1990 and 1998. Insights are offered
into how management sought to maintain this balance and ensure that the long term
complementary relationship between the processes of Exploration, Development and
Appropriation was not undermined by short-term actions.
Based on the experiences of Ceiltech and other biotechnology firms key quantifiable
outputs of the processes of Exploration, Development and Appropriation are devised.
Using an event study methodology, announcements of these key outputs, by all
publicly quoted UK biotechnology firms between December 1995 and January 1999,
are analysed. It is found that contrary to prior theoretic suggestions the outputs of both
Exploration and Exploitation activities generate observable financial valuations in the
stock market. Announcement of positive progress in Exploration and Development
activities are found to coincide with increases in share price over and above either the
past performance of the firm or the contemporary performance of market indices. This
suggests that contrary to theoretical arguments in the literature the causal feedback
loop between Exploration and Development activities and financial performance can
be quite direct.
It is also found that alliance formation plays an important role in value creation. It is
argued that the increase in market capitalisation that formation of alliances generate is
not fully explained by the sharing of resources and capabilities alone. It is argued that
formation of an alliance with a firm that has a high scientific and commercial
reputation within the stock market has a knock on reputational effect upon the
valuation of its biotechnology partner. The alliance offers uncertainty reduction
information to shareholders about the likely success and value of Exploration and
Development projects undertaken by the biotechnology firm, resulting in an increase in
the value of the firm. The concluding chapter of this thesis highlights major
implications that the findings of this study may have for both the pharmaceutical sector
and industry in general.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis seeks to address three general research questions. Each of these questions is
briefly outlined below. During the following discussion the reader is also informed of
the chapter of this thesis that seeks to analyse each research question.
1. Fro,z a theoretical perspective, what is the knowledge Exploration/Exploitation
dilenzina?
This question consists of two sub questions:
(a) From a theoretical perspective why should there be a tension between knowledge
Exploration and Exploitation?
(b) From a theoretical perspective why is it difficult to sustain efforts to increase
knowledge stocks through Exploration or to appropriate a return from current
knowledge stocks through Exploitation?
A number of scholars have argued in the literature that there is a tension between the
Exploration for new organisational knowledge and the Exploitation, or development
and use, of current stocks of organisational knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Levinthal, 1997; and Levinthal and March, 1993). It has been
argued that over time firms tend to invest increasing organisational resources to
Exploitation activities at the expense of Exploration. It is argued that this occurs due to
the shorter feedback loops that investments in Exploitation have relative to
Exploration, which is by definition a highly uncertain and longer term activity, and the
greater short term financial rewards that Exploitation activities attract (Levinthal and
March, 1993). This bias towards Exploitation of current stocks of organisational
knowledge is argued in the literature to pose a considerable long-term threat to the
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prosperity and survival of a firm (Hendry, 1993; Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and
March, 1993; March, 1991). The threat to prosperity and survival occurs because
investment in Exploitation to the detriment of Exploration implies that the ability of
the firm to innovate and adapt is severely impaired, thus reducing its ability to respond
to environmental shocks that require creation and implementation of new
organisational capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1995).
There exists a diverse literature on the challenges that promotion of both Exploration
and Exploitation pose to firms and management. In addressing the above question
Chapter Two reviews this literature to explore the principal problems that firms' face
in both the maintenance of Exploration and Exploitation activities individually and the
tension that exists between Exploration and Exploitation. Chapter Two condenses this
review into a series of figures, cumulating in an overall framework mapping the
tension within and between knowledge Exploration and Exploitation.
2. Is there evidence within a real organisational context that a firm 's activities can
be explained through the conceptual lens of balancing a tension between
knowledge Exploration and Exploitation?
This question consists of three sub questions:
(a) Can a firm's activities over time be categorised in terms of knowledge Exploration
and Exploitation?
(b) Does this analysis indicate that Exploration and Exploitation activities are in
balance or not?
(c) If a tension between balancing Exploration and Exploitation activities is found to
exist then how does a firm's executive team manage this tension?
In addressing the above question three in-depth case studies of UK biotechnorogy
firms, who are primarily in the business of discovery and development of drugs for
human health, were conducted. Each case, as approved for publication by the
management, is presented in Appendices One, Two and Three. The oldest of these
three firms, Ceiltech, is the focus of analysis in Chapter Three. In this chapter Celltech
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is analysed using the conceptual lens of Exploration/Exploitation and it is found that
its core activities, namely the discovery and development of drugs and the
management of inter-organisational collaborative partnerships, can be categorised as
knowledge Exploration or Exploitation activities. This analysis does indicate that
balance is not always maintained, however contrary to. theory it is found that balance
can be maintained over a period of five years. It is also found that the management of
Ceiltech has sought to carefully manage both the tension between Exploration arid
Exploitation and the interface between these activities, through a combination of
informal and formal monitoring and review systems.
3. Do the financial niarkets reward announcements of Exploitation activities with
higher returns thai, Exploration activities, as predicted by theory?
In addressing this question announcements by UK biotechnology firms over a three-
year period are classified as knowledge Exploration or Exploitation events. Using the
event study methodology, which is outlined in some depth in Chapter Four, these
events are analysed to determine whether shareholders reward positive announcements
about Exploration and Exploitation by increasing the stock market valuation of the
firm. Increases in share price over and above a number of performance hurdles, namely
the contemporary performance of a market index or past average share price
performance of the firm, are observed indicating that a tangible financial reward is
ascribed to both Exploration and Exploitation. Such increases are referred to as
abnormal returns.
Six value creation hypothesis are generated in Chapter Four, which are based on past
conceptual and empirical studies in the literature in addition to evidence from the three
in-depth case studies in the appendices. Past theoretical work (Levinthal and March,
1993) suggests that Exploitation activities should be accompanied by a greater
financial reward than Exploration activities. The evidence from Chapter Four suggests
that financial markets may attach a higher value to announcements of Exploitation
activities than Exploration. Exploration events are found to be associated with
abnormal returns of greater than 2%, while announcements of Exploitation events are
22
associated with abnormal returns of greater than 9%. It is also found that a key activity
in the biotechnology sector, namely alliance formation (Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999), is associated with creation of additional
shareholder wealth, generating abnormal returns of greater than 10%. Chapter Four
argues that announcements of Prestige Alliances are rich in information about both the
Exploration and Exploitation activities of biotechnology firms.
INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT
The empirical context of this thesis is a sample of UK biotechnology firms' the
primarily focus of whom is the discovery and/or development of drugs to improve the
treatment of human health, or the diagnosis of human diseases. Prior to detailing the
selection of the sample and data collection procedures an overview of the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry is provided. This is not meant as an
exhaustive analysis of the sector, rather it seeks to provide readers who are not familiar
with the industry a brief overview of its size and function. For a more detailed analysis
of the sector the reader is referred to the excellent Introductory Guide to Biotechnology
written by the Biotechnology Industry Association (BlO, 1999), the Ernst and Young
Life Sciences Industry reports (Ernst and Young, 1999a, 1999b, 1998) and Bogner and
Thomas's (1996) book on creating value in the pharmaceutical industry.
Biotechnology defined
Biotechnology is generally defined by the UK Biolndustry Association as "the use of
biological processes to niake useful products (including modified organisms,
substances and devices" (Biolndustry Association, 1999). The US Biotechnology
Industry Organisation note that "biotechnology is often defined as a combination of
advances in our understanding of molecular and cellular biology, plant, animal and
human genetics and how the human immune system fights disease" (BlO, 1999). The
use of biotechnology in a crude sense is an ancient activity. For example the
production of beers and wines is an application of biotechnology in the food sector,
while the production of penicillin is a more modern example (BlO, 1999).
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Modern biotechnology came to life with the discovery of DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid), which can be simply thought of as the blue print of life (BlO, 1999). Three
advances made the manipulation of DNA, and hence modern biotechnology, a
practical reality, namely hybridoma technology, discovered by Kohier and Milstein in
1975 at Cambridge (Faulkner, Senker, and Velho, 1995), Recombinant DNA (rDNA),
discovered by Boyer and Cohen in 1973 at Stanford University (Faulkner, Senker, and
Veiho, 1995) and Protein Engineering (Oxender and Graddis, 1991).
Applications of biotechnology ai:d regulation
Further advances in molecular biology have enabled firms to gain a much greater
understanding of biological organisms and how they can be manipulated to improve
human health, crop yields and environmental protection. The application of modern
biotechnology spans four important sectors in the world economy, namely, discovery
and development of therapeutic drugs to improve treatment of human diseases,
diagnostics tools to identify human and animal diseases, agricultural biotechnology,
which involves the genetic modification of plants and animals with the goal of
improving yields and nutrition, and environmental protection, such as clean up of
hazardous wastes (BlO, 1999; Ernst and Young, 1999a).
Because biotechnology involves production through the manipulation of biological
organisms it is a heavily regulated sector. Products that have been produced using
biotechnology cannot be marketed without regulatory approval. Regulation of
therapeutic drugs is undertaken by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
USA, and in the EU by the European Medical Evaluation Agency (EMEA), in co-
operation with national regulators. The FDA and National Departments of Food and
Agriculture regulate agricultural products. Drugs produced using biotechnological
processes are required to pass a long series of regulated clinical trials to ensure that the
drug is both safe for human consumption and brings clear therapeutic benefits. As this
thesis focuses on therapeutic and diagnostic biotechnology firms the agricultural and
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environmental biotechnology sectors are not reviewed', however an overview of the
pharmaceuticals sector is provided.
The drug discovery and development process is highly regulated, costly and success is
uncertain. An overview of this process is provided in Table One 2. This table details the
major stages of the process, the length of time and cost of each stage, and the
probability of a drug that enters a given stage making it from that stage through to
market launch. Table One also offers insights into the regulatory and financial success
of drug compounds. The process of moving a drug from discovery to regulatory
clinical trials is highly uncertain, with less than 5 in 5,000 to 10,000 compounds
making it from discovery to clinical trials (Berry, 1996; PhARMA, 1999). The whole
process from discovery of a promising compound to eventual regulatory approval to
market the drug is lengthy. For drugs launched on the market between 1990 and 1996
the process on average took 15 years (PhARMA, 1999). Drawing upon a sample of
drugs that entered clinical trials between 1980 to 1984 DiMasi (1995) found that only
18.3% of these drugs had gained regulatory approval, and estimated that only 23.5%
were expected to eventually gain regulatory approval. By 1998 80 biotchno1ogy drugs
had been approved for sale by the FDA (BlO, 1999), with 14 new biotechnology drugs
approved in 1998 by the EMEA (Ernst and Young, 1999a). It can be expected that the
number of biotechnology drugs will grow rapidly over the coming years. There are
over 2,200 biotechnology drugs in the development process, with over 300 products in
the final stage clinical trials (Ernst and Young, 1999b).
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE
Patents: the reivard for high risks and costs of regulatory approval
An important value driver in the pharmaceuticals business is the monopoly rents that
patent laws provide. The monopoly rights and profits that patents bestow on drugs are
meant to act as a reward for the high risks and costs attached to gaining regulatory
Readers interested in the agricultural and environmental services sectors are referred to BlO (1999)
and Ernst and Young (1999a; 1999b).
2 In this thesis tables and figures for each chapter are presented at the end of the that chapter.
25
approval. Patent protection in the US and Europe for drugs extends for approximately
20 years. It is estimated by the Pharmaceutical Researth and Manufacturers of
America trade association (PhARMA) that the average patent protection afforded to
drugs after they have gained regulatory approval is 12 years. They do, however, cite
some examples of drugs that have had as little as a half a year of exclusivity
(PhARMA, 1999). The costs and risks that patent monopoly rights seek to compensate
for are substantial. The cost of taking a drug from discovery through to regulatory
marketing approval was estimated by the Boston Consulting Group to be $500m, when
the cost of researching failures and interest charges were taken into account
(PhARMA, 1999). The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI)
estimates that only one in seven drugs that receive regulatory marketing approval go
on to become commercially successful (ABPI, 1999a). Grabowski and Vernon (1994)
observed from a sample of US drugs introduced in the early 1980s that the average Net
Present Value in 1990 US dollars was $22 million per drug, though it was found that
this result was highly skewed with only the top 30% of drugs recouping R&D and
other costs.
Once a drug's patent begins to expire then it is quickly subject to intense competition
from imitators. Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
1984 in the US and similar laws in Europe once a drug goes off patent then other firms
can very
 quickly legally produce a generic version of the drug. The effect of generic
competition is considerable. PhARMA (1999) report that for drugs who's patent
expired in 199 1-1992 genenc drug imitators captured 20% of the market immediately
upon expiry of first mover patent protection. Generic drugs had captured 44% of the
market within 6 months and 72% of the market within 18 months. World-wide generic
drugs represented 18.5% of prescnption units in 1984, rising to 46.5% by 1998
(PhARIvIA, 1999). By the late I 990s it is estimated that 55% of all NHS prescriptions
in England and Wales were written for generic drugs (ABPI, 1999b). In 1997 two of
Glaxo-Welicome's drugs began to go off patent world-wide. The effects in terms of
sales were quite pronounced. Sales of Zantac fell 45% from £ 1,375 million in 1997 to
£757 million in 1998. Sales of Zovirax fell 30.5% from £ 580 million in 1998 to £ 403
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million in 1998 (Glaxo-Wellcome Annual Report 1998). This decline in sales was
attributed to competition from generic drugs.
The challenge that expiry of patents pose to pharmaceutical firms is often cited as one
of their main strategic challenges. Pressure group Generic Access note that most
generic drugs are priced at 25% or less than branded drugs and that over the next 12
years patents will expire on drugs with current sales of $41 billion (Generic Access,
1999). This represents 13.4% of the current $306.3 billion global drug market (IMS
Health, 1999). Ernst and Young (1999a) note that about half of the sales of Eli Lilly
and Merck are derived from drugs that will go off patent by 2003. The challenge for
pharmaceutical firms who wish to maintain high net profit margins and sales growth is
to replace these drugs with new patented drugs. To do so pharmaceutical firms invest
about 20% of their turnover in R&D, making them the most R&D intensive private
sector funded industry in the UK and US (ABPA, 1999a; PhARMA, 1999). The UK
pharmaceutical sector invested £2.2 billion in R&D in 1997, while the US
pharmaceutical firms invested $20.6 billion (ABPA, 1999a; PhARMA, 1999).
It is expected that biotechnology will play an important role in pharmaceutical firms'
search for new drugs. The PhARMA Pharmaceutical hidustry Profile 1999 notes that
Currently there are 500 distinct targets for drug interventions. That figure is expected
to increase 6 - to 20 fold, to 3,000 to 10,000 drug targets in the near future." PhARMA
argues that the key driver of this expansion is developments in biotechnology and
genomes. It is noted by Ernst and Young (1999a) that an estimated 30% of
pharmaceutical firms' R&D budgets are available for external alliances and that much
of this money may be targeted at alliances with biotechnology firms. 30% of 1997
pharmaceutical budgets of UK and US firms would amount to about $ 7 billion. In
1998 the largest 100 biotechnology alliances netted biotechnology firms revenues of
S 1,786 million (Recombinant Capital, 1999). The top 20 pharmaceutical firms entered
into 226 new alliances with biotechnology firms in 1998 alone (Van Brunt, 1999). In
addition to financial payments to their biotechnology partners a substantial amount of
their R&D budget would have been consumed on costs associated with the running
clinical trials on drugs developed with biotechnology partners.
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Biotechnology and the pharmaceutical sector
Table Two compares the size of the pharmaceutical sector with that of the
biotechnology sub-sector. The world-wide pharmaceutical market is very large, with
$306,300 million in sales during 1998. The sector is relatively concentrated with the
top ten drugs representing 8.2% of the total market, all of which had sales in excess of
$1,000 million. UK firms sold three of the top ten drugs. These three drugs generated
combined sales of $7,218 million 3 . The top ten pharmaceutical firms in terms of sales
represented 29.6% of the world-wide market. Three of these companies were UK
based, with combined sales of $ 28.4 billion 4. As a whole the UK pharmaceutical and
biotechnology sector generated a trade surplus with the rest of the world of2.6 billion
(ABPI, 1999c).
INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
In contrast to the top ten drugs by sales, the top ten biotechnology drugs in terms of
sales represented 2.5% of the world-wide market, while the revenues of the US and
European biotechnology sectors combined, totalling some 2,461 finns (see Table
Four), have combined revenues that are only 5.3% the size of total sales in the
pharmaceuticals market world-wide. Revenues from the 32 therapeutic biotechnology
firms, which this thesis focuses upon, represents 0.1% of the global market in terms of
revenues. From the revenue picture it could b argued that the biotechnology sector is
of relatively little importance, however this would be misleading.
The value dnving engine of the pharmaceutical business is R&D of novel patented
drug compounds (Ernst and Young 1999a). Margins from patented drugs are higher
than non-patented sales and it is expected that much of the future pipeline of patented
S 3,858 million sales of Losec by AstraZeneca, $ 1,760 million sales of Seroxat by SmithKline
Beecham, and S 1,169 million sales of Augmentin by Smithkline Beecham.
' Glaxo-Wellcome with pharmaceutical sales of S 10.5 billion, SmithKline Beecham with sales of$ 7.3
bilJion, and AstraZeneca with combined sales of Astra $ 6.9 billion and Zeneca of$ 3.7 billion (Firn,
1999).
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drugs shall be derived from biotechnology. Table Three provides details of the
revenue, R&D spend, net losses, and number of staff for firms in the European and US
independent biotechnology sectors. It can be seen that while the entire European sector
is smaller than Glaxo-Weilcome in terms of revenues, R&D spend per employee is
considerably higher. As noted above pharmaceutical firms are amongst the most R&D
intensive in the world in terms of percentage of turnover invested in R&D, yet the
biotechnology sector is even more R&D intensive from the perspective of R&D per
employee. European biotechnology companies spent £ 32,775 per employee on R&D
compared to £ 20,415 per employee by Glaxo-Weilcome, the world's largest
pharmaceutical firm in 1998 (see Table Three). The industry is very heavily in the red,
with net losses in Europe amounting to £1,496 million and in the USA amounting to
£3,071.5 million. These net losses reflect the level of investment in R&D of the sector
and the fact that few have any significant revenues generated from product sales due to
the lengthily period it takes to steer a drug through the regulatory approval process,
combined with the relative youth of the sector5.
INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE
'Genentech, the world's oldest therapeutic biotechnology firm, was founded in the USA by Robert
Sanson. a venture capitalist, and Dr Herbert Boyer, one of the co-discoverers of Recombinant DNA
(rDNA). in 1976 Genentech was listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange in 1980. This listmg raised $
35 million for Genentech In 1982 the first rDNA drug (human insulin), developed by Genentech and
licensed to Eli Lilly, was launched on the market. In 1985 Genentech received marketing approval from
the FDA for the first biotechnology drug, called Protopin, to be developed, manufactured and marketed
by a biotechnology firm (Genentech, 1999). In January 2000 Genentech had a market capitalisation of$
34 4 billion.
Celltech, the oldest UK therapeutics biotechnology company, was founded in 1980. Celltech was listed
on the London Stock Exchange in 1993. This listing raised £ 30 million for Celltech and was at the tune
the largest ever placing and public offer of shares of a biotechnology busmess in Europe. Its first drug,
Chirocaine (originally developed by fellow UK biotechnology firm Chiroscience, which merged with
Celltech in 1999), was approved for marketing in Europe in 1999. This drug was the first major drug
discovered and developed through to marketing approval by a UK biotechnology firm. (Appendix One,
the Celltech case study; Ernst and Young, 1999a). In January 2000 Ceiltech had a market capitalisation
of 1,081 million.
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From Table Four it can be seen that the number of biotechnology firms in both Europe
and the US has grown over the last two years. While publicly quoted companies
represent only 5.7% of European biotechnology firms in number (68 firms out of a
total of 1,110) their combined R&D spend of 541 million, is 32.6% of the total R&D
spend of the European biotechnology sector. The R&D spend of publicly quoted
European firms is much higher than private firms £ 42,504 per employee for public
companies versus £ 30,100 for private firms. The R&D spend per employee of UK
public biotechnology firms is even more pronounced. The 32 therapeutic
biotechnology firms studied in this thesis spend £ 67,100 on R&D per employee (see
Table Eight).
INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE
From Table Five it can be seen that three countries dominate the European
biotechnology sector: 23% of European biotechnology firms are located in the UK,
19% are located in Germany and 12% are located in France. It should be noted that the
32 publicly quoted therapeutic and diagnostic firms that are the empirical focus of this
thesis represent 47% of the number of European publicly quoted biotechnology firms,
and greater than 20% of the total R&D expenditures of the wider European
biotechnology sector (see Tables Three, Four and Eight).
INSERT TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE
The European biotechnology sector in general, and the UK sector in particular, are
many years away from significant revenues generated by sales of drugs. To date only
one UK biotechnology company has had a drug approved for marketing, Chirocaine,
by Ceiltech-Chiroscience. With a lack of profits from drug sales to fund R&D
expenditures independent biotechnology firms in Europe and the UK are dependent on
two primarily sources of cash: funds raised from shareholders' equity and revenues
raised through collaborative agreements. From Table Six it can be seen that the amount
raised from shareholders has declined in the US but risen in Europe. Combining the
data from Table Three with that of Table Six it can be seen that public biotechnology
firms in Europe raised £ 358.2 million, while incurring net losses of £ 291.1 million.
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These companies need additional sources of funding if they are to not return to the
market quickly. Some such funds are obtained via alliances.
INSERT TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE
From Table Seven it can be seen that in 1998 European biotechnology firms entered
into 146 strategic alliances. These alliances serve a number of purposes. The first is
access to funds, second is access to drug development capabilities that the
biotechnology firm may lack, third is access to marketing and distribution capabilities
that they often also lack, and fourthly is the validation that these alliances bring to
biotechnology firms in the eyes of their shareholders. Ernst and Young (1999a)
excellently summarise a widely held view about the importance of alliances for
biotechnology firms when they noted that:
"Alliances remain the lifeblood for ELISCOs {biotecbnology companies}. The
current reality in Europe is that achieving successful alliances is one of the most
important validations of an ELISCOs commercial potential. In time successful
in-house product development may become an achievable goal, but for the
present the realistic model for Europe is one that focuses on solid research with
clinical development. ... The relative importance of strategic alliances, however,
reflects the simple truth that collaborators are closer to the market and are
therefore better able to assess the commercial potential of ELISCO products and
technologies. This importance grew in 1998 as capital funding generated through
alliances was one of the more important sources of funding for ELISCOs"
INSERT TABLE SEVEN ABOUT HERE
Table Seven offers an insight into the financial potential of alliances for biotechnology
firms. Collaborators typically undertake much of the cost of development of a
biotechnology firm's drug; in addition they provide a valuable source of cash.
Revenues earned by the top 100 biotechnology alliances for biotechnology firms
amounted to $1,786 million in 1998, an increase of 24.5% over the prior year
(Recombinant Capital, 1999).
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Table Eight provides detailed information on the financial performance of the principal
32 publicly quoted UK therapeutic and diagnostic biotechnology firms in 1997 and
1998. It can be seen that as a group they invested 127% of their turnover on R&D,
leading to a combined net loss of £ 296.6 million in 1998. They are very R&D
intensive firms, investing £ 67,190 per employee in 1998 compared to £ 20,415 by the
UK's largest pharmaceutical firm, Glaxo-Weilcome and £ 42,504 for publicly quoted
European Biotechnology firms as a group (see Table Three). Bearing in mind that only
one of these firms, Celitech-Chiroscience, has taken a drug from discovery all the way
through to regulatory approval for marketing they remain, as a group, a considerable
number of years away from break-even based on product sales, or alliance revenues
(Ernst and Young 1999a). Cash Burn is therefore critical to ihese firms. Cash burn is
cakulated as the current cash and equilivants of the firm divided by net losses. The
figure gives an insight into how long the firm could continue to incur the current rate
of losses without returning to the capital markets for additional equity or go bankrupt.
As can be seen from Table Eight the average for these 32 firms is 2.37 years, a period
considerably shorter than commentators' estimate it will take for these firms to break-
even based on product sales. Thus a critical competitive aspect for these firms is their
ability to communicate to shareholders that their investment is valuable (and by
implication worth shareholders reinvesting in via follow-on equity offerings) and their
ability to form revenue generating and cost sharing alliances, both of which conserve
cash. Both of these issues received attention in this thesis.
INSERT TABLE EIGHT ABOUT HERE
SAMPLE SELECTION
UK biotech,iology and the tension between Exploratioii and Exploitation activities
The reason why this thesis focuses on the UK biotechnology sector for its empirical
study is that this sector should be an extreme example of the challenges of knowledge
Exploration and Exploitation. As argued above, the value creating engine of this sector
is the process of drug discovery and development to create and replenish portfolios of
patented drugs. Discovery of new drugs can be viewed as essentially being a
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knowledge Exploration activity, involving the search for new knowledge on the
treatment of a disease and embedding that knowledge in a patented drug compound.
The rewards from such Exploration are considerable. From Table Three it can be seen
that Glaxo-Weilcome, while investing over a billion pounds per year in the R&D of
new drugs, it earned a net profit margin of 33% in 1997 and 1998. The motivation for
UK biotechnology firms to invest in Exploration for new drugs is strong, and reflected
in a combined market capitalisation of fJ,9474.5 million in 1998, despite net losses of
£ 296.6 million (see Table Eight).
The pull of Exploitation is also very strong in the biotechnology sector. From Table
Eight it can be seen that the cash burn for the sector, as a whole, is 2.37 years. This
varies from a low of 0.52 years for Tab to a high of 12.97 for Celitech. The pressure
that low cash burns bring is tangible. Despite being the first biotechnology firm to
have a drug approved for marketing difficulties in retaining AstraZeneca as a
marketing partner exposed Chiroscience to considerable uncertainties. With a cash
burn of only 1.15 years Chiroscienc was exposed to intense financial pressures and
was taken over by Celitech, who has both a strong relationship with its shareholders
and a cash burn of 12.97 years. Tab had a potentially exciting anti snake bite venom
about to be approved in 1999, however with a cash burn of 0.52 years it too
succumbed to take-over, this time by Proteus International, who also has a low cash
burn ratio. Efforts to balance the tension between Exploration for innovative
compounds, which consumes large amounts of cash (as much as $ 500 million per
drug if cost of failures is factored into the equation, PhARMA, 1999), and Exploitation
of current stocks of knowledge through alliances and follow-on equity offerings are
likely to be intense. For these reasons it was thought that this sector would offer a
potentially rich source of field data in the study of the tension between Exploration and
Exploitation.
Selection of sample companies
Three biotechnology firms were selected for in-depth case studies. The purpose of
these case studies was twofold. First, to gain a familiarity with the UK biotechnology
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sector. Second, to study the management of organisational knowledge within these
finns, to gain an insight into whether or not a tension betveen Exploration and
Exploitation activities exists within an industry where it is expected to occur, and to
see how this tension is managed if found to be present. The three cases were selected
on two criteria. The first was to gain a temporal spread of the sector. The second was
to gain a technological and competitive spread. From a temporal perspective Celltech
was chosen because it was the oldest biotechnology firm in the sector, having been
formed in 1980 and floated on the London Stock Exchange in 1993. Oxford Molecular
was chosen as a representative of the middle aged firms, having been founded in 1989
and floated on the London Stock Exchange in 1995. PoIyMASC was chosen to
represent the newer firms in the sector. It was founded in 1995 and immediately
floated on the Alternative Investment Market.
From a competitive and technological perspective these cases were chosen as they
offered an interesting overview of the sector. Ceiltech is a drug discovery and
development company. Its goal is to discovery novel compounds and, through
alliances with major pharmaceutical firms, to take these drugs through regulatory
development clinical tnals and onto the market. The ultimate return for Celltech is a
share of royalties from drugs that it discovered that eventually gain regulatory
marketing approval. Oxford Molecular does not seek to independently discover or
develop drugs, rather it manages networks of university and commercial partners to
discovery new compounds. The ultimate return for Oxford Molecular is a management
fee that it obtains from pharmaceutical or biotechnology firms for whom it manages
the drug discovery process. Essentially Oxford Molecular is a contract services firm.
PoIyMASC is a drug delivery company. It discovers novel drug delivery mechanisms
that can be applied to drugs to facilitate easier use by the patient (e.g. to take a drug in
oral, pill, form rather than as an injection) andlor improve the clinical effectiveness of
the drug. The ultimate return for PoIyMASC is a share of the royalties from drugs that
apply its delivery mechanism. Thus these three cases span the industry from drug
discovery and development (Celitech), to service support (Oxford Molecular), to
complementary products (PoIyMASC).
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Each case study was created with the co-operation of the management; thus all cases
have received clearance from the firms for publication. All interviews with managers
inside the firms were transcribed and a chain of evidence carefully maintained (Yin,
1989). Respondent validation was sought through a series of iterative re-writes where
the researcher's interpretation of the events in the company were checked with
managers inside the firm (Silverman, 1993), culminating in the case studies presented
in the appendices. Collection of additional data from company documents and
financial media sources (via the Reuters Business Briefings database) augmented data
from interviews. The focus of each case was upon specific drug discovery and
development projects and alliances. Through such practical activities the Exploration
and Exploitation of knowledge could be tangibly observed. Details of the case
methodology are provided in the analysis of the Celltech case in Chapter Three.
Selection of the 32 UK biotechnology firms to be included in the event study involved
the creation of a sampling frame of all UK therapeutic and diagnostic biotechnology
firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange up to the end of 1998. A company was
included in the sample if two of the following three sources listed it as a therapeutic or
diagnostic biotechnology firm: the Ernst and Young European Life Sciences Report
1999 or 1998, Pharmaceutical Business Neivs 6, or Genetic Engineering News
Directory of Biotechnology J9997 Each of these three publications are well regarded
as important sources of information about the European and UK biotechnology sectors.
Review of these three sources resulted in the creation of a list of 32 companies as
outlined in Table Seven. Further information on quoted UK biotechnology stocks was
sought through discussions with the case study interviewees, two interviews conducted
with managers in the London Stock Exchange, and a search of UK financial media and
newswire services using the Reuters Business Briefings database.
Pharmaceutical Business News is published every two weeks by the Financial Times (London)
During 1998 and 1999 the publication was split mto a number of sections, one of which was called Bio-
Europe, offering information on the activities of European biotechnology firms
The Genetic Engineering News Directo, y of Bzotechnoloii companies is published annually by
Genetic Engineering News (Larchntont, New York). which claims to be the oldest biotechnology trade
magazine in the world.
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STRUCTURE OF THESIS
The thesis is structured into five chapters, including this introduction, and five
appendices. Chapter Two reviews the literature on the management of the tension
between knowledge Exploration and Exploitation. The literature is interpreted via a
series of figures that seek to illustrate the tension within and between the processes of
knowledge Exploration and Exploitation. Chapter Three analyses the Celltech case
study using the conceptual lens of Exploration and Exploitation. This case was found
to be the most illustrative of the tension between Exploration and Exploitation and the
management thereof over a period of a decade. Chapter Four undertakes an event
study of all announcements of completion of pre-clinical trials (drug discovery), phase
I, Il and III regulatory clinical trials, and announcements of the formation of alliances.
.These announcements are interpreted in the context of six hypotheses. Chapter Five
seeks to summarise and draw the findings of Chapters Two, Three and Four into a set
of overarching conclusions. Appendix One details the Celitech case study. Appendix
To provides the PoIyMASC case. Appendix Three provides the Oxford Molecular
case. Appendix Four, in keeping with the event study methodology, lists all events
included and excluded from the sample. Appendix Five lists all conference papers and
publications completed during registration as a doctoral student at City University.
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TABLE TWO: SIZE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY IN 19988
Revenue 1998 Percentage of Global
__________________________________________ $ million
	 Pharmaceutical Sales
World-wide
Pharmaceutical Sales
	 306,300	 100.0
Sales of Top 10 Drugs9
	25,025 	 8.2
Sales of Top 10
Biotech Drugs (1997)'°
	 7,546	 2.5
Pharmaceutical Sales of
Top 10 Drug Companies
	 90,700	 29.6
US Biotechnology Sector Revenues
	 13,218	 4.3
European Biotechnology Sector Revenues
	 3,107	 1.0
Revenues of 32 Quoted UK Therapeutic
Biotechnology Firms"
	 349	 0.1
Glaxo-Weilcome Sales
	 10,500	 3.4
Sources: Company Annual Reports, Ernst and Young 1999a; 1999b; Hemscott.com ; IMS
Health 1999.
Unless specifically stated all data in the following tables on the biotechnology sector includes firms engaged in
therapeutics. diatnosttcs, agri-biotechnolo gy, and environmental sciences. Ernst and Young (1999a) indicate that
about 900o of the European sector is focused upon therapeutics and diagnostics.
Top ten therapeutic drugs by orldwide sales are: Losec ($3,858m, AstraZeneca), Zocor (S3,600m, Merck and
Co. 1997 sales), Prozac (S2.8l1.5, Eli Lilly), Norvasc ($2,575m, Pfizer), Liptor ($2,185m, Warner
Lambert Pfizer). Vasotec (S2,500m, Merck and Co. 1997 sales), Seroxat ($l,760m, SmithKline Beecham),
Zolofi (Sl.836m, Pfizer). Augmentin (Sl,600m, SmithKline Beecham), Clartin ($2,300m, Scherling Plough).
Source IMS (1999) and Company Annual Reports.
Sales data for top ten biotechnology drugs in 1998 as not available, thus 1997 figures are quoted. World-
wide sales are as follos: Procit (Sl.169m. AmgenlOrtho Biotech), Epogen (S1,161m, Amgen), Neupogen
(SI .056m. Amgen). Epivir (S973m. BioChem Pharma Glaxo Wellcome), Humulin (5936m, Genentech/Eli
Lilly). Intron (S598m. Biogea Schering Plough). Engerix B (S584m Genetech,SmithKline Beecham), Bataseron
(S38'rn. Chiron. Berlex. Scherhn g
 AG). Genotropin (S349m, Genentech/Pharmacia and Upjohn), Ceredase
(S333ni. Genzyme) Source Ernst and Young (1 999b).
" All 32 firms are listed in table seen. here details of their revenues, net losses, R&D expenditure, cash
balances, number of employees and market capitalisation is provided. These 32 firms represent 47% of the
publicly quoted biotechnology firms in Europe and 2O° of total biotechnology R&D spend.
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TABLE FOUR: NUMBER OF BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS: EUROPE VERSUS
USA
	
1998	 1997
EUR	 USA	 Total EUR	 USA	 Total
Public Companies	 68	 327	 395	 61	 317	 378
Pnvate Companies 1,110	 956	 2,066	 975	 957	 1,932
Total	 1,178	 1,283	 2,461	 1,036	 1,274	 2,310
Source of data: Ernst and Young, 1999a.
TABLE FIVE: NUMBER OF EUROPEAN BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS BY
COUNTRY
	
1998	 1998 %Change	 1997	 1997
Number % of total in number Number % of total
UK	 268	 23.7	 +7.2	 250	 24.1
Germany	 223	 18.8	 +26.7	 176	 17.1
France	 141	 11.8	 +5.2	 134	 12.9
Sweden	 94	 7.8	 +13.3	 83	 8.0
Switzerland	 68	 5.6	 +47.8	 46	 4.4
Netherlands	 64	 5.3	 +0.0	 64	 6.2
Belgium	 55	 4.6	 +19.6	 46	 4.4
Denniark	 50	 4.2	 +6.4	 47	 4.5
Finland	 49	 4.1	 +2.1	 48	 4.6
Italy	 43	 3.6	 +2.4	 42	 4.1
Ireland	 36	 3.1	 +0.0	 36	 3.5
Others	 87	 7.4	 -54.7	 64	 6.2
Total	 1,178	 +10.8%	 1,036
Source of data: Ernst and Young, 1999a; Ernst and Young, 1998.
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TABLE SIX: EQUITY RAISED BY BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS: EUROPE
VERSUS USA
1998	 1997
( million)	 ( million)
EUR	 USA Total	 FUR	 USA	 Total
Initial Public Offerings	 170.3	 397.0	 567.3	 127.8	 1,072.6	 1,200.4
Venture Capital
	
126.0	 465.1	 591.1	 109.5	 435.2	 544.7
Follow-on offenngs	 187.9	 661.0	 848.9	 100.5	 2,093.1	 2,193.6
484.2	 1,523.1	 2,007.3	 337.8	 3,600.9	 3,938.7
Sources of Data: Ernst and Young, 1999a; 1999b; 1998.
TABLE SEVEN: BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS ALLIANCE ACTIVITY
1998 % change	 1997
urnber of Strategic
Alliances by European
Biotech Firms
Top 2(J Pharmaceutical
firms \urnber biotech
alliance partners
Re enue earned b Top
100 Biotech firms from
alliance partners
	
146	 -14.1%	 170
	
226	 NA	 NA
	
Sl.7Sôni	 24.5°o	 S1,434m
Sources of data: Ernst and Younz 1999a; 1998; Recombinant Capital, 1999.
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Chapter Two
The Antagonistic Nature of Knowledge Management:
The Balance between Knowledge Exploration and
Exploitation
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade there has emerged a group of scholars who argue that the central
value adding task of the firm is the creation, storage and application of knowledge (for
example: Grant, 1996a and b; Huber, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Leonard-Barton,
1995; Liebeskind, 1996; Mahoney, 1995; March, 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995;
Pisano, 1994; Teece, 1998). Their perspective is often referred to as the Knowledge
Based View of the Firm 22 . It is an outgrowth of five rich literature streams, namely,
Epistemology, Organisation Learning, the Resource Based View of the Firm,
Organisational Capabilities and Innovation and New Product Development (Grant and
Baden-Fuller, 1995).
In this chapter organisational knowledge is viewed as being embedded in a firm's
administrative routines, capabilities, and product/service offerings 23. This chapter takes
Grant and Baden-Fuller (1995) note that the Knowledge Based View of the Firm is "an emerging
theory of the existence, organisation and competitive advantage of the firm which {is} based upon the
role of firms in creating, storing and applying knowledge."
Grant (1 996a) defines routines, noting that "the essence of an organisational routine is that individuals
develop sequential patterns of interaction which permit the integration of their specialised knowledge
without the need for communicating that knowledge ... this co-ordination relies heavily upon
procedures in the form of commonly understood roles and interactions established through training and
constant repetition, supported by a series of explicit and implicit signals "
Capabilities can be defined as "information based, tangible or intangible processes that are
firm specific and are developed over time through complex interactions among firm's resources..
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the perspective of the firm as a knowledge creation and application system and as such
falls within the domain of the Knowledge Based View of the Firm. A core issue that
has been raised in this literature is the tension between Exploration for new
organisational knowledge and the Exploitation of current organisational knowledge.
This tension, often referred to as the Exploration/Exploitation dilemma, has become
the focus of considerable theoretical and empirical research (for example: Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Levinthal, 1997; and Levinthal and March,
1993). One of the most influential works in this area is March's (1991 Organisation
Science article "Exploration and Exploitation in Organisational Learning."
Within the existing literature, Exploration can be defined as "the pursuit of new
knowledge of things that might come to be known" and Exploitation as "the use and
development of things already known" (Levinthal and March, 1993). It is widely
argued in the literature that a central component of success is the maintenance of a
balance of Exploration and Exploitation within the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and March, 1993; Hendry, 1996). March (1991) sums up
the sentiments within the literature when he observed that the maintenance of a balance
between Exploration and Exploitation is "a primary factor in system survival and
prosperity."
It should be noted at this point that the above definition of Exploitation, by Levinthal
and March, incorporates both knowledge development and knowledge use. It is argued
in this chapter that the distinction between knowledge development and knowledge use
are important, though such a distinction is rarely explored in the literature. It is also
argue in this thesis that an important linkage between Exploration and Exploitation,
and hence long term survival, is knowledge development. Thus this chapter devotes
considerable attention to a literature review of the concept of knowledge development.
unlike resources, capabilities are based on developing, carrying and exchanging mformation through the
firm's human capital." (Amit and Schoemaker 1993).
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Were balance a simple task then there would be no dilemma. Levinthal and March
(1993) note that "although there are clear occasions on which organisations need to
stimulate Exploitation and restrain Exploration, the more common situation is one in
which Exploitation tends to drive out Exploration." They argue that this is because
"Exploitation generates clearer, earlier and closer feedback than Exploitation. It
corrects itself sooner and yields more positive returns in the near term. As a result, the
primary challenge to sustaining an optimal mix of Exploration and Exploitation is the
tendency of rapid learners and successful organisations to reduce the resources
allocated to Exploration" (Levinthal and March, 1993).
This bias towards Exploitation is particularly problematic in fast moving environments
where current administrative routines, capabilities, products and/or services can
quickly become obsolete. While internal development may generate the new
organisational knowledge needed to replace obsolete knowledge this may be both
expensive and not always possible. In an increasingly interconnected economy firms
cannot bear the burden of sole independent discovery and development of knowledge
across all domains necessary to remain competitive. To do so is to become a victim of
the Not-Invented-Here syndrome24 . Thus a key element of long-term survival is the
process of Exploration of the external and internal organisational environment in the
generation of new organisational knowledge. Exploration activities also need to be
carefully managed with the goal of linkage to Exploitation and financial rewards.
In addressing the Exploration/Exploitation dilemma it is argued that previous authors
have under emphasised two crucial points. First, the Exploration/Exploitation dilemma
is more fully charactensed not as a dyadic relationship, but rather as a triadic one. That
is Exploration for new stocks of organisational knowledge, the development of current
stocks of knowledge into forms amenable to appropriation, and the use of current
stocks of knowledge for appropriation of a financial return. Thus the concept bf
Exploitation is explicitly divided into two related, but distinct, processes referred to as
24 For an overview of the Not-Invented-Here syndrome the reader is referred to Leonard-Barton (1995),
Chapter Six.
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primarily in two sections of this chapter: Exploration/Exploitation as a Triad and the
Conclusions section.
Second, through a detailed discussion of each of the three processes, Exploration,
Development and Use for Appropriation, part (b) of the first research question in
Chapter One is addressed, namely, from a theoretical perspective why is it dfficult to
sustain efforts to increase knowledge stocks through Exploration or to appropriation
return from current knowledge stocks through Exploitation? The discussion of this
question is found primarily in two sections of this chapter: Antagonistic Processes and
Some Pivotal Characteristics in the Antagonistic Nature of Knowledge Management.
The first of these sections explains why it is difficult for a firm to sustain its individual
efforts in Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation. It is argued that this is
due to the presence of three parallel antagonistic processes (namely Core Rigidities,
Slow Rate of Learning and Imitation), which challenge the firm's ability to create new
stocks of organisational knowledge through Exploration or to exploit current stocks of
knowledge through Development and use. The second section offers some insights into
how Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation can be re-energised and
their accompanying antagonists suppressed.
The third contribution of this chapter is to highlight that it is important to proactively
manage all elements of the dilemma, Exploration, Development and Use for
Appropnation. It is suggested that maximal value can be obtained where linkages
across these three processes are managed. Rather than focusing individually upon each
in a portfolio style approach, it is suggested that maximal value can be obtained where
all three are managed in tandem. It is argued that the critical link between Exploration
and financial reward is Development and that its importance in the literature needs to
be highlighted.
Structure of this chapter
The remainder of this chapter will be structured into five sections. The first section will
outline the triad of protagonist processes, which are labelled: Exploration,
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Development and Use for Appropriation. In this section the complementary and
antagonistic relationship that exists between these three processes is also outlined.
Four propositions on the relationship between Exploration, Development, and Use for
Appropriation and the financial value of the firm are offered in this section. These
propositions, while not critical to this thesis, do offer insight into both Chapters Three
(Celltech case analysis) and Four (event study). The second section will briefly
contrast the Exploration/Exploitation dilemma with Nonaka's knowledge spiral. It is
argued that Nonaka's knowledge spiral is not the same concept .as knowledge
Exploration/Exploitation. It is suggested that Nonaka's knowledge spiral conversions
from tacit knowledge 26 to explicit knowledge27, and visa versa, can occur within
Exploration, Development, and Use for Appropnation individually. The third section
will outline the three antagonistic meta-processes that are in conflict with the
protagonists. These are labelled. Core Rigidities, Slow Rate of Learning, and Imitation.
This section shall also outline the complementary relationship that exists between
these three processes. At this stage the relationship within and between protagonist and
antagonist processes wifl be summarised in Figure One. The fourth section will explain
how changes in level and nature of three dynamic characteristics of the firm can trigger
movement from protagonist processes to their antagonist and visa versa. These are
labelled. Intellectual Di i'ersity, Social Interaction, and C'odiJIcation. The movement
between each protagonist and antagonist will be outlined in a senes of figures (two to
four) The complementary and antagonistic relationship that can exist between these
three dynamic charactenstics of the firm shall also be outlined. The final section will
summarise the relationships between the protagonist and antagonist processes and
dynamic charactenstics of the firm in an overall framework (Figure Five).
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) note that there are two dimensions to tacit knowledge. "the first is the
technical dimension, which encompasses the kind of informal and hard-to-pin-down skills, or crafts
captured in the term know-how The cognitive {second} dimension of tacit knowledge reflects our
image of reality (what is) and our vision of the future (what ought to be) Though they cannot be
articulated very easily, these implicit models shape the way we perceive the world around us" (Nonaka
and Takeuchi 1995)
27 Explicit knowledge can be defined as that which can be written or explicitly communicated to others
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EXPLORATION/EXPLOITATION AS A TRIAD: EXPLORATION,
DEVELOPMENT AND USE FOR APPROPRIATION
This chapter is concerned with three meta-processes. First is Exploration, or the search
for and integration of new stocks of knowledge into the firm. This can be linked to the
concept of outward looking absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Second
is Development, or the extension of the current stock of organisational knowledge.
Extension of current stocks of knowledge is heavily effected by the descent of learning
and experience curves (Darr, Argote, and Dennis, 1995; Epple, Argote and Devadas,
1991; Petrakis, Rasmusen and Roy, 1997) where knowledge about the efficient
production of a given product or service, or the management of a given process
incrementally grows over time. Development may also involve incremental
development of a stock of knowledge that is not based upon riding down an experience
curve. Third is Use for Appropriation, which involves the use of current stocks of
knowledge to appropriate a financial return for the organisation. Such returns may be
derived from the sale of final product, such as a consumer drug, or intermediary
products, such as licensing of a patented drug. Appropriation is facilitated by inward
looking absorptive capacities, which facilitate speedy transfer of knowledge across
intra-organisational boundaries (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and knowledge
articulation, where tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge (Nonaka,
1994). Both of these processes facilitate speedy embedding of knowledge into products
and services that can be sold to external customers. 	 -
Exploration
As noted earlier, Exploration is defined by Levinthal and March (1993) as "the pursuit
of new knowledge of things that might come to be known" It is important to link this
definition to Levinthal's seminal work with Cohen on Absorptive Capacities (Cohen
and Levinthal 1989, 1990, 1994). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define absorptive
capacities as "the ability of a firm to recognise the value of new, external information,
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends." They note that "the ability to evaluate
and utilise outside knowledge is largely a function of the level of prior related
knowledge. At the most elemental level, this prior knowledge includes basic skills or
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even a shared language but may also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or
technological developments in a given field. Thus, prior related knowledge confers an
ability to recogrnse the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to
commercial ends."
Cohen and Levinthal sub-divide absorptive capacities into outward and inward looking
categones. Outward looking absorptive capacities incorporate the ability to recognise
and assimilate external knowledge into the firm. This is at the heart of the process of
Exploration which Levinthal and March (1993) proposed. It is important, however, to
recognise that the stock of new knowledge created by the firm can be discovered not
only by an external search of the environment and subsequent absorption, but also
from a recombination of knowledge that resides inside the firm. In essence this takes
account of Kogut and Zander's (1992) combinative capabilities. The firm's knowledge
stock can be increased through reliance upon its own creative minds, resources and
capabilities, to generate new organisational knowledge rather than external stimuli.
The knowledge created b' the method may well be known outside the domain of the
firm, however the firm has chosen to develop it independently, perhaps due to the lack
of an outward absorptive capacity to recognise and assimilate the knowledge, practical
impediments (such as Intellectual Property Rights), or the effect of Not-Invented-Here
syndrome Thus Exploration may involve the use both of absorptive capacities, or
external search and assimilation, and internally focused knowledge creation activities.
Exploration is defined as activities that seek to create new stocks of organisational
knowledge through the search for and assimilation of new knowledge originating from
the external environment, or through internal research activities. Exploration that
involves external search must also have an ex-ante goal of assimilation of new
knowledge obtained into the firm's stock of knowledge.
At its heart the process of Exploration seeks to create new opportunities for the firm to
create new technologies or processes. Exploration is about improving the flexibility of
the firm through the creation of new stocks of organisational knowledge. New stocks
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of knowledge broaden the firm's ability to react to, exploit, or shape, changes in its
external environment.
Development
The Levinthal and March (1993) definition of Exploitation contains two elements.
They define Exploitation as "the use and development of things already known."
Unfortunately these two distinct concepts appear to be used interchangeably after
initial definition, yet they are clearly separate processes with distinguishable goals. It is
important to separate Development from Use for Appropriation. Development, or
deepening, of current stocks of knowledge is triggered by investments in learning by
doing (Hatch and Mower, 1998). The goal of development is clearly to expand the
firm's current stock of knowledge. Use of knowledge in the context of the Levinthal
and March concept of Exploitation clearly has a different goal, namely the use of the
current stock of knowledge to appropriate an economic return for the firm. Thus
Development is focused upon the expansion of the current stock of knowledge and Use
for Appropriation with the appropriation of a financial return.
It is an obvious point that complex administrative routines and organisational
capabilities, may be developed by firms but that the knowledge embedded in these is
of no value if it cannot be profitably embedded in an end product or service sold into
the external environment (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Mathur
and Kenyon, 1998). Thus there is a clear link between Development and Use.
Similarly there is a clear link between the Exploration for new knowledge, the
Development thereof and eventual use. Levinthal and March clearly recognised that
while related to each other, Exploration is distinct from Exploitation. This chapter
argues that the same should apply to Development and Use for Appropriation. Thus
the process of Exploitation is split into two distinct, but related, processes, referted to
as Development and Use for Appropriation. An important argument of this chapter is
that Development acts as a linkage between Exploration and Use for Appropriation
and as such it should not be ignored.
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Development is defined as activities that seek to expand, or reconfigure, the current
boundaries of stocks of organisational knowledge through a process of deepening
understanding of the current stock of organisational knowledge by learning associated
with the decent of experience curves. The goal of Development is the expansion of a
firm's stock of knowledge into formats that facilitate Use for Appropriation.
Development identifies opportunities that exist within a firm's current stocks of
knowledge to realise efficiency improvements, new products or product extensions and
convert those opportunities into knowledge amenable to Use for Appropriation.
At its heart the process of Development is about exploiting gains from specialisation
by squeezing more value adding opportunities from a firm's current stock of
knowledge. Development, or deepening, brings with it the benefits of increased
specialisation, while Exploration brings with it the benefits of flexibility through
increased breath of pools of knowledge.
The link between Exploration and Development
There is a clear link between the processes of Exploration and Development. Without a
stream of new knowledge created by the process of Exploration, Development
activities will eventually fail to expand the firm's current stock of knowledge. In
common with Economies of Scale curves where eventually the curve can theoretically
rise and diseconomies occur, experience and learning curves can tail off or rise and
dis-economies of Development can emerge. Thus, Development on its own is not
enough to sustain expansion of a firm's knowledge stocks in the long term. Equally as
argued above Exploration requires Development for new knowledge to be converted
into a format that can be efficiently and effectively used for appropriation. A
knowledge stock that expands more rapidly than competitors' stocks is not of value to
the firm unless it can be effectively used for appropriation.
If Exploration is not linked to the process of Development then it will be difficult to
convert the outputs of Exploration into products and services that add value for the
firm. In such a scenario Exploration is disconnected from Exploitation. New stocks of
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knowledge, created through the process of Exploration, are not integrated into the
firm's current organisational systems, thus such knowledge is either not applied, or to
be applied a separate organisational structure needs to be created to facilitate its
Exploitation. One can imagine that circumstances may arise where such separation is
prudent, however, in general a firm could not profitably exist if new structures and
systems had to be created each time new stocks of knowledge were created.
Exploration as disconnected from Development: the case ofXerox PARC
An interesting example of such disconnection is that of Xerox PARC. In the 1970s
Xerox created a research centre at Palo Alto, called Xerox PARC. Its function was
essentially to Explore new technologies in the area of the paperless office, which
represented a considerable long term challenge to Xerox's domination of the
photocopier sector28 . The goal of Xerox PARC was to "invent systems that could
support executives, secretaries, salesmen, and production managers in what became
known as the 'office of the future'." (Smith and Alexander, 1999). Xerox PARC
created some amazingly advanced products for its time, such as.the first Personal
Computer, called the Alto (in 1973), the first word processing programme, the first
Graphical User Interface complete with mouse pointing device, the first Local Area
Network and the first laser printer (Xerox PARC, 1999).
Xerox PARC also had as a stated goal the transfer of promising technologies to Xerox,
which could then be exploited by the parent company (Smith and Alexander, 1999).
Technologies that had promise in the domain of imaging were successfully exploited
by Xerox, however large tracts of technology, for example the Personal Computer, that
were removed from the technological and cultural core of Xerox were never
successfully exploited by the firm. Others were, however, quick to realise the
commercial potential of knowledge explored at Xerox PARC and moved fast to
Readers who wish to obtain more detailed information on the fascmating history of Xerox PARC, m
particular its role in the foundation of the Personal Computer sector, are referred to Smith and
Alexander's (1999) very readable book entitled Fumbling the Future HowXerox invented, Then
Ignored, The First Personal computer, San Jose: toExcel Information on Xerox PARC's on-gomg
activities can be found on the company's web site (ipi/www parc xerox.com).
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develop and exploit it in the market. For example Xerox PARC demonstrated the Alto
to Steve Jobs in 1979, who in turn promptly hired key Xerox PARC staff to create the
Apple IL The creation of the Apple Lisa computer, launched in 1983 and a forerunner
of the Apple Mac was fuelled by Jobs' visit to Xerox PARC (Canton, 1997).
Viewing the experience of Xerox PARC in the 1970s from the perspective of
knowledge Exploration/Exploitation one could argue that the problem for Xerox
PARC was that the management of Exploration activities were largely unconnected to
Development and Use for Appropriation. The technologies created by Xerox PARC
were disconnected at both a technological and cultural level from the then current
photocopier and paper office knowledge base of Xerox. Holusha (1998) noted that
"one of the distinguishing characteristics of Xerox is that, as a corporation, it still
believes in the value of research." He notes that Burgelman, who consulted widely for
Xerox in the 1980s, believes that the reason for the failure of Xerox to convert the
knowledge created through the Exploration activities of Xerox PARC was that "the
company has many functional managers immersed in the details of its reprographics
operations, but few general managers to look afield." Smith and Alexander's (1999)
book on Xerox PARC and the creation of the Alto PC is rich in quotations that
illustrate that not only the technology, but more importantly, the culture and
management style of Xerox PARC was radically different from that of Xerox. There
appeared to be a lack of managerial linkages between the Exploration of Xerox PARC
and a vision of how this knowledge could, or should, be integrated into and developed
by Xerox itself.
Today, Holusha (1998) argues, Xerox is more successful at exploiting the research of
Xerox PARC because they seek "to tie its research more closely to product
development." Managers inside Xerox PARC also note that today there is a much
greater congruence between the culture of Xerox PARC and Xerox itself. In the 1 970s
Exploration was the goal of employees inside Xerox PARC. Development and
commercialisation was largely disdained. Today employees inside Xerox PARC are
more inspired by the image of Bill Gates and aim to link Exploration of new ideas to
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commercial Exploitation of those ideas through the powerful commercial vehicle of
Xerox itself than the pursuit of pure science alone (Holusha, 1998).
Because the Exploration activities of Xerox PARC were not connected to main
activities of the firm via Development, Exploitation by Xerox would have either
required radical upheaval in the core reprographics business to enable cultural and
technological accommodation of the ideas generated by Xerox PARC, or for separate
organisational structures to be created to develop and appropriate a return from these
ideas. This portfolio approach, where Exploitation is separated from Development and
Use for Appropriation is the way Xerox tackled this problem (Holusha, 1998). It set up
a venture capital division that provides seed capital to Xerox employees to set up their
own firms to exploit ideas that emerge from Xerox PARC. Thus Development is
largely undertaken by those who explored the idea in the first place, but is also
conducted outside the boundanes of Xerox. This approach has only created ten firms
so far, with varying levels of success (Holusha, 1998). This solution is, however
costly. New structures need to be formed. Xerox cedes 20% .of the equity to
management, but puts up l00 0 o
 of the seed capital. Its control over the technologies
created by PARC is lessened.
Exploration aizd Dei'elopineizt as complements and antagonists
The link between Exploration and Development is important and complementary, both
ha e the goal of expanding the stock of knowledge and each requires the other to
prosper in the long term. Without an injection of new stocks of knowledge from
Exploration activities Development will eventually encounter negative economies of
incremental knowledge creation. Without Development, Exploration activities will be
viewed as operating outside the firm. Integration of such knowledge will require new
organisational systems and structures, such as a new subsidiary company to be created
for the purposes of effective exploitation. If Exploration activities are linked to
Development, then new knowledge stocks can be incrementally infused into the firm,
minimising organisational disruption, while ensuring that the firm does not stagnate.
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The relationship between Exploration and Development is not, however, exclusively
complementary. The two processes can also be in conflict with each other. Exploration
seeks to increase flexibility and overcome the negative effects of specialisation caused
by Core Rigidities. Development seeks to reinforce the gains from specialisation in
capabilities. In a firm with finite resources and capabilities there will arise a conflict
between those who seek to invest in external search and those who support the internal
development of organisational knowledge. While overlaps do exist there is likely to be
a natural bias towards the support of internal development, over Exploration. This is
because often the benefits from Development are more immediately obvious.
Incremental extensions of current processes are more easily understood than the
creation and assimilation of new knowledge with which the firm has a lower degree of
familiarity.
Distinguishing Development from Use for Appropnation
Development is an important knowledge creation activity and, while linked to Use for
Appropriation, it is also distinct from it. Knowledge may well be created within the
Development activities of a firm that is subsequently not used for appropriation. This
may be because the knowledge proves unsuitable for appropriation within the firm and
is abandoned during the Development process, or alternatively because superior
appropriation opportunities arise over time making some developments uneconomic.
In essence once the firm has created new organisational knowledge, whatever the
source, development involves the firm being efficient at riding down its learning and
experience curves. There is a considerable body of literature on the value of learning
and experience curves (Arrow, 1962; Dorroh, Gulledge and Womer, 1994, Hatch and
Mowery, 1998; Henderson, 1974; Hirsch, 1952; Lieberman, 1984; Petrakis, Rasmusen
and Roy, 1997; Rapping, 1965; Wright, 1936, and Yelle, 1979). The essence of this
literature is that as a firm becomes more familiar with a given technology, process, or
administrative routine through usage it gains insights that enable it to become more
efficient and effective at the task. These insights may enable the firm to make
incremental improvements in technology or working practices. Such tasks lie at the
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heart of the process of Development, or knowledge deepening, and are related to, but
distinct from, either Exploration or Use for Appropriation.
Use for Appropriation
Use for appropriation is defined as activities that seek to leverage the firm's current
stock of organisational knowledge as effectively as possible in the marketplace either
by distribution of cost or informational advantages across the firm or deployment of
superior products and services in the marketplace. Either activity brings direct
financial rewards from the firm's current stock of organisational knowledge.
At the heart of appropriation is tangible action to deploy benefits derived from either
Exploration or Development across the firm or in the marketplace to obtain financial
returns. The goal of Use for Appropriation is to appropriate an economic return from
the firm's current stock of knowledge, as created through the processes of Exploration
and Development. New knowledge may incidentally emerge from Use for
Appropriation, however appropriation of an immediate financial return rather than
expansion of the firm's current stock of knowledge is the primary goal of this activity.
An example of Use for Appropriation is the launch of a new product in the
marketplace, or the introduction of a cross departmental and regional information
sharing database to disperse knowledge about cost saving processes and market
opportunities across the organisation.
The process of Appropnation is linked to Cohen and Levinthal's concept of inward
looking absorptive capacities. Inward absorptive capacities can be viewed as the firm's
ability to assimilate and conz,nerczallv exploit the firm's current stock of knowledge.
This process requires that relevant knowledge be communicated within departments of
the firm in addition to the assimilation of key organisational knowledge across
departments. It is not sufficient that the processes of Exploration create and assimilate
new knowledge and the process of Development incrementally deepens the firm's
stock of knowledge. If the goal of the firm to obtain economic rent is to be achieved
then it is important that this knowledge does not remain in isolated parts of the firm,
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rather that it is speedily distributed to all parts in which it can be profitably employed
and products be quickly and effectively deployed in the marketplace.
There is an immediate tension between the processes of Exploration and Use for
Appropriation, similar to that identified in the classic Exploration/Exploitation
dilemma. In essence there is a tension between the short-term need for positive cash
flows, which the Use for Appropriation process brings, and the more long-term search
for and creation of new knowledge that Exploration offers. This tension is partially due
to the conflict between outward and inward looking absorptive capacities. As Cohen
and Levinthal (1990) state "with regard to the absorptive capacity of the firm as a
whole, there may be a trade off in the efficiency of internal communication against the
ability of the sub-unit to assimilate and exploit information originating from other sub-
units or the environment. This can be seen as a trade-off between inward looking
versus outward-looking absorptive capacities. While both of these components are
necessary for effective organisational learning, excessive dominance by one or the
other will be dysfunctional."
The pay-off from inward looking absorptive capacities is likely to be known quickly.
There are tight feedback loops between the dissemination and assimilation of
knowledge from one part of the firm to another and the profitability thereof. If
carefully monitored the firm can establish in the short to medium term if the transfer of
administrative routines, or capabilities from one sub-unit to another has resulted in cost
savings, or the ability to deploy current products and services in new markets, resulting
in improved sales performance. The effects of outward looking absorptive capacities
are more long term. The search for new valuable knowledge is both time consuming
and its outputs uncertain. The assimilation of that knowledge into the firm takes more
time, and is likely to be more difficult to assimilate and apply than knowledge created
via the process of Development, due to its alien nature. Once assimilated only then can
the process of wide scale Use for Appropriation occur.
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Propositions: value added aiid knowledge Exploration/Exploitation.
The above discussion argues that Exploitation should be separated into two related, but
distinct, factors: Development and Use for Appropriation. Levinthal and March's
(1993) definition of Exploitation recognises these two factors, but the literature does
not appear to discuss the two factors in-depth or separately. The first proposition
offered is thus:
Proposition One: Exploitation is more fully characterised as two related, but distinct
processes: Development and Use for Appropriation. It is possible for both concepts to
be separately identified and measured in real organisational contexts. It is then
possible for each factor to be assigned a value by the market.
This proposition is explored in Chapters Three and Four. In Chapter three the activities
of Celitech are classified as Exploration, Development and/or Use for Appropriation.
Simple measures of each activity are created and applied to the Celitech case over a
period of a decade. In Chapter Four the impact of announcements of Exploration,
Development and/or appropriation events by UK therapeutic biotechnology firms upon
share pnce is analysed. It is found that the value assigned by shareholders to
announcements of events in these three categories is different.
For the second empirical exploration of proposition one to be possible then the market
must assign a value to both Exploration and Exploitation activities. As noted earlier,
prior literature has argued that there is a bias towards Exploitation activities due to
clearer and shorter financial feedback loops. It has been argued above that Exploration
plays an important role in the long term survival of the firm. Without an infusion of
new stocks of knowledge created by the process of Exploration the firm will in the
long term stagnate and be overcome by more innovative rivals. From this argument it
follows that both Exploration and Exploitation should be financially valuable. Thus the
second proposition offered is:
Proposition two: Both Exploration and Exploitation activities generate financial value
for the firm. Ills possible for this financial value added to be estimated from individual
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announcements of the outputs of Exploration, DevelOpment and Use for Appropriation
activities in an independent firm with relatively few projects.
This proposition is jointly explored with proposition one in Chapter Four. It is found
that it is possible to apply the event study methodology to this sector and conceptual
problem. Differences between the value of announcements of Exploration,
Development andlor Use for Appropriation events are observed in Chapter Four.
Given the increasing length and causal ambiguity of feedback loops, the temptation for
management will be to invest in descending order in Use for Appropriation,
Development and Exploration. Thus, without careful management, investment in the
process of Exploration declines over time, effectively ensuring the onset of Core
Rigidities, as outlined in the following section. The danger that such a policy poses is
noted by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), who state that "the cummulativeness of
absorptive capacity and its effect on expectation formation suggest that an extreme
case of path dependence in which once a firm ceases investing in its" (outward
looking "absorptive capacity in a quickly moving field, it may never assimilate and
exploit new information in that field, regardless of the value of that information."
It is important to note that for the firm to successfully manage its organisational
knov ledge it needs to recognise that globally these protagonist processes also feed into
each other. As was outlined above there is a clear interconnection between the
processes of Exploration and Development. For the process of Use for Appropriation
to operate there must be knowledge generated by the process of Development before it
can be distributed throughout the firm and integrated into products and services. Thus
it is that creation of new stocks of knowledge (Exploration) via outward looking
absorptive capacities and internal new knowledge creation activities combine with the
extension of current stocks of knowledge (Development) to be exploited through
inward looking absorptive capacities and the process of Use for Appropriation. Kogut
and Zander (1992) hint at the natural circular interaction between the processes of Use
for Appropriation, Development and Exploration when they state that "an important
limitation to the capability of developing new skills is the opportunity (or potential) in
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the organising principles and technologies for further Exploitation. Eventually there
are decreasing returns to a given technology or method of organising and there,
consequently, results an incentive to build new, but related skills." Essentially the firm
develops and appropriates a return from a technology to the extent that it cannot be
usefully developed anymore. In an effort to seek complementary routines or
capabilities to augment the technology the firm engages in a process of Exploration for
new ideas. This may trigger new leads that can be followed up through the process of
Development and incrementally improved into a new complementary set of skills or
technologies, which in turn can feed into the process of Use for Appropriation. Thus a
third proposition is offered:
Proposition Three: The value generated by a firm will be greater when the processes
of Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation are managed as an inter-
dependent set of activities than when managed as a portfolio of three separate
activities.
This proposition is briefly explored in Chapter three. It is argued that the renewal of
Celitech is partially attributable to the management's efforts to be innovative in
managing the linkages between Exploration, Development and use for Appropriation.
Whereas in the Celltech of the 1980s Exploration was separate from Development and
Use for Appropriation, in the l990s the management connected these activities through
a series of review systems. They also initiated a series of innovations that generated
signals about the potential value of drugs being created inside the firm's Exploration
processes. The principal signally mechanism employed was a series of alliances with
firms amongst the top twenty largest pharmaceutical firms in terms of turnover in the
world. Such signals facilitated valuation of Exploration activities by shareholders, thus
creating a visible financial feedback loop not only for Exploitation activities but also
Exploration.
An implication of proposition three is that, contrary to prior theoretical arguments,
balance between Exploration and Exploitation can be maintained in the medium to
long term. This is an extension of the argument that Exploration, Development and
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Use for Appropriation should be managed as an inter-dependent system. If
Exploration/Exploitation is managed as an inter-dependent system then it should be
possible for a balance to be maintained across the system. Thus a fourth proposition is
offered:
Proposition Four: Where balance between Exploration and Exploitation is maintained
over the long term then value added is greater than when the dilemma is managed by a
series ofperiods, where Exploration dominates in one and Exploitation in the other.
The literature argues that Exploitation tends to dominate over Exploration in the long
term, due to clearer feedback loops and greater short term financial gains (Levinthal
and March, 1993). Taking this assumption as fact implies that firms must periodically
engage in costly restructuring, where new ideas are infused into the firm by moving
from Exploitation back to Exploration or face extinction as of new technologies and
processes created by rivals emerge and transform the nature of competition.
Proposition four argues that if management could solve this dilemma and maintain
balance then the firm should be more competitive. It would not have to incur the costs
of period re-structuring that would accompany movements between domination of
Exploitation and Exploration. Instead the firm would be balanced, exploiting current
stocks of knowledge and managing the search for and assimilation of new stocks of
knowledge, the future of the firm, in an orderly manner.
NONAKA'S KNOWLEDGE SPIRAL AND EXPLORATION/EXPLOITATION
Some people have noted that Nonaka's knowledge creation spiral, which consists of
four processes of knowledge conversion, namely, socialisation (tacit to tacit
knowledge conversion), articulation (tacit to explicit), combination (explicit to
explicit) and internalisation (explicit to tacit) could be categorised into Exploration,
Development and application 29. However multiple elements of this spiral of knowledge
creation can occur within each of the three meta-processes of Exploration,
For a detailed discussion of Nonaka's spiral of knowledge creation the reader is referred to Nonaka,
1991, 1994 and Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995.
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Development, and Use for Appropriation. Articulation can be seen to be valuable in
Use for Appropriation as it speeds up transfer of knowledge suitable for appropriation
across the organisation quickly. However intertialisation could also play an important
role. Once the knowledge has been distributed throughout the organisation then
intemalisation may speed up use of the knowledge considerably as Nonaka notes that
tacit knowledge is applied at an intuitive level, and hence faster rate (Nonaka, 1991).
In the case of Development the processes of articulation, combination and
internalisation can all play a valuable role in exploiting the benefits of experience. In
the early stages of experience with a product or process, articulation may be very
important. Ensuring that all actors have a clear understanding of how the process or
product works by explicitly understanding its production or operation enables the firm
to deepen specialist knowledge. Conversion from tacit to explicit knowledge enables
the firm to move from a craftsman approach to management of a stock of knowledge to
a more production line approach, which facilitates riding down the experience curve.
Gaining an explicit understanding of a process as a whole enables. its division into
areas of specialism, the creation of a knowledge 'production line' thus driving the firm
down the experience curve. Combination of two forms of explicit knowledge may
enable incremental improvements to be made, thus driving the firm further down the
experience curve. As staff become more familiar with a product or process they begin
to internalise their knowledge of it, thus converting explicit process knowledge into
tacit. This process of internalisation may trigger fresh insights into how the product or
process can be made more efficient, thus propelling Development forward even further
and driving the firm down the experience curve.
One could take military aircraft development during World War II as an example of
these three processes in action. One can imagine that at the beginning of the war
production of aircraft was a near craft process. The technology of aircraft was
relatively new, and its application in warfare relatively limited. As the war intensified
craftsmen were drawn away from production and into the war itself. Women entered
the workforce, forcing a conversion of craftsmen's tacit knowledge into explicit
knowledge (articulation) such that non-specialists could operate production lines. As
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women on the line became more familiar with the aircraft production process they
internalised that knowledge enabling faster decent of the experience curve. Such
internalisation would have also brought with it insights into how aircraft could be
produced more efficiently. This knowledge could in turn be articulated to management
enabling alterations in production techniques, and hence greater efficiency gains. Thus
the spiral of knowledge creation combined with incremental decent of learning curves
enabling a female workforce that was initially unfamiliar with the process of military
aircraft production to, over time, achieve considerable improvements in both the
efficiency of production and the effectiveness of the product they produced
Combination of explicit knowledge from two sources can also spur Development. The
Celltech case is a good example of Development through combination. Ceiltech and
Bayer combined their patent portfolio in the area of antibodies that produce TNF
(Tumour Necrosis Factor). The combination of these two patents, which can be
classified as explicit knowledge, enabled the finns to create an "almost impregnable
position around TNF" in terms of legal protection (Dr Yarranton, Ceiltech case study).
This combination of patents provided important additional knowledge about anti-TNF
technology, which propelled the development of a new drug forward.
The process of Exploration can also be linked to Nonaka's spiral of knowledge
creation. The processes of articulation and combination are particularly relevant in
knowledge Exploration (Nonaka, 1994). Articulation of tacit knowledge from an
external source into explicit knowledge that can be used inside the firm would be a
good example of Exploration. Such articulation can be found in the Oxford Molecular
case study, which is in the appendices of this thesis. Yamanuchi, a large Japanese
pharmaceutical firm, entered into an alliance with Oxford Molecular for the purpose of
transferring knowledge about ION channels and their application to disease
management from university research centres, through Oxford Molecular, and into
Yamanuchi. Much of this knowledge was tacit in nature, held in the heads of
individual researchers within UK universities. The goal of Oxford Molecular was to
transfer this knowledge from these university researchers into explicit knowledge,
which could then be transferred to Yamanuchi. Thus tacit knowledge about the role of
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ION channels in a disease was acquired by Oxford Molecular and over time they
converted this knowledge into an explicit form, which was transferred to Yamanuchi.
Exploration, Development, and Use for Appropriation are meta-processes shaped
primarily by the goal of the knowledge creation activity: to create a new stock of
knowledge, incrementally expand a current stock of knowledge, or use for the purpose
of appropriation a current stock of knowledge. The form of knowledge conversion
under consideration, from tacit to explicit and visa versa shape shapes Nonaka's
knowledge creation spiral. Thus while Nonaka's work is of relevance in this chapter,
and is referred from time to time, it does not form the principal thrust of the arguments
developed in the remainder of this thesis.
ANTAGONISTIC PROCESSES
There are compelling reasons why balance is difficult to maintain. One of the principal
reasons for a firm moving out of balance is because each protagonist has an
antagonistic process that it is in conflict with and into which over time firms descend
in and out of. These antagonistic processes are Core Rigidities, Slow Rate of Learning,
and Imitation. Their roots are hinted at across many elements of the literature.
Core Rigidities
Core Rigidities are sets of knowledge, which although valuable now, are inappropriate
to future needs of the organisatlon. Core capabilities can, over time, turn in upon
themselves to become Core Rigidities. As Peteraf (1993) puts it: "current capabilities
may both impel and constrain future learning and investment activity." The process of
Exploration seeks to identify new knowledge upon which new capabilities and routines
can be developed to replace the capabilities that have in the past been a source of
success, but in the future may become an impediment. Core Rigidities are antagonuistic
to this process and seek to reinforce the use of current capabilities to the exclusion of
Exploration. Exploration seeks to widen the scope of a firms stock of knowledge, thus
increasing flexibility, while Core Rigidities are caused by sustained specialisation,
resulting in inflexibility.
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At the heart of the process of Core Rigidity is the dilution, and in extreme cases,
extinction of outward looking absorptive capacities and the internal creation of new
knowledge through recombination. The process of Core Rigidity results in a narrowing
of the breadth of potential and actual capabilities that the firm has at its disposal. This
is because the development of core capabilities tends to be path dependent (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990 & 1994; Collis, 1991; Mahoney, 1995). By concentrating ever more
on the maintenance and incremental extension of a narrow, specialised, range of
capabilities that are developed internally, the firm may under invest in outward looking
absorptive capacities, or re-focus internal research activities away from creation of new
technologies and processes. Increased specialisation also reduces the breath of
capabilities, which may be the source of new knowledge creation through
recombination. No matter how large and diverse the firm is, without stimuli from
external sources, it will eventually run out of ideas upon which to develop new
capabilities. In this scenario the firm would stagnate, losing the ability to generate new
capabilities to replace the old, due to a critical lack of understanding of the new
technologies, or administrative routines, upon which competition in the external
environment is now based. In this circumstance the firm becomes permanently
marooned and will, over time, either withdraw from the market in which its
capabilities are no longer relevant, or be forced from that market due to inefficiencies
in production andlor customer selection.
Slow Rate of Learning
The antagonist to Development is Slow Rate of Learning. Whereas Core Rigidities
impede the firm's ability to maintain outward looking absorptive capacities, Slow Rate
of Learning impedes a firm's ability to incrementally improve the firm's current stock
of knowledge. The pnncipal effect of a Slow Rate of Learning is to impede a firm's
descent down its learning and experience curves. The firm becomes relatively slower
at this task than its competitors.
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Hatch and Mowery (1998) note that the benefits of the learning curve do not occur
automatically as a result of increased production experience, but require deliberate
action to reduce costs and improve yields over time. Behind the learning curve effect is
a host of knowledge combination and re-configuration actions as represented in
Nonaka's knowledge creating spiral (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).
Nonaka (1991) notes that critical to the process of knowledge creation are articulation
(tacit to explicit knowledge conversion) and intemalisation (explicit to tacit). These
activities are also crucial to Development, as noted in the previous section of this
chapter. Over time a firm may become complacent and believe that its current systems
are as efficient and effective as they need be. Alternatively staff may become settled
and unwilling to exchange knowledge with those outside their immediate social circle.
These attitudes slow the spiral of knowledge creation as outlined by Nonaka.
Withdrawal from re-configuration of the current pool of organisational knowledge that
the spiral of knowledge creation embodies is referred to, in this chapter, as a Slow Rate
of Learning. It results in sub-optimal decent of learning curves and thus impedes the
process of Development, hence slowing the growth of a firm's stock of knowledge.
This slower pace of Development may be offset by superior outward looking
absorptive capacities, thus enabling the firm to compensate for slow internal
development and learning, with relatively faster learning from others. Slow Rate of
Learning could also be overcome with relatively faster inward absorptive capacities.
This would enable the firm to be relatively faster than nvals at appropriating a return
from its comparatively narrower stock of knowledge. However if rival firms are
considerably faster at the process of Development then overtime they should outpace
the firm in a learning race, accumulating a greater stock of organisational knowledge
from which to compete. In the long term survival of a firm is dependent on some
degree independent creation (part of Exploration) coupled with Development of
organisational knowledge. It is this that enables the firm to generate distinctive
competitive advantages from which to produce products and services for which the
external environment will financially reward it.
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mutation30
The antagonist to Use for Appropriation is Imitation. Every firm that grows
commercial knowledge about a specific issue faces imitation by its competitors.
Moreover, the greater the level of valuable knowledge, the greater the imitation risk.
Imitation, with adaptation, is the natural extension of the process of Exploration. Use
for Appropriation is in many ways a competition amongst the firm's inward looking
absorptive capacities and rivals' outward looking absorptive capacities. It is reasonable
to suggest that as a firm develops valuable organisational knowledge rival firms'
outward looking absorptive capacities will search that knowledge out, seeking to
identify, understand, improve and internalise it for their benefit. Such imitation by
competitors places pressure on the firm's inward absorptive capacities to become ever
quicker at the dissemination of knowledge generated in one sub-unit of the firm to
other relevant sub-units and its assimilation by those sub-units, thus enabling wider
appropriation of a return from that organisational knowledge. In extreme cases the
antagonistic process of Imitation by competitors may overload the firm's inward
looking absorptive capacities.
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), comment that unless key knowledge becomes explicit,
or codified, then it cannot be easily leveraged by the organisation as whole in the
creation of value added. Effective appropriation requires much of the technical and
organisational knowledge of the firm to be stored explicitly, or in detailed
organisational routines and procedures. Attaining these goals efficiently pressures the
organisation towards codification of its knowledge base.
The paradox of the process of Use for Appropriation is that to efficiently integrate
knowledge into the product and service offerings of the firm it will tend towards
codification. In so doing it increases the risk that its knowledge will leak out of the
firm and be captured by rivals' outward looking absorptive capacities. Thus efforts to
30lmitation does not imply just the copying another firm's knowledge bases, but involves taking some of
the best concepts of another firm's ideas and improving upon them (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Schnaars,
1994).
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improve the process of Use for Appropriation may simultaneously encourage imitation
by competitors.
Complementarity ofAntagonists
The challenge posed by the antagonistic processes is further complicated by the fact
that each antagonist may be complementary to the other. A core rigidity may develop
from sustained Development and be reinforced by a Slow Rate of Learning. When
faced with an agile competitor the temptation may be to dig deeper into the old ways
of doing business. This is the classic problem of doing what one does better, being
more efficient at delivering products and services employing current techniques, rather
than doing what one does differently, incorporating new techniques, and thus
becoming both more effective and efficient. In the face of reduced returns brought on
by Imitation one may sink further into a core rigidity response. This complementarity
across antagonistic processes means that if a firm descends into a cycle of two, or more
antagonistic processes then it may be very difficult to turn the system back to a
situation in which the protagonist processes dominate. This has important implications
for proposition three of this chapter. Given the interconnectivity of antagonistic
processes it is important that Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation be
managed at the higher management level as a unified whole, rather than as a set of
three separate portfolios. To manage them completely separately ignores that problems
that anse in one process are likely to have a negative impact upon the others.
The antagonism between the processes of Exploration, Development and Use for
Appropnation on the one hand, and Core Rigidities, Slow Rate of Learning and
Imitation on the other hand, is summarised in Figure One. Figure One outlines the
complementary and antagonistic nature of these relationships. Particularly important is
the opposite effect that protagonist and antagonist processes have upon absorptive
capacities and learning/experience curves. As can be seen, while absorptive capacities
have a positive effect upon Exploration and Use for Appropriation, Core Rigidities and
Imitation have negative effects upon absorptive capacities. Similarly while decent of
learning curves has a positive effect upon Development, Slow Rate of Learning has a
71
negative effect upon decent of learning curves. Thus the antagonistic processes have
the potential to impede, or overload, the protagonist processes by undermining
absorptive capacities and decent of learning or experience curves. The box surrounding
Development and Use for Appropriation recognises that these combined are what
Levinthal and March (1993) defined as Exploitation. It can be seen from Figure One
that Exploration has both a positive, or complementary, and negative, or antagonistic,
relationship with both aspects of Exploration, namely Development and Use for
Appropriation. Figure One also illustrates that the antagonistic processes of Core
Rigidities Slow Rate of Learning and Imitation all have positive or complementary
relationships with each other. This chapter will now turn to a discussion of what, over
time, can trigger movements between protagonist and antagonist processes.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
SOME PIVOTAL CHARACTERISTICS IN THE ANTAGONISTIC NATURE
OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
This section discusses how three characteristics of the firm, labelled Intellectual
Diversity, Social Interaction, and Codification of Knowledge, can be manipulated to
limit the negative impact of the three protagonist processes, namely Core Rigidities,
Slow Rate of Learning and Imitation. Such manipulation can facilitate the dominance
of Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation.
Movements Between the Processes of Exploration and Core Rigidity (Figure Two)
An important question is how are Core Rigidities promoted within the firm and how
can management stimulate a re-emergence of Exploration as the dominant process? It
is argued that changes in the levels and distribution of a characteristic of the firm,
labelled Intellectual Diversity can stimulate movement between these processes.
It is widely argued that the process of Exploration is more likely to occur in a firm that
contains individuals, or coalitions, who have several different perspectives. These
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could be diverse knowledge bases on how to conduct specific tasks (e.g. production of
a product) or differing perspectives on the strategic direction of the firm. This
diversity will highlight ways in which the knowledge embedded in the organisational
code is 'incorrect'. Diversity of perspectives and individual knowledge bases may
suggest novel combinations of the finn's current resources and capabilities, thus
avoiding stagnation (Herriott, Levinthal and March, 1985; Levinthal and March,
1981).
If such Intellectual Diversity is not present then neither the creation of new knowledge
through internal knowledge creation nor outward looking absorptive capacities could
occur. Diverse and curious minds propel the firm towards Exploration of new
technologies and organisational routines or processes which are complementary, or
even counter, to the ones that are promoted by the current organisational orthodoxy (as
expressed in the organisational code and culture). For the process of Exploration to be
successful it is not sufficient that diverse perspectives exist, those who hold different
ideas from the firm's current orthodoxy need to be encouraged to actively pursue them.
Diversity is injected into the firm by Mavericks, people who dare to think differently
to, or are slow to become indoctrinated by the perceived organisational orthodoxy, and
personnel turnover, which injects new ideas into the organisation via new personnel
and diminishes the power of other ideas via exit. Unlearning, often stimulated by
environmental shocks, also has a role to play. It promotes the casting off of old
perspectives of the competitive environment and enables the development of new ones.
On the other hand the process of core rigidity can come to dominate Exploration
where: there are perceived, andlor tangibly, high switching costs involved in changing
core capabilities (Kogut and Zander, 1992); inertia within the organisation, and the
high level of uncertainty (and hence cost) attached to investments in Exploration of
new knowledge (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991; Huff, Huff and Thomas,
1992). Each of these factors restrict the enactment of a firm's Intellectual Diversity,
and thus promote the dominance of Core Rigidities. Their existence encourages
members of the firm to continue to apply and expand their current knowledge base to
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the problems the firm faces, rather than developing alternative, more effective
knowledge bases.
These relationships are pictorially represented in Figure Two. The engine of change, or
movement between Exploration and Core Rigidities is Intellectual Diversity, as
characterised by the above factors. In Figure Two Intellectual Diversity is split into
dynamic and static elements. Mavericks, Personnel Turnover and Environmental
shocks are tied to Intellectual Diversity by a line and represent the dynamic elements.
Organisational inertia, Switching costs, and High Uncertainty of successful change, are
the static elements of Intellectual Diversity. It can be seen that dynamic changes in the
firm's Intellectual Diversity, that is the promotion and enactment of diverse
perspectives triggered by Mavericks, personnel turnover, and unlearning promotes
Exploration. Stagnation of Intellectual Diversity prompted by organisational inertia,
switching costs, and high uncertainty, means that fewer new ideas are encouraged and
enacted, even where there exists diverse perspectives within the firm, thus promoting
the dominance of Core Rigidities. The feedback loop between Exploration and Core
Rigidities indicates the negative, or antagonistic relationship that exists between each
process. This chapter will now look at Mavericks, personnel turnover and unlearning
in more depth.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Mavericks
Mavericks are slow to accept indoctrination into the "the company way", as
represented by the experiences embedded in the organisational code. Such people it is
argued, promote diversity of thought within the organisation. In so doing they will
increase the likelihood that alternative capabilities will begin to take root. These can be
accentuated and developed as elements of current organisational knowledge evolve
into a core rigidity.
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Mavericks complement individuals who learn the organisational code quickly, or 'fit'
into the organisation and do things 'the company way'. Quick learners integrate
current organisational knowledge into their jobs more efficiently than Mavericks, who
expend time questioning. 'Fast learners' may be less effective as catalysts to
organisational change than Mavericks. Change is more likely to occur if managers
notice a gap between the knowledge that the firm employs and that needed to
effectively deliver value to customers. Mavericks are good at this. Questions, which
highlight value adding dilemmas or incongruities, are more likely to come from the
questioning minds of Mavericks rather than 'company people'.
Encouraging Mavericks brings direct and obvious risks. Their protest against the
dominant orthodoxy may lead to serious conflicts, distracting effort from current
workflows. Too many Mavericks may lead to an over adaptive organisation, one in
which change becomes near continuous and progress down a single path rarely
proceeds long enough to appropriate an adequate return. The slow learning of
Mavericks may also impede speedier descent down current learning and experience
curves, which is critical to the process of Development.
Personnel Turnover
An alternative method of creating diversity is through injection of new ideas by hiring
new staff (Carley, 1992; Simon, 1991). Rapidly growing firms are constantly
recruiting. New recruits bnng with them new ideas and work practices, which can
stimulate the process of Exploration. Mature firms that want to become more adaptive,
have lower rates of growth and thus can often only increase diversity through
personnel exiting the organisation and being replaced by new staff. A personnel
turnover strategy requires a careful management of knowledge stocks, such that
valuable knowledge stored in departing personnel is substituted through the proces of
31 Downsizing, prevalent in mature organisations smce the 1980s, may provide an opportunity and a
barrier to turnover strategies. Exiting personnel offer the opportunity to mject new blood into the firm.
Equally, introduction of new personnel may encounter considerable resistance, bemg viewed as
inconsistent with the downsizing goals of cost reduction and improved efficiency.
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new personnel entering the organisation. Some of the disruptive effects can be avoided
if the knowledge is transferred and stored in retrievable fashion within the
organisation's routines or remaining personnel.
Use of turnover strategies also requires awareness of the possibility that the departing
staff during the 'hand over' period may indoctrinate new staff in knowledge, or
behaviours, which the firm's management would prefer extinguished (Javanovic and
Nyarko, 1995). As with Mavericks personnel turnover may impede speedier movement
down a firm's learning and experience curves, thus while promoting Exploration
Mavericks and Personnel Turnover may impede the process of knowledge
Development. This is caused by the requirement for new staff to learn how the current
administrative routines and capabilities of the firm operate and the lack of acceptance
of the current orthodoxy by Mavericks.
Unlearning
As noted above, it is widely recognised that organisational inertia inhibits change and
that every successful firm faces extreme difficulties in adjustment. As capability
development is path dependent, the removal of Core Rigidities takes time. Behaviours
can become deeply embedded and inhibit, rather than promote, actions that add value.
The defeat of Core Rigidities will require removal, or extinction of these behaviours.
Unlearning is defined by Hedberg (1981) "as a process through which learners discard
knowledge" which is "obsolete and misleading .... " Bettis and Prahalad (1995) and
Huber (1991) have noted that unlearning is critical to the broader issue of
organisational learning processes. New organisations are less disadvantaged than
established firms are because they have less to discard (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994)
The task of 'unlearning' can be viewed as a considerable organisational challenge,
because the effort and risks involved in switching from one capability to another can
be substantial. The interplay between bundles of resources and capabilities necessary
to create a new capability will, at the outset, be poorly understood since the creation of
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organisational knowledge is by definition a complex and uncertain process. Kogut and
Zander (1992) articulate this risk when they note that:
"Switching to new capabilities is difficult as neither the knowledge embedded
in the current relationships and principles is well understood, nor the social
fabric required to support the new learning known."
Movements between the Processes of Development and Slow Rate of Learning
(Figure Three)
An important question is how is a Slow Rate of Learning promoted within the firm and
how can management stimulate the re-emergence of Development as the dominant
process? It is argued in this section that changes in the levels and distribution of Social
Interaction can stimulate movement between these processes.
Many authors have noted that a firm's social system plays an important role in
determining the speed and path of learning (Brown and Duguid, 199 °!; Imai, Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1985; Kay, 1993; On, 1990; Simon, 1991). The key features of a firm's
social system that shall now be focused upon are the role of organisational slack,
common language and experimentation.
Changes in the levels of control of communication flows within firms can increase
shared understanding, through increases in organisational slack (Blacker, 1995; Cyert
and March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Nonaka, 1991). Language plays a central role in the
operation of social systems. For knowledge to be created there needs to be investment
in a shared language amongst the individuals involved (Blacker, 1995; Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; DeGeus, 1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Just as academics
develop precise codes to facilitate the transfer of ideas among themselves, so people in
organisations generally need to express their ideas in terms that others understand.
Given the central role of individuals in knowledge creation, without the transfer of
knowledge across individuals organisational knowledge would be unlikely to develop
to a commercial level, if at all.
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Sometimes small changes in Social interactions can result in considerable changes in
the efficiency and effectiveness of Development of an administrative routine or
capability. This is due to the often causally ambiguous interconnections between
bundles of resources, capabilities and human factors that lead to success (Badaracco,
1991; Hall, 1992; Itami and Roehl, 1987). Put simply, routines and capabilities can
evolve and be successfully deployed in a black box environment. Management may
have a reasonable understanding of the inputs dedicated to the routine or capability and
the broad outputs it produces but it remains largely unable to decipher the causal
relationships between the inputs which determine the successful delivery of the
outputs.
The existence of casual ambiguity can, as will be argued later, play a vital role in the
process of Appropriation. Casual ambiguity, however, challenges the ability of
management to control the process of Development. Changes in the distribution of
organisational slack, the nature of the firm's language, and interactions between
functions may unexpectedly impact upon casually ambiguous processes in both a
negative and positive manner. The feedback loops between the impact of changes in
Social interactions and outputs may be casually ambiguous and thus difficult to assess.
This may encourage management to adopt a policy of 'don't fix what's not broken' or
excessive caution in changing social systems for fear of long term, and difficult to
predict, impacts on the efficiency of the firm. Either policy is likely to slow the rate of
learning within the firm.
These relationships are pictorially represented in Figure Three. The engine of change,
or movement between Development and Slow Rate of Learning is Social Interaction,
as characterised by the above factors. It can be seen that dynamic changes in the firm's
Social Interaction, that is the promotion and enactment of dynamic slack, an open
common language, and experimentation promotes Development. Stagnation of Social
Interaction prompted by static organisational slack, casual ambiguity and closed,
multiple sets, of common language within the firm, promotes the dominance of a Slow
Rate of Learning. The feedback loop between Development and Slow Rate of Learning
indicates the negative, or antagonistic relationship that exjsts between each process.
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This chapter will now discuss slack, common language and experimentation in more
depth.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Slack
Slack can be defined as "the pool of resources in an organisation that is in excess of the
minimum necessary to produce a given level of organisational output" (Nohria and
Gulati, 1996). Two important subsets of this concept are absorbed and unabsorbed
slack. "Unabsorbed slack corresponds to excess, uncommitted liquid resources
absorbed slack ... corresponds to excess costs in the organisation" (Singh, 1986).
Absorbed slack can take many forms from excess capital equipment to information
overlaps.
Slack is viewed within the literature as both positive and negative. Economic
interpretations often view it as an inefficiency. Ghemawat (1991) notes thai slack
needs to be managed carefully as it can be subject to misappropriation, especially by
employees. Empincal studies by Jensen (1986, 1993) argue that firms with large
amounts of slack often invest in R&D projects with negative pay back. He draws his
evidence from firms in the oil, automobile, photographic and computer technology
industnes.
Another group of researchers argue that slack is not merely an orgarlisation
inefficiency, or an agency conflict, rather that it plays a positive economic role through
increased rates of learning, thus promoting the process of Development. Various
arguments are proposed within this literature. More slack permits a higher degree of
interaction between people, involving higher levels of communication, greater
flexibility and experimentation (Huber, 1991; Inkpen, 1995; Kogut and Zander, 1992;
Mc Gill and Slocum, 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Creating overlaps of
information and knowledge between organisational actors is another learning stimulant
(Cyert and March, 1963; Nonaka, 1991). Slack is also necessary for job rotation,
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another way of creating knowledge and a complementary strategy to personnel
turnover (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).
There exists an important additional distinction to the concept of slack, namely, static
and dynamic slack. Static slack occurs when the excess resources that exist within
parts of the firm have become fossilised. At one time that slack may have existed to
stimulate the process of Development, however it has served that purpose and is now
been appropriated for means that fall outside the economic goals of the firm. This in
essence can be the classic agency problem outlined by Jensen (1986, 1993). Dynamic
slack involves the management of organisational slack in such a manner that
relationships in the firm are monitored in terms of which ones currently need slack to
stimulate knowledge sharing and experimentation. Slack is reallocated from areas
where fostering such relationships is a lower priority, or where that slack is becoming
static, and towards areas of the firm where slack can be allocated to stimulate more
efficient Development.
The dynamic management of slack requires careful identification, monitoring and
control of absorbed and unabsorbed slack. This can partially offset the dangers of
misappropriation by agents, as proposed by Jensen. Such dynamic management of
slack is of course quickest in the case of unabsorbed slack. Liquid resources can be
used to buy equipment or time necessary for experimentation. Absorbed slack may be
slower to move around the organisation. Teams that have had information overlaps or
spare time to stimulate knowledge shanng can gradually have their work loads
increased by transfer of tasks from a team which has been working at a higher
operational efficiency, where it is believed that that team now needs time to stimulate
knowledge sharing or expenmentation. In each case the movement in slack from one
area of the firm to the other needs to be directed, monitored and controlled.
Static and dynamic management of slack does not only mediate the relationship
between slack and Development, but also by the volume of slack within the system.
The theoretic proposition that there is an inverse U relationship between slack and
innovation has existed for some time (Bourgeois, 1981). Recent empirical research has
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supported this proposition in terms of unabsorbed slack. Nohria and Gulati (1996)
have explained this empirical result by noting that "too little slack is immical to
innovation because it discourages any kind of experimentation whose success is
uncertain. Equally, too much slack is inimical to innovation because it breeds
complacency and a lack of discipline that make it possible that more bad projects will
be pursued than good." The optimal rate of unabsorbed slack which they found
equated to about 5% of a business unit's annual budget (Nohria and Gulati, 1997). The
optimal rate of unabsorbed slack has not been empirically assessed.
Thus it can be said that slack is a complex concept. Slack needs careful management if
it is to promote the process of Development. Dynamic management of slack, coupled
with an optimal amount, promotes Development while static slack, or too little slack,
promotes a Slow Rate of Learning.
Common Codes and Shared Language
In Nonaka's view the development routines and capabilities within firms involves the
aforementioned spiral of knowledge creation, where a series of conversions of tacit
knowledge into explicit knowledge, explicit knowledge into tacit, and from one form
of explicit or tacit knowledge to another are facilitated (Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka, 1994;
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). For Nonaka the driving forces for these transfers
between forms of knowledge are attempts to create new knowledge and to improve the
efficiency of integration of existing knowledge into the firm. Nonaka sees movements
to or from tacit knowledge as involving a high degree of Social Interaction. As
previously argued, this knowledge spiral is critical to the process of Development. The
efficiency of the creation of new knowledge through Nonaka's knowledge spiral is
greatly effected by the extent of shared common language. It is essential that all
relevant actors in the spiral share sufficient common language, such that they are able
to interact with each other and thus generate new shared tacit knowledge, or convert
such knowledge into an explicit form.
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Within functional disciplines, geographic regions, and levels of the organisational
hierarchy idiosyncratic language can develop over time. Finance departments can have
one terminology when referring to the revenue performance of various products, while
the marketing department can have a different terminology when discussing the same
theme. Such language differences occur in the natural course of events. Common
technical language can speed knowledge creation and transfer within disciplines, or
managerial levels, however it may impede knowledge creation across functional
boundaries. Such knowledge creation is central to the process of Development and,
thus, requires the promotion of some common language across the firm as a whole.
The creation of a shared language is risky. The first risk is that it makes it much more
difficult for Mavericks to operate. Shared language is a typical feature of a strong
culture, which is one that resists outsiders and non-conformists. Mavericks and new
corners are effectively excluded from organisation debates, or if included find
difficulty in communicating their ideas to established members of the firm. The second
problem which shared language can create is that of imitation. Paradoxically, whilst
shared language may discourage outsiders who want to change the course of the firm,
the existence of a shared language which is understood by exiting personnel will
increase the firm's transparency. Thus, a strategy that is designed to promote
Development and Development of current knowledge stocks may impede the process
of Appropriation..
Experimentation
Authors from the literature on organisational learning and change have long argued
that individuals and firms develop and extend organisational capabilities and routines
through a process of experimentation (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994; Huber, 1991;
March, Sproull and Tamuz, 1991). Experimentation provides the firm with the
opportunity to try out new ideas. The feedback provided by these experiments enables
the organisation to learn via experience, thus enabling Development. Without some
organisational slack the firm is so focused on production of outputs that actors have no
time experiment and hence learn from experience.
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Equally without a common language groups of people cannot co-ordinate their
activities such that they can collectively participate in and learn from experiments.
This problem is accentuated in a firm where many different idiosyncratic languages
develop. In this scenario, experimentation within groups who share that common
language may occur, however experimentation across groups is difficult. This impedes
both Development of routines and capabilities through cross functional teams, an area
which many authors argue is a key source of innovation (see Kessler and Chakrabarti,
1996 for a review of literature), and also the process of Appropriation, which by
definition requires knowledge transfer across functional boundaries.
Movements Between the Processes of Use for Appropriation and Imitation (Figure
Four)
There are three key forms of knowledge that flow across firm boundaries, namely,
explicit knowledge (e.g. product designs), knowledge embodied in products, and
knowledge embedded in the organisational routines and processes of the firm (Blacker,
1995; Geroski, 1991; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Inkpen, 1995; Teece, 1977).
Migration of explicit knowledge and embodied (product) knowledge is much more
rapid than embedded knowledge (Badaracco, 1991). It is not possible for the firm to
halt the leakage of valuable knowledge to competitors (Geroski, 1991; Mansfield,
1985; Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981; Ziss, 1994). An important question is
how the process of Imitation by competitors is strengthened by factors internal to the
firm? It is argued that changes in the levels and distribution of Codified knowledge
can stimulate both Appropriation and Imitation.
It is widely argued that the degree of codification of knowledge can affect the cost and
ease with which it can be distributed within the firm (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995;
Teece, 1998). Teece (1998) notes that "the more a given item of knowledge or
experience has been codified, the more economically it can be transferred
Uncodified, or tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is slow and costly to transmit.
Ambiguities abound and can be overcome only when communications take place in
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face-to-face situations. Errors can be corrected by a prompt use of personal feedback."
Personal feedback is costly and could act as an effective limit on the wide scale
distribution of shared meanings through tacit knowledge, thus impeding maximal Use
for Appropriation across the firm.
Appropriation is increasingly promoted by inter-firm alliances. Alliances can aid
appropriation across a number of dimensions. First is market access and penetration
(Doz and Hamel, 1998). For example in the pharmaceutical market, alliances by small
firms with global firms' enables quicker and deeper market penetration. A drug is a
very knowledge intensive product. It can be the result of ten or more years of R&D
(PhARMA, 1999). To maximise returns from that knowledge it is important to gain
market penetration quickly and on a global scale. Global partners have distribution
networks that are very costly to create. Young firms, with a limited number of drugs
(often one) seek to tap into this network and share revenues with the global partner.
The small firm thus appropriates a considerably larger return from its knowledge, prior
to its patents running out, than if it used its limited resources to establish an
independent distribution and marketing system (Ernst and Young, 1998).
Second, alliances can aid appropnation by accessing knowledge which is critical to the
success of a product, but which the firm does not wish to develop internally (Grant and
Baden-Fuller, 1995). Third, alliances can be used as a mechanism through which the
firm allows other firms access to knowledge which it possesses but which are surplus
to its requirements, in return for a fee, or knowledge exchange (Grant and Baden-
Fuller, 1995). Such access could include both unabsorbed slack, such as expert advice,
and absorbed slack, such as spare capacity on IT databases or R&D capabilities.
Fourth, alliances can enable appropriation of a return via technology transfer. The firm
transfers technology from itself to another in return for financial gain, and possibly to
also control the flow of knowledge leakage from the firm into the environment
(Badaracco, 1991; Teece, 1977).
In each type of alliance if, where practicable, knowledge is transferred into explicit
form then the transfer costs should be lower (Teece - 1998). If the knowledge
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transferred is explicit then it should also be easier for the transferring firm to legally
protect that knowledge and to monitor and control the flow of knowledge across
organisational boundaries. Where the knowledge transfer is tacit then the partners will
need to interact directly and transfer will occur through the process of socialisation
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). This may limit the viability of the alliance, due to
geographic distance, scale of the knowledge transfer, or monitoring and control issues.
Overcoming these problems may require the knowledge to be codified into routines.
Routines can be viewed as less efficient in terms of knowledge transfer than explicit
knowledge, but more efficient than tacit knowledge.
The dynamic management of codification and alliances can promote appropriation,
however static management promotes imitation. Static management can be viewed as
an over reliance on mechanisms to control the flow of knowledge out of the firm.
These mechanisms include Intellectual Property Rights, secrecy, and casual ambiguity.
Codified knowledge is subject to imitation due to its ease of transfer, however,
Mansfield (1985) found that even knowledge embedded in routines can leak out of the
firm quickly. His study showed between six and eighteen months after a firm
developed knowledge about new products or processes, understanding of that
knowledge had leaked to competitors. This data tends to indicate that relying solely on
gaining superior value added relative to competitors via once-off efforts to obtain
greater knowledge about a product, or process, may lead to a quite short term
advantage. Thus reliance on Codification as a key promoter in the process of
Appropriation requires that there is a flow of new knowledge being provided by the
processes of Exploration and Development.
Firms cannot necessanly rely on intellectual property rights for protection. For
example, writing down knowledge in a detailed patent offers legal protection. On the
other hand, given the explicit nature of a written legal procedure, patents provide other
firms with a considerable insight into the nature of a product or process. They can
work their way around this legal protection and imitate the product or procedure
(Mansfield et al., 1981).
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Avoiding intellectual property right issues by commercial secrets poses difficulties too.
The problem with a commercial secret is a basic one. If a secret is shared with some
one else then it's unlikely to remain a secret for long (Von Hippel, 1988). To gain
maximum value, the knowledge must be leveraged across the organisation, yet this
risks revealing the secret. Complex Social interactions are not limited to the
boundaries of the firm. Employees have social outlets other than the firm through
which knowledge may flow, including professional circles and private social networks.
Modem communication technologies, and managerial systems which encourage closer
interaction with actors outside the boundaries of the firm, such as just in time supply
chains and inter-organisational collaborative initiatives may accelerate such
interactions and, thus, diffuse key bundles of knowledge beyond firm boundaries.
The protection mechanism of casual ambiguity is a third possibility. If the actions and
relationships that lead to successful completion of a set of tasks are casually
ambiguous then it will be difficult for competitors to successfully imitate the capability
(Peteraf, 1993), but causal ambiguity also brings risks. Collis (1994) points out that the
existence of casual ambiguity in the operation of a core capability may make it
difficult for firms to detect that some minor changes between resources and
capabilities are destroying the core capability itself. As the complexity of a capability
increases, then the likelihood of such destruction will also increase over time. Over the
long term in an environment of high causal ambiguity changes to the firm's system is
likely to engage in as much capability destruction as creation. The dilemma facing the
organisation is to balance attempts at reducing imitation by increasing causal
ambiguity with the nsks of increased imitation from competitors spurred on by
codification of capabilities inside the firm.
In Figure Four the engine of change, or movement between Imitation and
Appropnation is Codification. It can be seen that dynamic changes in the Codification
of the firm's knowledge, promotes Appropriation. Stagnation of Codification, as
represented by an over reliance on the mechanisms of Intellectual Property Rights,
commercial secrecy, and casual ambiguity, may encourage leakage of knowledge from
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the firm to competitors and thus imitation. The feedback ioop between Appropriation
and Imitation indicates the negative, or antagonistic relationship that exists between
each process. The negative relationship between Codification and Appropriation
indicates a paradoxical relationship where Codification may simultaneously seek to
make the process of Appropriation more efficient, but also promote its antagonist,
Imitation.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
C'ompleinentarity and Antagonisni between Characteristics
In general one can view the characteristics of Intellectual Diversity and Social
Interaction as complementary. Unlearning, Mavericks and personnel turnover can all
be fostered in an environment where there is a managed level of dynamic slack. With
slack Mavericks can be free, within boundaries, to explore their alternative views of
the firm and what its function is. Slack can also enable unlearning to occur, giving
people time to develop new ways to work, without being forced to rely too heavily on
the crutch of old ways that excessive pressure to deliver results in a short time period
can bring. Slack may also aid in personnel turnover, enabling current staff to rotate
jobs and new staff to be added. Common language may liberate people, enabling them
to talk across disciplines. Unfortunately, common language may also foster an
antagonism between these two characteristics. This is because it may be a cultural
barrier to new personnel entering the firm. Much like an emigrant entering a country
the language of which he has learned in school but never spoken amongst natives. The
natives may embrace him, teaching him their colloquialisms, rejoicing in his new
perspective and accent, on the other hand they may not.
There exists an antagonism between Intellectual Diversity and Social Interaction on the
one hand and Codification on the other. Codification seeks to enable knowledge to
flow across the organisation more quickly and uniformly, however this occurs at some
compromise to the ideal of diversity. Codes require some degree of co-ordination and
conformity, while diversity requires some degree of tolerance of non-conformity.
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Should either mechanism meet the extreme of the other, then considerable conflict will
arise. This complementary and antagonistic relationship between characteristics again
has important implications for proposition three.
CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this chapter has been to review the literature on the
Exploration and Exploitation dilemma and to highlight linkages across Exploration,
Development and Use for Appropriation. These linkages have important implications
for how knowledge Exploration and Exploitation should be managed inside firms. This
chapter has pointed out that the goals of Exploration, Development and Use for
Appropriation can be both complementary and also conflict with each other. Each of
these processes has an antagonist. These antagonistic processes, Core Rigidities, Slow
l.ate of Learning and Imitation are also complementary. Finally the characteristics of
the firm through which Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation can be
promoted, and their antagonistic processes suppressed, can be both complementary and
in conflict with each other. Should management ignore the complementary and
antagonistic relationship between each of these three groups of the system
(protagonists, antagonists, and characteristics) and chose to manage Exploration,
Development and Use for Appropriation as independent portfolios then the impact of
difficulties in one area upon another may not be recognised. Actions to remedy
problems in one area may compound problems in another. Equally inaction in one are,
for example in Exploration, may have a knock on negative effect upon Development
and Use for Appropriation. Delay in recognition of such inter-relationships could be
potentially costly with, for example, the onset of a core rigidity reinforcing slow
learning and thus impeding progress not only in Exploration but also in Development.
In reaching the above conclusion, this chapter has explored the
Exploration/Exploitation dilemma in some depth, drawing upon a diverse range of
literature to offer a perspective on why Exploration and Exploitation can be in conflict
with each other. The processes of Exploration, Development and Use for
Appropriation have also been individually discussed. An attempt has been made,
drawing from the literature, to explain how each process. can be promoted, or
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suppressed, within the firm. These relationships are summarised in Figure Five. This
figure illustrates the commonly stated dyadic relationship of Levinthal and March
(1993) viewing the problem as balancing the tension between Exploration and
Exploitation. As argued through out this chapter Exploitation is sub-divided into two
categories, namely Development and Use for Appropriation. Thus the
Exploration/Exploitation dilemma is now classified as a conflict, and co-operation,
between search for and assimilation of new stocks of organisational knowledge, or
Exploration, the expansion of current stocks of organisational knowledge, or
Development, and the Appropriation of a return from stocks of knowledge
accumulated through the processes of Exploration and Development. In Figure Five
these processes are viewed as the protagonists in the management of organisational
knowledge.
These three of protagonist processes are in an antagonistic relationship with Core
Rigidities, Slow Rate of Learning, and Imitation. These antagonists impede outward
looking absorptive capacities, descent of learning and experience curves, and inward
looking absorptive capacities, which are critical to the operation of the protagonist
processes. The antagonism between these processes and the protagonists is mediated
by three characteristics of the firm, as outlined in section three. In Figure Five each
protagonist process is exploded vertically to illustrate the intermediary role of
Intellectual Diversity, Social Interaction and Codification between protagonists and
antagonists. Stimulation and management of Intellectual Diversity positively affects
Exploration, while its protagonist Core Rigidities, negatively effects Intellectual
Diversity, thus conflicting with the process of Exploration. Stimulation and
management of Social Interaction positively affects Development, while Slow Rate of
Learning impedes decent of learning curves by suppressing the knowledge creation
spiral of knowledge conversion as stimulated by Social Interaction. It can also be seen
that Intellectual Diversity and Social Interaction are complementary, while
Codification has a negative effect upon Social Interaction.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
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From Figure One, and the previous discussion, it can be seen that the antagonism
between Exploration, Development and Appropriation on the one hand, and Core
Rigidities, Slow Rate of Learning and Imitation on the other, is complicated by the
complementary nature of the antagonists, meaning that descent into one may well
promote the emergence of another. Equally the complementarity and antagonism
between the characteristics which trigger movement between protagonist and
antagonist processes means that efforts to promote the dominance of one protagonist
may trigger the decline of another. Finally, the short-term antagonism between, and the
long-term complementarity of, the protagonists further complicates the management of
organisational knowledge.
The principal contribution of this chapter has been to review the literature and frame
diverse strands into an overall perspective as outlined in Figure Five. Both the vertical
and horizontal interactions in Figure Five has been exposed and discussed at length.
This synthesis of prior work characterises the management of organisational
knowledge as an intensely antagonistic process. It is argued that not only are
Exploration and Exploitation in conflict with each other, but that it is even difficult for
organisations to sustain progress on either Exploration or Exploitation, as each has an
antagonistic process which impedes it over time. This complexity challenges
managers' ability to create and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage from the
kno ledge base of the firm, and yet this is one of the key propositions of the
Knowledge Based View of the Firm.
The remaining chapters of this thesis seek to explore a number of questions that arise
from this revie. In Chapter Three, an in-depth case study is analysed to explore
whether Exploration and Exploitation can be measured in a real organisational context.
An analysis of the Celltech case casts light on proposition one of this chapter. It can be
seen from this analysis that Exploitation can be sub-divided into Development and Use
for Appropriation. All three concepts can be separately identified inside Celitech and
measures of each are observed. The Celitech case also casts light on proposition four.
It is found that balance between Exploration and Exploitation did not always exist
inside this firm, but that for a period of half a decade balance was maintained. Chapter
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Chapter Three:
Balancing Knowledge Exploration and Exploitation in a Real
Organisation Over Time:
Lessons from the Ceiltech Case
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the Exploration/Exploitation dilemma and the maintenance of
balance was explored. This chapter studies the management of Exploration and
Exploitation (Development and Use for Appropriation) inside the oldest biotechnology
firm in the UK, Celltech. The Celltech case study is provided in full in the appendices
of this thesis. In this chapter it will be shown how Celltech moved from a situation in
which Exploitation had come to dominate over Exploration, in a maimer much as
predicted by Levinthal and March (1993). The greater short-term financial rewards of
investments in Exploitation activities came to drive out investment in Exploration. The
analysis of this case shows how Celltech moved away from a dominance of
Exploitation activities, reinvested in Exploration, and installed administrative systems
to aid maintenance of a balance between Exploration and Exploitation activities. The
analysis of Celltech both demonstrates that within a real organisation the balance of
Exploration and Exploitation is a real issue for firms seeking to manage their stocks of
organisational knowledge and also offers insights into how movement between
Exploitation and Exploration can be managed and balance maintained over time.
The Celitech case occurs in the context of organisational renewal, having experienced
a decline in the late 1980s followed by turnaround and renewal in the 1990s. The
management of investments in Exploration and Exploitation (Development and Use
for Appropriation) were an important feature of this story of decline and rejuvenation.
The theoretical issues raised in the previous chapter provide an important frame of
reference in the analysis of the Celitech case, however a short additional theoretical
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review needs to be added at this stage, namely,, the role of Exploration and
Exploitation in the context of organisational renewal. To this end this chapter begins
with a short theoretical section on renewal and the Exploration/Exploitation dilemma.
In the second section of this chapter the methodology employed to create the Celitech
case is briefly outlined. In the third section an overview of the Celltech case is
provided. This provides important information on Ceiltech's organisational context. In
the third section Celltech's renewal is explained by applying the lens of
Exploration/Exploitation. The fourth section details the organisational tools that
Celitech employed to move from an imbalance favouring Exploitation to renewal
through Exploration, eliminating Core Rigidities, and the installation of systems to
maintain a balance between Exploration and Exploitation. The fifth section offers
some lessons from the Celltech case. The final section links the analysis of Celitech
back to the theoretical chapter. It is observed that that the Celltech case exhibited much
of the factors promoting the dominance of Core Rigidities and Slow Rate of Learning
outlined in figures two and three of the previous chapter, while the changes instigated
between 1990 and 1998 involved pulling many of the levers outlined in those figures
that promote the dominance of Exploration and Development (Exploitation).
THEORY
As outlined in Chapter Two, it is widely argued in the literature that a central
component of success is the maintenance of a balance of Exploration and Exploitation
(development and Use for Appropriation) within the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal and March, 1993; Hendry, 1996). In common with others,
March (1991) observed that the maintenance of a balance between Exploration and
Exploitation is 'a primary factor in system survival and prosperity." Ceiltech's story,
elaborated below, runs counter to the oft stated theoretic proposition in the literature
that Exploitation tends to dominate over Exploration. This logic is summed up by
Levinthal and March (1993):
"Exploitation generates clearer, earlier and closer feedback than Exploration.
It corrects itself sooner and yields more positive returns in the near term. As
a result, the primary challenge to sustaining an optimal mix of Exploration
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and Exploitation is the tendency of rapid learners and successful
organisations to reduce the resources allocated to Exploration."
In mature organisations Exploitation tends to drive out Exploration, making renewal
based on Exploration very difficult. Renewal based on the creation and application of
new core capabilities is very difficult (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Peteraf, 1993). The key
problem is that the development of core capabilities tends to be path-dependent (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1989; 1990; 1994; Collis, 1991; Mahoney, 1995). The initial success of
a core capability leads to its growth over time. Success based on the Exploitation of
that core capability reinforces the behaviours upon which it is based. Over time these
behaviours become deeply embedded in the organisation. This process of development
(or deepening) of a core capability enables the firm to refine its organisational routines
and procedures in knowledge integration to such a point that it knows more than any
other firm about how to deliver, efficiently and effectively, value added to a particular
market. But as market needs change over time, other knowledge bases may emerge to
deliver superior value added. This shift may 'maroon' established 'mature' firms,
leaving them with core capabilities that are no longer appropriate (Herriott, Levinthal
and March, 1985; Miller, 1993). The resulting rigidities are due to the high switching
costs involved in changing core capabilities (Kogut and Zander, 1992); inertia within
the organisation (Huff, Huff and Thomas, 1992); and the high level of uncertainty (and
hence cost) attached to investments in the Exploration of new knowledge (Levinthal
and March, 1993; March, 1991).
As the firm hits a performance crisis the natural predisposition of employees is to get
out of trouble by focusing on doing what they currently do more efficiently. They rely
on the core competencies of the past to deliver success once more. Efficiency drives
enable the firm to avoid confronting the very difficult realisation that its past core
competencies are now Core Rigidities and must be replaced, rather than overhauTed. It
is very difficult for organisational members to abandon past successful behaviours and
explore new knowledge upon which to create new core competencies that better meet
the needs of the market.
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There is, of course, a literature on corporate restructuring and renewal. The
restructuring strand is typically understood as refocusing through downsizing of a
business unit or the shedding of unprofitable units from a multi-unit firm (Hoskisson
and Hitt, 1994; Markides, 1995; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Ceiltech had only two
divisions, reducing the relevance of these proscriptions. Moreover, its renewal was
based on revitalising the smaller, unprofitable research division not the profitable
contract division. The literature on business renewal is more relevant, for it 'argues that
in exceptional circumstances defunct firms or businesses can rejuvenate. (Baden-Fuller
and Stopford, 2994; Gilayer, Mayes and Mc Kieman, 1988; Pettigrew and Whipp,
1991). Until now, much of the evidence has come from the so-called mature sectors,
and the relevance to high technology sectors has yet to be established. For high
technology firms, such as those in biotechnology, there are serious technical issues to
be confronted. Given the hyper-competitive nature of the environment (D'Aveni,
1994), the paradigmatic shifts in technology (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996)
and the need for fast strategic moves (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), a serious question
arises as to whether any renewal is possible and, if it is possible, whether the models of
renewal in maturity are relevant.
The story of Celltech is unusual on two levels. First, it is an example of a mature high
technology firm successfully engaging in renewal. Second, this renewal was focused
around a strategy that enabled the firm to escape the gravity of Exploitation and move
towards a model of financially successful Exploration. Its renewal is particularly
unusual in that shareholder value rose after renewal from near bankruptcy and illiquid
stock in 1990 to a publicly traded firm with a market capitalisation of $ 502 million by
1999 (Mc Namara, 1999) and £ 1,081 million by January 2000. This rise in
shareholder value occurred in spite of the fact that prior to the change in 1990 the firm
had been marginally profitable, and from 1990 to 1998 it has posted cumulative net
losses of £75.9 million.
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METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION
Sources of Data, Validity and Reliability
The validity of the case study was maintained through rigorous data collection. The
first source of data was five interviews with senior executives inside the case company,
and the analysis of extensive relevant company documents on investment, revenues,
new product development, clinical trials, and alliances. The second was a search of
public domain data on all independent drug biotechnology firms listed on the London
Stock Exchange, which included Ceiltech. The third source of data was a series of case
studies, interviews with executives from other biotechnology companies and
interviews with executives from the London Stock Exchange, which helped to check
the interpretation of both the sector and the firm. In common with other case study
research, a central output of the data collection and analysis process was the writing up
of a detailed case study (Eisenhardt, 1989). The written up Celltech case study is
provided in full in the appendices. Another two supporting case studies, PoIyMASC
and Oxford Molecular are also provided in full in the appendices. To ensure that the
researcher's understanding of the industrial context was valid a companion document
on the biotechnology sector was written. This paper provided a statement of what the
biotechnology sector is and the nature of competition within it. This paper was first
reviewed by the Professor of Chemical Engineering to ensure accuracy, and was
modified to incorporate his expert comments. The note on the UK biotechnology
sector was then submitted to the Ceiltech management for review and was approved by
them as a valid overview of the sector. This document was some 25 pages in length in
single line spacing and given its background nature is not included in the appendices.
Triangulation of data sources helped to ensure validity (Jick, 1979; Kirk and Miller,
1986). For all three cases respondent validation was employed, where executives from
the organisation commented on drafts of the case (Silverman, 1993; Whyte, 1984).
Through a process of iterative rewrites, the final cases sought to incorporate a shared
understanding by both the researcher and the executives of the firm's story.
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Engineering present, who has experience of technical research in the field. His
knowledge of the science was essential in understanding the nuances of the business
and relating these to the managerial processes explored in this article.
Five managers were interviewed from differing levels in the organisation. These were
the Chief Executive of the group, the Director of Finance, the Chief Executive of the
Therapeutics division, the Director of Research, and the Director of Development.
Both the Directors of Development and Research were involved in a hands-on way
with actual projects, having been Ceiltech project leaders in the 1980s and early 1990s.
All except the Finance Director have PhDs in science and have previously worked for
many years in the pharmaceutical sector. These five executives were pivotal in the
reorientation of Celltech's strategy in the 1990s. The group Chief Executive was
interviewed first, following a broad interview schedule. This interview fleshed out the
overall picture and a new set of interview questions was developed for the remaining
four interviews. During early interviews issues arose which were unexpected, to which
follow up questions were applied both within and across interviews. By the end of the
five interviews, the interviewers felt that they had obtained an understanding of the
firm. The last interview did not reveal any significant new information, rather it
provided triangulation of existing data.
The focus of interviews was initially upon one successful innovative drug R&D
project. This project, known as CDP 571, which had been identified as critical to the
success of Celltech by the Professor of Chemical Engineering, and was confirmed as
such by each of the interviewees. From this core focus executives detailed not only
their experience of managing this critical project, but in turn the wider management of
Celltech as a firm that encompasses a diverse range of drug discovery and
development projects. A drug R&D programme such as CDP-571, which sought to
develop a cure for Septic Shock, involves two broad types of task. The first is drug
discovery, where compounds are identified, or generated, and shown to have potential
as a drug. The second task involves going though a series of three, or more, clinical
trials where it is proved to regulators that the drug is both safe for public use and is of
clear therapeutic benefit. Such projects encompass both elements of Exploration for
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new knowledge, Development of current organisational knowledge, and the
Appropriation of a return from the process of knowledge creation and use.
Classification of activities as Exploration and Exploitation
Based on the three case studies, and background research on therapeutic drug
discovery and development in the biotechnology sector, it became clear that three
activities are of key importance to the success of finns and executives within the
sector. First is the discovery of novel drug compounds. The process of drug discovery
involves the search for novel compounds that may have therapeutic benefit. The goal is
to identify, or construct, a promising compound that can be patented. Pre-clinical trials
are conducted on the compound, often involving experimentation on animals, to
determine if the drug has both a therapeutic function, in other words that it can tackle a
given disease or illness, and is not so toxic to the recipient as to cause more harm than
benefit. Especially in the Oxford Molecular case study it can be seen that the discovery
process involves a high degree of search for and creation of new knowledge. It is a
highly uncertain process, with less that 5 in 5,000 compounds identified in the
discovery process actually making it through to the next stage, clinical trials on
humans (Berry, 1996; PhARMA, 1999). At the heart of a drug discovery process is the
attempt to create new stocks of organisational knowledge and embed these in a
patented compound that can be later subjected to development via human clinical
trials. Thus drug discovery in this thesis is classified as an Exploration activity.
The second task that was identified as being of cntical important to the success in the
case companies was the development of a drug through a series of human clinical trials
to gain regulatory marketing approval of the drug. Once a compound has completed
pre-clinical trials it can seek entry to human clinical trials. These clinical trials
normally consist of three main types referred to as Phase I, Phase II and Phase Ill
clinical tnals. Phase IV trials, once marketing approval has been obtained are
increasingly undertaken, though these were not undertaken by any of the case
companies or the sample in the event study and are hence not discussed in this thesis.
Phase I clinical trials study the effects of the drug on a small number of volunteers to
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establish its safety. Despite the long experience of the pharmaceutical industry in drug
discovery and development the move from pre-clinical trials on animals to clinical
trials on man is still an uncertain process. Despite pre-clinical data and extensive
molecular modelling one cannot be sure of the effect that a compound will have upon
man. Thus the process of Phase I trials is essentially one of Exploration. The
researchers are seeking to establish the safety and effects of the compound in a new
environment, man.
Upon successful completion of Phase I trials, Phase II clinical trials can be undertaken
to test if the drug is of therapeutic benefit, that is does it result in an improvement in
the patient's condition. It also tests the range of dosages and their effects. Phase H
trials often test the effectiveness of the drug in tackling a condition relative to a
placebo group, and also test a range of tolerable doses to determine the most effective
dose. Essentially Phase II trials involve an incremental extension of the firm's stock of
knowledge about a drug. Pre-clinical trials have identified the drug and Phase I trials
explored its application in man. Thus Phase II trials can be viewed as being
Development of current knowledge.
Phase III clinical trials seek to establish whether the drug has a clear clinical benefit
relative to another drug on the market place, or the standard treatment. If the drug
passes Phase III trials then the firm can seek a Product License Application (or
equivalent). If regulatory authorities are convinced by the power of the clinical trial
data contained in the Product License Application then it may be approved for
marketing as either a prescription or over the counter drug. Phase III trials are
essentially a further incremental development of the firm's stock of knowledge and are
thus classified as Development.
The third area of value creation that managers consistently mentioned was the
formation and management of alliances. Executives from the three case companies
argued that alliances with both pharmaceutical and fellow biotechnology companies
form a central aspect of successful competition in the biotechnology sector. This view
is supported by empirical studies of the sector in the strategy literature (Hagedoorn,
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1993; Powell et a!., 1996; Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999). Managers noted that
alliances serve four main purposes. First, alliances often bring access to financial
resources. In each of the three case studies in the appendices the firm was many years
away from net profit based on sales of final products. In the interim period operations
are primarily funded by payments from alliance partners and equity. This view of
alliances can be classified Exploitation, or as Use for Appropriation. Biotechnology
firms share their portfolio of patented compounds and drug discovery capabilities with
partners in return for cash payments, thus appropriating a return from their current
stock of organisational knowledge. Alliances can also be viewed as involving Use for
Appropriation where the purpose of the alliance is to combine an approved drug with a
pharmaceutical firm's marketing capabilities to maximise sales in the final market.
Second, managers viewed alliances as offering signals to shareholders as to the worth
of their current stocks of knowledge. The logic expressed was that if major alliance
partners are willing to invest their scientific reputations by collaborating on a specific
drug discovery or development project then the current knowledge stocks of the
biotechnology firm must be valuable. Managers believed that such validation raised
the value of their firm's stocks making access to capital markets for further funds
easier. In this context alliances can be viewed as Exploitation, or Use for
Appropriation. The goal is to raise stock price to enable access to capital markets.
Essentially the firm trades its current stock of knowledge with an alliance partner in
return for which it receives scientific and commercial validation, which raises the
value of the firm's knowledge stocks in the eyes of the shareholder. The Ceiltech
experience, outlined in Appendix One, demonstrates that such validation aids a return
to the capital markets.
Third, managers viewed alliances with major pharmaceutical firms as offering access
to complex drug development capabilities. The capabilities of the three case companies
in the appendices were primarily in drug discovery, yet for a drug to make it to the
market they need to pass through complex regulatory clinical trials. Pharmaceutical
firms have formidable capabilities in the management of clinical trials. In this view
alliances can be seen as primarily about development of the biotechnology firm's
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current stock of knowledge. The biotechnology firm often takes the drug through
Phase I clinical trials. It then seeks a partnership with a pharmaceutical firm to
facilitate the incremental development of the knowledge created through the
biotechnology firm's drug discovery and Phase I clinical trial capabilities by accessing
the pharmaceutical firm's capabilities in Phase II and III clinical trials. Such
combination is not a simple process. It requires the combination of knowledge from
both the pharmaceutical and biotechnology company if successful Phase H and ifi
clinical trials are to be constructed and implemented. Unlike the. case of a marketing
alliance, where interaction might well be minimal, it can be seen from the example of
Celltech's alliance with Bayer that interaction and knowledge combination is required
in co-development of a drug. In this view alliances can be seen as being about
Exploitation of knowledge via the process of joint Development of two firms current
stocks of knowledge.
Fourth, managers viewed alliances as offering learning benefits. Alliances were used
by Celltech to learn how to manage human clinical trials, thus creating a new stock of
organisational knowledge in the area of drug development. In this context alliances can
be viewed as being about Exploration for new organisational knowledge. It should be
noted that managers often believed that over the life span of an alliance it could
achieve all four goals, thus a single alliance could contain elements of Exploitation
(both Development and Use for Appropriation) and Exploration.
From the above it is argued that alliances in UK therapeutic biotechnology firms can
be argues to contain information on the full spectrum of Exploration/Exploitation.
Alliance formation and participation may facilitate Exploration for new stocks of
organisational knowledge, Development of current stocks of knowledge, and
Appropriation of a financial return from organisational knowledge creation and
development activities.
AN OVERVIEW OF CELLTECH
Celltech can be viewed as having four basic historical periods, which link to the
balance of the Exploration and Exploitation of knowledge. For the first decade of its
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existence, two separate strands of the business were grown: contract manufacturing
and research (Biologics) and in-house research and development (Therapeutics). The
goal was to cover the costs of in-house R & D with revenues generated by doing
contract research on behalf of other finns. From Figure One it can be seen that after an
initial period in which R & D expenditure exceeded Biologics turnover, by 1985 R &
D amounted to less than 50 per cent of turnover, and by 1987 this was at an all time
low of 25.5 per cent, recovering to 50 per cent by 1990.32 In 1987 there were
marginally more employees located in the Therapeutics division than in.Biologics. By
1990 the number of staff located in the Biologics contract research and manufacturing
business was at an all time high of 60 per cent. Hence this time frame is referred to as
the Biologics period. During this period the firm developed strong technical
capabilities (Dodgson, 1991), although executives interviewed as part of this thesis
commented that the firm was consequently very hierarchical and lacked capabilities in
interdisciplinary research that were necessary for success in the discovery and
development of innovative drugs.
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE
In the second period (1990 to 1992), a new CEO joined the firm with a new
perspective. He saw the future as being in the development of innovative new drugs in
vhich Celltech had a slice of the action. As he puts it, "the winners have to be the
companies that are therapeutic because the value added is so huge." The firm was
formalh split into two divisions, Biologics and Therapeutics, and the CEO
implemented his new strategic vision by expanding the Therapeutics division. From
Figure One it can be seen that this expansion resulted in an increase in the amount of
inputs devoted to Therapeutics. The percentage of turnover devoted to own R & D and
the number of employees in the Therapeutics division both rose sharply. Within this
division the firm developed a capability in the creation of innovative drugs from initial
discovery through to regulatory clinical trials. This change in strategy required a shift
Data on turnover and R & D are only available from 1983 onwards. Data on the split of employees by
division were not available prior to 1987.
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away from core capabilities centred around technology application and towards
interdisciplinary research to create new drugs as opposed to new technologies. Thus
this period is referred to as re-asserting R & D, where the role of R & D was
accentuated, while the role of contract manufacturing and research, in terms of number
of employees and turnover, was marginally reduced (see Figures 1 and 2).
In 1992 the third period began which lasted until 1996. From Figure One it can be seen
that during this period the inputs devoted to Biologics and Therapeutics were largely in
balance. The firm developed a strategy of collaboration with large pharmaceutical
firms in the development of its drugs. This time frame is referred to as the alliance
period. The benefits of such collaboration was outlined by the firm as follows:
"They bring extensive expertise to the planning and conduct of clinical trials
in order to seek registration for products in a timely manner. They have
marketing expertise and strength in the therapeutic areas that should allow
them to optimise the launch and market penetration of new products...
Collaborative agreements also demonstrate third party validation of the
scientific and commercial potential of innovative discovery or development
programmes." (1996 Annual Report)
Current collaborators include some of the leading pharmaceutical firms in the USA
and the EU. The quality of Ceiltech's collaborators and the number of drugs it has in
both clinical trials and in discovery projects compares favourably with its major
biotechnology rivals. This collaborative strategy enables Ceiltech to exploit its
knowledge base before going to the end market, via cash milestone payments from
collaborators, but without selling a full interest in the downstream property rights.
Milestone payments and collaboration are not unusual in this sector. Celltech was,
however, amongst the first in the UK to successfully implement this strategy. It is also
unusual in the breadth and quality of its collaborators.
The fourth period began in 1996 when the Biologics division was sold for £50 million,
thus this period is referred to as the post-Biologics era. This signalled the final stage of
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Ceiltech's new direction. In 1990 Biologics dominated the firm to the detriment of R
& D. With the sale of Biologics Ceiltech had in six years converted itself into a firm
solely focused on the R & D of innovative drugs to the exclusion of contract
manufacturing and research. From Figure One it can be seen that all inputs are now
focused on own R & D. The value of the firm has see-sawed over its life. From near
bankruptcy in 1990, Celltech had been transformed. By 1998 it had a market
capitalisation of around $502 million. An analysis of stock market performance shows
that Celltech ranked eighth out of 50 independent European biotechnology firms,
having experienced a 25 per cent increase in share price in 1998 (Mc Namara, 1999).
This renewal occurred not by intensifying the firm's focus on the Exploitation of
organisational knowledge, but rather by refocusing on Exploration.
EXPLORATION/EXPLOITATION AS A LENS IN UNDERSTANDING
CELLTECH'S RENEWAL
This transformation from Biologics to Therapeutics can be explained in terms of the
Exploration/Exploitation balance. Investment in Biologics can be viewed as essentially
being an investment in Exploitation (Development and Use for Appropriation).
Celltech had developed world-class technical capabilities that leveraged the firm's
knowledge of antibodies and recombinant DNA through contracted manufacturing.
Such contract manufacturing was is a good example of Exploitation of a current stock
of knowledge by incremental development of antibody production capabilities, while
appropriating a return from this stock of knowledge via contract manufacturing.
Incremental development of these capabilities did occur, but only in the context of
learning by doing in the contract research division. Investment in contract
manufacturing had a rapid feedback from the market in terms of contracted revenues.
Celltech's investment in Therapeutics can be viewed as knowledge Exploration in
Levinthal and March's (1993) terms where Exploration is "the pursuit of new
knowledge of things that might come to be known." Drug discovery requires that
knowledge from multiple technical disciplines (for instance, molecular biology and
medicinal chemistry) be combined in the creation of an innovative compound that can
enter clinical trials. In 1990 this Exploration became more intense as the firm sought to
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develop its capabilities in interdisciplinary drug discovery. The feedback from the
market is not as clear, nor as fast, as in the case of Biologics' contracts. As observed
from Table One of Chapter One, the discovery of a compound takes on average 6
years, though in many cases considerably longer; the drug development process is
estimated to take a further 8.9 years on average (PIIARMA, 1999). As noted in the
methodology section, only 5 in 5,000 compounds that enter discovery programmes are
estimated to make it to developmental clinical trials, and only one of these to make it
on to the market (Berry, 1996; PhARMA, 1999). The cost of taking a drug through this
process is estimated to be in the region of $300—$500 million (BlO, 1996).
INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE
From Figure Two it can be seen that Ceiltech was experiencing very considerable
growth in Biologics turnover from 1987 to 1989. Gross margins attributed to the
Biologics activity, while falling, were quite high, ranging from over 31 per cent to 12.5
per cent. On the back of Biologics' success the firm was able to invdst £17.3 million in
Therapeutics R & D during this period, while also generating a net profit of900,000.
Therapeutics was not generating any turnover during this period. In this context one
can see that for a firm such as Ceiltech in the 1980s, the temptation to focus resources
on Exploitation rather than Exploration was very real.
The balance between Exploration and Exploitation in Ceiltech can be seen from two
perspectives: allocation of resources to each activity (Figure One) and revenues
generated (Figure Three). As noted earlier, from Figure One it can be seen that from
1985 to 1990 investment in Celltech's own R & D as a percentage of group turnover
initially declined, and remained below 32 per cent until 1990, when it dramatically
increased to 49 per cent with the arrival of the new management team. The numbçr of
employees working in the Therapeutics division declined over the period from 1987 to
1990. Employee numbers is a key metric as both R & D and contract manufacturing
and research are knowledge and labour intensive activities.
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In addition to a rising commitment to Biologics in terms of inputs, as seen in Figure
One, there was a parallel rise in level of turnover, or outputs, that Biologics generated
(see Figure Three). Combining Figures One and Two it can be seen that during the
period from 1985 to 1990 Exploitation (Biologics) came to dominate over Exploration
(Therapeutics).
INSERT FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE
The re-asserting R & D period from 1990 to 1992 can be seen in Figure One in terms
of a sustained rise in the percentage of employees located in Therapeutics. New
employees were hired within Therapeutics while there were redundancies within
Biologics. Figure Three indicates that in terms of one simple output measure, turnover,
the Therapeutics division was also beginning to make an impact. Retrenchment in the
Biologics division can be seen in Figure Three in terms of a decline in turnover
generated by the division. Thus it can be seen that the imbalance between Biologics
and Therapeutics in terms of resource inputs and revenue outputs began to be reversed.
The alliance period represents a time of sustained balance between the inputs allocated
to both Exploration (Therapeutics) and Exploitation (Biologics). From Figure One it
can be seen that the number of employees located in each division is largely in
balance. From Figure Two it can be seen that the performance in Biologics in terms of
margins improved over the period. From Figure Three it can be seen that both
divisions experienced a rise in revenues up to 1995, and a proportional decline in 1996.
Thus over a period of haifa decade, from 1992 to 1996, Exploration and Exploitation
in terms of inputs (Figure One) and outputs (Figures Two and Three) were largely in
balance.
Exploration/Exploitation inside Therapeutics
At the start of the fourth period, in 1996, the Biologics division was sold off. By that
time Therapeutics had developed its own sophisticated balance of Exploration and
Exploitation dimensions. All three Exploration activities defined in the methodology
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section are observed in the Therapeutics Division, namely, discovery of new drugs;
Phase I clinical trials; and development of a capability in collaboration with large
firms. Exploration within this division can be seen in its purest form as the discovery
of new drugs. Drug discovery by its very nature involves "the pursuit of new
knowledge of things that might come to be known" (Levinthal and March, 1993). The
objective is the discovery of a new innovative compound which tackles an illness that
currently lacks a drug therapy, or a compound that is based on a sufficiently novel
combination of knowledge that it does not violate current patented compounds. From
Figure Four33 it can be seen that from 1990 to 1998 Celltech has considerably
increased the number of identified discovery projects.
INSERT FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE
As noted in the methodology section Phase I trials are classified as an Exploration
activity and the number of such trials is found to have varied over time inside
Therapeutics. These trials represent about 11 per cent of the cost oferforming clinical
trials (Parexel International, 1996). From Figure Four it can be seen that this form of
Exploration peaked during the period of balance between 1992 and 1996, and that a
reduction in Phase I trials during 1997 and 1998 has been offset, in exploratory terms,
by a rise in the number of identified discovery projects.
The third form of Exploration noted in the methodology is the creation of the
capability to collaborate with large pharmaceutical firms. By 1990 two drugs were in
clinical trials, and the number has risen dramatically since then (see Figure Four). This
has been achieved by accessing the drug development capabilities of large
pharmaceutical partners through collaboration, with the partner taking the lead in the
management of clinical trials. Through interaction with pharmaceutical partners on
development projects, Celitech has, according to executives within the firm, developed
a capability in managing collaborations with large firms. Such collaborative
capabilities are argued in the literature to be a powerful source of competitive
" Data on the number of drugs in clinical trials were not available prior to 1987.
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advantage in general (Gulati, 1999). Within the biotechnology sector collaborative
networks, and the ability to work within them, is found to be a central source of
innovation and value creation (Powell et al., 1996; Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994).
The initial development of this capability can be viewed as another example of
Exploration.
In the methodology section of this chapter two main forms of Exploitation were
identified that are observed in the Therapeutics divisions, namely Development, as
represented by Phase II and III clinical trials and appropriation, as represented by
alliances. Phase II and III trials are essentially Development of current stocks of
knowledge, as embedded in the compound, rather than classic Exploration. Phase II
trials represent about 27 per cent and Phase III trials about 62 per cent of the costs of
the clinical trial process (Parexel International, 1996). From Figure Four it can be seen
that the number of Phase II and III clinical trials increased marginally in the period of
re-asserting R & D (1990 to 1992), while in the alliance period (1992 to 1996) there
was both an increase (in 1993) and a slight decline (in 1996). In the post-Biologics era
there has been an increase in the number of drugs in Phase II trials, representing an
increasing focus on Exploitation.
The second form of Exploitation is the management of prestige alliances 34 . Prestige
alliances can be viewed as predoininaielr exploitative. All four forms of Exploitation
through alliances identified in the methodology section are observed in the
Therapeutics division. First, alliance partners provide milestone payments to Celltech
for achieving prescribed stages in the discovery and development of a drug. Between
1992 and 1998 out of a potential £83 million a total of £26.5 million in milestone
payments was made to the Therapeutics division by collaborators. Second, prestige
alliances enable Celltech to access world-class drug development and marketing
capabilities, which enhances the value of their drug portfolio. This access is critical to
the development of the knowledge embedded in the discovered compound. Celltech
' Alliance partners are classified as prestige if they are in the top 20 firms in terms of pharmaceutical
turnover as compiled by IMS Health and listed in Firn, 1999.
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had little development experience in 1990, and no experience of the world-wide
marketing and distribution of drugs. Access to these capabilities enables it to exploit its
discovered compounds. If a product from one of Celitech's portfolio of prestige
alliances passes regulatory approval then Therapeutics will receive between a 25% and
45% share of that product's net profits by way of a royalty, without incurring any
manufacturing or marketing expenses itself. Third, executives noted that through these
collaborations Celitech has over time learned to develop, or deepen, its own initially
limited drug development capabilities, such that it now seeks to take on an increasing
role in the management of clinical trials, particularly Phase I and II trials. Fourth,
alliances with prestige partners bring with them a validation of both Celitech's
technology and its corporate strategy. This validation was vital to Celitech in raising its
perceived value among investors prior to its launch on the London Stock Exchange in
1993. Post-1997 it was also vital in the recovery of Celitech's share price after the
collapse of a Phase III clinical trial and the loss of Bayer as a prestige alliance partner
(Mc Namara, 1998). It will be empirically observed in Chapter Four that
announcement of prestige alliances have a strong and abnormally positive effect on a
biotechnology firm's share price.
From Figure Four it can be observed that prior to 1990 the firm did not have Prestige
Alliances partners in Therapeutics. The number of these alliances grew between 1991
from one, to a peak of five alliances in 1995, declining to four in 1997 and 1998. From
Figure One it can be seen that the returns from Exploitation in the Biologics firm were
declining from 1990 to 1992, with some recovery in margins in 1993 to 1995. During
this period exploitation, as represented by Prestige Alliances, was increasing as per
Figure Four. Thus declining exploitation in Biologics was partially offset with a rise in
exploitation in Therapeutics.
Figure Four offers a set of metrics from which the balance between Exploration and
Exploitation that has been achieved within the Therapeutics division can be observed.
From Figure Four it can be seen that the amount of Exploration within Therapeutics
has risen over time. In 1990 there were two discovery projects and one Phase I clinical
trial. By 1998 there were six discovery projects but no Phase I clinical trials; the
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renewal of Ceiltech coincided with a rise in the number of Exploration projects inside
Therapeutics. From Figure Four it can be seen that prior to 1993 the number of
Exploration projects within Therapeutics exceeded the Exploitation activities, however
from 1993 onwards the number of Exploitation activities increase. By 1998 there is a
greater emphasis on Exploitation projects than Exploration, suggesting that Celitech
may once again be moving out of balance.
FROM CORE RIGIDITIES TO EXPLORATION FOR NEW CORE
CAPABILITIES: ACTIONS TAKEN TO PROMOTE EXPLORATION AND
EXPLOITATION INSIDE CELLTECH
In 1990 Ceiltech exhibited many of the characteristics outlined in Chapter Two (Figure
Two) that promoted the suppression of Exploration. I-tow did the firm and its
management reverse the decline of Exploration and create the more balanced (in terms
of Exploration and Exploitation), higher value Therapeutics division? The data
contained in the Ceiltech case revealed the following to be important:
• the existence of a senes of crises in 1990, which can be classified as environmental
shocks from Chapter Two, Figure Two (as partially reflected in Figure Two of this
chapter);
• a new CEO and top management (personnel turnover as per Figure Two of Chapter
Two);
redundancies in the Biologics division simultaneous with the hiring of thirty
medicinal chemists, injecting a new knowledge base into Therapeutics (personnel
turnover as per Figure Two of Chapter Two);
• the reforming of teams from a functional organisation of technically orientated
teams to multi-functional project-orientated teams (changes in interaction
structures, as per Figure Three, Chapter Three);
the development of a shared culture and language across the firm (as per Figure
Three, Chapter Two);
• dynamic management of slack and support of a culture of experimentation (as per
Figure Three, Chapter Two); and
• the management of alliances to promote both access to resources and appropriation
(as per Figure Four, Chapter Two)
116
The next few pages of this chapter elaborate on what these changes entailed and why
they were important.
It was clear that at the end of the 1 980s there was a high level of inertia and resistance
to change from within Celltech. Biologics had been the source of Ceiltech's revenue
growth. The old management had committed itself to a technology focus, not
interdisciplinary research. Strong collaborative ties had been fm-med with academia
and were viewed as central to the future of the firm (Dodgson, 1993). At its
foundation, the central focus of Ceiltech had been a technology transfer agreement
with the Medical Research Council that sought to exploit academic knowledge
commercially. From contemporary annual reports and Dodgson's (1993) study of
Ceiltech's first decade, it can be seen that management was strongly committed to the
continuation and strengthening of this agreement, having negotiated in 1988 an
extension of the contract until 1993. Employees had come to jokingly refer to Ceiltech
as the 'University of Slough'. One executive noted that:
"Almost a third of its R & D spend was on these [academic] collaborations. I can
say that almost universally they were very non-productive. They were quite a
cash drain on the company."
On the Therapeutics side, research seemed to lack focus and was largely unproductive
(some departments consisted of only two people). Change would have to overcome the
firm's past commitment to collaboration with academia, and the accompanying
culture, and a reliance on profits from Biologics based upon the development and
application of technological capabilities reinforced by academic ties and hierarchical
structures.
Creating a crisis
As observed in Chapter Two, Huff, Huff and Thomas (1992) note that shocks are
needed to engineer change and that that rarely is a single shock to a managerial system
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sufficient. A single shock can be rationalised away as an aberration, or a temporary
occurrence. Ordinarily, as in the case of Celitech, a radical departure from the status
quo is only triggered by a series of significant shocks to the system, which are bunched
closely together. Celltech encountered a series of three distinct shocks. First came the
financial shocks of 1989 to 1992. It can be seen from Figure Two that Biologics's
gross margins were in considerable decline from 1988 to 1990. The rate of growth of
Biologics's turnover was declining over this period, and from 1990 to 1992 was
negative. Declining performance over a period of several years could not easily be
explained away. Second, Celltech's major shareholder, with a 36.4 per cent stake, went
bankrupt in 1990. This placed further pressure on Celitech to address its poor financial
performance. Third, the retirement of both the founding CEO and Research Director
was scheduled for 1990. This, combined with the two other shocks, offered a window
of opportunity in which change could be initiated and inertial forces overcome.
The challenge that these shocks posed should not be underestimated. Shareholder
pressure for change was intense. One senior executive recalled the mood of the time,
saying:
"It was relayed to us by the original investors that 'You are smart guys. You
can tell us a nice story, but how do we know it's valid?' You see, six or
seven years ago, very few financial institutions knew anything much about
science, let alone the pharmaceutical industry. They felt that they had already
been hoodwinked by one group of management and so what they said was
we had to do something quite distinctive that made them believe there was
something special about us."
To impress the shareholders new directions in strategy were necessary, new
capabilities had to be developed and scarce resources refocused, thus the firm invested
in the process of Exploration. A new management team was hired which had to drive
Celltech towards its ultimate goal of becoming a large R & D-led company that took
drugs to market. The old capability focused on the contract manufacturing of
antibodies and collaborative links with universities to maintain a leading edge
functional technology focus (Dodgson, 1991; 1993). New capabilities needed to be
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developed to focus on new product development, rather than technical excellence. As
one executive commented,
"An organisation of this type is not judged by the output of scientific papers.
It is actually judged by its ability to come up with technologies which in turn
will lead to therapeutic entities. The technology itself is fairly valueless until
you convert it into something practical... What I think we emphasised, if
anything, was to say that, if that is the basis on which we are judged, then
clearly if we cannot convert our technology into practical realities, we will
be complete failures."
Unleariiing, reorganising and new recruits
As noted in Chapter Two unlearning plays a crucial role in the stimulation of
Exploration (see Figure Two, Chapter Two). In the case of Celltech the switch
from technological capability to a more therapeutic-based capability was a
considerable challenge. Renewal was not just a matter of changing strategic
direction. More fundamentally, it required a change in the way staff thought about
science and how research was organised. This ideological change is encapsulated
in the move away from an almost academic culture, where close collaborative ties
with academia were mirrored n structures that executives described as like an
academic institution. As one executive commented, change required a shift away
from an academic philosophy of technical excellence, measured in part by the
number of scientific papers published, and towards a more commercially-minded
focus on getting products into the clinic. Another executive noted that this
required "almost a sea change in the way that we were organised."
Research was reorganised with teams focusing around three therapeutic targets
selected by the new management. Biologists of differing specialities were put in teams
to work towards a common goal. Previously they had worked within functional
groupings. Now scientists of differing functional expertise worked together within
specific projects. Each project had a goal of bringing a drug to clinical trials, thus
119
improving the firm's research productivity. This meant that teams no longer focused
on the development of technical expertise alone, but upon the combination of technical
expertise to develop novel therapeutic compounds.
Mixing old and new functions within common projects required scientists to learn
about issues outside their previous speciality. To do this they had to focus more on
these skills and less on their specialist skills, which had been their sole previous focus,
thus facilitating unlearning. This process of socialisation, a new challenge, a new
vision of the future, and a narrowly defined focus of work (three therapeutic areas with
individual teams looking at narrower issues) enabled a shift in capability to occur. (The
success of this strategy, in terms of research productivity and acceptance by
stakeholders, cumulated in the divestment of Biologics.)
As noted in Chapter Two, Intellectual Diversity is essential for change from Core
Rigidities towards Exploration to create new capabilities (Carley, 1992; Simon, 1991;
Javanovic and Nyarko, 1995). It was the new senior management recruited from
outside Ceiltech which brought with it this new perspective on how the firm could
achieve success. Additionally, the senior management team brought new skills,
including knowledge of asthma therapies, which had not previously been a focus at
Ceiltech. The strategy also involved hiring 35 medicinal chemists who were dispersed
across the projects as required. These new staff members enlarged Celltech's skill base
from biotechnology and into the more traditional medicinal chemistry skills of
pharmaceutical firms. From this discussion it can be said that Celltech initially
experienced organisational inertia and switching costs, which as Chapter Two notes
encourages the maintenance of Core Rigidities. Through a series of environmental
shocks, personnel turnover and unlearning Celltech was able to harness Intellectual
Diversity within the firm necessary to promote the process of Exploration for new
organisational knowledge and capabilities in the R&D of innovative drug compounds.
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Systems to foster the coexistence of Exploration and Exploitation
What other factors did Ceiltech use to engineer the change? As noted in Chapter Two
changes in Social Interaction play a vital role in stimulating Development, while
changes in the levels of Intellectual Diversity stimulates Exploration. Celitech's new
management stimulated both of these characteristics promoting both Exploration and
Development. This involved both the stimulation of Social Interaction through
informal mechanisms and creation of formal review systems to ensure both effective
Exploration for new knowledge and Development of current stocks of knowledge, in
addition to maintenance of a balance between Exploration and Exploitation activities.
The new management of Ceiltech paid particular attention to managing Exploration for
new knowledge and Exploitation of the knowledge derived from Exploration activities
by creating a series of systems to manage drug discovery and development. The
management of current projects and the search for new research ideas involves both
formal and informal systems. Close proximity is an informal mechanism; all staff are
located on one site and the layout of the building is specially descgned to facilitate
interactions. More formal mechanisms include quarterly reviews of the progress of
projects. If they are not meeting objective milestones, then reasons are elicited from
the team. If senior management believes that these problems are not solvable within
the present budget and time frames due to resource or capability deficiencies, then
projects are quickly shut down. Annual reviews enable the scientists to interact with
senior management in budget allocations for the coming year. Strategic research
reviews are conducted penodically. Through these reviews, ideas on new projects
bubble up. Often the original ideas upon which new project proposals submitted during
the research review are based stem from the conferences which the scientific staff have
attended, or literature they have read, in which interesting ideas were raised and then
independently pursued by themselves during slack time. A senior executive describes
the essence of how new ideas bubble up, culminating in the strategic review, as
follows:
"You don't say that we are going to have a meeting next Thursday. There
usually is a lot of discussion about the ideas. Eventually they [the proposals]
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come forward, but they don't come forward as a surprise on Thursday
afiernoon, to be decided by the end of the day. Because we are a small
company you are always talking to people, so you have a good idea of what
ideas are being discussed. It is almost a constant process of seeing what's
new, what we might do, what's exciting."
Coninion codes and shared language
As noted in Chapter Two creation of a common language plays an impottant role in the
Development of stocks of organisational knowledge. Creation of a common language
and interaction across functional disciplines (Chapter Two, Figure Three) played an
important role in the renewal of Ceiltech. When the firm changed from a discipline and
technology-based capability to a therapeutic capability, chemists were thrust together
with biologists leading to differences in common understandings. Disciplines that
within Ceiltech had previously worked in hierarchical isolation now had to converse
and work side by side on an operational level to integrate their diverse knowledge into
the production of a single drug. This required colleagues to train each other in the
basics of their discipline. In so doing, knowledge overlaps and redundancies were
created. An understanding of the language and mindsets of other disciplines facilitated
a deeper understanding of the problems facing the firm. Triggers for innovative
solutions were set off through this process of developing shared understanding at the
leel of bench scientists. The Director of Research summed up the effect of putting
people with different skill bases into common teams by noting:
We were very much organised along technical disciplines for quite a long
time, which gave us a very good strength in technology but maybe not a
good strength in biology. We found that when we moved into the therapeutic
areas we were able to get people to be focused on biological questions so
that they built up their biology base. So we had people who had a lot of
interest in inflammation, and these people built up a knowledge base around
inflammation as opposed to being molecular biologists, or cell biologists or
biochemists." The reorganisation "challenged [researchers] with learning
122
more about the biology, rather than just learning about techniques and
technology."
Exploration and Exploitation of a Collaborative Capability
As argued earlier in this chapter participation in an alliance network is a vital value
adding task for biotechnology firms as it facilitates both development of drugs and
appropriation of a return. One can see from Figure Four that between 1991 to 1998
Celltech has increased its number of prestige alliances. Such alliances facilitate both
Development and Use for Appropriation. Ceiltech's alliance network enables it to
access world class development projects, thus they argued, increasing the speed and
reducing the cost of gaining regulatory approval for promising trials. Collaborative
agreements also enabled Ceiltech to appropriate a return from the stocks of knowledge
they had in development. As noted earlier this has raised £26.5 million in cash
payments, with the potential for more milestone payments and downstream royalties.
To create its network of four prestige alliance partners and numerous other
partnerships with smaller pharmaceutical firms and research institutes Ceiltech had to
create a collaborative capability. This is described by the senior management as an
ability to interact with major pharmaceutical firms. The management argued that the
difficulty lay not so much in the identification of collaborative partners, nor in the
structuring of collaborative agreements, but rather in the management thereof.
Identification of partners was sometimes quite obvious, as in the case of the Celltech-
Bayer alliance where Bayer were the only major pharmaceutical firm to have a similar
patent portfolio to Celltech in the area of anti-TNF. The real problem rose in the
development of an understanding of how large pharmaceutical firms manage projects
and their relationships with biotechnology partners. Heie the development of a shared
language was vital. The need to share language at the operational levels of the firm. was
mirrored by the need to create a shared understanding with external collaborators. The
search for and management of external collaborations was conducted at the middle and
higher levels of management. Senior management at Celltech found that its
collaborators tended to think differently. This makes communications across firm
boundaries a slow process, where firms learn to talk to each other, and learn the
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meaning of their objectives, mindsets and systems, thus slowing the transfer of
knowledge needed to collaborate.
An example was Celitech's collaboration with Bayer. The decision-making structures
of the firms were quite different. Bayer focused on in-depth commercial analysis of the
project first and then on meticulous large-scale clinical trials. According to a Celltech
executive, decisions taken by the Bayer members of the project team sometimes
needed to be ratified by several layers of management. Celitech did not focus on
commercial analysis in as much depth as Bayer, nor did it have a lot of experience as a
company in conducting large-scale clinical trials, especially at Phase III. Ceiltech's
expertise was in the discovery of novel compounds, and there was only one level of
management between the project manager and the CEO. These issues, amongst others,
led to different ways of working in Ceiltech and Bayer. To work together these
alternative systems had to be understood by the Celitech management and
accommodated for. This initially slowed the project, however it offered excellent
opportunities to learn the management of alliances with large firms. This process can
also help a firm to recognise and learn of gaps in its own knowledge bases, stimulating
the managerial processes of both Exploration and Exploitation. For example, Ceiltech
recently hired a senior manager with expertise in the marketing of pharmaceutical
products to fill a gap in its knowledge of commercial analysis. Its expertise in clinical
tnal development has been deepened through learning from alliances with Bayer and
other large pharmaceutical firms, all of which are widely experienced in the
management of large-scale clinical tnals.
DISCUSSION
The renewal of Celltech provides five key lessons. First, contrary to suggestions in the
literature, renewal is possible through a movement away from Exploitation and
towards Exploration. The key to such a renewal strategy is that it be based firmly on
the principal of adding shareholder value. By moving away from the low margin but
profitable Biologics, and towards loss-making drug discovery and development, the
firm increased its market value. During this period the firm raised a further £41.7
million from shareholders. The new management realised that shareholders were not
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interested in short-term profits but rather in longer-term capital gains. Paradoxically,
bigger losses that focus on the right sort investments can mean bigger potential gains.
By intensif'ing investments in Exploration to develop a strong Therapeutics division,
the capital value of Celltech rose, despite an intensification of losses to £75.9 million
due to increased R & D.
Celltech moved to Exploration not just in terms of new scientific capabilities, but also
in terms of new managerial capabilities. This is a key lesson of the Ceiltech renewal.
Renewal based on Exploration requires co-ordinating changes in both technical and
managerial capabilities. Celltech would have failed if it had only renewed its technical
capabilities and ignored the creation of capabilities in managing collaboration and a
new relationship with shareholders.
The second lesson is that the management of crisis and galvanising the commitment of
key organisational actors is essential in overcoming organisational inertia to renew and
trigger fresh Exploration. This is not a new lesson, having been championed by Pascale
(1990), Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) and others. In Ceiltech, new management
entered the firm but was cautious at first, galvanising the commitment of a key group
of scientists and administrators prior to announcing the change in strategy from
technology focus to project groups orientated around the creation of individual drugs.
Having gained the commitment of the key scientists in the firm the sense of crisis,
which had been growing amongst staff, was relieved. The new team also brought with
it a sense of credibility, being made up of accomplished research scientists and
pharmaceutical administrators from Roche Holdings, amongst others. The key here is
that a relatively small number of new managers stepped into the crisis, untainted by its
past, galvanised a small number of key actors within the organisation, and then
presented the staff with a new strategic vision which was not only endorsed as
acceptable by shareholders, but which also excited and motivated staff. As one
manager put it, the staff were released from the constraints of contract manufacturing
and research, in which they had no long-term stake, and could now engage in big,
liberated science where their scientific skills and creativity could be profitability
pursued.
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The third lesson is that for a firm to renew based on Exploration it needs to stimulate
knowledge creation through an injection of both external and internal diversity.
External diversity was infused through the arrival of the new senior management team.
This brought new ideas on what the strategic focus of the firm should be, in addition to
a knowledge of how large pharmaceutical firms operate, which was fostered to develop
a capability in managing prestige alliances. External diversity also came in the form of
the new medicinal chemists. Inappropriate knowledge was partially extinguished by
the redundancy of 60 staff, which when combined with structural changes signalled
that the old ways of doing things were not to continue. Internal diversity was
stimulated by the creation of the new teams organised around drug projects. Executives
noted that the majority of new project ideas came from the creative resources of those
staff who existed in Celltech prior to 1990. In terms of stimulation of Exploration, as
outlined in Chapter Two (Figure Two), personnel turnover, unlearning and
environmental shocks all played an important role.
The fourth lesson from the Celltech case is that improvements in the process of
Exploration need not come at the cost of the process of Exploitation. At the same time
as creating an environment in which Exploration was encouraged and managed,
Celitech's management also took action to deepen its development process. The
process of Development was also promoted through by creation of a common language
and interaction both across functional boundaries within Celitech and across
organisational boundaries via alliances. Dynamic slack was also managed to stimulate
Development. By moving staff away from contract manufacturing and research and
into three drug discovery projects Ceiltech was able to greatly speed development of
its most valuable stock of knowledge, namely, compounds which Ceiltech owned itself
as opposed to developed on contract for other firms. In terms of promotion of
Development, as outlined in Chapter Two (Figure Three), dynamic slack, interactions
across organisational structure and common language all played an important role.
The fifth, and most important, lesson from the renewal of Ceiltech is that for
Exploration to be sustained it is vital that systems be installed to ensure that the
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outputs of Exploration activities are clearly linked to the finn's exploitative efforts.
Systems played two vital roles. First they sought to efficiently manage the processes of
Exploration and Development individually. Failing projects, be they Exploration or
Development, were identified quickly and either corrected or eliminated. Secondly,
systems were put in place to manage the linkage between Exploration and Exploitation
activities.
These systems occurred at two levels of the organisation. At the operational level, new
capabilities in interdisciplinary research were developed. At the upper management
level, capabilities in the management of collaboration were developed. Regular
research reviews were initiated which enabled an Exploration (discovery) project to be
assessed in terms of its ability to deliver tangible results in a timely and cost effective
manner, and the ability of the project to attract and retain collaborators (the
relationships with which were identified, cultivated and managed by senior
management). As drugs exited discovery projects, they were assessed by a Product
Development Panel, which sought to assess if each drug should move into the
Development, or Exploitation, stage of the R & D process. These systems ensure that a
tight linkage between Exploration and Exploitation is maintained.
Systems were also put in place to ensure that a balance between Exploration and
Exploitation was maintained over time. As drugs exit the discovery stage, the research
review process seeks to identify new discovery projects. Ideas bubble up from the
operational level and are assessed by the middle management, and reviewed by senior
management. This process, coupled with a system of strategic review, seeks to ensure
that Exploitation does not drive out Exploration in Celitech. This temptation is real
because as a drug moves through Phase II and III trials the costs rise dramatically,
while the time to market is diminishing. The temptation is to cut investment in
discovery projects so that these funds can be devoted to late stage clinical trials.
The Ceiltech case also offers insights into propositions one, three and four of Chapter
Two. The analysis of Celitech demonstrates that a real firm can be analysed using the
conceptual lens of Exploration and Exploitation. Measurements can be created to
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observe Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation in real finns. This lends
support to the contention in proposition one in Chapter Two that Exploitation can be
characterised as Development and Use for Appropriation and that these concepts
should be able to be measured in a real organisational context.
The analysis of Celitech also offers some insights into proposition three, namely, that
greater value can be obtained when Exploration, Development and Use for
Appropriation are managed as an integrated whole, rather than as separate portfolios.
Prior to 1990 Development and Use for Appropriation took place in the separately
managed contract manufacturing division. It was marginally profitable. Within the
research division exploration for new compounds was undertaken, but this was not
linked to Use for Appropriation or Development. No drugs were in the Phase 111111
development stage and no innovative methods were being employed to appropriate a
return from Exploration activities. The firm was near banlu-uptcy and its shares were
illiquid. The new management took an overarching view of Exploration, Development
and Use for Appropriation. In the Therapeutics division Exploration was linked to
Development via managerial review systems. Management were innovative in how
they communicated the value of Exploration activities to shareholders by initiating
Prestige Alliances that validated the value of the knowledge being created inside
Therapeutics, in addition to providing a return in the form of milestone payments and
transfer of costs. The result was that, despite intensification of net losses, Celltech
shares are now more liquid and the firm is the eight largest independent biotechnology
firm in terms of market capitalisation (Mc Namara, 1999).
The case also offers some insights into proposition four. The Celltech case illustrates
that balance between Exploration and Exploitation can be maintained beyond the short
term. This period of balance coincided with a rise in the value of Celltech on the stock
market. The experience of Celitech also casts some light into how balance may be
maintained, namely through the installation of managerial systems that seek to link
Exploration and Exploitation efforts, coupled with innovations that facilitate the early
Appropriation of a return from Exploration activities.
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CONCLUSIONS
Theoretical development has posed a challenge to organisations. On the one hand they
are told that they must balance Exploration activities with Exploitation activities if
they are to maximise their value. On the other hand, finns are told that in general,
maturity brings inertia and decline as Exploitation drives out the creation of new ideas.
All too often, people have drawn the conclusion that high technology firms live on a
knife edge and that having fallen, renewal is likely to be almost impossible
(Christensen, 1997) or the result of serendipity (Burgelman, 1994).
The Celltech case study throws into doubt some of these theoretical presumptions. The
Celitech case documents the renewal of a high technology firm from near bankruptcy
and paralysis to a high level of success. More importantly, the case demonstrates that
this renewal was not 'accidental', but rather the application of well tried and tested
managerial techniques which included a new CEO, the hiring of new staff from a
different discipline, the formation of new team structures and the infusion of new
organisational processes.
Much of the past research into the balance between Exploration and Exploitation has
relied on the generation of mathematical models as opposed to organisational case
studies (Levinthal, 1997; Cohen and Levinthal, 1994; 1990; March, 1991).
Instrumental cases can be useful in theory testing (Eisenhardt, 1989) and theory
extension (Yin, 1989) or theory development (Sutton and Straw, 1995). The Celitech
case was carefully selected such that it could act as an instrumental case to enable
Exploration of whether or not it was possible both to renew based on turning back the
tide of Exploitation and to maintain a balance between investments in Exploration and
Exploitation. The literature would suggest that both phenomena are difficult, and by
implication rarely achieved. By employing an alternative method to prior research,
based on a longitudinal case study as opposed to a mathematical model, this chapter
has offered further insights into both the process of renewal and the management of the
tension between Exploration and Exploitation inside a high technology firm.
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Chapter Four:
Wealth Effects of Announcements on Exploration and
Exploitation Events amongst UK Therapeutic Biotechnology
Firms
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Two the theoretic relationships between Exploration and Exploitation were
outlined. In particular it was noted that prior literature has argued that balance is
difficult to maintain and that there is an in build bias towards Exploitation, due to
shorter feedback loops and more positive financial returns (March 1991; Levinthal and
March 1993). In Chapter Three it was shown, through the lens of the longitudinal
Celitech study, that in a real organisational context it was possible to balance
Exploration and Exploitation for over half and decade and that renewal was possible
-by moving away from the dominance of Exploitation and towards Exploration. The
Celitech case clearly indicated that investments in Exploitation had been the key to the
firm's success in the 1980s. Re-focusing around Exploration had been the key to the
firm's turnaround in 1990, while maintaining a balance between Exploration and.
Exploitation through the 1 990s was essential in maintaining the momentum of the
1990 turnaround.
As Chapter Two illustrated, the management of the Exploration/Exploitation dilemma
is an important academic topic. The Cdiltech case illustrates that within a particular
organisational and temporal context the management of this balance is an important
aspect of value destruction and creation. The next logical question to ask is whether or
not the management of Exploration and Exploitation in general adds shareholder
value? If it does then this is clearly both an important academic and managerial issue.
This chapter seeks to answer the question of the wealth effects of knowledge
Exploration and Exploitation activities through the lens of an event study.
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Chapter Three classified key events, for biotechnology firms as being either
Exploration or Exploitation activities. The choice of events was driven by what
managers in all three case companies identified as being of critical importance in the
successful management of a UK biotechnology firm. The case studies are provided in
full in the appendices. Drug Discovery and Phase I clinical trials were defined as
Exploration events, Phase 11111 clinical trials were defined as Exploitation activities,
while alliances were defined as predominantly Exploitation but with Exploration
elements. This chapter undertakes an analysis of all announcements of progress in
these events made by UK publicly quoted biotechnology firms over a three-year
period. The goal is to assess whether shareholder reactions to such announcements
suggest that such activities add shareholder value, and if so which activities have the
greatest effect on wealth. A wealth effect occurs if, in reaction to the announcement,
the share price of the firm either rises or falls at a significantly greater level than one
would expect the share price to perform in the absence of the announced event.
The underlying argument in this thesis to date suggests that positive announcements
about the firm's Exploration and Exploitation activities should have a positive effect
on wealth. Chapter Two suggests that from a theoretical standpoint the wealth effects
of Exploitation activities are greater than Exploration. Chapter Three clearly indicates
that within a single organi:ational context, namely Celitech, both activities add value,
but the extent of the value created is dependent on the organizational context. This
chapter will quantify the extent to which Exploration and Exploitation activities add
value using a sample of all UK public biotechnology firm's between December 1995
and January 1999, thus providing a quantitative insight as to whether in general
Exploration or Exploitation activities add greatest value..
This study is the first, to the knowledge of this researcher, that uses the event study
methodology to assess the theoretical bias identified by Levinthal and March (1993)
that Exploitation tends to have a stronger positive financial feedback from the market
than Exploration activities. The classification of key organizational events into
Exploration and Exploitation makes such an empirical Exploration of this issue
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possible. This research is also the first to jointly explore the wealth effects of alliance
making and progress in the stages of the R&D process. It is true to say that the impact
of inter-organizational cooperative agreements upon shareholder wealth has been
explored in the literature. Such studies have examined the shareholder wealth effects of
equity joint ventures within single sectors such as Information Technology (Koh and
Venkatraman, 1991) and multiple sectors (Madhavan and Prescott, 1995; Mc Connel
and Nantell, 1985; Reuter and Miller, 1997). Event studies have also assessed the
effect of non-equity based strategic alliances within multiple sectors (Chan, Kensinger,
Keown and Martin, 1997; Das, Sen and Sengupta, 1998) and single sectors such as
biotechnology (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999). The sample of these studies has,
however, been exclusively or predominantly US, thus insights into the shareholder
wealth effects of alliance making for UK firms are sparse. An event study have also
been employed to examine the shareholder wealth effects of announcements of
progress in the R&D process across multiple industries (Kelm, Narayanan and Pinches,
1995), though this study is both confined to the US and excludes biotechnology firms.
This chapter seeks to make four contributions to the literature. First, and most
important, it seeks to apply the theoretical lens of Exploration/Exploitation to
shareholder wealth creation via the event study methodology. This will potentially
offer important insights into the relative financial return of Exploration and
Exploitation activities in the eyes of shareholders and support, or cast doubt upon,
Levinthal and March's (1993) assertion that Exploitation comes to dominate over
Exploration due to faster and casually unambiguous financial feedback loops. Second,
it is the first study, to the knowledge of this researcher, to offer insights into both the
shareholder wealth creation effects of alliance making and progress in the R&D
process within a single sample. This chapter will offer researchers potentially
important insights into shareholder's assessment of the relative importance of each of
these activities upon wealth creation. Third, the study will partially fill an important
gap in the literature whereby the wealth impacts of alliance making and progress in
R&D are well known for US listed firms, but not for UK firms. Fourth, the study will
offer insights into the process of wealth creation side of UK biotechnology, which the
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UK government has identified as a strategic growth sector (Office of Science and
Technology, 1999).
The remainder of this chapter will be split into five sections. The first section will
provide a brief whistle-stop tour of the event study literature in both Strategic
Management and Financial Economics. A brief explanation of the event study method
is offered at this stage. It will also highlight some of the major research themes that the
event study methodology has been employed to explore. The results of various studies
within and across the literatures are briefly contrasted. It is observed that event studies
employed to explore the same theme can generate both confirmatory and conflictual
data. Event studies which focus upon the wealth effects of alliance making and
progress in the R&D process are not discussed in this section, but will be employed in
the hypothesis and discussion sections. It shall be noted that though studies in
Financial Economics have challenged this method, its core assumption, that of the
efficient market remains robust enough that the event study methodology to justify its
continued application in modern academic studies.
The second section will develop six hypotheses that enable the researcher to test the
value adding nature of announcements of alliances and progress in discovery, Phase I,
II and III clinical trials. This enables one to more generally test whether Exploration or
Exploitation adds greater value in the eyes of the shareholder. These hypotheses shall
be developed through references to prior research in the literature and observations
based on the Celltech, Oxford Molecular and PoIyMASC case studies (see
Appendices). In the third section I will outline the methodology employed in this
chapter, detailing sample selection and the implementation of the event study
methodology.
The fourth section will analyze the effect of all announcements made by biotechnology
firms listed on the LSE over a three-year period to test the five hypotheses. It shall be
observed that in general the announcement of all four events had a significant and very
large positive effect on shareholder wealth. A hierarchy of value effects will be
observed, whereby, Prestige Alliances add the greatest value (over 10% abnormal
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returns on the day of the announcement), followed b,y progress in Phase 11/111 clinical
trials (over 9% abnormal returns), Regional Alliances (over 5% abnormal returns) and
finally, progress in Discovery/Phase I (over 2% abnormal returns). Alliance events
were found to have a marginally higher abnormal return the day of announcement
(7.74%) than announcements of progress in R&D (7.11%), however the standard
deviation of alliance events was lower than R&D events (7.84 and 11.27 respectively).
In the fifth section implications that these findings have upon the theory of knowledge
Exploration and Exploitation will be discussed.
A WHISTLE-STOP TOUR OF THE PREVALENCE OF EVENT EFFECTS
Brief explanation of what an event study does.
The methodological details of event studies are discussed in the methods section of
this chapter, however a brief explanation of what event studies are all about may be of
help to the reader. Underpinning the event study methodology is the efficient market
hypothesis, which argues that all publicly available information that offers insight into
the present and future performance of a share is promptly digested by the market and
reflected in a firm's share price (Fama, 1991). Thus the share price of a firm should
reflect shareholders' assessment of its future earnings potential. Returns in excess of
market performance should not persist beyond the short-term period (a matter of
minutes or in extreme days) required to assimilate the new information into a firm's
share price. In periods were the market received no specific information on the future
performance of the firm it's share price should broadly follow the performance of the
market around a random walk where prices are as likely to rise as fall. It is vital to the
maintenance of the efficient market hypothesis that evidence not emerge which reveals
that shareholders consistently over, or under, react to announcements that have an
impact upon firm valuation. Such evidence would break the assumption that share
price fully reflects the earnings potential of the firm. Equally it is important that
evidence does not emerge that persistent long-term abnormal returns associated with a
single event do occur. Such evidence would break the assumption that new information
is rapidly and completely assimilated into the price of a share.
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The essence of an event study is to assess shareholder reactions to unanticipated
announcements that provide new information about a firm and see if they have an
impact on share price. Such announcements should offer the shareholder new, or
additional insight, into the current or future performance of the firm. The events need
to be unanticipated because otherwise the information that they provide about the firm
should have been already assimilated into the firm's share price. If the event conveys
positive news then one expects share price to rise, while a price fall would be expected
in response to negative news. For an event effect to be deemed to have occurred then
such share price movements need to be significantly different from the 'normal'
behaviour of the firm's share price. Such significant differences are referred to as
'abnormal returns.' Determination of the normal behaviour of a share is at the heart of
the event study method and is discussed in the methodology section.
Some event studies in the management and financial economics literature.
The event study methodology has a long and rich history in the epirica1 literature
since its introduction into modern academic studies by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Rolls
in 1969. A wide variety of research topics have been explored through the lens of event
studies. Within the Strategy literature, shareholder wealth has been found to be
significantly effected by events as varied as top management changes, downsizing and
restructuring, strike commencement and settlement, product recalls, Mergers and
Acquisitions and socially responsible and irresponsible corporate behaviour. Within
the Financial Economics literature research event studies on the same topics as of
Strategy have included studies on the impact of top management exit from firms, the
effects of downsizing on firms and their competitors, product recalls and Mergers and
Acquisitions. Financial Economists have focused on a wide range of other issues,
primarily the search for systematic anomalies in the randomness of share price
movements, which could cast doubt on the validity of the event study methodology,
and also the effects of key changes in financial structure upon share price. Some of the
more exciting structural observations from these studies have included: the existence
of persistent abnormal returns for small firms in January, know as the 'January effect',
that Initial Public Offerings appear to be consistently under priced and that stock splits
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appear to result in persistent abnormal returns. A brief overview of some of the studies
from the Strategy and Financial Economics literature demonstrates not only the
widespread usage of event studies but also both the occurrences of reinforcing and
contradictory results that different event studies examining the same issue can
generate.
Worrell, Davidson and Glascock (1993), observed positive abnormal returns upon the
dismissal of a CEO if a successor is aimounced at the same time, while negative effects
were observed in the run up to a dismissal. Worrell, Davidson, Chandy and Garrison
(1986) observed that the death of a Chairman was accompanied by positive abnormal
returns, while the death of a CEO met with a negative market reaction. These results
have been used to support the hypothesis that who is in control of senior management
matters to shareholders. Observations from the Financial Economics literature
complement the argument of strategy that senior management matters to shareholders,
by observing that the departure of a senior manager, Chairman or CEO, to a rival firm
results in negative abnormal returns, while sudden death results in positive abnormal
returns.
Interestingly it has also been shown through event studies in the Strategy literature that
shareholders value the layoff of workers in general, though for different reasons. The
layoff of workers is argued to be a signal to shareholders that a firm is responding
positively to a market challenge, or cost inefficiencies, resulting in positive abnormal
returns in both US and Japanese firms (Lee, 1997). In US firms it has been found that
shareholders react positively to layoffs associated with a restructuring strategy, while
they respond negatively to layoffs linked to financial distress (Worrell, Davidson and
Sharma, 1991). Studies in the Financial Economics literature somewhat contradict the
findings of the management literature observing not only that layoff announcements
trigger negative abnormal returns, but that these spill over to competitors suggesting
that layoffs signal to shareholders that the industry in general is in recession (Sun and
Tang, 1998). Thus it can be concluded that while layoffs have a strong impact upon
shareholder wealth the direction and causality of the relationship remains a matter of
debate.
140
Studies on the effect of product recall upon shareholder wealth appear to be in broad
agreement within and across the literature. Significant product recalls result in negative
abnormal returns. Davidson, and Worrell (1992) observed that recalls of cars by US
manufacturers resulted in negative abnormal returns, with the greatest negative effect
occurring when the recall was accompanied by an offer of replacement or cash back
rather than repair. This builds on the work of Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) who
observed negative abnormal returns across both the car and ethical drugs industry for
firms who initiate product recalls. Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1988) further observed
that for major US manufacturers product recall by one firm resulted in negative
abnormal returns for both it and its competitors, supporting the hypothesis that product
recall has industry spillover effects.
A central concern of both the Strategy and Financial Economics literature has been the
impact of announcements of Mergers and Acquisitions upon shareholder wealth of
both buyers and sellers. Lubatkin (1987) observed from a sample tf 1,031 mergers
between 1948 to 1979 that pre-merger performance for acquiring firms was positive
and significant, while post merger performance was not statistically significant. Singh
and Montgomery (1987) observed from a sample of 105 acquisitions larger than $100
million that acquirers experienced greater positive abnormal returns where the
acquisitions were related. Financial Economists have explored the effects that method
of payment and ownership of the target firm have upon abnormal returns of acquirers.
In agreement with the Strategy literature Travlos (1987) observed from a sample of
167 acquiring firms between 1972 to 1981 that acquirers experienced larger abnormal
returns where the offer was in the form of a stock swap as opposed to a cash offer.
Chang (1998) examined the effect of announcing an acquisition of a private company.
In agreement with the findings of Travlos (1987) it was observed that positive
abnormal returns were associated with stock offers, however negative returns were
linked to cash offers. From this literature it can be concluded that the initial
announcement of an acquisition can be largely, though not always, associated with a
positive event effect. This review suggests that the results of Strategy versus Financial
Economics studies are largely complementary in the field of product recall and
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Mergers and Acquisitions, while mixed in the field of management turnover and layoff
announcements.
Management scholars have also explored the effect of strike action and social
responsibility upon shareholder wealth. Davisdon, Worrell and Garrision (1988)
observed that negative abnormal returns are associated with the announcement of the
commencement of a strike, while no effect is observed upon the announcement of
settlement or avoidance of a strike. Strikes of less than 20 days in duration, however,
can be associated with very small positive abnormal returns. Frooman (1997)
conducted a meta-analysis of 27 event studies that explored the relationship between
corporate social responsibility and shareholder wealth. Frboman concluded that
socially irresponsible behaviour, such as product recalls, criminal misconduct, or
antitrust suits, resulted in negative abnormal returns. Menzar, Nigh and Kwok (1994),
found in common with other studies that announcement of divestment of South
African operations resulted in negative abnormal returns. Wright, Ferris, Hiller and
Kroll (1995) observed that for a US sample between 1986 to 1992, negative abnormal
returns were associated with socially irresponsible behaviour, where firms were found
guilty of major discrimination, while socially responsible behaviour, where firms
received Exemplary Voluntary Effort Awards, were associated with positive abnormal
returns. It should be noted that replication work by Mc Williams and Siegel (1997)
casts doubt on the methodological validity of much of the social irresponsibility event
study literature. Notwithstanding their critique one can conclude that in general event
studies suggest that social irresponsibility is linked to negative abnormal returns.
The 'Jan uary Effrct', IPOs and Stock Splits: a challenge W an efficient market
hypothesis?
As noted above the Financial Economics literature has also devoted considerable
attention to the existence of persistent abnormal returns associated with financial
structuring events. It has been empirically shown that between 1927 to 1993 small
firms quoted on US exchanges have experienced abnormal returns every January
(Belier and Nofsinger, 1998). This phenomena, referred to as the 'January effect', was
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brought to the attention of the modem Financial Economics literature by Rozeff and
Kinney in 1976. Numerous hypotheses for the persistence of the 'January' effect have
been proposed. Beller and Nofsinger's (1998) study supports the investor behaviour
hypothesis, where shareholders sell in December to realise tax losses and re-purchases
occur in January, while Ritter and Chopra (1989) reject this hypothesis in favour of
portfolio re-balancing. Whatever the cause of the 'January' effect its persistence may
challenge the notion of an efficient market. Given that the 'January' effect is well
known one would expect, under an efficient market, that .this information be
assimilated and acted upon, thus market actors should anticipate the arbitrage
opportunity and act upon it by buying in December and selling at a profit in January.
In a review of prior studies, Smith (1986) reported that studies have found 2 day
abnormal returns for IPO stocks to vary from 11.4% during the period 1960 to 1969,
based on a sample of 120 firms, to 18.8% over the period 1960 to 1982, based on a
sample of 5,162 firms, to a high of 48.4% during the period 1980-1981, based on a
sample of 325 firms. Short term IPO under-pricing can be links td the underwriter's
desire to ensure that uninformed customers obtain positive first day returns and invest
in future IPOs issued by that underwriter (Beatty and Ritter 1986). There exits
evidence that over a long time horizon of three years IPO stocks subsequently under
perform a size matched portfolio by 17% (Ritter, 1991). Krigman, Shaw and Womack
(1999) observed that IPOs of firms who achieve positive abnormal returns on the first
day of trading continue to do so for the first year, while poor performers continue to
perform badly for a year. Informed investors, aware of both initial short run under
pricing and the persistence of long term winners and losers in the IPO market, flip
poorly performing IPOs (Krigman et al. 1999). Persistent under pricing of IPOs could
call into question the efficient market hypothesis for IPOs, however it does not per-se
mean that the market for stocks with an established trading record is inefficient.
Stock Splits, like the 'January' effect may cast some doubt upon the efficient market
hypothesis. Stock splits occur when the firm decides to split a single share into smaller
bundles because the value of a single share has become unwieldy large. For example a
firm who's share price has risen over time from 100 pence to 1500 pence may decide
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to initiate a 15 for 1 stock split to return the price of any one share to a price which
makes it easier for investors to trade. Given that the only thing that a stock split is
nominally about is the resizing of a single share, then one should not expect an event
effect as this act alone does not at face value offer new information about the future
earnings potential of the firm. It has, however, been observed by numerous studies that
not only do stock splits result in significant abnormal returns, but that these returns
persist for up to a year. This is a period well beyond the short time that the market
should require to assimilate new information into a firm's stock price, if stock splits do
in fact convey new information about the earnings of a firm. Grinblatt, Masulis and
Titman (1984) observed that Stock Splits result in short run abnormal returns.
Inkenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) observed from a sample of 1,275 stock splits
between 1975 to 1990 that firms experience abnormal returns of 3.38%, with the
smallest decal of firms experiencing abnormal returns of over 10%. Abnormal returns
were found to persist for one year. Such persistent abnormal returns are explained as
being due to a combination of signalling and trading effect. Signalling effects occur
where the management anticipates a period of sustained improvement in profitability
and signals this to the market via a stock split. Trading effects occur where a firm that
has performed well over the past year engages in a stock split due to the rapid rise in
its share price over the year, making the price of a single share unwieldy for bundling.
The persistence of these abnormal returns may represent a challenge to efficient market
hypothesis.
From the above whistle-stop tour of the event study literature three observations can be
made. First, the use of the methodology is widespread in both the Strategy and
Financial Economics literature. Second, event studies within and across the literatures,
in common with other methodological tools, can yield both complementary and
conflicting results. Third, there is a considerable body of research within the Financial
Economics literature that casts some doubt on the underpinning assumption of the
methodology, namely the efficient market hypothesis. Levis (1989) has found evidence
that such anomalies in the efficiency of stock markets are not confined to the US, but
also exist in the London Stock Exchange. It should, however, be noted that the
existence of long run persistent abnormal returns and over, or under, reaction by the
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market to specific events does not necessarily undermine the efficient market
hypothesis or the usage of the event study methodology, both of which are still
rigorously defended in the literature. An extensive literature review and critique by the
founder of the method, Fama (1998), offers a compelling argument that the efficient
market hypothesis is not undermined by studies observing long run abnormal returns
(e.g. stock splits), or over-reaction to certain events (e.g. Initial Public Offerings).
Fama argues that given that overreaction to announcements is found to be about as
common as under reaction and that long run positive abnormal returns are found to be
as common as long negative abnormal returns, that the core of the efficient market
hypothesis is maintained, namely that anomalies should follow a random walk and
thus their overall effect is cancelled out.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
Mc Williams and Siegel (1997) launched a strong attack on the methodological rigour
of event studies published in the management literature, arguing that many have failed
to pay sufficient attention to establishing strong theoretic arguments as to why
shareholder wealth should be affected by the events under study. Thus considerable
attention is paid in this chapter to the expression of both the theoretical and empirical
logic why announcements of alliances and progress in R&D should impact upon
shareholder wealth as expressed in changes in share price. Six hypotheses are
developed in this section. Support for the hypothesis is offered from the three case
studies, Ceiltech. Oxford Molecular and PoIyMASC, which form a part of this thesis
and are presented in full in the appendices.
Alliances and Wealth creation
In the literature five value enhancing benefits of inter-organisational co-operation are
often cited. First, is the pursuit of economies of scale that may arise from the
combination of two competing firms' activities into a single venture (Koh and
Venkatraman, 1991). Second, alliances can facilitate access to complementary assets,
which may not be contractually obtainable on the open market. Examples of
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complementary assets include access to marketing and distribution channels. Glaister
and Buckley (1997) undertook a survey of UK firms to discover what task and partner
related characteristics most influenced firms in the selection of Joint Venture partners.
They found that access to complementary assets was the second most important task
related selection criterion. Their factor analysis finds access to complementary assets
overall to be the third most important selection factor after access to technological
know-how and financial assets. Important complementary assets for biotechnology
firms include cash, due to their long time to market, complementary technology and
access to channels of distribution, which are primarily controlled by large
pharmaceutical firms. Hagedoorn (1993), in a study of the motives of 4,192 alliances,
found that for the 847 biotechnology alliances in his sample 13% of them were
primarily motivated by access to partner's financial resources, 35% for access to
complementary technology, and 13% by market access issues. Thus 61% of
biotechnology alliances were motivated by access to complementary resources and
capabilities. Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) in their study of collaborative
networks between pharmaceutical and 225 biotechnology firms observed that the
highest number of alliances by biotechnology firms involved access to key
complementary resources: marketing channels and finance.
In the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sector the breadth and fast moving nature of
technological opportunities may explain the prevalence of alliances as tools to access
complementary technological and commercial assets. Powell (1998) argues that the
technological landscape in servicing an individual therapeutic area can be so large that
even the largest pharmaceutical firms in the world cannot hope to contain complete
technological resources under one vertically integrated structure argues it. Thus in
seeking to make an impact in a given therapeutic area a pharmaceutical firm may
pursue many different technological solutions at once through a network of partners
who possess diverse technological capabilities which can be integrated into the
pharmaceutical firm's complementary clinical trial management and marketing
capabilities.
146
Third, alliances may be used to share costs, particularly in highly capital intensive
sectors such as defence where Hagedoorn (1993) found 36% of alliances were
motivated primarily by Cost sharing. He found, however, that cost sharing was the
primary motivating factor in only 1% of biotechnology alliances.
Fourth, alliances can be employed as a means of managing the risk, or uncertainty,
surrounding investments in R&D. Management of risks such as technological and
market lock-out can be powerful motives for alliance formation (Kogut, 1988).
Uncertainties such as which technology will emerge as valuable and the risk of being
locked out of the market by a competitor who shortens the time span for an innovation
to get to market can be particularly important in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology (Powell et al., 1996). Reduction of innovation time span is found by
Hagedoorn (1993) to be a primary motive in 23% of alliances for 4,792 firms, with the
importance for biotechnology firms rising to 31%. Winner take all games, or learning
races where several firms are competing to obtain regulatory approval for a drug to be
approved for use in treatment of the same illness, can be an important factor in
pharmaceutical competition. Powell et al. (1996) have observed that biotechnology
firms who ally with experienced (pharmaceutical) partners are more likely to succeed
in learning races. It is widely understood that the first drug to obtain regulatory
approval in the US obtains a dominant market share, while the next two drugs onto the
market tend to make up the lion's share of the remaining market. This may explain the
biotechnology sector findings of both Hagedoorn and Powell et al.
Fifth, alliances can be employed to jointly develop new capabilities or to acquire
through learning knowledge that is of value to the firm, but cannot be obtained through
an open market transaction. Theoretical papers have argued that alliances facilitate the
transfer of tacit knowledge, which can be an important source of competitive
advantage (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Kogut 1988). Learning and the transfer of
tacit knowledge are also becoming an important focus of empirical research on the
value of alliances. Powell et al. (1996) observed that pharmaceutical firms use
alliances with biotechnology firms as a method of teaming about new technologies to
assess if the technology is sufficiently valuable to be absorbed into the vertically
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integrated firm. Pisano (1990) empirically demonstrated that where a firm is more
dependent on pharmaceuticals for its profits it is more likely to internalise promising
biotechnology technologies. He noted that such technologies are often identified
though alliance interaction with entrepreneurial biotechnology firms. Das et al. (1998)
found strong support in their event study of 119 strategic alliances for the hypothesis
that technological alliances are associated with greater abnormal returns than
marketing alliances. It is argued that this is because technological alliances are
normally between small innovative firms and large mature firms. The market views
these as win-win alliances where access to complementary resources increases value,
though learning opportunities may play a role. Doz (1996) observed from 3 alliance
case studies, including one between pharmaceutical firms, that alliances where a high
degree of learning took place were successful, while alliances that exhibited a low
degree of learning were unsuccessful. There is a clear implication that higher degrees
of learning lead to higher degrees of project success and hence higher value added.
Within the Celitech, Oxford Molecular and PoIyMASC case studies (see appendices)
there exists strong support for the contention that alliances are used for the purpose of
access to complementary assets, cost sharing, management of risk and technological
uncertainty, and learning new capabilities. Little evidence was found to support the
argument that alliances were employed as means of obtaining economies of scale.
The example of Celltech, analysed in Chapter Three, illustrates the value adding
potential of alliances in the UK biotechnology sector. The CEO of Celltech, Dr.
Feliner, makes it clear in the Celltech case study that he views the management of
inter-organisational collaboration with major pharmaceutical firms as being at the heart
of his ambition to transform Celltech into a successful drug discovery and
development company. From his perspective collaboration enables Ceiltech to share
the risks and rewards of drug discovery and development in addition to enabling
Celitech to have access to world class drug development capabilities, which would
have been too costly and time consuming to independently create during its dramatic
turnaround in the 1990s. As noted in Chapter Three, the underlying logic of
collaboration at Celitech is summarised in the 1995 Annual Report as follows:
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"Because of the high cost and complexity of world-wide product development and
marketing the company collaborates with major pharmaceutical companies which
possess the necessary technological expertise and financial resources to optimize
the probability of success. As the company progresses towards profitability we
intend to retain a greater proportion of European rights to new products" (Annual
Report 1995)
Collaboration has brought Celitech several important benefits. The firm has obtained
£26.5 million in milestone payments from alliance partners. It has conserved its scarce
scientific and financial resources by passing development costs and activities onto
partners. Dr. Yarranton, the firm's Research Director, estimates that this has reduced
the firm's development costs by 50%, while also giving it access to world class clinical
trial capabilities of leading pharmaceutical firms.
Executives at Ceiltech noted that collaboration has provided important learning
benefits whereby the firm has learned the ability to manage development projects
across organisational boundaries more efficiently and effectively than it could do so
internally. This collaborative capability lies at the heart of the firm's strategy. It has
been learned slowly over time though collaborative ventures with several leading
firms, including Bayer of Germany, Zeneca of the UK, and Merck of the USA.
Executives in Celitech clearly believed that such collaborative capabilities add value to
the firm. Supporting the arguments of these executives is the work of Gulati (1999).
He conducts an analysis of 11 longitudinal case studies of alliances and argues that a
collaborative capability is an important source of competitive advantage.
Another important capability has been extended and internalised through collaboration,
namely management of drug development. It was noted by the CEO of the Celltech
therapeutics that experience in the development of drugs, learned through collaboration
with leading pharmaceutical firms between 1990 to 1997, now means that Celitech is
able to manage more stages of the development process internally than it could in
1990. This he argued means that Ceiltech can now retain a greater proportion of the
royalties to drugs created through collaboration than it could in 1990. This is because
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before it could only bring discovery expertise to the ,artnership, thus partnership had
to commence at the start of clinical trials. Now the firm can independently undertake
the lower cost end of drug development, namely Phase I and II clinical trials and then
enter into a collaboration with a firm who has expertise in Phase III trials and
marketing. This means that Celitech can retain a greater proportion of final rights than
it could before when entering into an alliance.
The theoretical benefit of a reduction in innovation time does not have appeared to
have materialised, however, with Dr. Ney, Celltech's Development Director, noting
that collaboration often means the firm must face a longer time to market. This she
argues may be due to the slower speed of larger collaborators' decision making
process, the time involved in knowledge transfer and differences in managerial control
systems making co-ordination more difficult. All executives in the firm however noted
that these costs were far exceeded by the benefits of collaboration outlined above. Thus
it can be seen in the Celitech case that the primary value adding rationales of alliances
are cost sharing, the management of technological uncertainty, access to
complementary assets (drug development and marketing), and learning new
organisational capabilities (drug discovery and management of collaboration).
The experience of PoIyMASC dovetails with that of Celitech, despite the fact that
Celitech is one of the oldest biotech firms in the sector, having been founded in 1980,
while PoIyMASC is quite young, having been formed in 1995. While Celitech
collaborates primarily with large pharmaceutical firms, PoIyMASC collaborative
portfolio consists of small specialised biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. It
collaborates with partners for three explicit purposes. First, to share costs and gain
access to complementary resources. The key complementary resource which
P01yMASC seeks access to is Intellectual Property Rights. The technology of
PoIyMASC is a drug delivery mechanism known as PEGylation. This involves the
coating of a drug to make delivery to the site of a disease easier. Po1yMASC attaches
the coating to other firm's drugs. Such combination of new a delivery mechanism with
a drug currently on the market is required to enter clinical trials prior to marketing
approval by regulators of the re-formulated compound. .Thus collaboration with the
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owners of the compound, who will be most knowledgeable on its clinical operation, is
vital if Po1yMASC products are to make it to the market. Second, Po1yMASC uses
alliances to enable the sale of its technology to other firms. This involves out-licensing
the technology to other firms, however given the complexity of such knowledge
transfer close collaborative links are required as opposed to a hands-off open market
transaction. Having transferred the technology these firms then independently apply it
to their own drug portfolio.
Given the high degrees of uncertainty attached to drug discovery and development,
initially PoIyMASC sought to confine itself to the licensing out of the drug delivery
technology that had been transferred from the Royal Free Hospital to it upon its
incorporation in 1995. Out Licensing is described as a low risk, low return strategy by
the management. However in 1997 the firm choose to engage in strategic alliances
which involved a third application of alliances, namely joint drug discovery and
development through access to the drug discovery capabilities of other firms. Such
alliances then involved the joint R&D of new drug cornpound, which apply
PoIyMASC's drug delivery technology in new contexts. Thus in the Po1yMASC's case
one can observe that the key rationales behind alliance formation are cost sharing,
access to complementary resources and capabilities, such as II' rights and drug
development capabilities, and sharing the uncertainties of drug development.
Oxford Molecular exhibits the collaborative rationales of access to complementary
resources and capabilities and learning. The objective of Oxford Molecular is not to
engage in drug discovery or development on its own account, but rather to manage the
drug discovery activities of other pharmaceutical and biotechnology firm's. As noted
in the firm's web-site:
"The guiding principle for the Drug (Discovery) division is to build a bride
between successful university research projects and the needs of commercial
research and development organisations involved in pharmaceutical and
biotechnology R&D." (Oxford Molecular, 1998).
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According to Dr. David Ricketts, the head of Oxford Molecular's Drug Discovery
Division, pharmaceutical firms engage in co-operative agreements with his division for
three main reasons: to fill technological gaps; because they lack the time on their
internal R&D timetable to research an issue; or to search for new technological
opportunities. Filling technological gaps and search both involve Oxford Molecular
obtaining access to technology and expertise that resides in universities and managing
the process of either embedding that knowledge in a drug discovery project or
transferring it from the university and into the pharmaceutical firm. These activities
demonstrate two important rationales for alliances, namely, access to complementary
capabilities that do not reside within the firm, and acquisition of new knowledge.
Three reasons why alliances may destroy value are proposed in the literature. The first
is that the management of alliances incur costs of co-ordination (Koh and
Venkatraman, 1991). Such costs can be tangibly observed in this thesis's case studies.
Oxford Molecular engages in a time consuming process of weekly electronic updates
between partners, monthly reviews, and quarterly face to face meetings. These reviews
can, and regularly do, involve a re-appraisal of the objectives of the project, which can
necessitate considerable re-organisation of resources within the project to facilitate
new goals.
Second, there is a danger that alliances may be particularly vulnerable to 'theft' of the
core competencies of one partner by the other (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Hamel, 1991),
or other forms of opportunistic behaviour (Parke, Rosenthal and Chandran, 1993). It
should, be noted, however, that recent empirical studies do not support the argument
that alliances result in 'hollowing out' of core competencies through unbalanced
learning (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). Furthermore no evidence, either from
interviewees or secondary sources, emerged from the Celltech, Oxford Molecular, or
PoIyMASC case studies to suggest that biotechnology firms feared, or had a
propensity to engage in, 'hollowing out' of a partner's competencies.
Third, it has sometimes been argued through case evidence that alliances may be a
prelude to a take-over (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991). This argument does not appear,
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however, stand up in the face of large-scale empirical work. Hagedoorn and Sadowski
(1999) analyse a sample of 6,425 inter-organisational relationships and found that only
2.4% of alliances transformed into joint ventures and that only 2.6% of alliances
transformed into Mergers or Acquisitions. The fear that a small partner is vulnerable to
take-over by a large partner appears to be unfounded with Hagedoorn and Sadowski
(1999) observing that a smaller proportion of alliances between small and large
partners are transformed into mergers or acquisitions than for large and medium sized
partners. It was further observed that the probability of transformation was even lower
in high technology sectors such as biotechnology. Finally, an event study of the
shareholder wealth effects of 345 strategic alliances across multiple sectors by Chan et
al. (1997) observed that in only five cases did the alliance transform into either an
equity joint venture or a merger within a four year time horizon.
During 1999 there have been two mergers and acquisitions involving the three case
firms from the appendices. Celltech took over a rival UK biotechnology firm,
Chiroscience in 1999. PoIyMASC was take-over in 1999 by Valenfis, a NASDAQ
listed US drug delivery company. In neither the case of Celitech and Chiroscience nor
PoIyMASC and Valentis had the two firms been alliance partners prior to the take-over
announcement. Thus the argument that an alliance is a prelude to a take-over does not
appear to be confirmed by either large-scale empirical studies or the case studies
reported in the Appendices of this thesis.
From the above it can be reasonably argued that the value adding benefits of an
alliance should outweigh the potential costs of partnership, thus one would anticipate a
positive effect on shareholder wealth to accompany the announcement of an alliance.
Furthermore, it should be noted that prior event studies, which have assessed the
shareholder wealth effects of alliance and joint venture announcements, have all
observed significant positive abnormal returns (Chan et al., 1997; Das et aL, 1998;
Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Madhavan and Prescott, 1995; Mc Connel and Nantell,
1985).
From the above it can be predicted that for a UK biotechnology firm:
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Hypothesis 1: announcement of an inter-organisational relationship, which has as a
stated goal the combination of complementary assets, the management
of technological uncertainty, the transfer between, or joint development
of new capabilities or knowledge has a sign fl cant and positive effect on
afirm 's shares price performance.
Aside from the value adding benefits that collaboration can bestow through access to
complementary resources and capablilties, the sharing of costs and uncertainty, and the
acquisition of new capabilities via learning, alliances can play another very important
role in the creation of value, namely, reputation building. Within the resource based
view of the firm reputation is acknowledged as a potentially important source of
competitive advantage (Grant, 1991; Hall, 1992), thus pursuit of increased reputation
through alliance making can be a potentially valuable source of value. The underlying
argument is that the greater the reputational resources of the firm the greater its ability
to deliver value added, hence share price should rise if the firm experiences a rise in its
reputational resources.
Empirical studies are increasingly exploring the value adding role that alliances play
by transferring reputation from an established firm to a less experienced firm. Through
a series of 7 case studies Larson (1992) observed that entrepreneurial firms often use
alliances with high reputation, experienced, firms (which this thesis refers to as
prestige alliance) as a way of breaking into an industry's 'inner circle'. Firms within
the 'inner circle' had reputations for reliability, durability, and superior product
quality, which can be important advantages in both the capital markets and in securing
customers. Larson's cases demonstrated that entrepreneurial firms sought to enter the
'inner circle' through a series of stepwise alliances where the firm traded on the
reputation of its alliance partners to acquire new, higher status, partners and over time
enter the 'inner circle.'
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Dollinger, Golden and Saxton (1997) undertook an experiment with MBA students
where they were asked to select a joint venture partner. It was observed from the study
that the decision to engage in a joint venture was significantly affected by the
perceived reputation of the partner firm. The greater the perceived reputation of the
firm the greater was its ability to attract partners. The fact that a partner was a
competitor did not affect the student's decision to engage in a joint venture. From this
study it can be concluded that decision makers clearly believe that the reputation of a
firm is an important criterion in the selection of a partner. It should be noted, however,
that the assumption that the behaviour of MBA students in a controlled experiment
correlates with that of executives making real partnering decisions is somewhat
dubious. Fortunately, there exists evidence in the UK that executives in finns are in
fact strongly influenced by a partner firm's perceived reputation when choosing
collaborative partners. Glaister and Buckley (1997) found in their survey that
reputation was the third most important characteristic of a partner in the decision to
partner, coming after trust between top management teams and the relatedness of a
partner's business. Thus it can be concluded that not only does case e'idence suggest
that entrepreneurial firms believe that reputation of partners can add value, but also
that firms in general are influenced by partner reputation in the decision to collaborate.
Based on a two-stage questionnaire survey of 98 firms, from seven countries, in the
chemical sector Saxton (1997) observed that the relationship between the perceived
financial, managerial and product quality reputation of an alliance partner is positively
associated with the success of an alliance. Reputation was measured by managers
involved in a given alliance on a ten-point scale, where one indicated that their partner
had the worst reputation in the sector and ten indicated best in the sector. Performance
of the alliance was measured both in terms of partner satisfaction with the alliance in
general and also with its ability to deliver the goals for which it was founded. From
this study one can see that managers in the chemicals sector (which included
pharmaceutical firms) believe that the prior reputation has a positive effect on the
outcome of an alliance. Thus it can be expected that the greater the prior reputation of
an alliance the greater the probability that the alliance will be successful. The increased
probability of success of a project undertaken with a higher reputation firm should be
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recognised by the shareholder and thus announcement of such alliances should result
in higher abnormal returns than announcement of alliances with lower reputation
firms.
Clearly reputation plays an important role in the value added by collaborative partners
in general, however, there exists evidence both within the literature and the case
studies in this thesis that reputation has a particularly strong link with the performance
of biotechnology firms. Stuart et al. (1999) analysed the relationship between alliance
making, reputation building and both the speed and value of Initial Public Offering in
301 biotechnology firms in the US over a fourteen-year period. They concluded that
the greater the reputation of the alliance partner network which a new biotechnology
firm creates the faster it moves to IPO and the greater the value of the firm upon
flotation.
They argue that alliances with high reputation firms should be positively associated
with increased shareholder wealth because "(1) relationships have reciprocal effects on
the reputations of those involved; (2) the evaluative capabilities of well know
organisations are perceived to be strong; and (3) relationships with prominent
organisations signal a new venture's reliability, and thus its high likelihood of
survival." In other words shareholders in biotechnology firms will believe that if a high
reputation pharmaceutical firm enters into an alliance with a biotechnology firm that it
believes that the collaborative project has a good chance of success because failure will
negatively impact on its wider reputation. Investors believe that the assessment of
pharmaceutical firms counts because they have the necessary scientific and
commercial capabilities to assess the likelihood of success in a drug R&D project.
They also believe that these skills will be applied to a careful audit of the
biotechnology firm's proposition to avoid investing in a project that may negatively
impact on the pharmaceutical firm's reputation.
There is strong support for this line of reasoning in this thesis's case studies.
Throughout the Celltech case there is a clear message from the management team that
collaboration with leading pharmaceutical firms has a validatory effect where by
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shareholders value the judgement of such collaborators. Dr. Bloxham, the CEO of the
therapeutics firm, made it clear that he believes that the Bayer alliance sent a strong
signal to shareholders that when management said Ceiltech's drug development
portfolio was valuable that this was not just hype, but backed up by the careful
assessment of a highly reputed pharmaceutical firm. He clearly stated his belief that
the announcement of an alliance with Bayer had a positive effect on Celltech's share
price and that from this perspective the alliance was a success.
Bloxham's argument is supported by independent comments by an analyst in the
Financial Times. Daniel Green, a respected observer of the UK biotechnology sector,
commented that:
"Most importantly, Celitech has collaborations with big name drugs companies and
their expert assessment is worth more than a City analyst's report. Where
companies such as Merck, Bayer and Schering-Plough invest, others follow."
(Green 1994).
In the PoIyMASC case there was again a strong believe that alliance partners acted as a
validation of the value of the firm's technology and strategy in the eyes of
shareholders. The Commercial Development Director was clear that in his view
announcements of alliances had a positive effect on share price. In conversations he
observed that he believed that alliance with a major pharmaceutical firm would have a
very positive effect on the firm's share price, though it must be noted that at that time
such an alliance had not been announced.
It can be seen that within both the literature and the case studies that there exists
evidence that the reputation of an alliance partner is believed to have an impact on the
assessment by shareholders of the future earnings potential of firms. This is because
the reputation of alliance partners is associated with the probability of success of the
projects the firm is undertaking and because high reputation (prestige) partners have
access to both information and evaluative expertise that shareholders may lack. From
the above it can be predicted that for a UK biotechnology firm:
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Hypothesis 2: announcement of an inter-organisatiinal relationship with a high
reputation partner will have a greater positive effect on a firm 's share
price performance than an announcement of a partnership with firm
with a lower reputation.
Progress in the R&D Process
At the heart of therapeutic biotechnology firms is the drive to gain regulatory approval
for drugs, which they discover and deve1op either independently or in conjunction with
collaborative partners. Drugs cannot be sold legally without extensive safety and
efficacy testing. National regulators need to be convinced that the drug can be safely
used and does in fact materially benefit the health of the targeted patient group before a
drug can be marketed to the public either on prescription or over the counter. The drug
development and approval process can be both costly and timely, being estimated to
cost between $200 and $350 million to take a drug from discovery to marketing
approval, and taking seven to twelve years to make it from concept to market (BlO,
1999). In return however, patented drugs obtain monopoly rights. Patent protection last
for 17 to 20 years, thus giving biotechnology firms a 7 to 12 year monopoly right in
the marketplace. Margins on patented drugs are very high, varying from 20% to 35%.
The drug approval process has four main stages. The first is pre-clinical trials, where
promising compounds are identified. The second is clinical trials 35, where drugs pass
through three stages referred to as Phase I, II and III clinical trials. The details of these
trials have been outlined earlier in Chapter Three, however they are now briefly
restated. Phase I trials seek to establish the safety of the drug on healthy volunteers.
These trials represent about 11 per cent of the cost of performing clinical trials (Parexel
International, 1996). Phase II trials involve establishing the tolerable range and most
effective dosage on patients suffering the illness. Phase III trials involve further
controlled tests where the efficacy and safety of the drug is compared relative to other
" For a more detailed description on what clinical trials involve the reader is referred to a layman's
overview of the clinical trials process at http:/www.drkoop.com/hcr/trials/library.html
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treatments. Phase II trials represent about 27 per cent and Phase HI trials about 62 per
cent of the costs of the clinical trial process (Parexel International, 1996).
Exact figures on the average success rates of each stage of the clinical trials process are
not available, however one can say that failure does occur at each stage36. Thus it is
reasonable to say that progress from one stage to a later one, for example from Phase I
trials to Phase II, signals that the drug is moving closer to market approval. With
progress from one stage to the next the uncertainty about the compound, in terms of its
medicinal potential and likelihood of final approval, reduces. Thus one would expect a
positive market reaction to announcements of progress in clinical trials.
Evidence that the market does in fact respond to announcements on the progress of
clinical trials does exist. Using the event study methodology Torabzadeh, Woodruff
and Sen (1998) analysed a sample of 204 announcements about FDA decisions to
approve or reject New Drug Applications over the period 198 1-1992. They observed
that FDA approval lead to a two-day cumulative abnormal return of 1.13%. Rejection,
which occurred in 20 cases, resulted in a negative abnormal return of 10.67%.
Approval for the smallest quartile of the sample lead to the highest cumulative
abnormal returns of 2.05%. All returns were significant at the 1% level.
More generally announcements about progress in R&D have been found to have an
effect on shareholder wealth. Keim et al. (1995) undertook an event study into
shareholder wealth effects of 501 announcements regarding progress in the R&D
process in 23 industries over the period 1977 to 1989. They observed that
announcements about progress in R&D prior to product launch resulted in two-day
cumulative abnormal returns of 0.88°0, though the effect was much stronger in R&D
intensive sectors such as biotechnology. For the 26 announcements about progress in
the R&D process of biotechnology firms a two-day cumulative abnormal return of
6.64°c was observed.
Regulatory authorities and firms are not at present legally obliged to publicly release results of all
clinical trials. Thus failed trials often go unreported. (drkoop, 1999).
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Given the importance of progress along clinical trials in the drug approval process, and
the more general empirical evidence on shareholder wealth effects of R&D
announcements, it can be predicted that for a UK biotechnology firm:
Hypothesis 3: announcement of material progress in a firm 's R&D process will have a
signfIcant and positive effect on that firm 's share price performance.
Material progress is taken as an announcement of pre-clinical trial
results (discovery), entry into Phase I, II or III clinical trials and/or the
successful completion of any such trials.
Given that progress from discovery (pre-clinical trials), to Phase I, to Phase II, to Phase
III clinical trials demonstrates a reduction in medicinal and commercial uncertainty
one would expect the announcement effect to be larger the further down the clinical
trials process the drug gets and, hence, the closer is moves to regulatory marketing
approval. As in the Chapter Three, the drug discovery process is split into two stages,
discovery and Phase I clinical trials, which represent the process of knowledge
Exploration, and Phase II and III clinical trials, which represent knowledge
development, or Exploitation. It can be expected that shareholder wealth effects should
be greater the further down the R&D process a drug moves. Thus it can be predicted
that for a UK biotechnology firm:
Hipothesis 4: announcement of material progress in the development stage of a firm 's
R&D process in ternis of clinical trial performance will have a greater
positive effect than announcement of material progress in the discovery.
or Exploration stage, of a firm R&D process.
As noted above, prior empirical work in the literature indicates that significant and
positive abnormal returns are associated with both announcements of alliances and
progress in R&D. Prior studies have not, to the knowledge of this researcher, analysed
the effects of these disparate events within a single sector. A reasonable argument can
be put forward that one would expect that the overall impact of both forms of
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announcement to be largely similar. Announcement about prngress in clinical trials, as
a whole, signal to the market reduction of uncertainty in the likelihood of any one drug
reaching the marketplace. Such announcements do not, however, carry any information
about the immediate financial rewards for the firm. Passing a clinical trial does not in
of itself bring a direct financial reward. The regulator does not give the finn a financial
prize for passing a trial. Alliances bring with them direct financial rewards in the form
of milestone payments, cost sharing, or access to valuable resources and capabilities.
Some bring with them signals to the shareholder that the likelihood of success of a
project is high because the partner has conducted an audit of the project and is
investing its financial capital and reputation in the project. However this signal is not
necessarily as tangible and direct as a clear announcement that a project has passed a
scientific hurdle set in a clinical trial, thus the uncertainty reduction signals of an
alliance may be lower than those of clinical trials. From the above it can be argued that
announcements of progress in clinical trials bring rich uncertainty reduction
information, but no immediate financial rewards, while alliance announcements bring
immediate and continuing financial rewards, but lower levels of uncertainty reduction
information. Thus it can be predicted that for UK biotechnology firms:
Hypothesis 5: Announcement of an undifferentiated group of alliances ('i.e. excluding
reputation indicators) should have as positive an effect on share price
performance as an undifferentiated group of announcements about
clinical progress (i.e. excluding details of which stage of the R&D
process the trial involves,.
Hierarchy of Shareholder Wealth Effects: Appropriation, Development and
Exploratioi:
From the analysis of Celltech in Chapter Three it can be hypothesised that the further
one moves along the continuum from knowledge Exploration to Exploitation the
greater the financial feedback from the market should become (Levinthal and March,
1993; March 1991). From Chapter Three it was argued that prestige alliances are rich
in both appropriation, through milestone payments and sharing of development costs,
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and development information, through reduction in uncrtainty over the likely success
of an R&D project. Based on the theory outlined in Chapter Two and in-depth case
research, in Chapter Three, it would be expected that announcements rich in both
information about development and appropriation should be the most valuable as such
announcements cover the full spectrum of Exploitation, which theory suggests to be
more valuable in the marketplace than Exploration. Thus, it can be expected that
announcements of Prestige Alliances should be very valuable.
Announcements about progress in Phase II or Ill clinical trials should be valuable
because they offer information to the shareholder that the uncertainty about the success
of the project has been reduced. Such announcements should be less valuable than
Prestige alliances because they offer less information about Exploitation, offering
information on reduction in development uncertainties but no immediate appropriation
rewards via financial payments or reduced costs via transfer of development costs to
partners.
Announcements of non-prestige alliance are valuable because they enable access to
resources and capabilities, however they do offer uncertainty reduction signals to
shareholders. Access to complementary assets can be viewed as aiding development
and potentially offering milestone payments, however they do not offer uncertainty
reduction signals to the market and therefore are less valuable signals of Exploitation
than prestige alliances. They are also less valuable signals of Exploitation than Phase
Il/Ill trial announcements because, again, they do not offer uncertainty reduction
signals to the market, while Phase 11/111 announcements do.
Announcements of discovery or Phase I clinical trial progress offer valuable insights to
shareholders on the Exploration activities of the firm. Such announcements should
therefore add value. The shareholder wealth effects of Exploration announcements
should, however, be lower than Exploitation announcements, given the theoretically
stated tendency of Exploitation to have more positive financial returns than
Exploration activities (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991). Thus it can be
predicted that UK biotechnology firms:
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Hypothesis 6.' announcements, which are richer in appropriation information, should
be associated with greater share price perfor,nance effects than
deepening or Exploration announcements. Thus a hierarchy of
announcement effects is expected, where the greatest effect comes from
announcements of prestige alliances, followed by progress in Phase
11/111 clinical trials, regional alliances and discovery I Phase Iprogress.
METHODOLOGY
Event and Sanple Definition
In this study of announcements by therapeutic biotechnology firms listed on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) that
occurred between December 1995 and January 1999 was used. Announcements were
obtained from three main sources: source company web-sites, Newswire services,
accessed via Reuters Business BriefIngs, and the Financial Times. It is reasonable to
expect that investors in any of these companies would have access to these three
sources and thus the event information was deemed to have been released to the market
the first day it appeared in any of these sources. Sources such as the Financial Times
(Das et al., 1998) and the Wall Street Journal (Koh and Venkatram, 1991; Mc Connell
and NanteEl, 1985) are very commonly used in event studies. Usage of Newswire
Services is less common (Chan et al., 1997), while this study is the first, to the best of
this researcher's knowledge, to employ company web-sites as a source of
announcements.
Over the period of the study 146 events were announced. In line with the
recommendations of Mc Williams and Siegel (1997) a list of all 146 events in the
sample can be found in Appendix Four of this thesis. These announcements were
classified into four categories. The first event type was the announcement of a Prestige
Alliance, which is used to indicate a high reputation alliance. Prestige alliances are
recorded when the biotechnology firm enters into an alliance with a pharmaceutical
firm which was ranked in the top 20 largest firms in terms of pharmaceuticals turnover
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in 1998 (Firn, 1999). An example of a Prestige alliance in the sample was Peptide
Therapeutics announcement of a new R&D Allergy vaccine alliance with
pharmaceutical giant SmithKline Beecham on 10 February 1997. This announcement
triggered a significant abnormal return of 11.24% on that day for Peptide Therapeutics.
The second event type was alliances with any other firm, which were classified as
Regional Alliances. An example of a Regional Alliance in the sample was
PoIyMASC's Blood Growth Factor drug discovery alliance with fellow UK
biotechnology Oxford Molecular on 25 March 1998. This announcement triggered a
significant abnormal return of 14.26% on that day for Po1yMASC. Alliances are only
classified as events where the announcement is of a new, as opposed to continuing,
collaboration with a firm. Alliances were included in the sample if their stated purpose
was joint drug Research andlor Development (e.g. Cantab Pharmaceuticals R&D
alliance with Kakestsuke into a new Chickenpox and Shingles vaccine), licensing a
compound to another firm in return for future royalties (e.g. Chiroscience's licensing
of the local anaesthetic to Zeneca), or marketing and distribution (e.g. Cortecs
marketing and distribution agreement for Macritonin in Greece with Glaxo-
Welicome).
The third event type was announcements about significant progress in pre-clinical drug
discovery trials or Phase I clinical trials. An example of progress in pre-clinical drug
discovery trials in the sample was Powderject's announcement on 16 September 1998
of positive results in a cancer vaccine trial on mice. This announcement triggered a
significant positive abnormal return of 1.95% for Powderject. An example of a Phase I
clinical trial announcement from the sample was Phytopharm's announcement on 13
October 1998 that its appetite suppressant drug had entered Phase I human clinical
trials. This announcement triggered a significant and positive .4.48% abnormal return
for Phytopharm.
The fourth event type was announcements about significant progress in Phase II or
Phase III clinical trials. An example of progress in a Phase II clinical trial from the
sample was KS Biomedica's announcement of positive results from it's P11
Rheumatoid Anhritis trial on 3 February 1998. This announcement triggered a
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significant and positive abnormal return of 35.3 1% for KS Biomedix. An example of
progress in a Phase III clinical trial in the sample was Phytopharm's announcement of
positive Phase III eczema drug trials on 25 March 1998. This announcement triggered
a significant and positive abnormal return of 15.30%.
Calculation ofActual, Normal and Abnormal Returns
The method by which abnormal returns were calculated and their significance tested
followed the standard event study methodology as outlined by Mac Kinlay (1997) and
Mc Williams and Siegel (1997). First actual returns for each company were calculated.
Then a model of the firm's expected, or normal, share price performance behaviour
was generated. The impact of an announced event upon the performance of the firm
was then calculated as the difference between the actual performance of the share and
its expected, or normal, behaviour. This difference is referred to as an abnormal return.
The abnormal returns of each firm that experienced each category of event were
averaged. The resulting average abnormal return was then tested to determine both its
sign and whether it was significantly different from the null hypothesis of zero
abnormal returns. In all cases it was found that announcement of a given category of
event did, as hypothesised, have a positive and significant abnormal return. The
method by which actual, normal, and abnormal returns were calculated is outlined
below.
The actual return for a firm i is calculated as follows:
P + D.
= log
Pu-i
Where i = the company and t day.
P11 the share price of company i on day t.
D 11 = the dividend granted for one share of company i on day t.
P, 1
 = the share price of company i on day t - 1.
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The expected, or normal returns, for company i are calculated as being a function of
the returns obtained by the market where:
E1 = +flRms+:
the continuously compounded realised returns on day t for a market index m.
a = the regression constant derived from regressing R, against R,,,.
$ = the regression coefficient derived from regressing R, against R,.
= is the error term derived from the regression with a mean of zero and a constant
variance.
The values of a and /3 are derived from regressing R., against R, over an estimation
period starting at t-180 days prior to the event day t=0 and ending on day t-20.
Following the advise of Mac Kinlay (1997) the estimation period was kept to a
minimum of 120 days to enable good estimations of a and /3
. 
The estimation period
terminates at day —20 to ensure that the event effect does not contaminate the
estimation of the normal return model parameters.
In the case of 31 observations the firms had not been trading on the stock exchange for
the 161 trading days required to generated estimates of a and /3
. 
This reduced the
sample from a total of 146 events to 115 events. Following the advice of Mc Williams
and Siegel (1997) for the benefit of future replication studies, details of the events
excluded due to confounding events are found in Appendix Four.
It is an obvious point that the selection of market index strongly influences what the
model will assign as the normal price behaviour of a given share. Most studies do
choose a single index and do not test the sensitivity of the abnormal return effect to
selection of market index. However, aware of recent criticisms of the event study
method (Chatterjee, Lubatkin and Schulze, 1998), this study shall employ three market
indices. The first model of normal returns regresses R against the returns of the FTSE
All Share index. This assumes that the normality of the performance of a UK
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biotechnology firm's share price is linked to the performance of the market as a whole.
Thus
E, = ai + /3RFTh&!It + It
The second model regresses R against the returns of an index of all UK biotechnology
firm's, referred to as UK Bio. This index was created specifically for this study, as no
comprehensive market capitalisation weighted index of UK biotechnology stocks was
publicly available. It is an index of all UK biotechnology firms listed on the London
Stock Exchange and the Alternative Investment Market, weighted by market
capitalisation. The base date for this index was December 1995. It was re-weighted
every three months. If a new firm listed on either exchange during the three-month
period then it was included in the index at the next re-weighting period. The UK Bio
index was thus calculated as:
Ru ® MktCapRatio
UKBIO =
N
Where MktCapRatio, calculated for each firm in included in the index once every three
Market Capitalisation of Finm
months, = ____________________________
Market Capitalisation of Firm
This model assumes that the normality of a UK biotechnology firm's share
performance is primarily related to the performance of its peer group of UK
biotechnology firms. Thus
= a + /JRUKB!ot +
A third model regresses R against both the returns of the FTSE All Share index and
the UK BlO index. This model assumes that the normal behaviour of a UK
biotechnology share is a function both of the general performance of the stock market,
moderated by the performance of its peer group of UK biotechnology firms. Thus
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E1 ai + f3RuKBIo: + f32Rup1Ot +
A more simple, but important, mechanism by which the normal returns of a share can
be modelled is to assume that the performance of the share in any given day should be
equal to the average performance of the share over the estimation period. This assumes
that the best guide to the normal behaviour of a share is its own historic performance
rather than that of the market. Chatterjee et al. (1998) have called into serious question
the use of market regression models in the estimation of the normal. behaviour of
shares and strongly recommend that when assessing the impact of an event upon share
price both a market model and the more simple average adjusted returns model be
employed. Mac Kinlay (1997) also recommends usage of such models in event studies.
Thus normal behaviour is calculated as:
R.,
E=
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Additionally, the impact that a simple adjustment by the market return, as opposed to a
regression model, would have on the normal behaviour estimation was calculated.
Thus normal share price behaviour was calculated as:
Rmr
E = 1=-IS
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R,,,, in one model was the FTSE All Share index, while in another it was the UK Bio
index.
Abnormal returns are calculated to be the difference between actual returns and
expected or normal returns.
AR,1 = R,, - E11
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Where AR is the abnormal returns on day t for company i. It is expected that, in the
absence of news impacting on the future earnings of the finn, abnormal returns should
not on average be significantly different from zero. Consistent significant abnormal
returns in the absence of the announcement of news impacting on the future earnings
of a firm would run counter to the underlying premise of an efficient capital market.
For each event type the abnormal returns of all firms who experience such an event are
averaged to produce an average abnormal return for the day ARC.
AR =
N
Where N = the number of firms in the sample who experience the given event.
It is found in the analysis that irrespective of the choice of model to calculate the
normal, or expected, returns of a share all events continue to generate significant and
positive abnormal returns. The abnormal returns generated by each of the above six
models can vary by up to 2.2°c.
Event I! 'indows and Ciuni1aiing Abnormal Returns
On occasion it is appropriate to observe the cumulative effect of abnormal returns over
a number of days. Cumulative returns, as opposed to the abnormal returns experienced
on the event day zero, are tested in circumstances where the researcher has good reason
to believe that the event effect should occur over an event window of greater than one
day. This is appropriate where the researcher beliefs that either they may have mis-
coded the event day or the market takes more than one trading day to assimilate the
information into the share price. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns were
calculated as follows:
t=12
CAR1I.t2 = AR
I-ti
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Under an efficient market hypothesis one would expect the market to take greater than
one day to assimilate information into a firm's share price only where there is a
leakage of that information to some actors into the market prior to the official
announcement of the news to the market in general on day 0.
The null hypothesis of an event study is that both AR = 0 and CAR I = 0. Two test
statistics are applied to the hypothesis. A simple parametric student t test is calculated.
Sample sizes of less than 120 reduce the power of parametric testing, thus in line with
the suggestion of both Mac Kinlay (1997) and Mc Williams and Siegel (1997) a simple
percentage positive negative test is also employed. The percentage positive negative
has as its null hypothesis that share price will follow a random walk such that on any
given trading day there is an equal probability that the share price of a given firm will
be positive or negative. Therefore for an event effect to be observed in a sample of
firms on average the number of positive returns reported would have to be either
significantly above or below 50%. The use of both the parametric t-test and percentage
positive negative tests together in one study is both prudent and accepted practice in
the event study methodology (Chan et al., 1997; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Mac
Kinlay, 1997; Mc Connell et al. 1985; Mc Williams and Siegel, 1997).
Mc Williams and Siegel (1997) note the validity and power of an event study is greatly
reduced the longer the event horizon. They argue that studies should seek to accurately
determine the date of the announcement, thus reducing the probability of pre-event
abnormal returns due to mis-coding. Pre-event abnormal returns should, they argue,
not occur in an efficient market. Mis-coding of the event day may occur where the
researcher cannot determine with certainty the time at which the market received news
of the event. In this research great care has been taken to accurately record the event
day. Where possible the announced event has been obtained from the source
company's web-site which normally records the date of the day on which a given
announcement was given to the market. Where the event was announced during the
hours of stock exchange trading that day was assigned as day 0. Where the date of
announcement occurred after the hours of trading (as occurred in a number of cases)
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the event day 0 was assigned as the next day of stock exchange trading, that being the
first occasion on which the event news could be absorbed into the firm's share price.
Where the date of the announcement could not be obtained from a firm's web-site it
was obtained from Newswire services and Financial Times announcements listed in
the Reuters Business Briefings database. Newswire service announcements would
normally be delivered on the day of the announcement from the firm and directly into
trading rooms, while Financial Times announcements tended to have a time lag of one
day. Thus announcements obtained from Newswire services were coded as day 0 on
the date the Newswire reported the event, while announcements in the Financial
Times, were coded as the day prior to the publication of the news.
Table One, Panels A to D, summarises the average daily abnormal returns for the days
—5 to +5 for each of the four event categories. Two models are included in these
panels, the UK Bio market model, and the average adjusted return model. From Table
One it can be seen the assumption that the event effect should be largely reflected on
day 0 is confirmed. For Prestige Alliances no significant abnormal re1urns are observed
outside day 0. For Phase 111111 clinical trials gained the largest and most significant
effect is observed on day 0 (significant at 1% level). Some small abnormal returns
(significant at the 10% level) are observed using the non-parametric percentage
positive negative test in days —3, -2, and —1, however these are not significant using
parametric tests. Significant, though small effects are observed in day +2, at the 10%
and 5% level. These results may be due to market re-examination of complex clinical
trial test results over the period from day 0 to day 2. It could reasonably happen that an
initial effect is observed on day 0 when the headline of the trial results is obtained,
while a smaller secondary effect occurs on day 2 once the complex scientific details of
the announcement have been fully analysed by investors. For Regional Alliances the
majority of effects are confined to the event day 0 (significant at 1% level). Very
small, but significant abnormal returns, of less than 1% are observed on days —3 and
+3 at the 5% level. For Discovery and Phase I trials abnormal returns are observed in
all days except —2, +1 and +5. These results may be questionable given the very small
sample size of 8. Results outside day 0 are only significant at the 10% level while
results on day 0 are significant at the 5% level.
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INSERT TABLE ONE ABOTJT HERE
The fact that abnormal return effects are largely confined to day 0 is in part due to the
careful attention devoted to an accurate assessment of the event day 0. The results do
support the contention that the effects observed are due to shareholders reaction to the
information content in announcements of the four event categories rather than other
information. This lends weight to the results detailed in the analysis section.
Control for Confounding Events
Another important threat to the validity of an event study's findings is the existence of
confounding events (Mc Williams and Siegel, 1997). A confounding event is any
announcement of information within, or around, the event window that may offer
investors information on the future earnings potential of the firm. Thus the information
effects of such an event would confound those of the events under study. Confounding
events that occurred in this study included announcements of interim and year end
results, progress in R&D, appointments of new senior managers, creation or
termination of alliances, issue of new shares and acquisition of assets. An example of a
confounding event in this sample was the announcement by Cortecs on 12 June 1998
of a new alliance with Boehringer Mannheim. On the same day Cortecs announced the
resignation of its CEO. Even though abnormal returns were observed on this day, they
could not be assigned wholly to the announcement of the new alliance. Thus the
announcement of the resignation of the CEO acted as a confounding event to the
announcement of a Prestige Alliance; hence this event was excluded from the sample
of Prestige Alliances. Following the advice of Mc Williams and Siegel (1997), any
confounding events observed within an eleven day window of 
—5 to +5 days were
excluded from the study. 48 confounding events were observed, thus reducing the
sample from 115 to 67 events. Following the advice of Mc Williams and Siegel (1997)
for the benefit of future replication studies, details of the events excluded due to
confounding events are found in Appendix Four.
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It is commonly acknowledge that announcements regarding the success of firms tend
to be published more frequently than failure (Torabzadeh et al., 1998). The frequency
of announcements regarding the termination of alliances or failure of clinical trials was
rare over the life of the sample. Only 6 announcements of alliance termination and 6
announcements of termination of clinical trails were observed. A sample size of 6 was
considered to be too small to generate meaningful statistical test results and thus only
announcements of success or progress are reported in this chapter. Thus the usable
number of sample events is reduced from 67 to 55. From Appendix Four it can be seen
that within this sample of 55 events there were 15 announcements of successful
Prestige Alliances, 16 Regional Alliance, 16 Phase 111111 clinical trials and 8
Discovery/Phase I clinical trials.
DATA ANALYSIS
Impact ofAlliance Announcements upon Shareholder Wealth
Table Two reports the abnormal returns associated with the announcement of the
formation of any form of alliance by a UK biotechnology firm over the period
December 1995 to January 1999. This table reports the abnormal returns on the day of
the announcement, day zero. As is standard practice in many event studies it also
reports the cumulative abnormal returns in a number of event windows within an
eleven-day event horizon from five days before the announced event to five days after
the announcement. Abnormal returns are reported as percentages rounded up to two
decimal places. Abnormal returns are reported from all six normal return models.
Three market models are reported: the UK Bio index of all UK biotechnology firms,
weighted by market capitalisation; the FTSE all Share index; and a combination of the
FTSE AU Share and UK Bio indices, referred to as the 2 Factor model. Three simple
adjustment models are also reported: an Average Adjusted Returns model, adjusting
actual returns by the average returns of the firm; UK Bio index adjusted returns; and
FTSE All Share adjusted returns.
INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
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From Table Two it can be seen that all six model report highly positive returns to
announcements of an alliance on day 0. Across all models the event effect for alliances
was found to be significant at the 1% level using both a parametric test and the simple
rank sign (çercentage positive negative) test. This effect is largest for the Average
Adjusted Returns model, with a return of 7.93%, significant at a 1% using both a
standard parametric test and a percentage positive negative test. The smallest effect is
reported by the UK Bio market model with an abnormal return of 7.48%. An F-test
was used to determine if the returns generated by the six models differed significantly
from each other. The f-statistic recorded was 0.1291 with a critical value of 2.2 189.
This indicates that the abnormal returns generated by each model are essentially drawn
from the same sample and thus are not significantly differen from each other. The f-
statistic for the 31 individual company returns was 5.5487, with a critical value of
1.4653, indicating that the abnormal returns for individual firms were drawn, as one
would expect, from different samples.
Significant cumulative abnormal returns continue to be generated by all models in all
windows from days -5 to +5. Table One clearly illustrates that the full effect of the
announcement of Prestige Alliances (Panel A), and the vast majority of the effect of
announcements of Regional Alliances (Panel C), is captured on day zero. Thus it is
reasonable to conclude that the shareholder wealth effects of announcement of
alliances amount to a significant, positive, abnormal return of 7.74%. This percentage
is the average of the abnormal return of all six models as reported the last row of Table
Two.
Table Three reports the abnormal return effects for Prestige Alliances only. Significant
abnormal returns are observed across all models for all event horizons. Table One,
Panel A, shows that the only significant returns generated in a given day is on day
zero, thus the full event effect is reflected in the first column of Table Three. All
models generate abnormal returns on day zero significant at the 1% level both
parametrically and using the percentage positive negative test. The largest event effect
of 10.51% is generated using the FTSE All Share market model, while the smallest
effect is 9.70%, generated by the FTSE All Share Adjusted returns model.
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iNSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE
An F-test was used to determine if the returns generated by the six models differed
significantly from each other. The f-statistic recorded was 0.0093 with a critical value
of 3.03 76. This indicates that the abnormal returns generated by each model are
essentially drawn from the same sample and thus are not significantly different from
each other. The f-statistic for the 15 individual company returns was 6.4562, with a
critical value of 2.1014, indicating that the abnormal returns for individual firms were
drawn, as one would expect, from different samples. Thus it can be said that the
average event effect was an abnormal return of 10.04% (as reported in the last row of
Table Three).
Table Four reports the abnormal return effects for Regional Alliances only. Significant
abnormal returns are observed across all models for all event horizons, though in event
horizons —2 to +2 through to —5 to +5 these effects are only significant at the 10% level
for the FTSE All Share Adjusted returns model. It can be observed from Table One,
Panel C, the largest and most significant abnormal returns are generated on the event
day zero. Significant abnormal returns are generated on day —3, of between +0.41%
and —0.1 l 0 o, and on day +3 the UK Bio model generates a small abnormal return of
between +0.88% and +O.99°. Relative to an average abnormal return of +5.41%
generated across all 6 models, as reported in Table Four, the returns on days —3 and +3
are very small. Unlike announcements of clinical trial results where a possible logic for
why the market would be slow to absorb information embedded in the announcement
was offered in the methodology section, no logic has been put forward for the
secondary effect on day +3 for Regional Alliances. It is, therefore, hard to justifr a
widening of the event horizon from one to seven days, given the diminished
explanatory power that such an action would bring (Mc Williams and Siegel, l97).
Thus it can be reasonably argued that the vast majority of the event effect for Regional
Alliances is captured on day zero. All models generate abnormal returns on day zero
significant at the 1% level both parametrically and using the percentage positive
negative test. The largest event effect of 5.70% is generated using the Average
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Adjusted returns models, while the UK Bio market m4odel generates the smallest effect
of 5.05%.
INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE
An F-test was used to determine if the returns generated by the six models differed
significantly from each other. The f-statistic recorded was 0.2478 with a critical value
of 3.0363. This indicates that the abnormal returns generated by each model are
essentially drawn from the same sample and thus are not significantly .different from
each other. The f-statistic for the 16 individual company returns was 3.9464, with a
critical value of 2.05 72, indicating that the abnormal returns for individual firms were
drawn, as one would expect, from different samples. Thus it can be said that the
average event effect was an abnormal return of 5.41% (as reported in the last row of
Table Four).
From the above analysis it is clear that there exists a strong and significant positive
increase in shareholder wealth as a result of announcements of alliances. This effect is
clearly stronger for announcement of higher reputation, Prestige Alliances than
announcements of Regional Alliances. These results suggest that the uncertainty
reduction signals that Prestige Alliances bring shareholders explain the considerable
wealth effect difference between Regional and Prestige Alliances.
Impact ofAnnouncements of Progress in R&D upon Shareholder Wealth
Table Five reports the abnormal returns generated by 24 announcements of progress in
the R&D process of UK biotechnology firms. It can be seen that highly significant and
positive abnormal returns are observed across all six models in the event horizon day 0
and days —ito +1, -2 to +2. Significant returns are only obtained using both tests for
the UK Bio Adjusted model in the horizons between event windows —3 to +3 through
to —5 to +5. From Table One, Panels B and D, it can be seen that significant abnormal
returns are observed for Phase 11/111 announcements between days -3, +3 and between
days —4, +4 for Discovery/Phase I trial announcements. In the methodology section an
argument was proposed as to why post-event day effects might be reasonably be
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expected. There is a possibility that pre-announcement effects might be due to leakage
of clinical trial results to selected investors. Such an occurrence did occur in the rather
infamous whistle blowing incident at British Biotechnology where the head of Clinical
Trials at the firm, concerned about the statements of senior management to the market,
did divulge details of trials that were meant to remain secret to the investment
community (Mc Namara, 1998).
INSERT TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE
From Table Five it can be seen that the highest abnormal returns of 8.06% are
generated by the FTSE All Share Adjusted returns model, while the lowest abnormal
returns of 6.60% are generated by the 2 Factor model. While the returns generated by
these two models differ by 1.46%, they are still both positive and substantial. The f-
statistic recorded was 0.0439 with a critical value of 2.2203. This indicates that the
abnormal returns generated by each model are essentially drawn from the same sample
and thus are not significantly different from each other. The f-statistic for the 24
individual company returns was 6.55 15, with a critical value of 1.5368, indicating that
the abnormal returns for individual firms were drawn, as one would expect, from
different samples. Thus it can be said that the average event effect was an abnormal
return of 7.11% on day zero, rising to 9.57% between days —ito +1 and 10.06% on
days —2 to +2 (as reported in the last row of Table Five). All results are significant to at
least the 2.5°c level, however if the event horizon is widened to beyond —2 to +2,
significance on the percentage positive negative test disappears in most cases, while is
a low 1O°o in the remaining.
Table Six reports the shareholder wealth effects of announcements of progress in Phase
11111 clinical trials. Abnormal returns are positive and significant in all event horizons
at a minimum of a 5 0 o level, while for day zero all returns are significant at thej%
level, with the exception of the 2 factor model which is significant at the 2.5% level.
The highest abnormal returns of 10.74°o are generated by the FTSE All Share
Adjusted model, while the lowest at 8.55% are generated by the UK Bio market model.
Similarly, over the event horizon —2 to +2 the largest returns of 17.72% are generated
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by FTSE All Share Adjusted model, while the lowest at 12.49% are generated by the
UK Bio market model.
INSERT TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE
An F-test was used to determine if the returns generated by the six models differed
significantly from each other. The f-statistic recorded was 0.0402 with a critical value
of 3.0363. This indicates that the abnormal returns generated by each model are
essentially drawn from the same sample and thus are not significantly. different from
each other. The f-statistic for the 16 individual company returns was 6.0688, with a
critical value of 2.05 72, indicating that the abnormal returns for individual firms were
drawn, as one would expect, from different samples.
As noted earlier an argument could be made to consider an event horizon greater than
day zero, given that event effects are observed in day +2 in Table One, Panel B, and a
logical reason for their existence was proposed in the methodology. Average returns
generated across all models for day zero were 9.32% and were significant at the 1%
level. Cumulative abnormal returns in the period —2 to +2 are 14.11%, though the
5.23% difference between the lowest returns of 12.49% and the highest of l7.72°
suggests that one should be cautious in using the average of the six models in periods
outside day zero.
Table Seven reports the abnormal returns attributed to announcements of progress in
Discovery (Pre-Clinical) and Phase I clinical trials. Weak abnormal returns are
observed on day zero. It should be noted that given the very small sample size, 8
events, one cannot have much confidence in the precision of the parametric test, thus
one should rely more on the simple percentage positive negative test (Mac Kinlay,
1997; Mc Williams and Siegel, 1997). Based on this test abnormal returns are found to
be significant at the 5% level on day zero for the UK Bio models, at the 10% level for
the 2 Factor and Average Adjusted Returns model, while no significant effects are
observed using FTSE All Share models. Similarly weak effects are observed in the
event horizons —1 to +1 and —2 to +2. From Table One, Panel D, it can be seen that
weak event effects are observed using the percentage positive negative test on most
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days from —4 +4, except on days —2, and +1. No cumulative abnormal effects are
observed in Table Seven for any event horizon beyond —2 to +2. Looking at
significance the most significant effects on day zero the highest abnormal returns of
2.81% are generated by the UK Bio adjusted model, while the smallest 2.74% are
generated by the UK Bio market model (both significant at 5%). Over the period —ito
+1 the highest and lowest returns are +3.91% and +3.17% (significant at 5% and 10%),
while over the period -2 to +2 abnormal returns become smaller with a high of +2.46%
and a low of +1.75% (significant at the 10% level). The most significant returns are
obtained in day zero, thus interpretation of the results is best confined to this horizon.
INSERT TABLE SEVEN ABOUT HERE
An F-test was used to determine if the returns generated by the six models differed
significantly from each other. The f-statistic recorded was 0.063 1 with a critical value
of 3.0550. This indicates that the abnonnal returns generated by each model are
essentially drawn from the same sample and thus are not significantly different from
each other. The f-statistic for the 8 individual company returns ws 1.8398, with a
critical value of 2.775, indicating that it cannot be said with confidence that the
abnormal returns of individual firms were drawn from a different population. These
results cast doubt on the power of this sample of events. Only returns, significant at a
minimum of 500 were averaged, giving an average abnormal return across the models
of for day zero of 2.77%.
From the above analysis it is clear that there exists a strong and significant positive
increase in shareholder wealth as a result of announcements of progress in R&D. The
majority of this affect can be explained by Phase Il/Ill clinical trials. It is difficult to
say with a high degree of statistical confidence that the wealth effects of such trials are
actually significantly greater that announcements of progress in Discovery and Phase I
trials. This is because of the small sample size of Discovery/Phase I trial events. Based
on this small sample it can, however, suggested that there do appear to be larger wealth
benefits from announcements of knowledge development, as represented by Phase
Il/Ill trials, relative to announcements of knowledge Exploration, as represented by
Discovery/Phase I trial announcements. This would lend some weight to the theoretical
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argument that Exploration could come to dominate over Exploration due to greater
financial returns.
Is there a Hierarchy of Shareholder Wealth Effrcts?
From the above analysis it is clear that there are strong shareholder wealth creation
effects from the announcement of new alliances and progress in Phase 11/111 clinical
trials. Weaker effects are observed for progress in Discovery (pre-clinical trials) and
Phase I clinical trials. As has been argued above the majority of the effect is observed
on the event day zero. Looking at Figure One, it can be visually observed that the
effect of Prestige Alliances is larger than P11/Ill trials, followed by Regional Alliances
and Discovery/Phase I trials. This supports the argument of hypothesis six that a
hierarchy, based on Exploration and Exploitation, does exist and favours the greater
Exploitation information content of Prestige Alliances over types of event.
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE
As argued above the effects attributable to Discovery and Phase I trials are less clear.
To determine if a clear hierarchy exists between the three significant events a simple
regression was employed. Abnormal returns for all events between 
—5 and +5 days
were taken as the dependent variable and regressed against three independent dummy
variables, namely Prestige Alliance, Regional Alliances and Phase Il/Ill clinical trials
on day 0. The results of this regression model are presented in Table Eight. This model
yields an Adjusted R Square of 0.0507. Prestige Alliances have the highest coefficient,
0.07553, which is significant at the 5% level, while the Phase 111111 dummy has a
coefficient of 0.0666, which is significant at 7.5% level. Thus one can argue that
Prestige Alliances have the greatest explanatory power, followed by Phase Il/Ill
clinical trials. This supports the argument that a hierarchy of announcements is present,
as hypothesised.
INSERT TABLE EIGHT ABOUT HERE
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ABSOLUTE CHANGE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ABNORMAL RETURNS
This chapter has concentrated on calculation and analysis of abnormal returns as is
normal in event studies. It is important, however, to note that abnormal returns are
distinct from absolute changes in market capitalisation of the firm itself in response to
a given event. Abnormal returns calculate the percentage return that an investor obtains
over and above (or under as the case may be) that earned had the shareholder invested
in a basket of other shares instead. Absolute changes in market capitalisation of the
firm are calculated as the rise or fall in market capitalisation of a firm in response to a
given event. That is:
Absolute Change	 = Market Capitalisation 0 - Market Capitalisation..J
This informs the reader of the actual impact that an event had upon the company's
valuation in absolute monetary value. For completeness and the general information of
the reader absolute changes in market capitalisation on day zero were calculated for all
events included in this chapter. These absolute changes in market capitalisation are
provided in Tables Nine to Twelve. These tables provide the following details: type of
event; name of the company who announced the event; percentage change in market
capitalisation, for comparison the percentage mean absolute return across all models
on day zero is also provided; finally the absolute change in market capitalisation in
millions of pounds on day zero is listed. Table Nine provides information on Prestige
alliances. Table Ten provides information on P11111 clinical trials. Table Eleven gives
the details of Regional Alliance events. Finally, Table Twelve provides details of
Discovery and P1 clinical trial events.
From Table Nine it can be seen that announcement of a Prestige Alliance partner
generally adds several million pounds to a biotechnology firm's market capitalisation.
The mean increase in market capitalisation was £ 12.3 million, with a maximum of
64.5 million and a minimum of a £ 8.9 million decline. Comparing the fourth and fifth
columns indicates that the absolute change in market capitalisation mirrors the change
in average percentage abnormal returns. The maximum difference between the two
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percentages of 4.5% in the case of the strongly positive Powderject alliance with
Glaxo-Welicome.
Chiroscience achieved the largest increase in market capitalisation of £ 64.5 million
when it announced that it entered into a marketing/licensing agreement with Zeneca
for its newly approved local anaesthetic Chirocaine. This large increase in part
compensated for the slightly negative earlier reaction by the market to Chiroscience's
filing of the product for approval from the European Medical Agency. Table Ten
mnthaCes CtaC cIic- auioarzcemerzt triggcrcd a Jcc)ine of.f 4.3 million in Chiroscience's
market capitalisation. At the time the market was worried about Chiroscience's ability
to maximise its return on investment from the product due to lack of a strong
marketing partner. As indicated in Chapter One, unfortunately for Chiroscience its
agreement with Zeneca was short lived as its was forced to abandon the product to gain
regulatory approval in its merger with Astra of Sweden. In March 1999 Zeneca and
Chiroscience concluded an agreement to return Chirocaine to Chiroscience. In June
1999 Chiroscience announced that it had found new marketing partners, Purdue
Pharmaceuticals in the US and Abbott Laboratories elsewhere (excluding Japan). On
the same day Chiroscience announced that it would no longer be an independent
company and merged with Celltech. The new group was called Celitech-Chiroscience.
In November 1999 Celltech-Chiroscience announced a merger with Medeva. It was
announced that the new company would revert to being called the Celltech Group. By
January 2000 this new group was the fifth largest pharmaceutical firm by market
capitalisation that had a primary listing on the London Stock Exchange37 . Celitech has
emerged from the setbacks of the failure of its Septic Shock trials and its alliance with
Bayer in May 1997, as outlined in the Celltech case study in Appendix One. It has to
become one of the largest bio-pharmaceutical firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange, while Chiroscience, which was the first UK biotechnology firm to gain
regulatory approval of a novel therapeutic drug, has lost its name and independence.
On 13 January 2000 Celltech had a market capitalisation of £ 1,081 million, while Medeva had a
market capitalisation of 830 million. Only Glaxo-Wellcome, with a market capitalisation of 63,248
million, SmithKline Beecham (44,424 million), AstraZeneca ( 44,181 million) and Elan ( 5,490
million) were larger than the Celltech Group.
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INSERT TABLE NINE ABOUT HERE
From Table Ten it can be seen that announcements about PIJJP[II clinical trials, in
common with Prestige Alliances, generally coincide with increases in market
capitalisation of several million pounds. The mean increase is £ 12.2 million, with a
maximum increase of £ 74.3 million and a minimum of a £ 4.3 million decline
(Chirocaine as discussed above). The £ 74.3 million increase is attributable to an
Alzheimer's drug trial undertaken by Shire Pharmaceuticals. Alzheimer's is a sever
condition that affects a large number of patients in the western world, who can live
with the condition for many years. At present treatments are of limited effectiveness. If
Shire were to succeed it would, thus, have a large and wealthy potential customer base.
This may explain the large rise in market capitalisation.
INSERT TABLE TEN ABOUT HERE
From Table Eleven it can be seen that Regional Alliances attracted an almost
uniformly positive rise in market capitalisation (in one case there was no change at all).
As expected the change is smaller than for Prestige Alliances, however it still is in the
order of a million or more pounds. The mean increase is £ 4.2 million, with a
minimum of zero and a maximum ofE 16.1 million. This maximum was generated by
Peptide Therapeutics alliance with Medeva in 1997. At the time Medeva was one of
the largest biotechnology firms in the UK. The main feature of Regional Alliance
announcements is that they have a positive and significant impact upon the firm's
share price, but also that there is relatively less variability between firms than in the
cases of Prestige Alliance and clinical trial announcements.
From Table Twelve it can be seen that on average announcements of Discovery and
Phase I clinical trials attract a mean rise in market capitalisation of 6.3 million. This
is higher than Regional Alliances, however the variation is much greater with a
maximum of 30.5 million and a minimum of a £ 3.4 million decline. The largest rise
of 30.5 million is attributable to results from a positive Phase I trial of its Hepagene
hepatitis B vaccine treatment. The scale of the rise is somewhat surprising, given that
only 2% of the estimated 350 million hepatitis B sufferers world-wide are in the most
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lucrative markets of the US, EU and Japan (Pilling, 1998). The market may, however,
have taken positive signals from the company's decision to scale up vaccine
manufacturing facilities in preparation for approval of the drug and application for fast
track drug trial status from the FDA as a positive signal.
INSERT TABLE ELEVEN ABOUT HERE
The second greatest rise was from Chiroscience's announcement of the results of P1
trials of an MMP inhibitor. The target indication for the trials was cancer.
Chiroscience's partner in this project was Bristol Meyers Squibb. The positive reaction
at this early stage may have been for two reasons. First, MMPs were a relatively hot
technology in 1998. British Biotech had attracted a great deal of attention with its
research in MMPs. MMP inhibitors are believed to play a role in a wide variety of
illnesses, in particular cancers and inflammation. Both of these are illnesses that affect
a large portion of the population, and more importantly are common in western, high
value, markets. Chiroscience's P1 trials were to be in cancer. Importantly these trials
were hoped to indicate that Chiroscience's second generation MMPs generated fewer
side effects than earlier MMPs. Side effects can be a major cause of failure of drugs to
gain regulatory approval.
The third greatest rise, of £ 6.1 million again related to a cancer drug, this time a
vaccine from Powderject. This announcement came in a year when Powderject was
attracting considerable positive attention in the stock market. Earlier in 1998
Powderject had signed a potentially large ten-year Prestige Alliance with Glaxo-
Weilcome to research and develop vaccines. Potential milestones from this deal
aniounted to £ 180 million, coupled with a S 20 million equity investment by Glaxo-
Wellcome.
INSERT TABLE TWELVE ABOUT HERE
Overall Tables Nine to Twelve offer some interesting information on the effects of
individual announcements. Tables Nine and Eleven suggest that for this sample of
firms, positive alliance announcements result in market capitalisation rising by several
million pounds. Tables Ten and Twelve demonstrate that positive announcements of
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clinical progress can result in large increases in market capitalisation at each stage. For
example the results of Shire's Pill Alzheimer's trial resulted in a £ 74.3 million rise in
market capitalisation; KS Biomedix's P11 Rheumatoid Arthritis trial resulted in a rise
of £ 28.4 million; while Medeva's P1 hepatitis B trial coincided with a rise in the
firm's market capitalisation of £ 30.5 million. From the above one can observe that in
this sample of firms announcements of new alliances (prestige or regional) and of
progress in all stages of clinical trials has the potential to add many millions to a firm's
market capitalisation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
It is clear from the analysis that hypothesis one is strongly supported. Shareholders
of 1.5K biotechnology firms attach significant important to the formation of alliances.
Announcement of an alliance adds 7.74% to a biotechnology company's market value
(significant at the 1% level). Table Thirteen contrasts the findings of this study with
those of the major event studies focusing on inter-organisational co-ojerative ventures
in the literature. All except Reuter and Miller (1997) have reported positive returns,
normally significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect is much larger in the
UK biotechnology sector than alliances as a whole. The largest effect reported in the
studies in Table Thirteen is an average abnormal return on day zero of 3.54% for
horizontal technological Strategic Alliances (Chan et al., 1997).
INSERT TABLE THIRTEEN ABOUT HERE
The findings of this chapter are not, however, surprising. Most studies focused on
firms who would have had a track record of sales in final markets, however few of the
firms in this chapter's sample have any significant sales volume and most have
reported losses in the millions for several years. Biotechnology investments take years
to come to market. Shareholders cannot therefore assess the performance of the firm in
terms of current earnings and thus search for signals that the firm is both conserving
scarce cash resources and making prudent investments that have a good chance of
eventual marketing approval by regulators. Thus shareholders react positive to
alliances which conserve cash resources by co-operative discovery and developing of
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new drugs. The benefit is that their investment is concentrated in the highest value,
aspect of the value chain, namely innovative discovery of new compounds. Alliances
enable the firm to concentrate its investment in scientific discovery and access other
firm's expensive development capabilities in alliances. PhARMA (1999) estimated
that on average the development and marketing of a drug takes 8.9 years and consurne
53.5% of the total cost of bringing a drug to market. Thus co-development and
marketing can conserve considerable resources, in addition to offering learning
opportunities for young biotechnology firms in how to manage the development of a
drug. Executives at Ceiltech noted that they had a very low investment in development
(less than ten staff with no person dedicated to marketing) for the very reason that top
quality development capabilities were very expensive to create internally but could be
easily and cost effectively obtained via alliances.
Prior studies, as summarised in Table Thirteen, have not examined the effect of
reputation of alliance partners upon abnormal returns. It is clear from the analysis
section that hypothesis two is strongly supported. Prestige Alliances attract abnormal
returns of 10.04%, whiie the effect of Regional Alliances is only about half that
amount at 5.4 1% (both significant at the 1% level). The reasons to explain this result
can be twofold. The first is that the resources and capabilities of a Prestige partner are
likely to be significantly greater than a Regional partner, thus shareholders may believe
that their firm can access superior development and marketing capabilities from
Prestige partners. This would not only improve the quality of the drug development
and marketing process relative to either going it alone or an alliance with a Regional
partner, but would also potentially attract superior learning opportunities. For a smart
firm, the logic goes, it is better to learn from the master of the craft. Comments by
managers in the case companies suggest that the masters of drug development and
marketing are Prestige Alliance partners.
The second benefit of Prestige Alliances is much more fundamentally about the
knowledge Exploration and Exploitation process. Shareholders believe that Prestige
Alliance partners have superior evaluative abilities to other partners. They have a long
history of evaluating drug discovery and development projects. Their past judgement
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on these matters have made them the leaders of one of the most profitable sectors in
the world. They also have very considerable experience in alliances with
biotechnology firms. It is not unusual for a pharmaceutical firm to have hundreds of
alliances with biotechnology firms and universities going at once. Application of their
evaluative abilities, coupled with prior experience of biotechnology alliances, to a
decision to ally with a UK biotechnology firm is deeply valued by shareholders. Such
an alliance signals to the biotechnology firm's shareholder that the best evaluators of
the scientific risk versus financial benefit of a drug discovery and development
projects have concluded that this is a project worth investing in. By investing the
pharmaceutical firm's financial resources, via milestone payments, scarce and costly
development capabilities, and most importantly their reputation in an alliance project,
the biotechnology firm's shareholders' uncertainty about the likelihood of success in
Exploration and development is greatly reduced. They also received immediate
appropriation benefits, via milestone payments, in addition to reduced uncertainty
about the likely future earnings potential of the project. This argument explains why
Prestige Alliances are not only more valuable than Regional Alliahces, but also
experience the highest abnormal returns as predicted in hypothesis six.
It is clear from the analysis that hypothesis three is strongly supported.
Announcements of progress in the R&D process attract abnormal returns of 7.11%
(significant at the 1% level). This finding is in line with the findings of Keim et al.
(1995) who reported a 6.640 o abnormal return associated with announcements of
progress in the R&D process from a sample of 26 events. Shareholders clearly value
such announcements because they reduce uncertainty about the likelihood of
Exploration and development projects entering the appropriation phase, via marketing
regulatory approval of a drug compound.
From the analysis section medium support for hypothesis four is observed. It is fair
to say that the majority of the 7.1100 effect observed in support of hypothesis three can
be explained by announcements of progress in the development stage of the R&D
process, classified in this thesis as Phase Il/Ill clinical trials. These announcements are
associated with an abnormal return of 9.32% (largely significant at the 1% level).
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These announcements are of high value to the shreholder because they reduce the
uncertainty about the success of development. The overall R&D process was found by
PhARMA (1999) on average to take 15 years from discovery of a compound to sale in
the marketplace, costing between $200 and $350 million (BlO, 1999). Development
and marketing is estimated by PhARMA (1999) to represent over half the cost and
length of time to complete the process. In the case of Po1yMASC and more particularly
Celitech it was made clear that the core value adding activity of the firm was the
production of innovative novel drugs which make it through the regulatory process and
on to the marketplace. As Dr. Feliner, CEO of Ceiltech, observed "the winners have to
be the companies in therapeutic because the value added is so huge."
This study is the first, to the best of this researcher's knowledge, that attempts to assess
the shareholder wealth implications of progress in the R&D process upon UK
biotechnology firms in general. The findings confirm as a general rule, the observation
of individual biotech managers, that announcements of progress in R&D drive
improvements in shareholder wealth.
Due to small sample size, it is hard to say with confidence that Phase IL'III clinical trial
announcements are generally more valuable than Discovery! Phase I trials. At a
theoretical level one can say that it is expected that Discovery/Phase I trial
announcements should be less valuable for two reasons. First, while they do lQwer the
uncertainties faced by shareholders as to the likelihood of success in the R&D process
their impact on uncertainty reduction is not as great as Phase 111111 trials. At the end of
the Discovery process all the shareholder knows is that testing on animals suggests that
the compound may have a positive impact on human heath. At the end of Phase I trials
all that the shareholder knows is that the compound has a minimal level of safety in
humans. Longer term effects and efficacy are only revealed via Phase 111111 trials.
Secondly, a lower effect would be expected because announcements of Discovery and
Phase I trials are classified as Exploration activities. This is because according to
Levinthal and March's (1993) Exploration/Exploitation propositions the returns
generated by Exploration activities should be lower than Exploitation. It is true to say
that the abnormal returns from such announcements were low at 2.77% and only
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significant at the 5% level. The evidence indicates that the shareholder wealth effects
of Exploration are lower than development (Phase 111111 trials). This lends partial
support to hypotheses four and six, however, the small sample size of eight
Discovery/Phase I events makes empirical generalisation problematic.
From the analysis strong support for hypothesis five is observed. The abnormal
returns of Alliances at 7.74% are similar to those of announcements of progress in
R&D at 7.11%. Both results are significant at the 1% level.. Widening the event
window from day zero to an eleven day —5 to +5 day event horizon suggests that
hypothesis five is confirmed. In the lead up to the to day zero the cumulative abnormal
returns observed in Figure Two, are generally quite small, however on day zero both
events have a very significant positive gain. The CAR from day —5 to day 0 is larger
for all trials, however by day +5 the cumulative abnormal returns of both events have
converged.
INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE
Convergence can be reasonably expected to occur and largely confirms the beliefs of
managers from the case studies. They attached a high importance to both alliances and
progress in clinical trials. The activities are largely complementary. Most UK
biotechnology firms seek to engage in independent discovery up to the point of patent
and pre-clinical trials, but thereafter often engage in alliances to conserve resource on
the one hand and on the other gain access to capabilities which increase the probability
of eventual success. Two complementary resources and capabilities that are
particularly important are access to complementary technology, as in the case of the
Celltech-Bayer alliance expanded upon in the appendices, and complementary
capabilities, such as development capabilities. Thus it makes sense that alliances be as
valuable, in general, as progress in clinical trials. Progress in such trials is strongly
affected by alliances, while alliances are driven by the aim of getting a project through
clinical development and unto the market.
Based on both the analysis and the above discussion it can be seen that there exists
considerable evidence in support of hypothesis six. From a financial perspective
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Levinthal and March (1993) appear to be right. Exte,rnal markets do value Exploitation
over Exploration. Table Fourteen summarises the abnormal returns generated by each
event type in the context of the Exploration and Exploitation. This table summarises
the abnormal return effects of each of the four categories of event and details the type
of information each announcement offers the shareholder about Exploration and
Exploitation. It can be seen that Prestige Alliances offer the most in terms of both
information about Exploration and Exploitation and are thus the most valued. Prestige
Alliances contain the richest information load providing insight for shareholders into
appropriation (via uncertainty reduction, access to markets, and milestone payments),
development (via cost sharing, access to complementary capabilities) and both
Exploration and development (via the uncertainty reduction that their evaluative
capabilities bestow and learning opportunities). Prestige Alliances generate an
abnormal return of 10.04%.
INSERT TABLE FOURTEEN ABOUT HERE
Phase 11/Ill clinical trials, bestow rich information about the development
(Exploration) activities of the firm, playing a critical role in uncertainty reduction, and
are thus the second most valuable announcement, generating and abnormal return of
9.32%. Regional Alliances generated the next highest returns of 5.41%, offering
important information on the Exploration and development activities of the firm, via
cost reduction, access to complementary capabilities, and learning opportunities. They
do not, however, provide much uncertainty reduction information in contrast with
either Prestige Alliances or Phase 11/111 clinical trials. The smallest, and least
significant, returns were generated by announcements of Discovery or Phase I clinical
trials. The results summarised in this table thus offer strong support for hypothesis
six.
This chapter has explored the shareholder wealth effects of four announcements,
linking these to the debate on Exploration and Exploitation, in addition to the central
concerns of the biotechnology sector. Six hypothesis were developed, with all six
finding support from the analysis of the data. It has been shown that in line with
theoretical predictions in the literature the market dces appear to value Exploitation
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activities more than Exploitation. It has also been shown that the general impact that
two events, namely alliance formation and progress in clinical trials, which managers
in the sector believe to be important, do in general have a large positive and significant
impact on shareholder wealth. Alliances and progress in R&D do add shareholder
wealth within the UK biotechnology sector and the Exploration/Exploitation
classification can offer insight into why value is created.
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TABLE TWO: PERCENTAGE CUMJJLATIE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR
ALL ALLIANCES (N=31)
Model	 Day 0	 Day-ito +1 Day -2 to +2 Day -3 to +3 Day -4 to +4 Day-S to
____________ __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ +5
UKBio
Mean CAR	 7.48	 8.00	 7.70	 7.76	 8.44	 9.20
StdDev	 7.83	 9.68	 9.51	 9.73	 11.08	 12.94
t-stat	 5.3128****	 4 . 5986****	 4.5068****	 4.4404****	 4.2415****	 39593****
% Positive
t-stat	 4.8493****	 3 . 0533****	 3 .0533****	 3 . 0533****	 3.0533****	 3.4125****
FTSE All share
Mean CAR
Std Dcv	 7.91	 7.94	 7.52	 7.33	 7.81	 8.33
t-stat	 7.74	 10.31	 10.39	 11.29	 12.49	 14.23
%Positive	 5.5699****	 4 .2879****	 4.0301****	 3 . 6143****	 3 .4220****	 3.2591****
I-stat
_______________ 4 . 8493****	 3 . 0533****	 3 . 0533****	 2 . 6941****	 2 .3349***	 2.3349***
2 Factor
Mean CAR	 7.76	 7.78	 7.27	 7.16	 7.79	 8.48
StdDev	 7.66	 10.15	 10.25	 11.01	 12.05	 13.94
t-stat	 5.6388****	 4 . 264****	 3.9478****	 3.6211****	 3 5977* ** *	 3.3862****
0 Positive
t-stat	 4.8493****	 3 .0533****	 3 . 0533****	 2 . 6941****	 2 .3349***	 2.6941****
Avg Returns
over Est.
\Vindow
Adjusted
• Mean CAR
	 7.93	 7.90	 7.62	 7.36	 7.96	 8.51
StdDev	 7.70	 10.49	 10.35	 11.04	 12.50	 14.02
t-stat	 5.7324****	 4 . 1912****	 4 . 100l****	 3 .7128****	 3 .5642****	 3.3783****
0 Positive
i-stat	 5.2085****	 3 . 0533****	 2 . 6940****	 2 . 6940****	 2 .3349***	 2.3349***
LK Bio
Adjusted
Mean CAR
	 7.86	 7.69	 7.27	 6.87	 7.33	 7.73
Std Dcv	 7.76	 10.79	 10.87	 11.78	 13.39	 15.14
t-stat	 S.6370****	 39670****	 3 .7242****	 3 . 2468****	 30473****	 2.8429****
0 Positive
i-stat	 5.2085****	 2 . 6941****	 2 . 6941****	 2 . 6941****	 2 . 3349***	 2.6941****
FTSE All Share
Adjusted
Mean CAR
	 7.50	 7.30	 6.73	 6.14	 6.24	 6.47
Std Dev.	 7.84	 10.66	 10.57	 11.36	 13.01	 14.54
i-stat	 5.3243****	 3 .8130****	 3 . 5654****	 3 .0084*t**	 2 . 6723****	 2.4804"
% Positive
t-stat	 4.490l****	 3 .0533****	 2 . 3349***	 2.3349***	 l.9756**	 2.3349***
Average CAR
across all
models	 7.74
I stat signhticance tot 1 lailed test
*	 p<.lO (>1.31)
** p <.05 (>1.70)
p <.025 (>2.04)
****p<oI (>2.46)
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TABLE THREE: PERCENTAGE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR
PRESTIGE ALLIANCE (N=15)
Model	 Day 0	 Day-ito +1 Day -2 to +2 Day -3 to +3 Day -4 to +4 Day -5 to +5
UKBio
Mean CAR	 10.07	 10.53	 10.13	 8.88	 9.42	 10.59
StdDev	 8.89	 12.12	 11.90	 12.63	 14.28	 17.19
t-stat	 4.3839****	 3 .3646****	 3 .2962****	 2.7222****	 2 .5813***	 13848***
% Positive
1-stat	 3.3566****	 2 . 3238***	 2 .3238***	 1.2910	 1.2910	 1.2910
FTSE All share
Mean CAR
StdDev	 10.51	 11.13	 10.61	 9.16	 9.65	 10.57
t-stat	 8.70	 11.92	 11.98	 13.21	 14.65	 17.65
% Positive	 4.6844****	 3.6i66****	 3 .4296****	 2 .6854****	 2.55 19***	 2.3192***
t-stat
______________ 3 . 3566****	 2 . 3238***	 2 . 3238***	 1.2910	 0.7746	 1.2910
2 Factor
Mean CAR	 10.45	 11.14	 10.54	 9.25	 9.72	 10.69
Sid Dcv	 8.56	 11.77	 11.82	 12.95	 14.52	 17.54
1-stat	 4.7299****	 3 .6642**** 34537**** 2.7666****	 2. 5937***	 2.3606***
00 Positive
t-stat	 3.3566****	 2 .3238***	 2 . 3238***	 1.2910	 0.7746	 1.29099
Avg Returns
over Est.
Window
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 10.31	 10.82	 10.53	 9.05	 9.62	 10.77
StdDev	 8.89	 12.24	 11.99	 12.83	 14.16	 1714
t-stat	 4.4893****	 3 .4241****	 3 .4017****	 2 .73i8****	 2 .6293****	 2.4206***
0 Positive
t-stat	 3.3566****	 2 .3238***	 1.8074**	 1.2910	 1.2910	 1.2910
UK Bio
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 10.28	 10.75	 10.40	 8.87	 9.38	 10.49
Std Dcv	 8.96	 12.46	 12.32	 13.34	 14.98	 18.25
1-stat	 4.4425****	 3 . 3418****	 3 .2694****	 2 . 5755***	 2.4270***	 2.2265***
0 Positive
t-stat	 3.3566****	 l . 8074**	 1.8074**	 1.2910	 1.2910	 1.8074**
FTSE All
Share Adjusted
Mean CAR
	 9.70	 10.43	 10.07	 8.45	 8.55	 9.62
StdDev.	 9.25	 12.28	 11.87	 12.79	 14.60	 17.58
t-stat	 4.0622****	 3 .2896****	 3 .2862****	 2 . 5604***	 2.2690***	 2.1 195**
0 Positive
t-stat	 2.8402****	 2 . 3238***	 1.8074**	 i.8074**	 1.8074**	 1.8074**
Average CAR
across all
models	 10.04
I stat signiticance br 1 1ailed test
* p<10 (>1.35)
** p <.05 (>1.76)
*** p<.O25(>2.14)
***p<ol (>2.62)
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TABLE FOUR: PERCENTAGE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR
REGIONAL ALLIANCE (N=16)
Model	 Day 0	 Day -1 to +1 Day -2 to +2 Day -3 to +3 Day -4 to +4 Day-S to +5
UKBio
Mean CAR	 5.05	 5.62	 5.42	 6.71	 7.53	 7.90
StdDev	 5.99	 6.15	 6.11	 6.16	 7.58	 7.42
t-stat	 3.3678****	 3.6542****	 3 .5506****	 4.3558****	 3.9721****	 4.2570****
% Positive
t-stat	 3.5000****	 2 .0000**	 2.0000**	 3.0000****	 3.0000****	 3.5000****
FTSE All share
Mean CAR
Std Dcv	 5.4g	 495	 4.63	 5.61	 6.08 .
	 6.23
t-stat	 6.03	 7.76	 7.97	 9.25	 10.24	 10.24% Positive	 3.6331****	 2.5496***	 2.3221***	 2.4268***	 2.3743***
	
2.4363***
t-stat
______________ 3.5000**** 2
.0000**	 2.0000**	 2.5000***	 2.5000***	 2.0000**
2 Factor
Mean CAR	 5.23
	 4.62	 4.20	 5.19	 5.97	 6.41Std Dcv	 5.90	 7.40	 7.67	 8.79	 9.30	 9.62
t-stat	 3.5426****	 2 .4967***	 2.1881 ***	 2.3649***	 2.5691 ***	 2.6663****0 Positive
t-stat	 3.5000****	 20000**	 20000**	 25000***	 25000***	 25000***
Avg Returns
over Est.
Window
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 5.70	 5.15	 4.90	 5.78	 6.41	 6.38
Std Dcv	 5.81	 7.97	 7.98	 9.21	 10.95	 10.28
t-stat	 3.9192****	 2 .5846***	 2.4542***	 2.5127***	 2.3412***	 2.4822***
0 Positive
t-stat	 4.0000****	 2 . 0000**	 2.0000**	 2.5000***	 2.0000**	 2.0000**
UK Bio
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 5.58	 4.81	 4.34	 5.00	 5.40	 5.14
Std Dev	 5.84	 8.35	 8.70	 10.19	 11.87	 11.52
t-stat	 3.8262****	 2 .3064***	 1.9943**	 1.9612**	 1.8189**	 1.7848**
0 Positive
t-stat	 4.0000****	 2 . 0000**	 2.0000**	 2.5000***	 2.0000***	 2.0000**
FTSE All
Share Adjusted
Mean CAR
	
5.44	 4.37	 3.60	 3.97	 4.08	 3.53
StdDev.	 5.82	 8.24	 8.39	 9.75	 11.36	 10.72
t-stat	 3.7404****	 2 . 1239**	 l.7165**	 1.6274*	 1.4353*	 1.3159
% Positive
t-stat	 3.5ØØØ****	 2 .0000**	 1.5000*	 1.5000*	 1.0000	 1.5000k
Average CAR
across all
models	 5.41
T stat significance for 1 Tailed test
* p<.lO (>1.34)
** p<.O5 (>1.75)
*** p<.025(>2.l3)
**** p <.01 (>2.60)
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TABLE FIVE: PERCENTAGE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS:
DISCOVERY, PHASE 1,11 AND III TRIALS (N=24)
Model	 Day 0	 Day-ito +1 Day -2 to +2 Day -3 to +3 Day -4 to	 Day -5 to +5
____________ __________ __________ __________ __________ +4
	 __________
UK Bio
Mean CAR
	 6.61	 8.75	 9.08	 8.89	 7.08	 7.32
StdDev	 10.00	 17.92	 20.26	 22.63	 19.44	 18.19
t-stat	 3.2386****	 2 .3910***	 2.1948***	 1.9255**	 1.7855**	 1.9716**
% Positive
t-stat	 2.8577****	 2 .4495***	 2 .4495***	 0.4082	 0.4082	 1.2247
FTSE All share
Mean CAR
Std Dcv	 6.97	 9.21	 9.73	 9.98	 8.41	 8.09
t-stat	 0.0992	 17.68	 20.15	 22.38	 18.83	 17.53
%Positive	 3.4411****	 2 . 5517****	 2.3654***	 2.1846***	 2 . 1887***	 2.2607***
t-stat
_____________ 
2 .4495***	 2 .8577**** 2 .4495***	 0.8165	 1.2247	 1.2247
2 Factor
Mean CAR	 6.60	 8.79	 9.14	 8.92	 7.44	 7.55
Std Dcv	 10.08	 18.04	 20.43	 22.82	 19.59	 18.28
t-stat	 3.2080****	 2 .3881***	 2 . 1913***	 1.9158**	 1.8608**	 2.0230**
0 Positive
t-stat	 2.4495***	 2 . 8577****	 2 .4495***	 1.2247	 1.2247	 1.6330*
Avg Returns
over Est.
Window
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 7.19	 9.37	 9.93	 10.12	 8.37	 8.41
Std Dcv	 9.81	 17.61	 20.00	 22.23	 18.79	 17.50
t-stat	 3.5893****	 2 .6059****	 2.4320***	 2.2304***	 2. 1820***	 2.3559***
00 Positive
t-stat	 2.8578****	 2 .4495***	 2 .4495***	 1.2247	 1.2247	 1.2247
UKBio
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 7.21	 9.43	 10.04	 10.27	 8.57	 8.66
Std Dcv	 9.73	 17.46	 19.82	 21.84	 18.34	 16.98
t-stat	 3.6293****	 2 . 6470****	 2.48 12***	 2.3045***	 2.2891***	 2.4966***
00 Positive
t-stat	 3.6742****	 2 .4495***	 2 . 8577****	 2 . 0412**	 2.0412**	 2.4495***
FTSE All
Share Adjusted
MeanCAR	 8.06	 11.88	 12.44	 12.64	 9.89	 9.27
StdDev.	 11.27	 22.30	 24.90	 27.52	 22.67	 20.27
t-stat	 3.5028****	 2 . 6093****	 2 .4479***	 2 .2500***	 2. 1375***	 2.2399***
% Positive
t-stat	 2.8577****	 2 . 0412**	 2.4495***	 1.6330*	 0.8165	 1.6330*
Average CAR
across all
models7.11	 ___________
T stat significance for 1 Tailed test
* p<.l0 (>1.32)
** p<.O5 (>1.71)
*** p<.025(>2.O7)
**** p <.01 (>2.50)
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TABLE SIX: PERCENTAGE CUMULATIVE kBNORMAL RETURNS FOR
PHASE II AND III TRIALS (N=16)
Model	 Day 0
	 Day-ito +1 Day -2 to +2 Day -3 to +3 Day -4 to +4 Day-S to +5
UK Bio
MeanCAR	 8.55	 11.18	 12.49	 14.07	 11.82	 11.53
StdDev	 11.64	 21.60	 24.13	 26.13	 22.24	 20.93
t-stat	 2.9384****	 2 .0675**	 2.0702**	 2.1542***	 2.1267**	 2.2046***
% Positive
t-stat	 3.0000****	 2 . 0000**	 2.5000***	 3.0000****	 3.0000****	 2.5000***
FTSE All share
Mean CAR	 9.25	 12.23	 13.97	 15.82	 13.75	 13.03
StdDev	 11.34	 21.02	 23.51	 25.40	 21.00.	 19.62
t-stat	 3.2645****	 2 . 3265***	 2.3768***	 2.4911***
	
2.6192****	 2.6562****
% Positive
t-stat	 2.5000***	 2.5000***	 2 .5000***	 2.5000***	 3.0000****	 3.0000****
2 Factor
Mean CAR	 8.60	 11.41	 12.84	 14.32	 12.46	 12.22
StdDev	 11.69	 21.70	 24.22	 26.23	 22.21	 20.77
t-stat	 2.9425****	 2 . 1023**	 2.1204**	 2.1846***	 2.2439***	 2.3535***
% Positive
t-stat	 2.0000**	 2.5000***	 2.0000**	 2.0000**	 2.0000**	 2.0000
Avg Returns
over Est.
Window
Adjusted
Mean CAR
	 9.40	 12.18	 13.80	 15.61	 13.41	 12.89
StdDev	 11.21	 20.97	 23.50	 25.43	 21.19	 19.80
t-stat	 3.3540****	 2 .3243***	 2.3494***	 2.4553***	 2.5316***	 2.6045****
0 Positive
t-stat	 2.5000***	 2.0000**	 2.5000***	 2.5000***	 2.5000**	 2.0000**
UK Bio
Adjusted
Mean CAR
	 9.41	 12.20	 13.83	 15.65	 13.46	 12.95
StdDev	 11.13	 20.78	 23.26	 24.95	 20.61	 19.13
t-stat	 3.38l4****	 2 . 349l***	 2.3783***	 2.5089***	 2.6123****	 2.7086****
% Positive
t-stat	 3.0000****	 2 . 0000**	 2.5000***	 3.0000****	 3 . 0000****	 2.5000
FTSE All
Share Adjusted
Mean CAR	 10.74	 16.04	 17.72	 19.61	 15.98	 14.52
StdDev.	 12.87	 26.40	 29.12	 31.47	 25.64	 22.89
t-stat	 3.3376****	 2.431 7***	 2.4356***	 2.4927***	 2.4927***	 2.5366***
% Positive
t-stat	 3.0000****	 2 . 0000**	 2.5000***	 2.0000**	 2.0000**	 2.0000**
Average CAR
across all
models	 9.32	 12.54	 14.11
T stat significance for 1 Tailed test
* p<.IO (>1.34)
** p<.O5 (>1.75)
*** p<.O25(>2.13)
****<01 (>2.60)
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TABLE SEVEN: PERCENTAGE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR
DISCOVERY AND PHASE I TRIALS (N=8)
Model	 Day 0	 Day-ito +1 Day -2 to +2 Day -3 to +3 Day -4 to +4 Day-S to +5
UKBio
Mean CAR	 2.74	 3.91	 2.26	 -0.0147	 -0.0239	 -1.11
StdDev	 3.55	 3.86	 4.68	 -0.1173	 0.0529	 5.15
t-stat	 2.1776**	 2.8638***	 1.3662	 -0.7007	 -1.2767	 -0.6096
% Positive
t-stat	 2.1213**	 2.1213**	 2.1213**	 -1.4142	 -1.4142	 0.0000
FTSE All share
Mean CAR	 2.41	 3.17	 1.25	 -1.70	 -2.26	 -1.79
StdDev	 3.52	 4.17	 5.16	 5.39	 . 4.95	 4.20
t-stat	 i.9334**	 2.i505**	 0.6854	 -0.8913	 -1.2922	 -1.2031
00 Positive
t-stat	 0.7071	 1.4142*	 0.7071	 -2.1213	 -2.1213	 -2.1213
2 Factor
Mean CAR	 2.59	 3.57	 1.75	 -1.88	 -2.59	 -1.80
Std Dcv	 3.64	 3.63	 4.64	 6.05	 5.65	 4.86
t-stat	 2.0167**	 2.7806***	 1.0639	 -0.8785	 -1.2964	 -1.0457
00 Positive
t-stat	 1.4142*	 2.1213**	 1.4142*	 -0.7071	 -0.7071	 -0.7071
Avg Returns
over Est.
Window
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 2.76	 3.74	 2.19	 -0.86	 -171	 -0.54
Std Dcv	 3.63	 4.76	 5.36	 5.54	 4.90	 5.31
t-siat	 2.1517**	 2.2216**	 1.1534	 -0.4402	 -0.9864	 -0.2886
00 Positive
t-stat	 1.4142*	 1.4142*	 0.7071	 -1.4142	 -1.4142	 -0.7071
UK Bio
Adjusted
Mean CAR	 2.81	 3.90	 2.46	 -0.48	 -1.21	 0.06
Std Dcv	 3.56	 4.95	 5.80	 5.94	 5.53	 6.10
t-stat	 2.2375**	 2.2315**	 1.2014	 -0.2267	 -0.6218	 0.0291
0o Positive
t-stat	 2.1213**	 1.4142*	 1.4142	 -0.7071	 -0.7071	 0.7071
FTSE All
Share Adjusted
Mean CAR	 2.70	 3.55	 1.87	 -1.30	 -2.28	 -1.23
Std Dcv.	 3.61	 4.77	 5.44	 5.76	 5.16	 6.14
t-stat	 2.11I0**	 2.101O**	 0.9734	 -0.6388	 -1.2483	 -0.5683
00 Positive
t-stat	 0.7071	 0.7071	 0.7071	 0.0000	 -1.4142	 0.0000
Average CAR
across models
with a
significance of
at least 5°o	 2.77
T stat significance tor 1 Tailed test
* p<.1O (>1.41)
** p <.05 (>1.89)
** p <.025 (>2.36)
****p<ol (>3.00)
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TABLE EIGHT: RESULTS OF DUMMY REGRESSION MODEL
Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T statistic	 P-value
Intercept	 0.0267	 0.0299	 0.8919	 0.3766
Prestige Alliance
	
0.0755	 0.0370	 2.0398	 0.0466
P11/Ill trials	 0.0666	 0.0366	 1.8181	 0.0749
Regional Alliance 0.0274	 0.0366	 0.7496	 0.4569
RSquare	 0.1034
Adjusted R Square 0.05 07
Observations	 55
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TABLE NINE: ABSOLUTE CHANGE iN MARKET CAPITALISTION FOR
PRESTIGE ALLIANCES (DAY 0 LESS DAY -1)
Biotechnology	 Pharmaceutical Principal
	 %	 Average	 Absolute
Company Name Alliance 	 purpose of Change Percentage Change in
Partner	 alliance•	 in	 Abnormal £ millions
Market Returns
____________ ___________ ________ Cap. ________ ________
Chiroscience	 Schering Plough R&D	 + 7.4	 + 6.3	 + 18.6
Chiroscience	 Bristol Meyer	 R&D	 + 1.7 .+ 2.1	 + 4.8
________________ Squibb
	 ___________ ________ __________ ___________
Chiroscience	 Zeneca	 Licence of	 + 22.8	 + 20.3	 + 64.5
drug to
Zeneca
Cortecs	 Astra	 Distribution - 3.5	 - 2.9	 - 8.9
___________________ _________________ agreement _________ ____________ _____________
Cortecs	 Glaxo-Weilcome Distribution + 0.0	 + 0.1	 + 0.0
__________________ _________________ agreement _________ ____________ _____________
KS Biomedix	 Hoffman La	 R&D	 + 6.3	 + 6.18	 + 2.5
________________ Roche	 ___________ ________ __________ ___________
Oxford	 Rhone-Ploulenc- R&D
	 + 16.7	 + j4.6	 + 1.7
Biomedica	 Rorer
Oxford	 Rhone-Ploulenc- R&D
	 + 23.1	 + 21.0	 + 2.6
Biomedica	 Rorer	 (different
alliance to
one above)	 -
Peptide	 SmithKline	 R&D	 + 12.2	 + 11.2	 + 13.6
Therapeutics	 Beecham
Peptide	 Pfizer	 R&D	 + 3.8	 + 3.1	 + 3.6
Therapeutics_________________ ____________ _________ ____________ ____________
Peptide	 Novartis	 R&D	 + 2.0	 ± 2.3	 + 0.7
Therapeutics_________________ _____________ _________ ____________ _____________
Phytopharm	 Pfizer	 R&D	 + 11.6	 + 10.4	 + 4.2
Powderject	 Glaxo-Weilcome R&D	 + 33.1	 + 28.6	 + 61.5
Shield	 Abbot	 R&D	 + 23.8	 + 14.3	 + 15.4
Diagnostics	 Laboratories
Xenova	 Eli Lilly	 R&D	 + 16.0	 + 17.6	 + 7.3
All Prestige	 -
Alliances:
Mean	 + 11.8	 + 10.3	 + 12.3
Median	 + 11.6	 + 10.4	 + 4.2
Std Deviation	 10.6	 9.0	 21.5
Maximum	 +33.1	 +28.6	 +64.5
Minimum	 - 3.5	 - 2.9	 - 8.9
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TABLE TEN: ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN MARKT CAPITALISTION FOR P11/HI
CLINICAL TRIALS (DAY 0 LESS DAY -1)
Biotechnology	 Stage of Trial	 % Change Average	 Absolute
Company Name	 in Market Percentage Change in
Cap.	 Abnormal £ millions
Returns
Biocompatibles	 Pill EMA filing	 + 6.6	 + 5.6	 + 22.2
Chiroscience	 Pill EMA filing	 - 1.6	 - 2.0	 - 4.3
Cortecs	 Pill launch of	 + 9.2	 + 8.3	 + 22.3
_____________________ diagnostic 	 ___________ ____________ ____________
KS Biomedix	 PIE results	 + 42.3	 + 35.3	 + 28.4
Peptide Therapeutics 	 P11 enters	 + 7.8	 + 7.3	 + 9.3
Phytopharm	 P11 results	 + 12.3	 + 15.3	 + 3.2
Phytopharm	 P11 enters	 + 2.3	 + 2.5	 + 0.6
Proteus International	 Pill Approval (of + 42.0	 + 35.5	 + 9.4
_____________________ a diagnostic) 	 ____________ _____________ ____________
ScotiaHoldings	 Pliresults	 + 0.7	 ^ 1.1	 + 3.1
Scotia Holdings	 Pill EMA filing	 + 2.8	 + 3.2	 + 8.5
Shield Diagnostics	 Pill launch of	 - 1.1	 - 1.6	 - 1.5
______________________ diagnostic	 ____________ _____________ ____________
Shield Diagnostics	 Pill FDA	 + 7.9	 + 4.9	 + 7.5
Approval (of a
_____________________ diagnostic) 	 ____________ ____________ ____________
Shield Diagnostics	 PIll FDA filing	 + 9.9	 + 9.0	 + 9.0
Shire Pharmaceuticals Pill results 	 + 0.1	 - 0.2	 + 0.7
Shire Pharmaceuticals Pill results 	 + 10.9	 + 9.9	 + 74.3
Stanford Rook	 Pill enter	 + 15.5	 + 14.6	 + 2.2
All P11/Ill
Mean	 + 10.5	 + 9.3	 + 12.2
Median	 + 7.8	 + 6.5	 + 8.0
Std Deviation	 13.3	 11.4	 18.9
Maximum	 + 42.3	 + 35.5	 +74.3
Minimum	 - 1.6	 - 2.0	 - 4.3
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TABLE ELEVEN: ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN MARKET CAPITALISTION FOR
REGIONAL ALLIANCES (DAY 0 LESS DAY -1)
Biotechnology	 Alliance	 Principal	 % Change Average	 Absolute
Company Name Partner 	 purpose of in Market Percentage Change in
alliance	 Cap.	 Abnormal £ millions
Returns
Cambridge	 Progenitor	 R&D	 + 1.0	 + 1.9	 + 0.9
Antibody____________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
Cantab	 Marie Currie R&D	 + 3.2	 * 2.9	 + 4.3
PharmaceuticalsCancer Care 	 ___________ ___________
Cantab	 Kakestsuke	 R&D	 + 2.4	 + 2.6	 + 2.5
Pharmaceuticals____________ ____________ ____________
Celsis	 Becon	 Distribution + 0.0	 + 0.0	 + 0.0
InternationalDickinson	 agreement ___________ ___________ ___________
Celitech	 Zymogenetic R&D	 + 3.1	 + 2.8	 + 7.6
Chiroscience	 Alcon	 R&D	 + 1.9	 + 1.5	 + 7.4
Laboratories___________ ___________
Chiroscience	 Geron	 R&D	 + 1.9	 + 1.8	 + 5.3
Peptide	 Medeva	 R&D	 + 19.7	 + 17.7	 + 16.1
Therapeutics_____________ _____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
Peptide	 OraVax	 R&D	 + 3.6	 + 3.4	 + 3.6
Therapeutics_______________ ______________ _____________ _____________ _____________
PoIyMASC	 Oxford	 R&D	 + 16.0	 + 14.3	 + 3.8
Molecular
PoIyMASC	 Traskaryoic R&D	 + 7.7	 + 7.5	 + 1.8
_________________ Therapeutics ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________
Shield	 Hitachi	 Distribution + 1.4	 + 0.1	 + 1.0
DiagnosticsChemical	 agreement	 ____________ ____________ ____________
Therapeutic	 Altana	 License of	 + 4.8	 + 4.9	 + 2.3
Antibodies	 product
fromAltana ___________ ___________ ___________
Vanguard Medica Elan	 License of	 + 5.0	 + 4.5	 + 2.4
product to
____________ Elan	 ___________ ___________ ___________
Xenova	 Wallac	 R&D	 + 2.9	 + 3.7	 + 1.2
Xenova	 Institute of	 R&D	 + 18.6	 + 17.6	 + 6.3
Grassland____________ ____________ ____________
All Regional
Alliances:
Mean	 + 5.8	 + 5.5	 + 4.2
Median	 + 3.1	 + 3.2	 + 3.0
Std Deviation	 6.4	 5.8	 3.9
Maximum	 + 19.7	 + 17.7	 + 16.1
Minimum___________ ___________ + 0.0 	 + 0.0	 + 0.0
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TABLE TWELVE: ABSOLUTE CHANGE iN MRKET CAPITALISTION FOR
DISCOVERY AND P1 CLINICAL TRIALS (DAY 0 LESS DAY -1)
I Biotechnology	 Stage of Trial	 % Change Average	 Absolute
Company Name
	 in Market Percentage Change in
Cap.	 Abnormal £ millions
___________________	 Returns
Cambridge	 P1 enters	 + 0.8	 + 1.0	 + 0.6
Antibodies_________________
Chiroscience	 P1 enters	 - 1.0	 - 1.3	 - 3.4
Chiroscience	 P1 enters	 + 6.3	 + 6.0	 + 15.0
Medeva	 P1 results	 + 9.7	 + 9.2	 + 30.5
Oxford Biomedica	 P1 enters	 + 0.0	 + 0.0	 + 0.0
Phytopharm	 P1 enters	 + 4.5	 + 4.5	 + 1.5
Proteus International	 P1 results	 + 0.0	 - 0.0	 + 0.0
Powderject	 Pre-clinjcal	 + 2.3	 + 1.9	 + 6.1
______________________ positive results
All Discovery/PI
Mean	 + 2.8	 + 2.7	 + 6.3
Median	 + 1.6	 + 1.5	 + 1.1
Std Deviation	 3.7	 3.6	 11.3
Maximum	 + 9.7	 + 9.2	 + 30.5
Minimum	
- 1.0	 - 1.3	 - 3.4
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TABLE FOURTEEN: A HIERARCHY OF WEALTH CREATION
Announcement of:	 Average	 Lowest Level of Exploration	 Exploitation
Abnormal Significance	 Information	 Information
Returns	 Reported
on Day
Zero
Prestige Alliance
	
10.04%	 1%	 Uncertainty	 Milestone
reduction in
	 payments
Discovery	 (appropriation),
projects that	 Uncertainty
are part of the
	
reduction in
alliance. Cost	 Development, cost
sharing and	 sharing, access to
access to
	
top quality
complementary development and
technology,	 marketing
Opportunities	 capabilities.
to learn
development
capabilities
from the worlds
____________	 leaders.
Phase lI/Ill	 9.32%	 100 (parametric)	 None	 Uncertainty
clinical trials	 5°o (rank test)
	 reduction in
Development
__________________ ____________ __________________ _______________ process.
Regional	 5.4 1%	 loo	 Cost sharing	 Cost sharing,
Alliances	 and access to	 access to top
complementary quality
technology,	 development and
Learning	 marketing
opportunities	 capabilities.
may exist but
would be lower
than from a
Prestige
________________ ___________ ________________ partner.
	 _________________
Discovery/Phase I 2.77%
	
5% (parametric) Uncertainty	 None
clinical trials	 100o (rank test)	 reduction in
the Exploration
___________________ ____________ ___________________ process.
	 ___________________
207


Chapter five
Conclusions
This thesis studied the tension between Exploration for new organisational knowledge
and Exploitation of current stocks knowledge. This tension has received considerable
attention in the literature (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992;
Levinthal, 1997; and Levinthal and March, 1993), but much of this has tended to be
conceptual in nature and thus there remains much scope for empirical studies on this
topic. Prior literature has argued that over time investment in Exploitation tends to
occur at the expense of Exploration investments. It is argued that this occurs due to the
more casually unambiguous and shorter feedback loops between investments in
Exploitation activities and financial performance. On the other hand it is argued that
feedback loops between Exploration activities and financial performance are both
causally ambiguous and temporally distant (Levinthal and March, 1993). The
arguments underpinning this literature were reviewed in Chapter Two and the major
findings of that chapter are discussed below.
Having explored the conceptual tension between Exploration and Exploitation and
offered insights into how this tension could be managed these ideas were explored
within the context of an in-depth case study on Celltech, one of the oldest
biotechnology firms in Britain. There is little prior literature that empirically examines
a case firm in the context of the tension between Exploration and Exploitation. As such
this case offers fresh insights into the management of this tension inside a real firm.
The findings of this case and its implications for the literature are discussed in the
following section of this chapter. A key output of the Celltech study was that
Exploration activities may have relatively direct and powerful feedback loops with
financial performance on the stock market. This observation appears to challenge an
important convention in the literature and was thus explored in more depth via an
event study in Chapter Four. The findings of Chapter Three and Four combined
indicate that Exploration activities are financially valuable, that this value can be
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observed, and that the tension between Exploration and Exploitation can be managed
and balanced inside a real organisation. The findings of both Chapters Three and Four
are also discussed in the following section.
Following a discussion of the findings of the Chapters Two, Three and Four, which are
linked to the three main research questions outlined in Chapter One, three limitations
of this research are highlighted and discussed. These limitations are: small sample size,
caused by the youth of the sector; single sector bias; .and sector specific
operationalisation of variables. In closing this chapter three more general conclusions
that emerge from the findings of this research are highlighted and discussed. These
conclusions also summarised in Table Two of this chapter.
The first conclusion is that there now exists some empirical data, albeit limited by
sector and sample size, that indicates that both Exploration and Exploitation activities
can in fact be measured and feedback from financial markets observed. The measures
provided in this research offer some guidance for future researchers who may wish to
study Exploration and Exploitation effects in other sectors. The second conclusion is
that observation of stock market reactions to the outputs of Exploration and
Development activities may be of assistance to operational managers in both large and
small firms when seeking to value the potential financial contribution of such projects.
Such valuation may be of aid in assessing which projects in their portfolio should
continue and which are in need of serious re-evaluation. Such valuations may also be
of help in the creation of systems to reward key staff engaged in Exploration and
Development activities. The third general conclusion is that formation of alliances to
conduct Exploration and Development projects can aid value creation. In forming
alliances small firms need to be mindful not only of the .value that a partner can create
by the resources and capabilities it invests in the project but also reputational effects.
Formation of an alliance with prestige partners, who have a strong scientific and
commercial reputation within the stock market, can have a considerable effect on the
small firm's share price. This is because creation of such an alliance may contain
additional uncertainty reduction information that is of value to the small firm's
shareholders.
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THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THIS THESIS: RESEARCH QUESTIONS RE-
VISITED
Relating the findings of Chapter Two to the research question one
At the beginning of Chapter One the first research question that this thesis sought to
address was stated as follows:
1. From a theoretical perspective, what is the knowledge Exploration/Exploitation
dilemma?
This question consists of two sub questions:
(a) From a theoretical perspective why should there be a tension between knowledge
Exploration and Exploitation?
(b) From a theoretical perspective why is it difficult to sustain efforts to increase
knowledge stocks through Exploration or to appropriate a return from current
knowledge stocks through Exploitation?
These questions were explored in Chapter Two. The chapter sought to undertake a
literature review and interpret it in the context of the Exploration/Exploitation Debate.
The tension between Exploration and Exploitation was argued to be due to the
conflicting goals of each process. Exploration was defined in Chapter Two "as
activities that seek to create new stocks of organisational knowledge through the
search for and assimilation of new knowledge originating from the external
environment, or through internal research activities." Exploration seeks to widen the
firm's stocks of new knowledge. These new stocks expand the breath of strategic
options open to the firm. Exploration offers the firm a window into new technologies
and managerial systems that may become the core competencies, or products, of the
firm in the future. At its heart Exploration is the attempt to maximise the gains from
diversity of technology and processes. Exploration is about increasing the strategic and
operational flexibility of the firm: creating new opportunities, encouraging new ways
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of thinking about how the firm can be managed, envisioning and exploring new
technologies and processes. Exploitation, on the other hand, was argued to be about
incremental extension of current stocks of organisational knowledge and activities that
appropriate a return from current stocks. At the heart of Exploitation is the attempt to
maximise the benefits of specialisation.
Thus there is an immediate tension between Exploration and Exploitation. Exploration
seeks to target the firm's resources at the creation of new stocks of knowledge.
Exploration investments in their extreme pursue a belief that the value adding engine
of a company is the creation of new stocks of organisational knowledge, whereas
Exploitation seeks to target the firm's resources at appropriation of a return from
current stocks of knowledge and the incremental improvement of such stocks. It was
argued in Chapter Two that the tension between these processes needs to be carefully
managed as if one dominates over the other for a sustained period of time the survival
of the firm may be jeopardised. If the firm over invests in Exploration activities for a
sustained period of time then it runs the risk sub-optimal returns for investors, and also
exhausting its capital base. This is because it begins to fail to sufficiently exploit its
innovations and thus has insufficient revenues generated by sales of products or
services in the marketplace to provide a satisfactory return on investment to
shareholders. If the firm over invests in Exploitation activities then a point will come
when incremental improvements in its current stocks of knowledge will not yield
efficiency improvements as great as those achieved by competitors with next
generation technologies and processes. Nor will the firm's portfolio of products match
the evolving needs of customers, thus the firm will experience reduced profits and
eventually either withdraw from the marketplace or be driven out by fitter competitors.
It was argued in Chapter Two that Development mediates the relationship between
Exploration for new stocks of knowledge and Appropriation of a return from current
stocks of knowledge. Development was defined in Chapter Two as "activities that seek
to expand, or reconfigure, the current boundaries of stocks of organisational
knowledge through a process of deepening understanding of the current stocks of
organisational knowledge by learning associated with the decent of experience curves.
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The goal of Development is the expansion of a finn's stock of knowledge into formats
that facilitate Use for Appropriation." The relationship between both Exploration and
Exploitation (Development and Use for Appropriation) was described as largely
complementary in the long term. The process of Development relies on the process of
Exploration to provide a new stream of knowledge that can be incrementally expanded.
Without this the firm would eventually run out of incremental development
opportunities. The new knowledge generated by Exploration also acts as a reference
point for products and routines being incrementally developed. Comparison of
Exploration and Development activities raises the question as to whether incremental
development of current products and services will yield greater efficiency
improvements and attract more customers than ideas emerging from the process of
Exploration. If not the question becomes should the current knowledge be phased out
and the new installed. If so the practicalities of converting new stocks of knowledge
created by the process of Exploration into products and services, or new more efficient
and effective routines, requires Development. New technologies and processes do not
emerge from Exploration fully formed. They require adaptation to fit into the current
workings of the organisation. Thus it was argued in Chapter Two that there is a clear
link between Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation.
Reasons were offered in Chapter Two as to why it is difficult maintain a balance across
Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation and also why it is difficult to
sustain efforts in each individual process over time. It was argued that three
accompanying antagonists impede these processes.
Core rigidities can impede the process of Exploration. As noted in Chapter Two, core
rigidities are sets of knowledge, which although valuable now, are inappropriate to
future needs of the organisation. Outward looking absorptive capacities 38
 play an
important role in the process of Exploration but core rigidities can dilute, or in extreme
cases extinguish, a firm's outward looking absorptive capacities and efforts by the firm
One may recall from Chapter Two that outward looking absorptive capacities incorporate the ability
to recognise and assimilate external knowledge into the firm.
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to internally create new knowledge through recombination. Core rigidities encourage
the firm to focus upon an ever-narrowing set of capabilities, as a result of sustained
specialisation. The predisposition of the firm becomes to solve both the challenges and
opportunities offered by the market through use of current technologies and
capabilities rather than exploration for new, and potentially more efficient and
effective capabilities and technologies.
Chapter Two argues that a slow rate of learning can impede the process of
Development. It notes that the benefits of riding down a finn's learning curve are not
automatic, but a result of deliberate action to improve costs and sustain yields (Hatch
and Mowery, 1998). It was argued that a slow rate of learning impedes a finn's ability
to incrementally improve the firm's current stock of knowledge by failing to
continuously take proactive action to descend its learning curves. The argument is that
over time, as a firm incrementally improves its capabilities and technologies, it may
become complacent, believing that incremental improvements have made its
capabilities as efficient and effective as practical. Thus the firm begins to become
progressively slower in taking proactive action to search out incremental
improvements, though such improvements may in fact exist. This results in sub-
optimal decent of learning curves, and hence impedes Development. Competitors who
are more proactive in pursuit of incremental improvements may eventually overtake
such firms in learning races, even where their initial stock of knowledge was smaller.
Chapter Two argues that imitation by competitors poses a challenge to sustained
appropriation of a return from current stocks of organisational knowledge. It was
argued that imitation by competitors is essentially a process of the imitator's outward
looking absorptive capacities competing with the innovator's inward looking
absorptive capacities 39. The imitator seeks to capture a share of the innovator's profits
through erosion of its competitive advantage, while the innovator seeks to maximise
One may recall from Chapter Two that inward looking absorptive capacities facilitate speedy transfer
of knowledge across intra-organisational boundaries. These help the firm to rapidly transfer knowledge
of cost saving technologies and routines across the firm or transfer of new product and service concepts
across the firm as quickly as possible to facilitate market penetration.
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the profits from its innovation by speedy appropriaion in the market as facilitated by
efficient and effective inward bound absorptive capacities. Such imitation by
competitors places pressure on the firm's inward absorptive capacities to become ever
quicker at the dissemination of knowledge generated in one sub-unit of the firm to
other relevant sub-units and its assimilation by those sub-units, thus enabling wider
appropriation of a return from that organisational knowledge.
It was argued that the goals of the processes of Exploration, Development and Use for
Appropriation, while complementary in the long term, could be antagonistic to each
other in the shorter term. Equally it was argued that Core Rigidities, Slow Rates of
Learning, and Imitation by competitors can reinforce each other. The implication of
these arguments is that Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation should
not be managed as independent portfolios, but rather as an inter-connected system.
This is because in the long term they are complimentary to each other and essential to
the survival of the firm and also because difficulties in one area may impact strongly
upon the other. Should a portfolio approach be employed then the impact of problems
in one process upon another may not be recognised. Inaction in one area may reinforce
problems in another. For example inaction in Exploration may eventually mean that
the firm runs out of Development opportunities. As noted in Chapter Two delays in
recognition of such inter-relationships could be potentially costly with, for example,
the onset of a core rigidity reinforcing a Slow Rate of Learning and thus impeding
progress not only in Exploration but also in Development.
The relationships between the processes of Exploration, Development, and Use for
Appropriation on the one hand and Core Rigidities, Slow Rate of Learning and
Imitation on the other were argued to be intermediated by three general characteristics
of the firm, namely Intellectual Diversity, Social Interaction and Codification of
knowledge. It was argued that changes in these characteristics could trigger
movements between processes, for example changes in Intellectual Diversity could
stimulate Exploration and repress Core Rigidities. The discussion of these issues in
Chapter Two moved the literature forward by acting as a literature review and
synthesis combining diverse strands of the literature to develop an improved
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understanding of the balance between Exploration and Exploitation. The overall
discussion was summarised pictorially in Figure Five of Chapter Two.
Arising from the above arguments about interconnectivity four propositions linking
Exploration/Exploitation to generation of shareholder value were derived. These
propositions were as follows:
Proposition One: Exploitation is more fully characterised as two related, but distinct
processes: Development and Use for Appropriation. It is possible for both concepts to
be separately ident/Ied and measured in real organisational contexts. It is then
possible for each factor to be assigned a value by the market.
Proposition two: B or/i Exploration and Exploitation activities generate financial value
for the firm. It is possible for this financial value added to be estimated from individual
announ cements of tile outputs of Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation
activities in an independent firm ii'ith relativeh' few projects.
Proposition Three: Tue value generated by a firm will be greater when the processes
of Exploration. Development amid Use for Appropriation are managed as an inter-
dependent set of activities than it'/iemz managed as a portfolio of three separate
activities.
Proposinomi Four: Where balance between Exploration and Exploitation is maintained
over tile long term themi value added is greater than when the dilemma is managed by a
series ofperiods. t'here Explorat foil dominates in one and Exploitation in the other.
Propositions one and two were empirically explored in this thesis. Propositions three
and four while theoretically derived in this thesis were not empirically explored and
thus open to future empirical testing.
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Relating the findings of Chapter Three to research qIestion two
It was found in Chapter Three that it was possible to operationalise Exploration,
Development and Use for Appropriation into measurable terms inside a real firm. This
has important implications for the Exploration/Exploitation debate because it enables
empirical exploration of an important theoretical issue. Each process was measured in
terms of inputs and outputs. Input measures focused upon the numbers of employees
dedicated to Exploration or Exploitation activities inside a case firm, Ceiltech. Output
measures focused upon the financial revenues that Exploration versus Exploitation
projects raised, but also separated the R&D and commercialisation process of drugs
into Exploration/Exploitation terms. Discovery research and Phase I clinical trials were
classified as exploration. Phase II and III trials were classified as Development, while
alliance formation was classified as predominantly appropriation. Creation of input and
output measures, though crude, enabled exploration of the second research question of
this thesis. The second research question was stated in Chapter one as follows:
2. is there evidence within a real organ isational context thai afirm 's activities can be
explained through the conceptual lens of balancing a tension between knowledge
Exploration a,zd Exploitation?
This question consists of three sub questions:
(a) Can a firm's activities over time be categorised in terms of knowledge Exploration
and Exploitation?
(b) Does this analysis indicate that Exploration and Exploitation activities are in
balance or not?
(c) If a tension between balancing Exploration and Exploitation activities is found to
exist then how does a firm's executive team manage this tension?
By exploring part (a) of this research question, the first proposition of Chapter Two is
addressed. Development and Use for Appropriation are separately identified and
measured in the context of the Celitech case study. Operationalisation of these
concepts is not a simple matter and as such the work on Ceiltech moves this literature
forward in the arena of a high technology sector. Operationalisation of these concepts
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enables part (b) of research question two to be addressed. Based on input and output
measures it was argued that prior to 1990 Exploitation (Development and Use for
Appropriation) was favoured over Exploration investments in Ceiltech. The financial
and organisational renewal of Ceiltech was shown to coincide with a re-emphasis of
the role of Exploration inside the firm, as measured by an increase in the inputs
devoted to Exploration, coupled with the emergence of revenues generated by
Exploration activities. It was found that in terms of inputs and outputs Exploitation
dominated Celitech between 1985 to 1990, while balance between Exploration and
Exploitation was maintained between 1992 to 1996 (see Figure One, Chapter Two for
input measures and Figures Three and Four, Chapter Two, for output measures).
Part (c) of research question two was addressed in Chapter Three and the
accompanying case study in Appendix One on Celitech. It was shown that some of the
characteristics of the firm suggested in Chapter Two could stimulate movement
between Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation and their accompanying
antagonists. Unlearning and injection of Intellectual Diversity int the firm via
personnel turnover and re-organisation of teams was shown to diminish the effects of
core rigidities and promote the re-emergence of Exploration. Dynamic management of
organisational slack and creation of a shared language was shown to positively effect
experimentation and hence promote Development activities. Other more traditional
managerial methods were also shown to play an important role in the promotion of
Exploration. These included the existence of an external threat to the survival of the
firm, in the case of Celitech the bankruptcy of the major shareholder coupled with
declining margins (see Figure Two, Chapter Three), and creation of an alliance
network to gain access to key development and commercialisation resources and
capabilities that the firm lacked. Such resources and capabilities were central to the
firm's reassertion of Exploration and creation of a pipeline of innovative drag
compounds.
Insights into the management of the tension between Exploration and Exploitation
were offered from the experiences of Ceiltech. It was observed that innovation in
appropriation coupled with installation of basic management review systems played an
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important role in the management of this tension. Jnnovation in the financing of
Exploration was particularly important in the process. By creating a network of
prestige alliance partners Celltech was able to increase access to funds for Exploration
activities from two sources: partners and the stock market. Partners provided financial
payments upon achievement of milestones in the R&D process. Shareholders used
such alliances as a signal of the value of Exploration projects within the firm,
rewarding the firm with increased share price, thus making future equity offerings
easier for management to undertake.
The most powerful example of the interaction between stock market funds and alliance
partner relationships was in the case of the Ceiltech-Bayer lliance. As argued in
Chapter Three (and supported by Appendix One) when Bayer was willing to invest a
potential £ 26 million in milestone payments (of which £ 15.6 million were actually
paid during the life of the Celltech-Bayer alliance), and dedicate both significant
development capabilities and managerial resources to an alliance on the CDP 571
septic shock drug project with Celitech, investors used this as a validation of Celitech's
technology and the future value of its Exploration activities. Celitech was able to use
this validatory effect to launch an IPO in 1993. This IPO raised over £ 30 million new
equity funds, much of which was used to fund future Exploration projects. This
innovation in financing of Exploration made such investments more viable to Celltech
and thus diminished the short-term pressure towards generation of funds through
Exploitation activities.
Having diminished the pull of over Exploitation it was important for the firm to put in
place internal mechanisms to ensure that the large funds generated by the IPO did not
stimulate over investment in Exploration to the exclusion of Exploitation. Thus
management put in place a series of managerial review systems that sought to
explicitly link research to development and thence to the marketplace. These review
systems were detailed in Chapter Three and Appendix One.
These findings have three interesting implications. First, the operationalisation of
Exploration and Exploitation in the context of Celltech shows that this theory can be
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applied within real firms with real challenges, such as renewal. It can be seen that
changes in the balance between Exploration and Exploitation can have a real effect on
the success of such a firm. In the case of Ceiltech movement away from Exploitation
and towards Exploration stimulated a very powerful renewal of the finns fortunes.
Secondly, it can be seen that despite the tensions between Exploration and
Exploitation, as theoretically outlined in Chapter Two, it is possible within a real
organisation to maintain a balance between the two activities in terms of inputs and
outputs over a sustained period of time (1992-1996). Third, Chapter Three provided an
insight into how Exploration and Exploitation are managed in a real organisational
setting. Lessons may be learnt from the experience of UK biotechnology companies in
innovation in the finance of Exploration that could be applied in other sectors to
stimulate their own Exploration or renewal efforts.
Relating i/se findings of Chapter Four to research question three
In Chapter One the third research question that this thesis sought to address was stated
as follows:
3. Do the financial markets reward announcenzemzts of Exploitation activities with
higher returns than Exploration activities, as predicted by theoiy?
Drawing upon the literature review this general research question was elaborated upon
in more detail via propositions two to four in Chapter Two. These were further refined
into a series of six hypotheses on the relationship between Exploration/Exploitation
and shareholder value in Chapter Four. These hypothesis were based both upon
knowledge gained from a further review of literature and the experiences of in-depth
case study companies. It was found that in keeping with the thrust of proposition two
announcements about Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation could be
identified in the financial press and corporate web-sites. Using this information the
impact of such announcements upon shareholder value could be assessed using the
event study methodology. It was found that positive announcements about Exploration,
Development and Use for Appropriation (as operationalised in Chapters Three and
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Four) did coincide with rises in the share price Qf the firm over and above the
performance of both market indices and historical performance of the firm's own share
price. This general finding offers important support to the observation in Chapter
Three that investments in Exploration can generate real shareholder wealth in addition
to being a potential source of funds through milestone payments and equity raised via
an IPO or follow-on offerings. Propositions three and four were not empirically
analysed using the event study in Chapter Four and remain theoretical observations
rather than empirical facts.
Four types of event were analysed in Chapter Four. Prestige alliances were identified
as being particularly valuable due to the information they rovide shareholders on
Exploitation activities (Development and Use for Appropriation), in addition to
offering signals on the value of Exploration projects. P11/Pill clinical trials were
argued to offer shareholders rich information on Development. Regional Alliances
were argued to offer information on Development, while Discovery and P1
announcements were classified as Exploration activities.
A summary of the findings of the event study is provided in Table One of this chapter.
This table offers a brief summary of the hypothesis, for a full reproduction the reader is
referred to Chapter Four. This table offers information on the number and type of
events studied for each hypothesis, the abnormal returns generated by two models,
namely, UK Bio4° and the Average Adjusted Returns 4 ' model. These two models were
chosen as representative of the results generated by all six models and because of their
4° The reader will recall from Chapter Four that the UK bio model tests the significance of the change in
a share price in response to a given event over a specified event window against the performance of an
index of UK biotechnology stocks (weighted by market capitalisation) over the same event window. In
the case of Table One, Chapter Five the event period is the event day zero. In the case of Chapter Four
various event windows were analysed. The narrowest event window was day zero, the widest was day -
5 to day +5.
The reader will recall from Chapter Four that the Average Returns model tests the significance of the
change in a share price in response to a given event over a specified event against the average
performance of that share during the estimation period from day —180 to day -20.
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industry specific nature. Models employing the FTSE All Share index as a benchmark
for calculation of abnormal returns generated similar results to both the UK Bio and
Average Returns models. The significance of the returns generated by these models is
provided using both a parametric test and, due to small sample size, a simple
percentage positive/negative non-parametric test result is also provided. From Table
One (of Chapter Five) it can be seen that hypothesis one, two, three and five are all
strongly supported by the analysis, while hypothesis four and six obtain a medium
level of support. In Chapter Four, Table One, it was observed that the majority of the
effect of a given announcement in this sample occurred on day zero42, thus in Table
One of Chapter Five, all reported Abnormal Returns are for a single day event
window, namely the event day zero.
iNSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE
Alliances were identified in both the in-depth case studies and the literature review in
Chapter Four as playing an important role in value creation. Hypothesis one sought to
determine if the announcement of a new alliance between the sample biotechnology
firms and pharmaceutical or other biotechnology partners would add shareholder
value. This tested a belief by managers within the case finns that alliances played a
crucial role in both the creation of new stocks of knowledge and incremental
development of current stocks and thence the creation of shareholder value. Alliances
were argued to bring with them resources and capabilities that the case biotechnology
firm's needed to take their promising drug candidates through the regulatory
development process and on to the market. It was also argued that alliances played a
role in validating the value of scientific work undertaken inside the firm in the eyes of
shareholders. Alliances also enabled finn's to obtain cash payments based on work still
in Exploration or Development stages, thus enabling finn's to better balance the
pressures for innovative Exploration against the need for short-term financial gains that
Exploitation through sales in end markets bring.
42	 Table One, Chapter Four, it can be observed that the largest abnormal returns were on average
experienced on day zero and that with the exclusion of Discovery/N events these returns were
significant at the 1% level using both parametric and non-parametric tests. Discovery and PT events
were significant at the 5% level.
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The results of the event study clearly indicated that announcements about the
formation of alliances had a strong impact on share price generating abnormal returns
of 7.5% (UK Bio model) and 7.9% (Average Adjusted Returns model), both of which
were significant at the 1% level. This is an important finding insofar as it supports both
the assertions of case study interviewees and observations from the literature.
Hypothesis two sought to test if the type of alliance partner resulted in greater
abnormal returns. A belief was expressed by interviewees that alliances with prestige
partners, operationalised as any firm in the top 20 in terms of global pharmaceutical
sales, had a very strong effect on shareholder value. This they argued was because
these firms brought world class development and marketing capabilities, which made
the passage of a drug through the regulatory process more efficient and effective, and
also increased market penetration if approved by regulators, due to access to
distribution and marketing channels. The reputation literature would suggest that these
alliances should be very valuable due to the positive signalling effects that they offer
shareholders as to the potential of a project in which they participate.
Interviewees argued that these effects would be larger for prestige alliances than all
others. The data confirmed their intuition. Prestige Alliances generate nearly twice as
much abnormal returns as Regional Alliances, 10.1 % versus 5.1% using the UK Bio
model and 10.0% versus 5.4% using the Average Returns model. All results were
significant at the 1% level. Confirmation of this hypothesis made an important
contribution because it once more confirmed the intuition of case managers and also
because it added a weight of evidence to the argument in the literature that partner
reputation is an important factor in determination of alliance effect upon shareholder
value.
Hypothesis three sought to establish if announcements of progress in clinical trials
resulted in abnormal returns. It was the view of the case companies that this should
occur. Similarly an argument can be made based on the literature that such
announcements should add value as they provide important uncertainty reduction
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information to shareholders. Again the intuition of case managers was supported by the
data. Announcements of progress in R&D generated abnormal returns of 6.6% (UK
Bio model) and 7.2% (Average Returns model), both of which were significant at the
1% level.
Hypothesis four sought to establish if news about later trials attracted greater abnormal
returns than earlier ones. It was argued that this should be the case from an
Exploration/Exploitation perspective. According to the predictions of Levinthal and
March (1993) Exploitation announcements should generate greater returns than
Exploration announcements. Discovery/PI clinical trials were classified as Exploration
announcements, while Phase IJJffl clinical trials were classified as Development
(Exploitation) announcements. Once again the hypothesis was supported, though in
this case the power of this support was lower. Pil/ifi announcements were associated
with abnormal returns over three times greater than those of DiscoveryiPl
announcements, 8.6% versus 2.7% (UK bio model) and 9.4% versus 2.8% (Average
Returns model). Abnormal returns for Pil/ifi announcements were significant at the
1% level, with the exception of the non-parametric test for the Average Returns model,
which was significant at the 2.5% level. Abnormal returns for Discoveiy/PI
announcements were significant at the 5% level, with the exception of the non-
parametric test for the Average Returns model, which was significant at the 10% level.
The lower significance levels mean that hypothesis four only gained medium support.
The implications of this finding are none the less important. Events were classified as
Exploration or Development (Exploitation) announcements and both generated
positive abnormal returns, thus both are associated with shareholder value. Table
Twelve of Chapter Four indicates that while the sample of Exploration announcements
may have been too small to confidentially state that a statistical relationship between
announcements of Exploration events and shareholder wealth increases exists one can
observe that at an individual level such announcements are important. Three
announcements in that table generated very large abnormal returns of £ 30.5 million, £
15 million and £ 6.1 million respectively.
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Hypothesis five sought to test if announcements of alliances and R&D progress were
roughly the same. The case companies argued that both alliances and progress in R&D
played a vital role in their success. They argued that medium term survival required
both a growing portfolio of drug candidates in various stages of development and a
growing portfolio of alliance partners. Analysis of the data suggests that on average an
announcement of each of these two event categories generates approximately the same
abnormal returns. Again this confirms the intuition of case managers through analysis
of data from a larger sample of firms. Table One indicates that Alliances generated
abnormal returns of 7.5% (UK Bio model) and 7.9% (Average Abnormal Returns
model) versus 6.6% and 7.2% generated by announcements of R&D progress. These
returns while not identical and vely similar and support the belief that both alliances
and progress in clinical trials are viewed as important value generating activities by
shareholders.
Hypothesis six sought to test if a hierarchy of announcements existed that would
mirror arguments about value creation and Exploration/Exploitation. It was argued that
announcements that were richest in information about both Exploration and
Exploitation should generate the greatest returns. Chapter Five argued that Prestige
Alliances offered rich information to shareholders about the value of a biotechnology
firm's Exploration projects, reduced the uncertainty attached to Development, and
provided short and medium term financial rewards via milestone payments, thus they
should be associated with the greatest abnormal returns. PH/ffl results should be next
highest, because they offer rich information about uncertainty reduction and progress
in the process of Development. Regional Alliances offer the next highest returns
because they transmit uncertainty reduction information in Development, through
access to scarce resources and capabilities, but do not provide as certain information as
bestowed by positive results from P11/Ill clinical trials. Announcements of
Discovery/PI trials are classified as Exploration and should bestow the lowest
abnormal returns because of their distance from the market and financial returns, as
predicted by Levinthal and March (1993). The results of Table One offer medium
support to this hypothesis. Prestige Alliances do result in the largest abnormal returns,
10.1% (UK Bio model) and 10.0% (Average Returns model) however these are only
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0.6% to 1.5% lower than returns associated with Pil/ifi trials. Regional Alliances
generate considerably lower abnormal returns of 5.1% (UK Bio model) and 5.4%
(Average Returns model), with Discovery/PI trials generating abnormal returns of
2.7% and 2.8% respectively. These results do offer medium support for the hierarchy
predicted in hypothesis six.
Reflections on the connections between the findings of Chapters Two, Three and
Four
Overall Chapters Two to Four provide considerable theoretic and empirical insight into
the relationship between Exploration and Exploitation. They cover a spectrum of
methods from qualitative in-depth case studies through to quantitative analysis of the
relationship between announcements and share price. Important linkages were
observed between theory and practice, as highlighted in the Ceiltech case in Chapter
Three. Importantly the intuitions and observations of managers inside case companies
were often confirmed through empirical analysis of share price movements in Chapter
Four. As predicted by managers in the case firms both progress in development of an
alliance network, to access scarce resources and capabilities necessary to take a drug
from conception through to commercialisation, and progress in the process of gaining
regulatory approval were both found to trigger a positive response from shareholders.
Though the intensity of this response varied from event to event, it was found that the
average response of shareholders was in line with the financial predictions of the
Exploration/Exploitation literature. Abnormal returns were largest in response to
announcements rich in both Exploration and Exploitation information and smallest in
response to Exploration information.
Qualitative evidence from the Celitech case, however, suggests that inside firms
managers are not always driven towards Exploitation to the exclusion of Exploration,
as the literature may suggest. In the case of Celitech a financial crisis resulted in a
movement towards Exploration activities and away from Exploitation activities, rather
than an immediate intensification of Exploitation activities. Chapter Four also offers
insights that an event study could not provide, such as how is the tension between
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Exploration and Exploitation managed inside firms themselves. The renewal of
Ceiltech shows that financial value can be generated through Exploration activities
long before they evolve into saleable products and services, or cost saving technologies
and processes. It can be seen from Chapter Three that managing that tension requires
not only an eye to the capital markets but also careful management controls to be
installed. Much time was spent inside the firm ensuring that managerial systems were
installed that sought to maintain a clear connection between Exploration for new
compounds, Development, and Appropriation.
Qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis have both played a role in this
thesis. Individually each has offered insights into the management of organisational
knowledge, combined they offer a richer insight into the management of the tension
between Exploration and Exploitation and generate some interesting implications for
both the literature and practice. Some of these have been touched upon already in this
chapter, and individually in prior chapters. Having outlined some limitations of the
study this thesis will close by highlighting three important implications of this study
for both theory and practice.
LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
Three limitations of this study can now identified and discussed. Efforts taken to
minimise their effects are highlighted.
Small sample size
The number of observations analysed in Chapter Four was not large. Only 146
observations were available for the event study and due to methodological constraints
only 55 could be analysed. It should be noted that the small number of events observed
is a reflection of the relative youth of the sector. Data was only available for a
sufficient number of firms from December 1995. Equally given the length of time
available to complete this study data collection had to cease in January 1999. Within
this period considerable effort was made to identify all relevant events. The reduction
of the sample due to confounding events was taken in light of the advice of Mc
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Williams et a!. (1997). Their inclusion would have cast serious doubt on the reliability
of the results of the event study.
By sub-dividing these 55 observations first into two groups and later four groups
sample sizes became quite small. This means that the statistical power of the findings
from these samples needs to be treated with some caution. To protect the validity of
the study's findings both a parametric and non-parametric test was undertaken in line
with the advice of Mac Kinlay (1997) and Mc Williams et al. (1997). It should be
noted, however, that in Mac Kinlay's paper (1997) he shows that where abnormal
returns are high (and variance across the sample low) then the ability of parametric test
statistics to correctly reject the null hypothesis is very high even in the case of samples
of 20 and fewer.
Mac Kinlay (1997) suggest that where statistical power is a concern the researcher
should try to more accurately identify the event day, thus enabling a reduction in the
length of the event window, and also employ a non-parametric sign test. It should be
noted that in an effort to maximise the value-added of Chapter Four both of these
suggestions were rigorously pursued. Much time was taken to carefully identify the
event day enabling a reduction of the event window from 11 days, -5 to +5, to a very
narrow window of day 0. Evidence from Table One, Chapter Four, suggests that this
narrow event window captured the majority of the event effect and also increased the
significance of the parametric test. Mac Kinlay (1997) observes that "inclusion of the
non parametric tests provides a check of the robustness of conclusions based on
parametric tests." In Chapter Four care was taken to only support a hypothesis were
both the parametric and non-parametric tests had a high level of significance.
A second concern regarding the event study is that only eight usable Exploration
events were observed over the period of the study. One measure taken to offset the
statistical limitations that a sample of eight imposed was to report the absolute effects
of each individual Exploration event in Table Twelve of Chapter Four. From this table
it was seen that the variation in effect was very large. Some events had a very small
impact on firms' market capitalisation, while three had a very large effect. Thus the
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economic impact of individual Exploration events upon firms' market value was seen
to be considerable.
A third concern was that while there was a clear, if small, sample of pure Exploration
events, and a larger sample of Development events there was no pure sample of Use
for Appropriation events. The impact of appropriation was combined with other effects
in the announcement of Prestige Alliances, thus the individual impact of appropriation
announcements was not identified. This problem is again largely a factor of the youth
of the sector. As the sample of firms matures then more will announce the launch of a
drug into the actual marketplace and announcements of sales levels will begin to
emerge. Such announcements could then be analysed using the event study method,
assuming of course that confounding events are not also present. In the future if a
sufficient number of such events occur analysis by event study would be a potentially
valuable research avenue, as it would enable more complete testing of the
Exploration/Exploitation theory.
The results of Chapter Three impose another limitation upon the findings of this thesis.
Embodied within the Celltech story is much of the experiences that the wider sector
has faced. It is the oldest firm in the sector and has faced many of the major challenges
that other UK biotechnology finns periodically experience: the tension between
contract services and innovative R&D; replacement of the senior management team;
success followed by disappointing results in both alliance formation and clinical trials;
and seeking a listing on the London Stock Exchange. The case is thus illustrative of the
challenges faced by managers in the sector and solutions applied to them. Nevertheless
Celitech is a single case, therefore the insights offered in Chapter Three and the case
study in the appendix are an illustrative, rather than definitive, statement of how
Exploration/Exploitation is managed in the sector. Such a defmitive statement might
emerge if a follow-up study employing a large-scale questionnaire were undertaken.
Despite the small sample of case studies and events available to the researcher it
should be noted that considerable effort was undertaken to maximise the power of the
results obtained. Results of the qualitative case studies fed into the event study. The
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event study was applied to a much larger sample than the case work and as such
offered more statistically generalisable insights into the UK quoted biotechnology
sector.
Sector bias
As was observed in Chapter One of this thesis the UK therapeutic biotechnology sector
has several characteristics that make it unusual. First, it is a highly regulated sector.
Before a finn can sell a drug over the counter or via a prescription to the general public
it must undertake a number of clinical trials that prove to the regulatory authorities that
the drug is both sufficiently safe and effective that it can be legally sold. To
compensate for this high regulatory hurdle, which costs many millions of pounds to
meet, firms are rewarded with monopoly rights through the patenting system.
Second, case interviewees, annual reports and news media sources often argue that
returns are greatest from novel drug compounds. Creation of such compounds require
considerable investment in R&D. Thus the sector is both subject to considerable
regulation and is driven by R&D investments. Third, the technologies that the
biotechnology sector is founded upon are relatively new. Private UK therapeutic
biotechnology firms were not formed until the 1980s and the first did not seek a listing
on the London Stock Exchange until the early 1990s. These three features, while not
unique to the sector, are equally not common to all sectors of the UK economy. The
reader therefore needs to consider industry specific conditions when seeking to
generalise from this sample of biotechnology firms about the relationship between
Exploration and Exploitation that one should expect in other sectors.
Operation alisation
Operationalisation of events in Chapter Four was by necessity quite sector specific.
Classification of Exploration, Development and Use for Appropriation by stage of the
R&D process and alliance formation should apply in the wider pharmaceutical sector,
however direct application beyond this sector would not be practical. The study of
Exploration and Exploitation in Chapter Three is more easily transferable across
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sectors. Resource input measures should be applicable across sectors as should
financial output measures. Specific non-fmancial output measures of Exploration and
Development are, as in the case of this study, quite industry specific. To replicate this
study in other sectors the researcher would need to identify key non-financial output
measures of Exploration, and Development prior to undertaking the event study.
In summary the variables created in this thesis were by necessity quite industry
specific. Their application offered insights into the operation of the tension between
Exploration and Exploitation in the phannaceuticals sector, which is a very important
sector for the UK and the wider European and Global economies. Operationalisation of
this theory in both Chapters Three and Four, despite their industry specific nature, also
offers future researchers insights into the process by which such operationalisation can
be undertaken.
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS UPON THE LITERATURE AND
MANAGEMENT POLICY
Much work has been undertaken in this thesis that advances the academic literature on
the management of the tension between Exploration and Exploitation. These specific
advances have been signalled both within individual chapters and specifically in prior
sections of this concluding chapter. Chapter Two made an important contribution by
reviewing and integrating past literature in addition to highlighting the interconnected
nature of the tension between Exploration and Exploitation and the important
intermediary role of Development. Chapters Three and Four undertook the important
task of empirical exploration of the theory outlined in Chapter Two. Chapter Three
made an important contribution by providing insights into how the tension between
Exploration and Exploitation occurs inside a high technology firm. The contribution of
Chapter Four was also important. It is the first empirical analysis, to this researcher's
knowledge, of the response of financial markets to the outputs of the tension between
Exploration and Exploitation, yet financial responses are cited in the literature as an
explanation for why Exploitation comes to dominate over Exploration investments
inside firms. The findings of this chapter confirmed the experiences of case managers.
It also advanced the academic literature by actually testing in the field a theoretical
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belief that Exploitation activities attract greater financial rewards in the short term than
Exploration activities. It challenges the view that feedback loops between Exploration
activities and fmancial reward are so complex that they may be unobserved, while
confirming that in general the largest fmancial rewards are associated with
announcements rich in Exploitation information. There is, however, evidence in
Chapter Four that in some cases the markets react powerfully to announcements of
progress in Exploration activities.
Each of these findings makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the
tension between Exploration and Exploitation activities. Notwithstanding the
limitations that were outlined above, it is argued that three more general and exciting
conclusions can be drawn from the work embedded in this thesis. Firstly, Exploration
activities can in certain circumstances attract strong and direct feedback from the stock
market. Secondly, the announcements of small listed companies could act as an
important benchmark for valuation of internal R&D projects inside large listed firms
and the reward of key staff involved in such projects. Thirdly, that alliances may play
an important reputational role in validation of risky R&D projects, adding value
greater than from resource sharing and market access alone. These three implications
are summarised in Table Two. This table repeats the three statements outlined above,
links each statement to evidence in this thesis, and then outlines the key implications
of such a statement. A more detailed discussion of each of the three implications is
offered below.
INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
Temporally distant Exploration activities can add observable shareholder value
The outputs of Exploration activities that are temporally very distant from final
product markets, but that have a defined link to high value end markets, are valued by
shareholders. In Chapter Four, Table Twelve, it can be seen that announcement of
Phase I clinical trial results can add considerable value. The example of Chiroscience
is quite illustrative. It announced that it had entered Phase I clinical trials for its MMP
inhibitor and market capitalisation rose by £ 15 million. From Table One, Chapter
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One, it can be seen that the average time to market from entry of Phase I clinical trials
to market launch was almost nine years. Clearly this project was temporally distant
from the final market place. The announcement was also clearly Exploration. The
technology knowledge being Explored was novel from the perspective of both the firm
and the external environment and its likely commercial application quite uncertain.
From Table One, Chapter One, it can be seen that the probability of a drug that enters
Phase I trials making it through to the final marketplace is 10%. Even then only 30%
of the drugs that make it to the marketplace subsequently generate sufficient revenues
to recoup the cost of R&D (Grabowski and Vernon, 1994).
In the specific case of the Chiroscience announcement, the medicinal application of
MMP inhibitors, while a hot technology at the time, was still quite uncertain both from
a technological and commercial perspective. It was known that MMPs played a role in
a wide variety of diseases, however the exact role of compounds based upon MMP
inhibitors in the treatment of such diseases was still quite uncertain. It was believed
that MMP inhibitor technology was of considerable commercial potential, but only if it
proved to have a medicinal application in high profile, profitable, illnesses. At the time
it was believed that MMPs represented the opportunity to offer superior treatment in
diseases, such as some cancers, where cunent treatments were not highly effective and
the risk of death considerable. In this context the market saw Chiroscience's MMP
inhibitor Exploration investment as quite distant from the final market, but of
considerable long term financial value and thus rewarded the firm with a large and
significant rise in market capitalisation.
One can envisage that this phenomenon can occur in many other industries. The
challenge for management is to be innovative in how they fmance such investments
and signal their worth to shareholders. In the case of biotechnology firms the role of
prestige alliances partners, as auditors of the value adding potential of the firm's
Exploration investments, was very important. Formation of alliances with prestige
partners may have considerable value adding potential in other sectors. Small non-
biotechnology firms, who engage in high cost, temporally distant, and technologically
complex Exploration projects may benefit from entry into alliance partnerships, where
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such partners have a long past track record in delivery of both technologically
sophisticated products to end consumers and high returns to investors. The issue of
alliances is discussed in more detail in the closing section of this thesis.
Firms in other sectors may benefit from observation of shareholder reactions to
progress in their own Exploration activities. To make such observations it would be
necessary to obtain on-going signals from shareholders as to the future value of a given
Exploration investment. This would require the firm to structure such investments so
that that a series of outputs can be announced to the stock market and affiance partners
indicating relative progress. In the case of biotechnology finns such milestones are
easily identifiable as end points of one stage of clinical trials and the commencement
of another. Clear identification of such milestones is facilitated by the need to prove to
regulators that a drug has passed a series of rigorous clinical trials. In the absence of a
regulatory requirement it may be possible for other sectors to construct a series of such
nodal points, in co-operation with shareholders.
A key feature would be the provision of credible data to support assertions of success
or failure at each node. Often results of pre-clinical and clinical trials are the subject of
peer review in journal outlets. Such peer review articles, or the publication of the
principal results and data from clinical trials enables outsiders, including shareholders,
to judge the relative success of the Exploration project and hence its potential future
value. If firms from other sectors could open their Exploration projects to such peer
review then announcements of progress may be interpreted by shareholders and
assigned a positive or negative response. This would shorten the feedback loop
between Exploration investments and financial reward, thus enabling management to
assess the value of on-going investments in Exploration more directly well before
returns generated by final market sales could be observed.
The fact that Exploration activities are valued by the stock market has powerful
implications for the literature on the balance between Exploration and Exploitation.
Positive, validated, announcements about progress in Exploration and Development
can have a strong positive effect on a finn's share price. Linkage of the outputs of
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Exploration activities to stock market reactions may shorten the feedback ioop between
Exploration and financial reward. This may lessen the gravitational pull of investment
in Exploitation activities to the exclusion of Exploration that is proposed in the
literature, thus making the task of maintaining a balance between Exploration and
Exploitation more viable for firms to achieve.
Small company listings could offer benchmarks for rewarding staff involved in
Exploration and Development projects inside large firms
Where firms identify innovation as a key value driver for their business then
management needs to put in place a system to acquire innovative products, services or
processes. One extreme approach might be to outsource innovation, buying in
innovative technologies and processes from the external environment, while
maintaining sufficient outward bound absorptive capacities to intemalise such
externally created knowledge. Another approach might be to promote Exploration
activities inside the firm itself. An important challenge is how to motivate and reward
staff inside the firm to pursue Exploration investments that add shareholder value. One
opportunity that may arise from this research project is to partially link the financial
reward of key staff involved in Exploration projects to the shareholder value associated
with the announcement of the outputs of such projects over time.
A conventional approach may be to offer share options that link in the employee to
future shareholder value of the firm as a whole, thus the employee receives a financial
reward based on the performance of the firm as a whole. Another approach might be to
reward employees in response to direct rises in share price associated with
announcements of the outputs of Exploration activities in which they played a central
role. There is clear evidence in Chapter Four that positive announcements of progress
in clinical trials have an identifiable effect on shareholder value. Such effects offer
management an opportunity to value key Exploration and Development projects long
before they generate products sold to end markets. These value effects could be used
by small high technology firms to both reward staff who have played a key role in such
projects and also assess the relative value adding impact of various projects undertaken
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within the firm over time. Monitoring the response of shareholders to announcements
of progress across a range of projects offers important learning opportunities to
management. Over time they can observe which projects are consistently rejected by
shareholders. Continued financial support of such projects in the face of unfavourable
shareholder responses would require strong internal justifications of future value
added, while funds made available by discontinuation could be channelled to projects
that the owners of the firm believe to have greater potential value.
Announcements by small firms of progress in clinical trials have an identifiable effect
on shareholder value in part because the firms are relatively small and hence the
number of projects they announce relatively few. Larger firms, for example Glaxo-
Welicome, undertake a very large number of Exploration and Development projects
simultaneously. Announcements from large finns are frequent, thus the likelihood of
confounding events is considerable. The impact of announcement of a positive Phase II
trial for example may be difficult to assess due to the high possibility that other events
will be announced at a similar time. Such simultaneous announcements would act as
confounding events and thus make an associated rise in shareholder value difficult to
assign to the Phase II trial announcement alone. The average impact of a Phase il/ifi
trial announcement in Chapter Four (Table Ten) was £ 12.2 million. In the case of the
sample of UK biotechnology companies such announcements were associated with an
average abnormal return across all six models of 9.3% for the firm as a whole. For
individual projects at a large firm such as Glaxo-Weilcome a rise of £ 12.2 million in
market capitalisation may represent a considerable success for the project team
(assuming such a rise could be clearly identified). A series of such successful projects
would have an important impact on the value of the firm as a whole, however their
individual impact would be minimal. The overall impact of a £12.2 million movement
in Glaxo-Weilcome's share price would be difficult to detect. The finn had a markt
capitalisation of approximately £ 60,150 million in January 2000. A £ 12.2 million
movement would thus represent about 0.0002% of the firm's market capitalisation.
Such a small percentage rise would be unlikely to generate a significant effect in an
event study.
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One way for such large firms to identify the value creating potential ofprojects may be
to use the announcements of smaller firms as benchmarks or value creation proxies. In
projects where the large firm is collaborating with a smaller biotechnology firm, listed
on the stock market, it could monitor the movements in the share price of its
biotechnology partner that are associated with announcements from the project. The
pharmaceutical firm could then assess the proportion of that value attributable to its
efforts and use this as a guide in the motivation and reward of its staff who are
collaborating with the biotechnology firm on the given project.
For projects where the pharmaceutical firm is engaging in a wholly internal
Exploration or Development project it could select similar projects in small
biotechnology firms and use these as proxies. Announcements from projects with a
similar technological and commercial profile could be monitored and their effect on
the biotechnology firm's share price assessed. These effects could then be used, with
caution, in assessing the value of a similar project inside the larger pharmaceutical
firm. This valuation could be combined with internal accounting and scientific
measures of the value of the project and then be used to determine financial rewards
for key members of the project team. Benchmarking of this type can be most easily
envisaged within the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector. There are a large
number of small listed companies working within the same regulatory framework as
larger firms and because a large number of collaborative Exploration and Development
projects are undertaken between large and small listed firms. It may well be possible
for such value/performance benchmarks to be created in other sectors where a
population of small and large quoted firms is present.
This form of benchmarking may enable such firms to inject external market responses
into their valuation of internal Exploration projects. It could offer a mechanism by
which the financial pull of Exploitation investments is reduced relative to that of
Exploration. Key staff working on such temporarily distant projects could see the
fmancial impact of their work and be rewarded for short term rises in market
capitalisation long before the project produces products that are sold in the
marketplace. This may be of help in both the motivation and reward of staff engaged in
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key, but long-term, Exploration projects and also help management to maintain a
balance between investment in, and reward of, Exploration versus Exploitation
activities.
Alliance formation plays an important role in signalling the value ofExploration
and Development activities
It can be seen from Chapters Three and Four that formation and on-going management
of a network of alliance partners can play a strong role in the creation of value inside
UK biotechnology finns. The role of alliances in value creation has been an important
topic of research in the literature, as was highlighted in Chapter Four. The findings of
this research are important in that they offer further evidence of the value adding
effects of alliance formation and insights into what types of alliance add greatest value.
It was found that alliances with prestige partners add greater value than with regional
alliance partners. Importantly this research offered knowledge-based arguments as to
why such alliances should create greater value. It is important to realise that value is
not only created by access to superior development and marketing resources and
capabilities, but also that reputational effects play an important role in the process of
value creation.
Alliances with prestige partners add greater value in part because they offer
shareholders insights into the quality of drug discovery and development activities
inside biotechnology firms. Their endorsement of a particular project or firm adds
value because they are believed to have powerful scientific and due diligence
capabilities that greatly assist in the valuation of a drug discovery and development
project. In entering into a partnership with a smaller firm the pharmaceutical firm will
obtain access to scientific and commercial data on a project that, due to confidentiality
concerns, is unlikely to be publicly available to shareholders. Major pharmaceutical
firms have rich reserves of knowledge about the drug discovery and development
process, which they can apply to assess the likely commercial success of a given
project in which they are being invited to collaborate. Investment by the
pharmaceutical firm offers important information to the shareholders of the
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biotechnology firm. Entry into an alliance with the biotechnology firms suggests that
its pharmaceutical partner believes the project has a favourable risk/return profile and
will seek to improve that relationship by injecting its considerable expertise into the
project. If the pharmaceutical partner has a high scientific and financial reputation
within the stock market then the result of such investment is likely to drive the share
price of the biotechnology firm's stock upwards in response to the new information
that such an alliance provides shareholders.
Just as pharmaceutical firms are seen as an independent auditor of the worth of
biotechnology firm partner's Exploration projects, large high reputation firms in other
sectors could fulfil the role of technological and commercial auditor of the value of
Exploration projects in small, relatively young, firms in their sector. Should they
confirm the potential value of a project in a small firm by investing in the project, then
shareholders uncertainty about the likely success in the management of the R&D
project and its eventual commercial value should be reduced. In this circumstance one
would expect the small firm's share price to rise in response to a reduction in
uncertainty over the future success of a major Exploration project. Both firms gain
from the partnership. The large firm obtains access to new technologies and processes
without incurring the risk or cost of initial Exploration. The small firm gains access to
world class development and commercialisation capabilities and the validatory effect
that the alliance may have in the eyes of its shareholders.
Should firms in other sectors seek to engage in prestige alliances as a mechanism of
not only gaining access to resources and capabilities that they lack, but also seek to
obtain reputational benefits then it is important that they select partners carefully. The
management of the smaller finn need to ensure that the due diligence benefits that
occur in prestige alliances in the biotechnology sector can be recreated in their own.
Questions that need to be asked include whether or not the alliance partner will have
access to scientific and commercial capabilities necessary to value the project? Are the
scientific and commercial capabilities of that partner widely respected within the stock
market? Will the audit undertaken by the partner signal uncertainty reduction
information to the stock market in a more credible manner than prior announcements
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by their own firm? Is the intellectual property embedded in the collaborative project
sufficiently protected to ensure that the smaller finn will be able to extract value from
a successful project? In the case of biotechnology/pharmaceutical alliances the
existence of strong intellectual property rights, through the patenting of compounds,
helps ensure that the biotechnology firm can demand a share of eventual royalties.
Such patents confer on the biotechnology firm legally enforceable rights. The
biotechnology finn's tacit knowledge about the workings of the compound also ensure
that it plays a role in on-going discovery and development, thus again enabling it to
maintain a share of value. Thus the biotechnology firm is able to protect some of its
explicit and tacit knowledge from sole appropriation by it partner.
If the answers to the prior questions are all yes and the smaller firm is able to ensure an
on-going role in the value creation and appropriation process then formation of
alliances with prestige partners may be an important value creation activity in sectors
outside the research focus of this thesis. Prestige alliances have facilitated considerable
investment in Exploration within the biotechnology sector, enabling such firms to
avoid the tendency of Exploitation investments to drive out Exploration. These
alliances have also been of considerable benefit to large pharmaceutical partners,
enabling them to participate in a wider range of innovative projects than would be
otherwise possible. The application of such alliance networks in other sectors may act
as a powerful stimulus to investment in Exploration activities, encouraging creation of
innovative new products and processes, and avoiding over investment in Exploitation
activities, thus improving the long term ability of firms to survive in turbulent
environments.
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Appendix One
THE CELLTECH CASE STUDY:
Celitech's Rejuvenation in the 1990s
INTRODUCTION
Ceiltech was born in 1980. Investment funds were obtained primarily from British and
Commonwealth, Midland Ventures, Prudential and the British Technology Group.
From 1980 to 1990 the company built up the foundations of a strong contract
manufacturing and development business, in addition to an in-house research and
development business. In the early years the firm had a diverse set of interests focused
around diagnostics, nutritional and contract business. Only towards the end of the
1980s did it begin to focus primarily on therapeutics (drugs for human consumption)
including involvement beyond sub-contracting. Its key technologies were the large
scale production of animal cells and hybridomas and their use to produce monoclonal
antibodies. Management's goal was to cover the costs of developing in-house drugs
with revenues generated from contract work. Even though it seemed to succeed in this
goal, shareholders were unhappy: Ceiltech had only one product in clinical trials, an
osteoporosis drug. The largest shareholder was in financial difficulties and needed to
realise its investment. Other investors wanted to remain with the finn, but were
unhappy with the status quo. They wanted the firm to have more candidate drugs in
trials and increased research productivity.
In 1990 Dr. Peter Feliner joined the firm as the new CEO with a different perspective.
He saw the future in the collaborative development of innovative drugs with major
pharmaceutical partners. These new collaborations would differ from the contract
research of the past because Celitech would share some of the risk and rewards if the
product came to market. As he puts it, "the winners have to be the companies in
therapeutic because the value added is so huge." From 1990 to 1996, the firm re-
focused its efforts on creating a capability in the development of innovative drugs.
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These drugs were to be developed up to phase ifi clinical trials. All projects were to be
in the therapeutic areas of Immunomodulation, Oncology and Inflammation. This
strategy posed new technical and organisational challenges to the firm. The principal
technical challenge was to create new capabilities in biology and medicinal chemistry,
moving from a technological focus towards the development of drugs. The
organisational challenge that this posed was to shift away from hierarchical research
towards inter-disciplinary in-house research.
In 1990 contract manufacturing and development was made into a separate company,
known as Ceiltech Biologics. In 1996 the Biologics firm was sold for £ 50 million to
the Swiss firm Alusuisse-Lonza. By this action Ceiltech pinned its flag firrnlyto the
mast of R&D in innovative drugs to advance human health.
Ceiltech (in 1996) had a market capitalisation of over £ 400 million, making it one of
Britain's largest independent biotech firms. It invests over £ 17 million pounds a year
in R&D. With over 180 employees it is large, even by US standards. It has over five
drugs in clinical trials and a further five or more in pre-clinical development.
By the end of 1996 Ceiltech had a strong financial position in the UK biotech sector.
The sale of Biologics and cash payments from alliance partners had reduced the need
to rely on capital markets as a sole source of funding. The company had a senior
management team that had considerable experience in the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology sector. It had created a strong portfolio of discovery and development
projects, in partnership with some of the world's leading pharmaceutical firms. Now it
was at a pivotal period in its history, with its first potential product on the brink of
regulatory approval.
THE EARLY DAYS: CRISIS, A NEW TEAM, AND A NEW MANDATE
The Emergence of a Crisis
Tn 1988 the Financial Times included Celitech in its 'pick of the British and US firms
specialising in therapeutic drugs' (Science Editor 1988). Yet in October 1989 the CEO
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announced that he was seeking retirement (March 1989a) and by November 1989 the
Financial Times was identifying Ceiltech as a potential take-over target (March
1989b). It was a crisis in shareholder support that prompted the arrival of a new senior
management team and a major change in corporate strategy. In the years leading up to
this crisis while the finn was not making strong profits neither was it a loss maker (see
Table One for fmancial details). Considering the biotechnology sector in general Dr.
Feilner noted, in 1996, that:
"the shareholder loyalty issue is tightly related to financing risks. As
shareholder loyalty declines the cost of capital rises. This is particularly
important in the biotechnology industry which is such a large consumer of
capital at present and does not have access to cash-flows from product sales as
yet."
Interpreted in this light the events of 1989 are quite significant.
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERB
The first real public warning of trouble seems to have been signalled by an article in
the Financial Times suggesting that Celltech might be a take-over target prompted by
an announcement in 1989 that British and Commonwealth wished to sell its 36.4 %
shareholding (March 1989b; Ceiltech Annual Report 1989). The pressures in B&C
were mounting and these were passed on to Ceiltech. At this time Ceiltech was not
quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Although shares were transacted by means of
matched trading this mechanism was really an avenue for exit by small investors,
rather than one the size of B&C. By mid 1990, B&C had gone into administration and
needed to realise its investment. A difficulty was that the market value of Celitech had
remained relatively static over the previous two years (March 1 989b, 1 990b).
According to a member of the current management team attempts during the period of
crisis to convince a pharmaceutical company to buy the B&C stake proved difficult as
those approached seemed to value the company at below the price at which the original
shareholders had entered the company. This view is reinforced by a contemporaneous
article in which a number of senior executives in pharmaceutical firms stated they were
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not interested in buying Celitech because they did not believe the firm would (at that
time) add value above its price (March 1990a). One analyst noted in the article that
"anyone who buys Ceiltech will be buying an enormous amount on trust."
The B&C crisis was not the only issue facing the finn. One of the current senior
management team recalls that in 1990:
"The company was in a fairly parlous state because a number of projects that
had been much vaulted by the previous management had not delivered as much
as had been hoped."
Dr. Feliner notes that generally diagnostics and contracting had tighter margins than
those achieved by firms who were successful in drug discovery and development. In
his view the greatest upside potential in the sector exists in the discovery and
develoirnient of novel dmgs,, hence the new strategy of focusing on drug discovery and
development rather than on the other options. This required a change in strategic focus.
The change in strategy was influenced by the demands of current shareholders, the
desire for change of many within the company, as well as by the ideas of the new
management team.
Shareholder's desire for change was, to some extent, mirrored by internal desire for
change. According to Dr. Ursula Ney, who is now the Director of Development but in
1990 was a project leader, inside the firm was a growing acceptance that a change in
corporate direction was needed. Reflecting on 1990 she noted:
"In the months leading up to the change I think a lot of people had seen that the
company was in trouble. Partially there were people coming up for retirement.
The head of research was due to retirement as was the CEO and others. The
company had lost its focus, it had lost where it was going. The majority of
people realised that something had to be done."
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The appointment of a New Team
The company and the shareholders were looking for an experienced management team
who could be trusted to direct a new approach. In August 1990 it was announced that
Dr. Feliner had been appointed as the new CEO and that Dr. David Bloxham, who had
worked with Dr. Feilner in the past, was appointed as the Director of Research
(Financial Times 1990).
Recalling the mood at the time one of the senior management said:
"It was relayed to us by the original investors that 'you are smart guys. You can
tell us a nice story, but how do we know its valid?' You see six or seven years
ago very few financial institutions knew anything much about science, let alone
the pharmaceutical industry and they felt that they had already been
hoodwinked by one group of management and so what they said was we had to
do something quite distinctive that made them believe there was something
special about us."
The experience of the new team, which took up the challenge of the shareholder, is
given in Table Two.
INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
Shareholders and the New Mandate
Dr. Feliner believes that over the long term shareholders invest in Ceiltech because it
has:
1. The expertise and ability to deliver therapeutic innovations;
2. The ability to judge when and how much to invest in R&D options and to remain
focused around these investments; and
3. An ability to communicate effectively with the city in terms it understands.
It is left to the reader to determine from the remainder of the case whether this long
term perspective was balanced against the short term stipulations laid out by the
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shareholders. Dr. Bloxham, the current CEO of Celitech Therapeutics, recalls that
these were threefold:
1. To make no new share issues in the short term:
2. To improve the liquidity of Celitech shares through flotation on the London Stock
Exchange; and
3. To strengthen the share price and reduce losses from therapeutics.
Within these three criteria the management had a carte blanche. The key for the new
management was to increase the value of the firm such that shareholders could make
some capital gain. Given the valuation problems, sale to a third party was not a viable
option (March 1990a).
• One senior manager noted that the new management needed to build on the fruits of
the first ten years of therapeutic discovery, while carrying along sufficient internal
support to implement change. Reflecting on 1990 the same executive recalled that the
previous management had left the company with some considerable advantages. The
firm had
"been quite successful at times during the 1980s and the management had
raised something like £ 70 million from the market, which in those days was
not trivial. They had created a manufacturing business that was, apparently,
running in a reasonably profitable manner. What this meant was that when we
arrived on the scene we had quite a positive cash balance ... {however} ... the
original investors were malcontent and had a number of stipulations on what
could be done."
As noted earlier, Dr. Fellner views shareholder loyalty and confidence as critical to UK
biotechnology firm's survival. Without shareholder loyalty Celltech would have no
ready access to the capital markets. The firm was years away from product generated
'Items in {} are interpretations of what the interviewee meant rather than exact quotations.
264
cash flows, and had cash burn45 of only two years. In the view of several senior
managers there was an urgent short term need to control expenditures and seek
alternative sources of income, while simultaneously creating a strategy which would
reduce short term shareholder dissatisfaction and raise long term market confidence.
Re-structuring
The primary short term priority of Ceiltech's management was survival. Dr. Bloxham
recalls that:
"The first issue we really had was to scale the organisation back to the size
which was appropriate for the financial base of the organisation and our
potential access to capital, which at the time looked rather poor."
In pruning the organisation the two most basic tasks were to sub-divide the group into
two separate firms and to re-organise R&D to be more productive.
The two new finns were Biologics and Therapeutics. Biologics was concerned with
contract manufacturing and development services. Although it provided income, and
overall profitability, this business offered little upside potential when compared with
Therapeutics. The rationalisation of Biologics maintained it as a profitable, but
separate business. Therapeutics was concerned with the discovery and development of
novel drugs. No longer was Therapeutics to engage in contract research. Now it was to
have long term participation in all R&D undertaken. From an outsider's perspective,
this restructuring complemented the efforts to increase productivity and to reduce costs
through clear delineation of tasks between the two firms.
The overall R&D expense was reduced (see Table One) while actions were
simultaneously taken to make research more product focused. Some savings came
45Cash burn is taken as the amount of cash and equivalents on the balance sheet divided by the pre tax
losses of the firm. It is a rough approximation of how long the firm has before it will need to return to
capital markets or seek alternative sources of finance at its present rate of income and expenditure.
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from a reduction in open ended academic collaborations. A senior executive
remembers that:
"the company at the time I joined (in 1990) had a lot of open ended
collaborations (with academics) in fact almost a third of its R&D spend was on
these collaborations. I can say that almost universally they were very non-
productive. They were quite a cash drain on the company. We were almost
ruthless in pruning these down ... The minute we were working on a two year
time scale the open ended collaboration just didn't fit into our time scales.
There was no point in saying 'well we are planning for what we will be doing
in the year 2005', when we were dead in 1992"
There was a simultaneous hiring of new staff and re-focusing of R&D activities. The
immediate financial result of re-organisation was redundancies of 60 staff and
restructuring charges of nearly £ 5 million (see Table One for financial details). R&D
expenditure was reduced by £ 1.5 million and group losses halved. The cash burn now
stood at 3.5 years and breathing space had been created.
TILE EMERGENCE OF A NEW STRATEGIC FOCUS
The renaissance of Celitech's standing in the city and the industry is inextricably
linked to a new direction in the firm's drug discovery and development strategy. The
search for a research focus was strongly influenced by Dr. Feilner's general view of the
biotechnology sector that the margins in contract manufacturing and development,
agro-bio, and diagnostics were slim. His interest was in the quest to discover novel
drugs. If Ceiltech discovered and patented a major new drug it could get a twenty year
exclusive right and the margins from this seemed to be huge when compared with the
alternatives.
The choice of new therapeutic focus and organisational hierarchy was driven by the
new top management. As Dr. Yarranton, who is now the Director of Research, put it:
"It came from the top. Of course there were managers further down but the way
we were going to organise ourselves came from David Bloxham."
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The core of the new strategy was to have more product focused research Dr. Bloxham
recalls that the change in overall strategy in 1990 was, in essence, a change in attitude.
"An organisation of this type is not judged by the output of scientific papers. It
is actually judged by its ability to come up with technologies which in turn will
lead to therapeutic entities. The technology itself is fairly valueless until you
convert it into something practical ... What I think we emphasised, if anything,
was to say that if that is the basis on which we are judged, then clearly if we
cannot convert our technology into practical realities we will be complete
failures. ... We felt we had to pick novel mechanism based approaches that
gave us opportunities in areas where there was a clear clinical need to produce
something which would be commercially worthwhile."
Dr. Yarranton, sums up the change in broad strategy by saying:
"What happened when management changed was we said we are not going to do
any more contract research. Research is here to generate products and that's where
uliimately the company will sink or swim. Contract research kept us going from
year to year but it isn't going to turn Ceiltech into a big pharmaceutical company
or even give us a rosy future."
People within the firm had come to refer jokingly to Celitech as the 'University of
Slough'. There was a consensus amongst the researchers that change was necessary.
Both shareholders and scientists were looking for leadership. A number of senior
executives noted that it appeared that the scientists inside the organisation wanted the
new management team to make the choice of targets and rejuvenate the firm. Within
the three broad areas of Immunomodulation, Oncology and Inflammation, the senior
management decided to focus on five projects. There was a wide choice of target
projects to choose from within the firm, however some of this research lacked a
product focus. As Dr. Ney put it:
"I think that some of the decisions that we had to make were fairly obvious. We
were under time pressures. We had to work quickly to start producing products and
pipelines of products. So we couldn't start with a blank sheet of paper."
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The choice was not dictatorial. It did involve consultation with the senior scientific
staff Thinking on the 1990 changes Dr. Bloxham puts it best when he notes that:
"The choice was not based upon randomly saying, 'I will force everyone to do
what I tell them to'. It was based on saying, 'I think these are the twenty best
people in the organisation. These are the ideas that they would be most
comfortable with. We will encourage them to pursue those.' Those individuals
then gave the impetus to carry out the plan ... At the end of the day it would
never be quite sure who came up with the idea {of each specific project)
because I think it is a shared experience where you have to get all the scientists
to buy into the project. One thing you learn very rapidly is that you can't tell a
scientist what to do in authoritative mode!"
Dr. Ney confirms this non-random selection process. She remembers clearly that
Celitech were already making progress in cancer discovery, hence the focus on
oncology. There was also a long running project in anti-TNF (Tumour Necrosis
Factor), hence the focus on Inflammation and Immunomodulation. Dr. Bloxham had
considerable past experience in Asthma projects, hence a new project in Asthma. The
Asthma project also required a significant medicinal chemistry capability to be
developed.
So while there were 60 redundancies, simultaneously 35 medicinal chemists were
brought into the firm. This new blood not only provided key skills needed to
implement the new strategy, but also a group of people who could stimulate and
challenge Celitech with new ideas, uninfluenced by its past history. (This perspective
may have been influenced by similar experiences which Dr. Bloxham and Dr. Feilner
had encountered in Roche). The willingness to broaden the technology base in pursuit
of the firm's broader goal is a striking illustration of the change in strategy away from
a technology focus46.
We mean by technology focus that Ceiltech had previously been driven by the development and
maintenance of a technological expertise in large scale production of animal cells and hybridomas and
their use to produce monoclonal antibodies to order.
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RE-ORGANISING TEAMS FOR SCIENTIFIC CREATIVITY
Inter-disciplinary learns
Hand-in-hand with the selection of a new research focus was the re-organisation and
strengthening of the process by which new scientific knowledge was created and
applied in the firm. In 1990 teams in the firm were considered by Dr. Bloxham to be
over staffed. There had been an assumption that satisfactory research productivity
could be achieved by organising around separate departments within which resided
homogeneous functional specialists. The new strategy considered a key lever to
improved research productivity to be a focus on medicinal indication rather than
functional specialism (e.g. Cell Biology; Biochemistry). Research teams were
therefore re-organised around specific indications and diverse specialists were brought
together to work on that specific indication. The value of all research was to be
measured in terms of production of new drug candidates. The principal was that each
research team would now have sufficient resources and capabilities within itself to
develop plausible drug candidates in their targeted indication. The stand alone teams
now had both critical mass and strong research focus, yet the numbers of research staff
remained largely unchanged.
The re-organisation involved moving the firm from an extremely hierarchical form, in
which researchers each worked in relative isolation within their specialist departmental
areas, to a flatter structure. The old organisational form had created a strong
technological focus and capability, but if Ceiltech was to develop novel drugs it had to
strengthen its capabilities in biological research.
In commenting upon the Ceiltech of 1988 Dr. Ney, who was then working as a project
manager in the firm, noted that:
"I must admit that when I first came here I was amazed that the organisation of
research was skill based, which in some cases consisted of departments with
just two people ... For a very small company it was very hierarchical."
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Reflecting on the 1990 strategy change Dr. Geoff Yarranton, the Director of Research,
remembers that the move from hierarchical towards interdisciplinary research:
"was really almost a sea change in the way that we were organised..."
Motivating Scientists to Change
Motivating the scientists to embrace change seems to have been an important theme.
Several senior executives commented that if change was to succeed it was critical that
the scientists supported the re-organisation. Without their co-operation the firm could
not hope to change its course and take a compound quickly from discovery into
development. To make these new teams work Dr. Bloxham believed that it was critical
to communicate clearly that the focus of the scientist's job had changed away from
development of technologies and towards production of products, which by necessity
involved interdisciplinary inputs. As he put it:
'What really was required was to make the scientists themselves understand
that what they were being judged on was products entering into clinical
evaluation rather than the development of technologies per Se. It always
seemed to me that all that was needed to focus this energy {the creative energy
of the scientists} was to make them all believe that what they are here for is
the improvement of human health and if that's what they are really interested
in they can only do this by having products which do something about it."
Dr. Bloxham's point is reinforced by Dr. Ney who remembers that:
"Having a bit of a clean out and starting again (looking back) was quite well
accepted. It hurt some people, there were a lot of redundancies {in Biologics} but
that didn't really affect the therapeutics side ... Therapeutics was fairly untouched
in the harsh numbers game that was being played. They had to change their type
and style of work, but I think that a lot of people liked it."
Dr. Yarranton shares this view, noting that the change, in and of itself, was a great
motivator as it offered scientists a new challenge, something which, in the right
environment, they relish. Reflecting on the 1990 change in strategy he says:
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"It was quite invigorating that change because it was such a big change. I think
when new management comes in it is quite good to make a significant change. It
gave people a new challenge, because they were challenged with learning more
about the biology, rather than just learning about techniques and technology
People hunger after challenge. Obviously some people left because they didn't like
it, but in general we didn't have that much turnover. People could understand the
rationale. Obviously the rationale was that we need to get products, and to get the
products you need to understand the biology of the systems. They were organising
these models into biology focus groups {focused around the three therapeutic areas
and including medicinal chemistry capabilities). People seemed to enjoy that
working in inter-disciplinary teams focused on developing drug candidates in one
indication). There was a buzz about the place, and it was quite new."
Jitter-disciplinary Learning
An environment of inter-disciplinary co-operation regarding knowledge sharing and
creation was fostered in Therapeutics. Thrown together and strongly motivated by
crisis and shared vision, researchers had to learn to work together on a common task.
Formal interdisciplinary interaction was reinforced by informal socialisation. The labs
at Celitech are open plan, with coffee and dining areas near the labs, which may help in
the creation of proximity.
The new tasks often involved researchers moving out of their own specialist field,
learning new skills, blending these with their own, and through this creating a broader
based shared language with which to interact with their colleagues. Thrown into this
cauldron were the newly hired medicinal chemists. The new people faced the informal
social and professional 'clubs of the old.' The 'old clubs' faced yet another uncertainty
- new people with a different language and knowledge base.
Dr. Yarranton says that tensions between these groups took time to reduce and total
integration has not yet been fully achieved by 1996. The process of learning to work
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together created a new knowledge base and capability within the firm. Dr. Yarranton
sun-is up this transformation in working methods and capabilities when he say that:
"We were very much organised along technical disciplines for quite a long time
which gave us a very good strength in technology but maybe not a good strength in
biology. We found that when we moved into the therapeutic areas that we were
able to get people to be focused on biological questions so that they built up their
biology base. So we had people who have a lot of interest in inflammation and
these people built up a knowledge base around inflammation as opposed to being
molecular biologists, or cell biologists, or biochemists." The re-organisation
"challenged {researchers} with learning more about the biology, rather than just
learning about techniques and technology."
Dr. Bloxham believes that the net result of these changes in teams and research focus
enabled Ceiltech to have sufficient mass to undertake big, liberated science. This
motivated the scientists and enabled the group to push products quickly through the
discovery process into development where they could be used to attract collaborators.
THE NEW STRATEGY IN ACTION: THE BAYER COLLABORATION
The principles of the new strategy can be understood by examining the story of
CDP571/BAYX1351. At an interview in 1996 Dr. Bloxham noted that this project was
an interesting example of the Celltech strategy in action. He commented that:
"it highlights both all the successes and the problems that go with a business of this
type ... I think that it is an interesting project to focus on because it will tell you
just about everything you need to know about the roller coaster life that exists
within the biotechnology sector."
Selection of the Project & early days
The story begins in the labs of Celltech during the mid to late 1980s. The firm had
being working on a murine based antibody to TNF (Tumour Necrosis Factor) as a
therapy for Septic Shock. The R&D of this product had been proceeding well and the
firm had several strong patents filed protecting its anti-TNF position. In 1989 Ceiltech
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decided not to develop the murine product because management believed that the time
lags to market were too long. Consequently it began a recombinant programme to
hu.manise the murine antibodies. The humanised product would be a more advanced
product.
In 1990 the winds of change transformed the fortunes of anti-TNF programmes in
Ceiltech. The new management were looking for a programme from which they could
show quick results to the market and found one in the shape of CDP571/BAYX1351.
The new senior management believed Ceiltech had to get something out of the labs
quickly to attract a major pharmaceutical collaborator. In the view of Dr. Bloxham
such a collaborator which would provide the company with cash payments, to reduce
the rate of cash burn, and validation in the eyes of the capital markets. The two year
cash burn did not give much time, therefore a fairly advanced programme needed to be
found quickly. As he put it:
"We wanted to {get the project out of the laboratory and into development) in the
shortest length of time possible because we wanted to use that as the basis of a
collaborative deal we would do with somebody and that would be our validation.
That validation would enable us to raise more money and survive. So a lot of what
we did with that project is linked to the process of survival and evolution of this
business and the satisfaction of what shareholders wanted which was an increase in
liquidity and a better share price."
Dr. Ney believes that anti-TNF was chosen because:
"There had already been a research programme {CB-6} in Celitech to look at
engineering an antibody. So some of the ground work had been done. It was sitting
there and could produce a product in terms of engineering an antibody. We had a
lot of the skills in-house to do that. People knew what they were. You could se
how you could, in a limited space of time, get a product through."
Dr. Yarranton, who had been leading the earlier anti-TNF projects, believes that the
central additional ingredient new management brought
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"was to look not only at Septic Shock and say 'well maybe things like Rheumatoid
Arthritis and immune diseases are a better target than Septic Shock'."
Collaboration - Making a Deal
The massive effort of CDP 571 began to show quick results. The drug candidate
started moving out of the labs and into development in the summer of 1990. This
coincided with the firm's search for a collaborator and it quickly became apparent that
Bayer was a suitable candidate. Bayer met Celltech's requirement that the collaborator
be a major pharmaceutical firm. Combined, the firms could command what Dr.
Yarranton believed was an "almost impregnable position around 1'NF."
At that time it was believed that Bayer's murine anti-TNF for Sepsis was close to a
successful phase Ill trial. Celltech agreed to halt its own humanised programme in
return for a share in the future rights of Bayer's anti-TNF project. The collaboration
proposed that the development of the next generation humanised product would also
be undertaken at a later stage. Celltech would have responsibility for development to
phase II with Bayer taking over there afterwards. Bayer would pay Ceiltech a potential
£ 26 million in milestones. By the end of 1996 Celltech had received £ 15.6 million in
milestone payments from Bayer. If the clinical trials proved successful Ceiltech would
receive a 12% royalty on all sales by Bayer while retaining some European marketing
rights (Lister 1996). Bayer calculated that the potential peak market would be $ 700
million per year, world-wide. From the shareholder's perspective this was a deal with a
major pharmaceuticals firm, and thus a validation of Celltech's long term potential
value. From the view point of those inside the firm the success in getting a product out
of the clinic and into development, in addition to enlisting a major collaborator, may
have signalled that the new management's strategy was beginning to show tangible
results.
Learning andAdaptation from CDP 571/BA }'X1351
During 1996, while reflecting on the Bayer collaboration, Dr. Bloxham noted that
lessons were learned which were applied to the later, post 1992 collaborations. Dr.
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Ney noted that the collaboration was a lesson in the inner workings of large firms, the
uncertainties of clinical trials, and the challenges of co-operation. Bayer's first phase
HI Sepsis trials proved inconclusive and hopes of a quick product to market dissipated.
In the early 1990s, awaiting results from Bayer on the Sepsis phase ifi clinical trials,
Ceiltech independently funded clinical trials into two additional targets: Crohns and
Rheumatoid Arthritis. In retrospect, the logic, according to Dr. Bloxham, was that:
"We had a deal which was based entirely on Septic Shock. We could have stopped
there completely ... {however} we felt there were more opportunities for this
malady that we would want to explore, therefore we undertook to explore them at
our own expense. We were hoping that we would generate results which would be
good enough to convince Bayer that in addition to the work on Septic Shock they
should contemplate expanding their research activities ... this was clearly a
management decision."
The idea was that if the eventual Septic Shock trials proved unsuccessful then Ceiltech
had another promising route which it could develop quickly. If the Septic Shock trials
proved positive then these candidates could be pursued to reinforce the collaborators
position in the anti-TNF market. In Dr. Bloxham's view this offered Ceiltech "an each
way bet." These trials were successful up to phase II. In an agreement with Bayer the
phase ifi development of these candidates was passed over to them, thus conserving
Ceiltech's cash positions.
The decision to proceed first with Septic Shock, followed later by Rheumatoid
Arthritis and Crohns Disease, was, according to Dr. Bloxham, due to "a genuine
market issue" of which market and product to develop first. For complex market
reasons Bayer needed the Septic Shock drug to be developed and released onto the
market first. Furthermore, the view of Peter Allen, Celitech's Finance Director, is that
were Celitech to have developed successfully a treatment for Septic Shock it would be
of greater financial value than one for Rheumatoid Arthritis, though both would, of
course, be substantial.
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At present there is no drug treatment for Septic Shock on the market, thus if Celitech
were to succeed in developing such a drug it would be the first player in this market.
About a half a million people per annum suffer from Septic Shock, which is often fatal
(Ceiltech Annual Report 1995). About 800,000 people per annum suffer from severe
Rheumatoid Arthritis (Ceiltech Annual Report 1995). There are a number of drug
treatments for this illness already on the market. From the point of view of the
management Celltech would be a second mover in this market and could not expect to
capture as large a market share as in that for the treatment of Septic Shock
In 1996 Dr. Bloxham commented that the difficulties of 1990 meant that Ceiltech
could not take on much risk, hence most of the later development costs and
responsibilities were passed over to Bayer. Now (in 1996) that Ceiltech is financially
stronger and has enhanced skills, internally and through collaborations, he believes that
a greater load of risk, for increased returns, could be borne. Dr. Bloxham believes that
if the Bayer collaboration were to occur today Ceiltech would seek to take a greater
proportion of the discovery and development process, thereby retaining more control
over European development and marketing and a greater proportion of final rights.
This would probably involve a lower proportional milestone payment. According to
some members of the Celitech management team such an arrangement would allow
Ceiltech to work jointly with, but not be completely reliant on, the sometimes slow,
though undoubtedly methodical, progress of major pharmaceutical firms. Ceiltech's
speed in clinical development within European markets could be used to show slower
collaborators the way and to spur faster progress. This would shorten the time taken to
get through clinical trials while retaining the marketing and phase III clinical trial
expertise and resources brought by large collaborators.
The financial result of the project was startling. By the end of 1996 Bayer had paid
£ 15.6 million in milestones, none of which was repayable if the project eventually
failed. In 1996 Dr. Bloxham summed up the value of the Bayer collaboration:
"it was a very cash positive deal. It gave us a lot of kudos in the city. Bayer is a
highly respectable company and they will get products out of the deal if there are
products there".
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The logic of collaborator validation appears to have been vindicated by later press
comments, one of which noted:
"Most importantly, Ceiltech has collaborations with big name drugs companies and
their expert assessment is worth more than a City analyst's report. Where
companies such as Merck, Bayer and Schering-Plough invest, others follow."
(Green 1994a).
BUILDING ON EARLY COLLABORATIVE SUCCESS
The CDP571/BAYX1351 project was not without its risks, both in terms of technique
(anti-TNF) and choice of illness (Septic Shock). Anti-TNF is a novel but risky
approach. In 1995 US biotech firm Immunex halted Anti-TNF clinical trials due to
unpromising results. Furthermore, it has been reported that nine US biotech firms have
targeted drugs at Septic Shock, but all failed in clinical trials (Lister 1996).
Infamously, Synergen failed a phase ifi clinical trial on a Septic Shock. It chose to re-
test while simultaneously building a manufacturing facility only to fail again. The
result was a take-over offer by Amgen for Synergen that valued the firm at $9 versus
$66 per share at its height in 1992 (Green 1994b). To manage such risks senior
management at Ceiltech felt it necessary to develop additional promising projects with
first tier collaborators. The firm proceeded to do this with considerable success.
In 1993 a new collaboration commenced with Schering-Plough, while an older
collaboration with American Cyanamid successfully survived that firm's merger with
American Home Products. Further collaborative R&D deals were struck with Merck in
1994 and Zeneca in 1995. The reasoning behind these deals is compelling:
"Because of the high cost and complexity of world-wide product development and
marketing the company collaborates with major pharmaceutical companies which
possess the necessary technological expertise and financial resources to optimise
the probability of success. As the company progresses towards profitability we
intend to retain a greater proportion of European rights to new products" (Annual
Report 1995)
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The benefits of this strategy appear to have had a positive influence on the firm's image
in the city's eyes (Green 1994a, c).
Figure One provides an outline of the collaborative ventures in which Celitech was
involved in 1996. Essentially knowledge flows between the collaborators and in return
a share of rights to future products, milestone payments and vital skills and resources
are exchanged. Financially Ceiltech gains milestones payments. To date this has
amounted to over £ 26.5 million, with a contracted potential of £ 83 million.
Development costs which otherwise would have to be borne by Ceiltech have been
passed over to collaborators. Dr. Yarranton estimated that by 1996 milestone payments
from collaborators covered nearly 50% of research and development costs at Ceiltech.
Milestones notwithstanding Celltech maintains a substantial share of the final rights of
products sold. Royalties and rights accruing from collaborations are calculated to
amount to between 25% and 45% of net profits.
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE
Celitech management noted that collaboration also validates the firm's worth in the
city's eyes. Following this logic, the financial reward of the virtuous cycle of
collaborative validation came in 1993 in the shape of the largest ever placing and
public offer of shares of a biotechnology business in Europe. This helped strengthen
the balance sheet by £ 30 million. It also reduced the firm's exposure to B&C's need to
sell a substantial shareholding in Ceiltech, which had been one of the triggers of the
1990 crisis. While in 1992 B&C controlled about 36% of Ceiltech, by 1995 this was
reduced to less than 4%.
Collaboration brings benefits, but it is not without resource allocation problems for
Ceiltech. The collaboration with Merck acts as an illustration of these commitments.
The project has moved from research and into clinical stages and back again. When
work moves back into research up to 30 people can be assigned to that collaboration
alone. These commitments vary in size, but continue to impact on resource allocation
during the life of the collaboration.
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Dr. Ney once commented that collaboration often means the firm must face a longer
time to market. This is sometimes due to the slower speed of larger collaborators, to
the time involved in knowledge transfer, and/or to systems differences. She points out
that this has its risks. For example Centocor, Celitech's major rival in anti-TNF, were
moving much faster through the regulatory process because they were working
independently. They were also looking at Rheumatoid Arthritis and Inflammatory
Bowel disease targets. One of the key questions Ceiltech faced was whether its
technology would win through the regulatory process where Centocor's did not? In
this case Celitech would be alone in the market. Alternatively, what would happei if
Ceiltech's product, which Dr. Ney believed to be superior, arrived at the market later.
In this case could Ceiltech, as a second moet, capture an increasing market share
through both a superior product and employment of Bayer's deep marketing expertise
and global distribution system?
SYSTEMS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM
From an outsider's view point it seems that underpinning Celltech's ability to generate
sufficient progress in research and development to maintain and expand its portfolio of
collaborators and drug candidates has been the establishment of new management
systems. According to Dr. Yarranton these systems help monitor and review progress
of current projects and identify and select new ones. Timely termination of failing
projects is a key element in maintaining research focus and conserving scarce cash
resources. For a new project to be given the 'go ahead' it must have clear quantifiable
measures, based on clinical criteria, by which it can be managed. Termination and
selection require both managerial insight and systems of monitoring and control.
Dr. Yarranton describes the monitoring process as follows:
"You manage the projects by objectives and milestones. All objectives should have
time frames associated with them. You have regular quarterly reviews, after all, we
are a small company so you can monitor things reasonably closely. So the bells
should start if there is a problem because you are not hitting the objectives. You
then analyse if it is something very critical that is causing you to not hit the
objectives. {For example}Is it because there is a technical problem? I make a
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judgement as to if it is solvable and if so how long is it going to take to solve. So
that's really bow we manage them. If there really is ... a problem that can't be
solved we will of course terminate it."
Over the years the firm has installed four research selection, monitoring and review
systems to maintain the momentum of its success. There are review systems for drug
development, drug discovery, annual reviews, and long term strategic review systems
Research Review Systems
As products have moved out of research and into development with collaborators,
research resources have begun to be freed periodically. This has placed an increasing
emphasis on the selection of new research candidates. Ideas are always bubbling up
from researchers, who are free to experiment on their ideas subject to two criteria.
First, they continue to meet their job targets and second, with the proviso that
experimentation does not place a significant resource drain on the firm.
As resources are freed the firm engages in both an informal and formal search for new
candidates. As Dr. Yarranton puts it:
"You don't say that we are going to have a meeting on next Thursday. There
usually is a lot of discussion about the ideas. Eventually they {proposals} come
forward, but they don't come forward as a surprise on Thursday afternoon and we
decide by the end of the day. Because we are a small company you are always
talking to people so you have a good idea of what ideas are being discussed. It is
almost a constant process of seeing what's new, what we might do, what's
exciting."
Projects are more formally screened by a senior management team comprising the
Directors of Research and Development, the CEO of Therapeutics and senior
scientists. The following criteria are broadly applied:
a) Does the project fall into the firm's three broad research areas ? If not, there would
need to be an overwhelming benefit in entering such a project.
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b) Does the project proposal have a plausible clinical entity?
c) Are there clear quantifiable measures from which progress can be managed?
d) Does this project represent greater potential than competing alternatives?
Development Review Systems
Reflecting on the early 1 990s Dr. Ney commented that with so many products in the
discovery pipeline the development process focused on taking products from research
directly into development. This attitude has begun to change. The focus shifted
towards research productivity. Staff are now expected to maximise the number of
products entering clinical development. The central criterion for entry is that each
product pass a Product Development Review conducted by a committee which asks a
number of critical questions. Products that do not meet these criteria do not enter
development. According to Dr. Ney some of the key questions are where is the market
and what is the clinical need? It is not now simply a question of taking good researcb
from the lab and into the clinic. The market pull dimension is growing in importance
along side the supply push.
Projects must submit a Product Development Proposal (PDP) to the Product
Development Review Committee before they formally enter the development process.
This committee consists of all senior management with scientific expertise. It is an
important aspect of Celltech's managerial systems that those who monitor and control
project selection and review have the necessary practical scientific experience to make
content and process judgements on project quality and performance.
The PDP identifies which issues will need to be addressed in the development cycle.
These include the types of clinical trials to be run, and what are to be the clinical
targets and clinical end points against which a trial is judged. Pre-clinical data is
offered to support these statements. The 'market pull' factors are also considered with
an analysis of the strength of the firm's patent position relative to the competition and
a broad outline of the final market. Costing is included in the PDP. Prior to formal
review of a PDP considerable informal discussions take place, hence no product
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reaches the formal committee unless there is a consensus that it has a good chance of
success in development. Of the six or seven products that have gone before the
committee none have been formally rejected, but two have been subsequently dropped
during development.
Annual Review Systems
The PDP review process is reinforced by a five to ten year rolling corporate plan that is
undertaken each year. Under this annual process senior management compute cost
implications of on-going and proposed projects. Senior scientists assess what targets
can be achieved within the resource budget and present capabilities. Celltech has a
policy that every project must be given enough resources to attain the milestones
placed upon it. This differs from budgeting and review systems in some
pharmaceutical firms. According to a senior Celitech executive one such firm applies a
competitive system where achievement of last year's goals results in increased annual
budget, and vice versa. This can result in a cycle of success for well funded projects
and a cycle of ever deteriorating performance for struggling projects, as each setback is
met with a reduced budget. Celltech believe that its policy is better than the
competitive method which can lead to over-funding high profile scientists and projects,
thereby reducing research efficiency.
Strategic Reviewing Systems
Every few years a more formal strategic review of the whole firm's research efforts
takes place. In this review the firm reflects on where it is going as a whole versus
where it should be going. As Dr. Yarranton puts it
"From time to time we do a more strategic review, rather than just saying
everything is going fine and there is a slot now {for a new project). Every so often
we have to stand back and say, 'are we doing things right? Has the game changed?'
About a year and a half ago we had such a strategic review. We decided that we
would throw everything up in the air, without any preconceived ideas of what we
should do. 'What are the new areas we should be looking at ? What are the areas
we have been working on in the last four or five year that should be changed?"
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Out of this review the firm did change some of its strategic objectives, which resulted
in changes in projects and resource allocations. In particular there was a change in
technological focus. Specifically, research commenced on expression of antibodies in
microbial systems. This research is being carried out with the aim of significantly
reducing the cost of goods in the future mass production of antibody products.
Despite strategic reviews the firm continues to have limits on the feasible breadth of
change. The firm has committed considerable investment to past projects and skills.
Naturally it is influenced by these capabilities in the search for new direction. Even in
the considerable changes of the 1990s past decisions limited the choice of future paths.
The leads for new projects in Celitech tend to come from the past. As Dr. Yarranton
comments:
"It takes a lot of start up effort in medicinal chemistry programmes because you
have to get all of you enzymes, your counter screens, your targets, you have to set a
screen cascader. It is quite clear that there are NPTs {New Product Targets).
This screening effort will help identify targets which the organisation can pursue now
and which later may enter the regulatory approval process. In general, when seeking a
starting point for a new project firms can return to the results of a previous screening
effort in the identification of new promising drug candidate projects. As Dr. Yarranton
observed:
"Your chemistry programme develops quite an interesting chemical bank in which
you have some selection compounds and some non-selection compounds. The non-
selection compounds are a good start for a chemistry programmes on other targets.
So we can roll out from our own chemistiy programmes additional targets without
long start up times. Because all the agents are not changing, we can use the set
counter screens. So there is a certain economy there that enables us to develop new
drugs from existing projects."
Introduction of new staff helps stimulate innovation and open up future paths of
opportunity. Dr. Yarranton commented that
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"(New staff} all have a different view, and some of these views maybe quite
challenging. You always need to be challenged with new views. You do not want
to just recruit people who take what you said and give it back to you - that's not
very useful."
The problem in the recent past is that staff turnover has been low. In research Dr.
Yarranton believes that a turnover of 5-6% would be optimal, whereas currently it is
about 3%.
According to a number of the executive team, the formal systems of PDP, Strategic
Reviews, and Annual Reviews of the rolling plan, are reinforced by the informal
consensus building approaches which are possible because of the firm's small size.
Summarising the views of several executives one can say that these formal review
systems are founded on the informal bubbling up of ideas and projects. The formal
systems and tight quarterly monitoring of projects combined are the embodiment of a
determination to identify and stop failed projects. These formal and informal systems
are embedded in a culture of learning from failures within and across projects.
Together this enables Celltech to identify promising projects and support them through
the R&D process.
An overview of Celitech's principal, publicly quoted Research and Development
activities is provided in Table Three. This puts some real drugs, diseases, and
collaborators to the strategic developments that occurred between 1990 and 1996.
INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE
A BITTER SWEET PILL:
THE RESULTS OF THE SEPTIC SHOCK TRIALS
'... it was found that in the patient group treated with BAYX 1351, mortality
was not significantly lower than in the control group. The results do not
confirm trends towards efficacy seem in two clinical trials on BAYX 1351'
Celitech Press Release dated 7 pm 20 May 1997
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'Celitech does not expect the second generation novel anti-TNF antibody CDP
571 (BAY 10-3356) to be further developed. Ceiltech now expects to regain the
development rights for CDP 571 in chronic indications, including Crohn's
disease ... Celitech is financially very strong, with net cash at 31 March 1997 of
£41.0 million. The company has collaborative agreements with a range of
international pharmaceutical companies, and four novel product candidates in
Phase II clinical development. In addition, it has a pipeline of novel compounds
in pre-clinical development ...'
Celltech Press Release dated 7 pm 20 May 1997
The immediate market reaction the next morning was one of disappointment. On a day
when the FTSE-ALL Share and FTSE Pharmaceutical indices rose slightly Ceiltech's
share price dropped dramatically from 630 pence to 341 at the close of business. About
45% of the firm's market capitalisation was wiped out in one day. The market
capitalisation fell from over £ 481 million to £ 260.5 million. Figure Two traces the
history of Celltech's share price since its launch on the London Stock Market. Despite
the Septic Shock set back the market capitalisation of the firm was still higher than at
the end of the first day it traded in 1993, when it was valued at over £ 176 million (all
data from Datastream International).
INSERT FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE
The termination of the Bayer collaboration was triggered by a clause in the
collaborative contract. One senior executive commented that careful drafting of the
original contract has been a vital lesson for Ceiltech. When the contract was drawn up
it was recognised that the personalities and companies might change during its life,
therefore it was important to draft the exit clauses tightly. This contract clearly stated
that if the project were terminated for scientific reasons all rights returned to Celltech.
This leaves Ceiltech with the option to obtain new collaborative partners, an option
which it is actively pursuing.
No doubt had the drug passed Phase III then this would be an unqualified success story
with a happy ending. Despite the setback the story is, however, one of success. Bayer
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paid Celitech £ 15.5 million in milestones, yet the reported development expenditure
incurred by Ceiltech was only 15% of that amount (Ceiltech Web site). The company
has not lost its discovery investment. There are still several promising indications that
CDP 571 may yet win through in terms of regulatory approval. Celitech is actively
pursuing Phase II trials in Crohns disease and remains interested in Rheumatoid
Arthritis.
To an outsider one of the key lessons of the Septic Shock story may be in the careful
and realistic management of upside and downside risks in this highly risky business.
Clearly this is an area in which Ceiltech excels.
In a recent article John Beary, the Senior Vice President of Regulatory and Scientific
Affairs at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, noted that only
5 out of every 5,000 compounds that make it to pre-clinical testing ever make it into
human testing47. Of those five only one is eventually approved. Seen in this light the
Septic Shock programme did well to get as far as it did. With four other product
candidates and a pipeline of pre-clinical candidates Celitech is still firmly in the race to
realise its goal of taking drugs through from discovery into the market.
CELLTECH AND THE FUTURE
The financial strength, managerial experience, and product portfolio that Celitech has
accumulated since 1990, means that it is well positioned in the UK sector. An analysis
of Table Four confirms that Celitech is strong across a wide range of parameters
compared with six of its leading peers listed on the London Stock Exchange:
. In terms of market capitalisation Celitech ranks fourth - this after a major setback.
• It has raised more from equity and asset disposals than all bar British Biotech..
47 Beary, J. (1996). The Drug Development and Approval Process. P/iA RMA Drugs in Development.
Http:www.phrma.org/charts/approval.html
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• It has the third highest cash burn. The cash bums for each of these firms has been
calculated and it was found that Ceiltech has the longest with greater than 14.5
years, while the remaining firms are between eight and four years.
• It has the third highest number of staff, most of whom are in R&D.
• It has a very strong portfolio of major phannaceutical collaborators when
compared with the other firms.
INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE
From the perspective of an outsider Ceiltech appears to have a strong position from
which to re-group and base its future after the fai1ure oCBY K (3S(. (t ( tmt
lot from its internal and collaborative ventures, building up a promising portfolio of
potential drugs targeting diseases that affect large groups of the population. These
projects each have partners with strong marketing and distribution bases on which
future clinical trial success can be quickly turned into market presence. Its present cash
position means that it can continue independent research for a number of years without
recourse to capital markets. Overall Ceiltech has created a unique and strong position
in the UK biotech sector.
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TABLE TWO: BACKGROUND OF SOME OF CELLTECH'S EXECUTNE
TEAM
Name	 Position
in 1997
Dr. Peter	 CEO of
Feilner	 Celitech PLC
Dr. David	 CEO of
Bloxham	 Ceiltech
Therapeutics
Peter Allen Finance
Director
Dr. Ursula	 Director of
Ney	 Development
Dr. Geoff	 Director of
Yarranton	 Research
Position in
1990
Joined
Celitech as
Managing
Director in
1990.
Joined
Celitech as
Director of
Research in
1990.
Did not join
Ceiltech
until 1992,
when he
became the
Finance
Director.
Project
Manager,
including
briefly the
precursor to
CDP 571
Director of
Molecular
Biology.
Academic B
PhD from Cambridge
University.
PhD from the University of
Southampton. Lecturer at
University of Southampton
in Biotech. Visiting
Professor at University of
Washington. Max Plank
institute - Munich.
Chartered Accountant
PhD in Pharmacology from
Royal Free Medical
College. MBA from
Middlesex Business School.
PhD from the Mill Hill
National Institute for
Medical research.
Researcher at Mill Hill.
Industry Experience
Director of Research
at Searle UK Research
Laboratories.
CEO of Roche UK
1986-90. Director of
Roche UK Research
Centre. Board member
of British Biotech.
Director of Biology
Research at Roche
U
Director of R&D at
Laboratonos Almirall
S.A.
Orozzp Financial
controller of
Associated British
Ports Holdings PLC &
L'Oreal UK.
Marketing executive at
International
Management Group.
Articles at KPMG Peat
Marwick
Head of research lab
in Switzerland. Roche
UK as an
inflammation
researcher. Joined
Ceiltech in 1988 as a
Project Manager.
Joined Ceiltech in
1982 as a research
scientist.
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Appendix Two
THE POLYMASC CASE STUDY:
Formation, flotation and early years of a new quoted UK biotechnology firm
INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HERITAGE
The Royal Free Hospital School ofMedicine, University ofLondoa
The origins of the company are to be found in a challenge to the School of Medicine in
the 1980s in which it was argued that the departmental structure was inappropriate for
the advancement of clinical solutions to medicinal problems. In response to the
challenge the university set up a multi-disciplinaiy unit known as the Molecular Cell
Pathology Laboratory (MCPL). The MCPL combined the capabilities of the Royal
Free's Haematology and Biochemistry departments. As Dr. Gillian Francis, the current
Chief Executive of Po1yMASC and the then head of the MCPL, recalls the purpose of
the unit was 'translating what you know at the molecular level through to a cell
biological level into pathology and hence into medicine'
Reflecting back on the origins of the MCPL she noted that:
"The history of the Molecular Cell Pathology Laboratory is itself quite
interesting. It is actually based upon a critique which was given to the medical
school about the problems of generating real life solutions to clinical problems
when we were working within the traditional university structure. Our criticism
was that the departmental structure was acting as a disincentive to real-life
research. Fine for academic problems and model systems, but not fine for
getting things through to the bedside because you had all the biochemists in
one department, the haematologists in another, pharmacologists in another, and
so on......{The setting up of the MCPL} 55 has been a very powerful move."
" Items in { } brackets are interpretations of what the interviewee was referring to in the relevant quote.
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This group began to make considerable progress during the 1980s. By 1988 MCPL had
filed three patents. The group was beginning to move from blue skies research and
closer towards the stage of translating its research into real products which needed to
be tested in the clinic. The Royal Free had engaged in considerable drug discovery, but
if products were to be developed then a commercial vehicle with which to make
substantial financial investments needed to be created. As Dr. Francis puts it:
"The intellectual property which the team had developed was spawning
products which were nearing the clinic and obviously as we neared the clinic
the costs were escalating. It got to the point whereby it was inappropriate for
the university to incur the high level of costs required, so we decided to set up a
company and did this by the unusual expedient of floating under AIM" (the
London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market).
Today Po1yMASC is still located next to buildings of the Royal Free Hospital. The
Royal Free remains a substantial shareholder in the firm. Three of the staff are on
secondment from the Royal Free. The intellectual property created by the MCPL was
transferred to Po1yMASC and the two still work closely together. Clearly much of
what Po1yMASC is today lies in the roots of the Royal Free.
Po1yMASC's Team, Technology and Thence its Name
Perhaps the greatest legacy that Po1yMASC received from the Royal Free was the
technology transferred to it upon its creation. This technology is embedded in explicit
patents and more tacitly through the staff who invented them and were transferred to
Po1yMASC. The relationship between the newly created Po1yMASC and the Royal
Free was summarised by the company's placement document in 1995 as follows:
"proceeds of the Placement will, inter alia, be used to acquire, from RFHSM
{Royal Free), the necessary intellectual property (which will include an
assignment of the existing patents and patent application) .... RFHSM, has
conditionally subscribed at par for Ordinary Shares and, following the placing,
will hold Ordinary Shares representing 26 per cent of the enlarged share capital
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of the Company. RFHSM has contracted with the Company in relation to the
provision of certain services for at least five years and to second certain key
members of staff to the company as required."
The Founding Scientists
The core scientific team which Po1yMASC assembled upon its creation was seconded
from the Royal Free. This team had a deep tacit knowledge of Po1yMASC's key
technology, as expressed in the patents which they had invented. The team had a
histoiy of working together in the MCPL from which they may well have shared
common experiences and views of the world, leading to a shared organisational culture
with which they infused Po1yMASC. Their deep knowledge of and commitment to
these patents made them well placed to translate the knowledge embedded in these
patents into marketable drugs. As Dr. Francis put it:
"The motivation for the founding science team was very clear. We made this.
We've spend a tremendous amount of our academic life creating this stuff and
it would be a tremendous disaster for us not to see it through into the clinic, not
to have it survive, because good technologies can fail for human reasons rather
than because of flaws in the technology."
Leading this group of scientists is Dr. Gillian Francis. She is listed as the principal
inventor of five of PoIyMASC's patents and co-inventor of a sixth. She has twenty one
years experience in research of growth factors and cytokines, a key aspect of
PoIyMASC's research, and ten years experience in PEGylation56 of proteins. Dr. Derek
Fisher, the former Deputy Head of the MCPL, moved to Po1yMASC as the Director of
Biochemistry. He is also a sole inventor of one of the company's patents. He has
twenty one years experience in polymer science, and ten years experience in
PEGylation. Dr. Christina Delgado, the Director of Pharmacological Research of
PEGylation involves the attachment of a synthetic polymer polyethylene glycol to biological
molecules. The purpose of PEGylation is to reduce harmful reactions by the body's defences to some
therapeutic drugs and to make longer lasting agents by reducing removal from the body and/or
destruction of the agent.
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Po1yMASC, was the principal inventor of one of the MCPL's patents and the co-
inventor of another. She has thirteen years experience in polymer science and ten years
experience in PEGylation. Clearly the three principal founding scientists have
considerable research experience in the key technological areas in which Po1yMASC is
involved, namely polymer science, PEGylation of proteins, growth factors and
cytokines. Other personnel transferred from Royal Free include Dr. Farooq Malik, who
specialises in PEG-cytokines and is listed in the 1995 Prospectus as one of the joint
inventors of one of Po1yMASC's Polymer Modification patents; Dr. Ajay Agrawal,
who specialises in liposomes 57, a key technology in which PoIyMASC is involved; and
Josephine Kandiler the laboratory manager, who has over 20 years experience in
biomedical research.
The Technology
Molecular Altering Structural Chemistry is a set of techniques for attaching polymers
to molecules. At the moment the preferred polymer which Po1yMASC is employing is
PEG (polyethylene glycol). This is not a new technology. PEG was discovered about
thirty years ago. There are currently 2 products on the market, with several more in
clinical trials. These products, ADAGEN (to treat the rare condition commonly known
as the 'Bubble Boy Disease') and ONCASPAR (to treat acute lymphoblastic
leukaemia), developed by Enzon Inc. of the USA, were approved by the FDA in 1990
and 1996 respectively. The first patent family in this technology, developed by Enzon
A lip osome is defined as "a small capsule made of lipids. Lipids can form stable sheets of molecules
in solution, in which the polar 'heads' point outwards into the watery solution and the apolar 'tails'
stick together in the middle of the sheet. If such a film closes up into a ball, the result is a sphere with
watery solution outside and inside separated by a lipid 'bilayer'. This is a liposome."
"Liposomes have been suggested as the basis of several methods of drug delivery, especially for the
delivery of peptide drugs. This is because they could protect their contents from digestion in the
stomach and so deliver them to the intestine, where they would be absorbed, or could allow them to be
injected into the bloodstream and be carried around to a specific organ"
Source: William Baths (1995) Biotechnology from A to Z. Oxford University Press.
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Inc., expired in 199658. The principal area in which PoIyMASC is involved is in
PEGylation of protein and peptide (J)rotein fragments) pharmaceuticals. The discovery
of cytokines, which are proteins that send messages to the body's cells, offers potential
for new pharmaceuticals, however they are not without their problems. According to
Po1yMASC, the principal problems are that large proteins are not removed by the
body's defences within hours, while peptides are removed within minutes by the
kidneys, many foreign proteins can trigger life threatening immune reactions, many are
also insoluble in water making them difficult to inject, and finally up to 80% of the
injection can be wasted, thus increasing the cost of the dosage (Web-site and
interviews).
One solution to these problems, offered by the promise of biotechnology, is
recombinant technology whereby many of a drug's foreign features are removed so as
to reduce the potential of an immune reaction. However, many of the problems remain
and another solution is PEGylation. As Dr. Francis puts it:
"Cytokines form the basis for making many excellent therapeutics. However
they are not very good pharmaceuticals. The attachment of the polymer solves
many of the problems of converting these molecules into pharmaceuticals"
PEGylation is basically a concealment technology which fools the body into thinking
that the protein, or peptide is water and hence does not trigger an immune response.
Dr. Stephen Charles, Po1yMASC's Commercial Development Director, notes that the
essential characteristics of the PEG polymer are that it is very mobile, covered in water
and consists of long linear chains. As he put it:
"Those characteristics tend to make this look like water. So if you are another
molecule coming along to have a look at this, or a cell based system to clear it
and get rid of it, then all you see is water. That's the trick. So it is a
concealment technology. It's a man made mask as it were."
58 Details regarding Enzon Inc. are from the company's web site http:www.enxon.com
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It is on this concept that the name of the company is based. Poly stands for polymer,
while MASC stands for Molecular Altering Structural Chemistry. MASC can also be
interpreted as a means of hiding something, or a concealment technology. Hence
Po1yMASC is essentially a company which seeks to offer medicine a concealment in
the war against disease.
The Po1yMASC PEGylation is considered by the management to be superior to those
currently on the market. Other techniques on the market employ relatively harsh
chemistries, which can damage the protein to which the PEG is being attached. The
advantage of the Po1yMASC PEG is that it can be applied under relatively mild,
physiological, conditions. Another advantage of the PoIyMASC PEG, according to its
web-site, is "that the reaction mixture is relatively innocuous and does not have to be
removed before the PEG protein is exposed to the target cells in many assay systems."
The management believe that these advantages will enable Po1yMASC to be successful
in attracting custom to its PEG technique over rival products on the market.
To move from concept, as expressed by patents, through to actual drugs delivered to
the bedside it was necessary to create a commercial infrastructure through which the
creative energies of the founding scientists could be translated into products. The
remainder of this case study relates the story of how this team sought to create and
develop this commercial infrastructure.
THE AIM FLOTATION
Context in which the Firm was floated
The first step in the creation of this commercial infrastructure was the establishment of
a company independent of the university structure. The university would have found it
difficult to justify the considerable financial investment in the risky enterprise of
bringing drugs to the market, rather than fundamental research which is a core function
of a university. Furthermore, the culture and organisational structure necessary to bring
PEG to the market differed radically from that of the university. Dr. Francis sums up
the options which faced the founding scientists in 1995 as follows:
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"It became very clear to everybody that we had two options:
1. We could have licensed all the technology to an individual pharmaceutical
company as an academic unit, and then it would have gone into a handful of
products, because that's all that a pharmaceuticals company could add that
was applicable, it would be all that they could get through in the time
before the patents expired.
It was a decision we all took at this time that if we wanted to get a lot of this
technology through to many pharmaceuticals, the only way to go was
2 the second way, to set up a company and. license the technology on a
product by product basis."
The founding scientists were successful academics. Without the entrepreneurship of
these scientists Po1yMASC would not have been created for it was through the
leadership of Gillian Francis that the MCPL was created within the Royal Free,
combined they had created the core patents, and it was they who led the group out of
the university structure and into a public company. A key question then is why did
they do so? The answer is that they wanted to remain a part of the process, to shepherd
their technology through initial discovery to market application. Dr. Francis captures
the essence of this motivation as follows:
"the core science team are the scientists who have built their knowledge base
and their remit as academics is to get it through to the bedside ... I guess a lot
of us feel that we are on a sort of mission, a crusade."
PoIyMASC was the first biotechnology firm in the UK to move directly from the
university structure to a listing on the stock exchange (Annual Report 1996). ATM is a
market set up by the London Stock Exchange to enable young companies with high
growth prospects to raise share capital. The rules of this market are less onerous than
the Official Exchange and is often viewed as the London's rival to New York's
NASDAQ. It should be noted from the outset that PoIyMASC was viewed by AIM as
an exciting high technology firm with strong growth potential and an entrepreneurial
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management team. This is reflected in the fact that Po1yMASC's CEO, Dr. Francis,
was awarded the Entrepreneur of the Year Award by AIM in 1996.
Creation of a biotechnology firm here in the UK has been eased by increasing
awareness of the growth potential of the sector and changes in stock exchange
regulations. Sir Brian Richards, one of the founding fathers of the UK biotechnology
sector, recently noted that access to venture capital for biotechnology firms has
become easier in the mid 1990's (public lecture at City University, February 1998). In
1990 there were no biotechnology firms listed on the London Stock Exchange due to
rules of the exchange which required all firms entering the market to have an
established profitable track record. Without access to a public listing the opportunities
for Venture Capitalists to realise a capital gain on their initial investment were limited
in the medium term. Shares could only be sold by the mechanism of matched trading
and this is not a practical option for a large investor. Access to a stock exchange listing
was made possible by changes in the rules of the exchange in the early 1990s
(pioneered by British Biotechnology and Sir Richards). With a listing the liquidity of a
company's stock rises hence offering Venture Capitalists an opportunity to exit their
investment once a capital gain has occurred.
Since the early 1 990s there has been a rush of biotechnology firms lisUng on both the
Official Listing and AIM. By the time PoIyMASC sought flotation the market had
established an understanding of the sector and was more open to investment in the
sector. Solid technological basis and a strong management team are still required,
however there are now a growing number of investors familiar with the sector. Thus
when Po1yMASC launched itself on the market in 1995 it was not in totally uncharted
waters from the perspective of the investor.
Impact of the AIM Listing
The AIM listing had the duel effect of raising much needed share capital and
subjecting the firm to the rigours of regulation by both AIM and institutional
shareholder monitoring. An AIM listing also offers the firm the option to return to the
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market for fresh capital, subject to its performance, nor does this listing preclude the
firm from seeking a London Stock Exchange Official Listing in the future.
The firm employed Teather and Greenwood to manage the placement of five million
shares at a price of £1 per share in December 1995. The placement was over
subscribed. This issue, combined with issues of a small number shares in August and
November, raised £4.5 million after £633,000 in expenses (Annual Report 1996).
The company's shares traded strongly in its early days. By the end of January 1996 the
price had risen to £1.57, increasing the firm's market capitalisation from the placement
value of20 million to £31.4 million. Just prior to the firm's second AGM in March
1998 the price of the shares had stabilised around £1.175, or a market capitalisation of
£23.5 million. Table One outlines the principal shareholders as at March 1998 versus
the minimum amounts to be held by associates of Po1yMASC and the Royal Free on
flotation.
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE
Just after the placement in 1995 the major shareholders were the founding scientists,
with a combined 31.75% share of the company, and the investment arm of the Royal
Free (Freemedic) with 26%, Medical Marketing International had a 5% holding, with
an employees' share option trust (Po1yMASC ESOP) and other directors controlling a
further 8.93% of the company's shares (Placement Prospectus). With the exception of
the holdings of the Royal Free, which have declined by around 13%, this position
remains largely unchanged in 1998 indicating the continued strong ties between
PoIyMASC as a corporate entity and its institutional heritage from the Royal Free.
From Table One it can be seen that Royal Free, the founding scientists and the
directors retain a majority shareholding (50.39%), with a further 6.25% held by
PoIyMASC ESOP. Thus while the City of London, through institutional and private
It is worthy of note that the transfer of intellectual property rights and tangible assets from the Royal
Free to Po1yMASC at its foundation involved the transfer of 5.2 million shares to the Royal Free at a
price per share of .1 pence each, or a total of £ 5,200. The value of this holding at the day of the
placement was £5.2 million and as at March 1998 it would be worth £6.12 million.
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shareholders, does exercise influence over the company, it is a minority interest. The
market discipline imposed on this company by the stock market may be lower than
other biotechnology companies (e.g. Ceiltech or British Biotechnology) where the
founders and employees have a clear minority interest in the firm.
POLYMASC'S STRATEGY
Having outlined the company's institutional heritage and the AIM listing this case now
turns to a direct Exploration of the strategy which underpins the success of PoIyMASC
to date. The reader's attention is first directed towards the technological strategy of the
firm and then its commercial strategy, separating out its strategic and financial goals.
Technological
The underlying technological strategy of Po1yMASC is the development and
Exploitation of a platform technology, namely PEGylation. PEGylation is believed by
the firm to have a wide number of applications. As Dr. Charles puts it:
"PoIyMASC is different because we add value to other people's drugs. We can
take an existing protein based pharmaceutical product, something that is
currently on the market and improve its performance considerably by attaching
one of our polymers ... We do not just attach PEG, the polymer, to proteins and
peptides, we can attach it to liposomal delivery systems ... We have PEGylated
living cells. We have PEGylated viruses. We have PEGylated red blood cells.
We can PEGylate anything that moves. So what that means is that there is an
incredibly broad range of opportunities."
Another advantage of this kind of platform technology is that for a young company
like Po1yMASC it may well be able to get drugs to the market quickly by
piggybacking on an already approved drug. Thus the firm can get a drug to market
much quicker than the decade or longer that it often takes to steer a new and novel
chemical entity through the regulatory process. As the 1996 Annual Report notes:
"Our advisors on regulatory procedures have confirmed the view of the
Directors, expressed at flotation, that the time to obtain regulatory approval of a
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PEG-modified variant of a clinically established protein or peptide
pharmaceutical will be substantially less than the equivalent initial approval."
As previously mentioned this platform technology is not new, therefore to be
successful in a crowded patent market Po1yMASC's technology needs to be clearly
superior to rival techniques. Po1yMASC appears to have a real advantage here. The
Prospectus states that there was only one company (Enzon Inc.) specialising in the
delivery of PEGylated techniques to pharmaceutical firms. As stated earlier, the initial
patents surrounding Enzon's technology were due to expire in 1996, though according
to Enzon it has developed second generation PEG patents 60. The view of Po1yMASC's
management team, as outlined earlier, is that their technology offers clear advantages
over current patents, is supported by the Expert's Report in the Prospectus which
states:
"On the basis of initial data we believe that the Po1yMASC chemistry can
indeed show advantages over competing technologies particularly in the
modification of labile proteins and PEG-liposomes"
Building Patent Protection
Having a superior technology was not sufficient to realise the potential of a platform
technology. It was essential for Po1yMASC to legally protect its core technology via
patents. The Expert's Report in Po1yMASC's Prospectus states that:
"It is clear in such a competitive field, which has many issued patents, a well
formulated patent strategy for generating and protecting new intellectual
property is of prime importance"
The management of Po1yMASC sought to address this issue squarely at the foundation
of the firm. Four patent families were transferred from the Royal Free to PolyMASC
and the four inventors, or co-inventors, of the relevant patents were seconded to, or
employed by, PoIyMASC. The firm sought to further lock in these key personnel by
ensuring that they were major shareholders as outlined in Table One. All these
60 Enzon web site http://www.enzon.com
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scientific staff were precluded, under AIM rules, from liquidating their shares for the
first year of trading. In the first two years of trading Po1yMASC has not only employed
external agencies to advise on its patent strategy but has successfully defended an
opposition against one of the patents in its four active patent families (PEG-
liposomes). It has built on its initial patent families by making new patent applications
(in gene therapy and cancer with its partner Genzyme and in an additional polymer
conjueates technique) and has also entered into partnerships to generate additional
future patent applications (for example in the area of human growth factors via a
collaboration with Oxford Molecular). An overview of the management developments
in Po1yMASC's patent portfolio is contained in Table Two.
INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
COMMERCIAL
Strategic Goals
The long term goal of Po1yMASC is not to become a fully integrated pharmaceutical
firm, rather it will focus on licensing out its PEGylation technologies, the development
of promising new chemical entities up to the early stages of regulatory development,
and the extension of its PEGylation platform technology. For Po1yMASC the fact that
its strategy is centred around a platform technology, which has a wide variety of
applications, is a decided advantage over other biotechnology firms who have invested
the majority of shareholder's funds in the clinical discovery and development which
seek to address the needs of a narrow range of illnesses. As Dr. Charles puts it:
"One of the good things about Po1yMASC is that it has a platform technology.
Unlike most biotech companies, where they have one or two wonder drugs,
which, if they fail that's the end"
The other side of this approach is that the company has a lower upside potential. If a
wonder drug does make it through to market then sales can be several hundred million
dollars per year. Thus while the platform technology strategy reduces risk, it also
reduces shareholder returns. To add some extra 'spice' for Po1yMASC's shareholders
the firm has broadened its strategy to encompass a limited amount of investment in
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collaborative and independent drug discoveries. Should these projects succeed the firm
will have a greater percentage of royalties on the final drugs than if it licensed out a
PEG product to a company which is then attached to one of its current drugs.
Reflecting back on this evolution in commercial strategy Dr. Charles recalls that:
"When I joined the company {in October 1996) plans to have our own
development work was not yet implemented. It was initially a pure licensing
strategy. In other words here's PEG, lets go and find the big players and
PEGylate their products and the money we make from doing that will make
Po1yMASC profitable and that is true ... Now we are pursuing these three
opportunities {which are the aforementioned alliances with Oxford Molecular,
NOF and Hydro Med Sciences) which we feel would benefit our shareholders
considerably, because it would give us the opportunity to license the product
much further down the cycle"
Thus the strategy of the firm has broadened from contracts focused on licensing out of
technology to a more balanced portfolio of contracts:
Out-licensing of technology for third party products
• Strategic Partnerships with shared development and profitability
• Sole development to clinical trials to add greater value with subsequent
licensing (Po1yMASC Web-site)
Dr. Charles sums up the core commercial strategic direction of the firm as follows:
"We do not intend to become a Vertically Integrated firm ... The initial
Business Strategy of the firm is to form collaborations with a variety of large
and small pharmaceutical companies, who have on the one hand existing
products on the market, or new products in development, all of which could
benefit from PEGylation, or polymer attachments, and then strike up deals with
each of these companies. So we will have a broad base so that if one or two fall
out we will still have a viable business, rather than having everything hinge on
one or two clinical trials . .
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Financial Goals
In the short term the principal financial goal of Po1yMASC, in contrast to that of most
other biotech start-up firms, was to conserve its scarce cash resources. Po1yMASC has
sought to achieve this goal by breaking even within the first two and a half years of its
foundation. November 1997 was a landmark as it was the first month in which the
firm's income exceeded expenditure. The management are seeking to break-even in the
medium term, and perhaps even make a profit, through its licensing business, while in
the longer term profitability can be boosted by royalties from drugs which are licensed
out to companies for use in successful drugs. This, according to the firm's Prospectus,
would take a minimum of five years after a licensing agreement was signed, as the
drug would have to go through regulatory approval before going on the market and
thus activating sales based royalties.
Dr. Charles sums up the financial strategy as follows:
"The underlying licensing business which Po1yMASC has will break-even and
return profitability in the short term ... Clearly the later, or the further down
the development path you can take a drug before you license it the larger and
higher the royalty income. We will probably never directly market anything. So
we are dependent for our big income, our real income, on royalties from our
marketing partners. We want to get these numbers as big as possible {hence the
firm would like to take drugs as far down the development process as its
current resources and capabilities enable it to).... What we are aiming to do in
our research programs is to cover the costs of the scientists and running the
company. Any license fees and royalties would take us into profitability."
Table Three surrimarises key elements of the financial performance of Po1yMASC
since its formation. From this table we can see that cost of sales as a percentage of
turnover has greatly declined from 317% to 125%. Interest income has declined as the
company's capital expenditure and losses have cut into the £4.5 million pounds raised
from its AIM floatation. The firm's financial goal of break-even is a practical one.
Given P01yMASC's cash bum it will have to return to the capital markets if it does not
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break-even within the next few years. Based on an analysis of the financial accounts of
several biotechnology firms listed on the Official London Stock Exchange Listing one
can see that recourse to bank debt, other than an overdraft, is unlikely to be an option.
None of these firms have significant bank debt and many have a history of returning to
the capital markets when their cash reserves become low.
INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE
ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN
Multi-Disciplinary Teams and Meritocracy
Molecular Altering Structural Chemistries (MASC) are being researched by other
firms and universities, therefore Po1yMASC competes in a real sense with these
organisations not only for space in the commercial marketplace but also for scientific
talent. To be successful PoIyMASC needs to attract scientific talent and use it
effectively. To this end the firm has created a culture which it feels is more appropriate
for the efficient discovery and commercialisation of polymer attachment technology
than its rivals in the universities and pharmaceutical firms.
Po1yMASC saw an opportunity to build superior polymer attachment techniques by
combining people from different disciplines into the one team. Essentially it sought to
combine the abilities of chemists in the building of molecules with the understanding
that biologists have about how the body fights disease. Dr. Francis believes that other
organisations still have not learned the value of, or lack the ability to, combine these
disciplines within one structure. She notes:
"Polymer coupling systems were being built by chemists, not biologists at that
time (when Po1yMASC was founded). This is very important. The tendency
of the university structure to compartmentalise people, means that people are
working with only part of the story ... We thought the major barriers were
going to be in academia because of the departmental structure ... but in fact we
found it is just as bad in the phannaceutical industry because it actively adopts
extraordinarily linear structures of line managers. Manager A reports 4o B, C
reports to B and thence to A, etc. Those structures being very vertical are also
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disincentives to the process {of developing new polymer attachment techniques
and applications) ... We have insisted on extremely rigorously destroying any
form of hierarchy when we are in the process.
Our strength is in the way we've grappled with the problem - we have not had
people working with only part of the story. The saga is quite interesting,
because it is still going on. Chemists are still making these polymer coupling
systems and expecting them to work. ... {bringing together and) managing a
multidisciplinary team, with all the relevant skills from medicine, chemistry
through to molecular biology and so on, has been a very fruitful exercise."
As alluded to in the above quotation this multi-disciplinary concept is further refined
by what Dr. Francis refers to as the 'suspension of hierarchical processes' during the
creation of new polymer attachment techniques, or the attachment of polymers to
specific client drug molecules. This suspension of hierarchy involves the creation of a
meritocracy in scientific debate. The ideas of all team members, irrespective of
seniority, are subject to a process of internal review. Debate is focused on data rather
than personality. In the view of senior management this suspension of hierarchy is a
critical element of Po1yMASC's future success. Commenting on this system Dr.
Francis stated:
"When we are working in this process the hierarchy is temporarily suspended.
This means that the mechanism is in place for whoever is right to prevail, not
whoever is senior. That is something you actually have to work at extremely
hard to achieve. People have to suspend a lot of their emotions, their need to
dominate, their need or liking for little bits of power, and so on. It's a very
difficult thing, we found, to get people to suspend that ... It is an unusual
quality {to be able to tolerate suspension of hierarchy) ... Getting people from
senior positions to allow the juniors in the team to say no, that's not correct,
that's flaky and to allow them to prevail is not always easy for senior people to
do. Our success, I am absolutely certain, relies on the fact that we have been
able to suspend that hierarchical process."
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'Ideas Merchants' and 'Human Databases'
One of the interesting aspects of Po1yMASC is how this meritocracy challenges the
core of one's personal beliefs on the value of their ideas. Scientific discovery is based
on the re-conceptualisation of the world, the generation of new ideas by individuals
and teams. It is a natural tendency for people to feel that theirs is the important idea,
the break-through. Not so in PoIyMASC. Dr. Francis distinguishes between what she
refers to as 'ideas merchants' and 'human data bases'. At the heart of Po1yMASC is
the linkage between these two kinds of people. Combined they have a powerful role to
play in the creation and application of new ideas, alone they can achieve little. The
managerial problem is that no one likes to be viewed as a 'human data base', everyone
wants to be thought of as an 'ideas merchant' for they are the people the wider world
remembers. Fundamental to getting these people to feel comfortable working together
is the suspension of hierarchy. Dr. Francis summarises the creative and managerial
relationship between 'ideas merchants' and 'human databases' as follows:
"Because we can suspend that process it allows the ideas merchants in the team
to access the human data bases. Now the ideas merchants may not be in
possession of all the information. But the human data bases, some of whom
rarely have ideas, {are vital to the process} provided that you can somehow
make them emotionally comfortable with the position of being not on the
whole an ideas merchant, it works well. That is a difficult trick to pull because
there is so much cachet in society for the ideas merchant that we've found that
quite a lot of people can suffer a lot of emotional stress at finding that they are
unable to be an ideas merchant and finding that they are being slotted into the
{role of a} human data base. We have to address the emotional needs of these
individuals, because we are doing things that act across people's emotional
needs, part of the thing about this process of suspending hierarchy is that it is
temporary.
This happens when we meet together to do science. When we stop doing
science and go off to the pub, all the normal things like fighting to win an
argument and having your vanity can all be there. At a cocktail party argument
fine, that stuff's appropriate. But it isn't appropriate for argument which is in
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effect discourse to dissect the truth, people have to be willing and able to
suspend all that normal emotion. We're quite open about all this. We tell
people when they join, for heaven's sake, don't fight to win an argument.
Defend an idea that you feel must be defended. Convince on data or convince
on logic; use your knowledge. The usual kinds of shifting sands argument, that
has to be seen for what it is and weeded out and this is a hard nosed policy."
It is natural that most of the 'ideas merchants' are likely to be those who founded the
company and have crystallised their ideas through many years of academic
development and commercially viable patents, however new people do serve an
important role in the firm as catalysts and key sources of knowledge. The challenge is
to successfully interface idea with the rich data and knowledge that 'human databases'
offer. Dr. Francis alludes to challenges of this relationship when she comments that:
"New people bring new and larger data bases and I am sure that some of them
will also bring new and fresh ideas. It depends what your threshold is for
dignifying something with the notion of idea. But certainly the new people are
making an input. I think there is a culture shock for people coming from large
teams, because large teams, or teams that don't work as we do, don't accustom
them to what is a very heavy amount of peer scrutiny. I mean even though I
am the founding scientist of the company, if I write a document I submit it for
peer scrutiny and it gets kicked around. Anything that's produced gets kicked
around. And basically, if it has a flaw you just have to take it on the chin and
be glad it's been improved. We have people who have come in from
pharmaceutical companies who think well, I should be in charge of this and
that should mean that I am beyond scrutiny. We have no-one beyond scrutiny,
certainly not at the scientific level. In fact we expect it. It's sort of an internal
peer review process . .
Managing Tension: Motivation and Communication
As can be seen the multi-disciplinary team is not without its challenges. On the one
hand it may lead to a technically superior product and attract scientists who enjoy
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working in inter-disciplinary teams, on the other hand it represents a direct challenge
to the dominant ways of working in more traditional organisations with which
Po1yMASC competes, namely universities and pharmaceutical firms, and at a deeper
level how people view the value of their own ideas. This could lead to considerable
conflict as the organisation grows and more people need to be co-opted from
traditional firms and into PoLyMASC. Dr. Francis is aware of this managerial
challenge and observes that:
"I know from past experience that in this culture {where hierarchy is suspended
and people who come from traditional hierarchical organisations enter
PoIyMASC} these people will become disaffected very, very rapidly and this is
one cause of staff turnover ... It is a very small team and the impact on the
psycho-dynamics of the team from new individuals is actually very profound.
You can watch it happen, and this 'syncytium' 6 ' use of minds is a delicate
process. Some individuals can perturb it tremendously ... My job is to make
sure that the process is working as it should and to rapidly solve the problem if
a new member throws the delicate system off balance."
As noted earlier in this case the motivation of the founding scientists is clear. They
have personally created the technology upon which PoIyMASC is based. They
maintain a psychological and fiscal ownership of the intellectual property of the firm.
They are motivated by a strong desire to see their technologies translated into real
drugs which can be delivered to the patient's bedside. As the company grows new
personnel are needed to sustain growth. This poses a challenge for the founders: how
to align the goals and actions of new employees with those of the founders. Dr. Francis
poses the problem as follows:
"Our problem with new people coming in is how to incentivise and motivate
them. There is a problem in that we're almost like a parent fighting for the
survival of a child, and we are so committed that there is almost a big gulf
61 Syncytium is defined as a "mass of protoplasm with several nuclei but forming one cell." From The
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th edition, Oxford University Press.
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between the core team and people coming in. Obviously they don't have these
long standing ties with the project."
This gulf is partially bridged by hiring promising new people who match the needs of
Po1yMASC. Ideally one could identify people whose goals are congruent with the
vision of Po1yMASC and hire only those people, however Po1yMASC have found that
the interview process is not always an accurate indicator of a person's suitability to
work in a meritocracy based on multi-disciplinary teamwork. Reflecting on the
accuracy of the interview process as a selector of employees who will respond
positively to the Po1yMASC way of working Dr. Francis commented that:
"It is impossible, I have found, to assess properly whether someone is like that
at interview. I've found a great deal of fault in the interview process."
This problem is thus addressed through a process of introduction to the Po1yMASC
way of doing research and business. Promising employees are hired and quickly
exposed to the values of the firm as expressed via the multi-disciplinary team work
environment. Through direct exposure to these working practices there is an
opportunity for both sides to evaluate their compatibility. Those who adapt to the
system remain, those who do not adapt depart. As Dr. Francis puts it:
"Over the years, we've had people who can tolerate {the suspension of
hierarchy and peer scrutiny at Po1yMASC}, survive and remain with the team,
and people who can't, people we have to either evict, or wait for them to decide
that this is not for them and to disappear."
There is still the problem of how to offer incentives to these people such that they will
join the firm to become exposed to the ideals of Po1yMASC and ensuring that they
stay long enough to enable a mutual determination of to whether they can work
successfully within the PoIyMASC culture. To this end the company employs
traditional incentive schemes, mixed with a connection to newcomers' altruistic desire
to bring new and improved technologies to the bedside. Commenting on the
motivation schemes in place at P01yMASC, Dr. Francis says that:
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"the company structure has built in the traditional motivation schemes, for
example employee share holding schemes and all these things, so that the
motivation of the newcomers will be fiscal rather than this cross between
altruism and the desire to protect one's intellectual offspring, as it were.
Obviously a lot of the new people really lock into the altruistic motives
although there are people who don't share these motivations and enthusiasms."
An essential element of successful interdisciplinary teamwork is communication. As
Dr. Francis puts it "understanding the workings of a team who aren't just working in
concert, but are forming almost a 'syTicytial' brain, doing this by melding their skills -
that process is poorly understood." To aid in understanding this process, day to day
operations at Po1yMASC are often sub-divided into project teams. Project teams are
charged with the delivery of specific techniques or products. For example there is a
project team working on the creation of new products in blood growth factors in
conjunction with Oxford Molecular.
In charge of each team is a project management group. The key role of the project
management group is to ensure that the team is well informed and working together,
thus leveraging the skills of individual team members to create more in combination
than they could individually. This communication aids in both understanding the
process and avoiding the dangers of de-motivation that more linear systems can
involve where individuals work in a black box and their efforts are combined via a
linear hierarchical process. Dr. Charles emphasises the importance of communication
in managing projects:
"One of the biggest jobs of the project management group is to disseminate the
information so that people understand it. So that each player within the team
knows exactly what they are supposed to be doing and when, but also to have
an appreciation of the bigger picture so that they know where they fit, because
it can be extremely de-motivating if you are in a black box doing something
without any idea why you are doing it or what happens if you don't do it and so
on. P01yMASC's style is to involve everybody in the whole thing so that they
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know exactly where they fit and why they are doing it and what is the reason
for doing it."
One of the greatest challenges for PoLyMASC in the future may be managing the
evolution of this 'syncytial' brain over time as the organisation grows. In 1996 the firm
had an average number of employees of ten, seven of whom were scientists (Annual
Report 1996). As the firm expands it may become more difficult to attract and manage
employees who are driven by the same motives as the founders. Equally it may be
difficult to maintain the strong levels of communication across the company if it
should experience rapid growth in employee numbers. This case will now turn to one
of the most exciting elements of the way Po1yMASC does business: the management
of alliances.
MANAGEMENT OF ALLIANCES
Goal and Form ofAlliances
As noted earlier in this case by Dr. Charles, Po1yMASC does not want to become a
Vertically Integrated pharmaceutical firm, hence it needs to work in cohort with other
firms. Thiough its partners it gains access to key resources, such as finance to cover
research and development expenses, capabilities which PoIyMASC at present has
chosen not to own in-house, such as management of regulatory clinical trials (drug
development), and access to a drugs portfolio to which Po1yMASC's polymers can be
attached. The expert's report in the Prospectus commented that the strategy of not
becoming a vertically integrated finn but instead to achieve market success through a
web of external partners, while not without risks, was the most appropriate strategy.
"Po1yMASC's aim of developing and licensing proprietary technologies to
corporate partners, as opposed to becoming a fully integrated pharmaceuticals
company, is in our view the most appropriate business strategy to exploit their
core competency and to lever specialist external resources in the most effective
manner. Experience in working with pharmaceutical companies does, however,
caution that unforeseen delays or changes in priorities can occur and that the
timings of some of PoIyMASC's development programmes may change. We
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note, however, that PoIyMASC has been prudent in setting realistic timelines to
get to initial clinical trials." (Expert's Report, Prospectus)
As noted in the strategy section of this case Po1yMASC has a portfolio of three types
of contract with external partners. These contracts can be broadly termed alliances. The
first form of alliance is Out-Licensing. This involves licensing PoIyMASC's
technology to an external partner who then applies it to one of their own drug
programs. This licensing strategy is expected to enable Po1yMASC to break even or
become profitable in the short term. The 1996 annual report notes that several of its
potential clients have over twenty drugs in their portfolio which could be enhanced by
application of PoIyMASC's PEGylation technology. PoIyMASC has entered into
several out licensing contracts since its formation, principally with Onyx
Pharmaceuticals, Cangene and TKT. The second form of alliance which Po1yMASC
has entered into are Strategic Alliances which involve Po1yMASC and its external
partner sharing the costs of development and a share of the profits if products from the
alliance eventually make it to the market. According to Dr. Charles Po1yMASC has
entered into at least three contracts of this nature, namely with NOF, Hydro Med
Sciences and Oxford Molecular. The third form of alliance is one which seeks to
purchase in capabilities which Po1yMASC does not wish to own in-house, but which
are critical to the firm's long term success. These contracts can be called Out-
Sourcing alliances. Po1yMASC is currently involved in one out-sourcing alliance with
Shearwater, who provides Po1yMASC with access to manufacturing resources and
capabilities. A summary of the alliances which PoIyMASC is currently engaged in is
provided in Table Four.
INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE
Partner Identification and Pursuit
Simplicity, it is often said, is complexity cleverly disguised. So it is with Po1yMASC's
identification and pursuit of strategic alliance partners. Vertex Pharmaceuticals was
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one of the leading US biotechnology firm of the late 1980s 62 . It pursued its strategic
alliance partners with a flurry of Trans-Atlantic, Pacific and Continental travel.
Technology and times have moved on since then, not only in the bio-sciences but also
in communication. What Vertex sought to achieve via the plane, Po1yMASC pursues
via database faxing, bio-partnering meetings and its web-site. As Dr. Charles
commented:
"I don't advocate jumping on planes and cold calling companies in the US,
Europe and Japan, because I don't think that that works. It does work to some
extent, but you have a less than a one percent hit rate. And it is very expensive
and time consuming."
Po1yMASC's approach is parsimonious. It has, according to the management, yielded
considerable commercial success for a firm of its youth. In the first instance this
success can be observed in the number of firms which were interested in Po1yMASC's
technology. Dr. Francis, in a Press Release dated September 1996, commented that
"we have already met with over fifty companies around the world to discuss potential
collaborations." This was reinforced by a statement in the 1996 Annual Report which
noted that "the high rate of identification of potential commercial partners almost
exceeded our ability to service their interest in Q2/Q3 1996." To be truly successful,
however, it was important that the process of attracting potential partners be both
efficient, that is attract the maximum number of partners whose drug portfolio could
actually benefit from Po1yMASC's technology, and secondly be effective, that is
actually lead to signed contracts. To be both efficient and effective Po1yMASC
employed a systematic approach to partner identification and negotiation.
Dr. Charles sums up Po1yMASC's approach as follows:
62 The story of the first few years of Vertex Pharmaceutical's corporate life is a
fascinating and easy read. The Vertex story is narrated in Werth's book entitled The
Billion-Dollar Molecule: One Company 's Quest for the Perfect Drug, published in
1994 by Touchstone of New York.
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"Part of the strategy is opportunistic obviously. Some may just come through
the door, most of them do, but in terms of finding corporate partners I have
three approaches, bio-partnering, database mailing and our web site."
Bio-partnering meetings are rather like dating clubs for potential pharmaceutical and
biotechnology alliance partners. These meetings enable a small biotechnology firm
such as Po1yMASC to target a broad number of potential partners at one location.
More importantly bio-partnering meetings are designed to establish fruitful contact
between companies who have common interests, or needs. This is facilitated through a
database which the bio-partnering organisers have, listing key details of all attending
the meeting, such as what are the key products and services which they offer to, or
need from, partners. Dr. Charles describes the bio-partnering process as
"meetings that have been organised to facilitate meeting the right people. They
{the conference organisers} have a database of people who are going along and
you get that database before you turn up. You select from the database the
people who you would like to meet and feed that into the organisers and they
set the meetings up for you. {When compared to standard scientific
conferences) all your lunches are taken up with meetings, but now they are
meetings with people who you want to meet ... It's great. There is a bio-
partnering desk at the meeting and there are one or two people sitting behind it.
They can answer queries and track people down. It works a treat ... you meet
everybody that you wanted to meet. Fantastic."
Bio-partnering meetings can generate an enormous number of potential leads.
Following-up each one of these contacts in person could be very expensive, given that
they originate not only from within the UK but also internationally. Dr. Charles has
come up with a very cost effective mechanism of following up these contacts. He has
designed a very comprehensive web-site to which all contacts are initially referred.
This web-site contains detailed information on Po1yMASC's technology (both for
scientists and non-scientists), outlines Po1yMASC's key scientific and administrative
staff, provides an overview of the company's commercial strategy, and includes all the
firm's Press Releases, which provide information on financial results, details of
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alliance deals, and progress of the finn's technology. Dr. Charles summarises the
interconnection between bio-partnering meetings and the web-site as follows:
"I had been in the company two or three days and we went to one of these Bio-
partnering meetings I have told you about and I came out with forty leads. Each
one was different. It is just an enormous task overcoming that problem. Just
getting back to those people with detailed responses to their questions. So I
thought that the best way to do it is to have a Web site. Everything they need to
know is on the Web site. The technical section is extreme. It is broken up into
bits. There are short summaries at the start and you can go down into more
detail. This really took away all of the follow-up. The first stage of follow-up is
the Web site."
With the growing usage of the Internet in business life the web-site has become a
marketing tool in its own right. According to Dr. Charles an increasing number of
people are searching the Internet for polymer attachment services and thus
Po1yMASC's web-site is beginning to attract potential partners in its own right.
The third approach which Po1yMASC employs is database mailing. This involves
creating a database of companies which PoZyMASC believes could benefit from
polymer attachment and then tailoring a fax to the needs of that company and the
person to whom the fax is addressed. The success of this method is surprisingly high.
The firm has had a response rate of 10% from one of its mailings. The approach is both
efficient, being cheap and tailored, and effective, in that one of its current partners,
Onyx Phannaceuticals of the USA, was attracted to Po1yMASC via this approach. Dr.
Charles summarised the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach when he
commented that:
"If you get a 1 or 2% response you are doing extremely well, yet in February
we got a 10% response. Two weeks ago we announced the first deal that has
come as a result of that mailing ... Database faxing is extremely cost effective. I
sit at my desk, either at home or at the office, and I fax these people. As I say
we get nearly a 10% response. That's very cheap. And you learn. We are doing
it again, but we have modified it slightly. It is very easy to do"
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In the past two years Po1yMASC's approach to attracting partners has resulted in
hundreds of contacts, from which eight active alliances have been signed (as per Table
Four). From Table Five it can be seen that Po1yMASC has, in pure numbers, compared
favourably to some of its more established compatriots on the Official London Stock
Exchange. It has established a portfolio of partners on a relatively small budget.
INSERT TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE
Closing the Deal
The real challenge in developing a portfolio of partners is in successful signing of a
partnership agreement and its subsequent management. It is essential that contacts be
converted into active partnerships if Po1yMASC is to turn its technology into profit.
PoIyMASC has learned some key lessons from its experience in attracting partners and
then closing deals. In his capacity as Commercial Development DirectQr, Dr. Charles
highlighted three particularly important aspects in successfully closing a deal, namely,
negotiating at the right level inside the other firm, understanding the various stages of
the licensing process and negotiating fees based on an explicit project plan.
In establishing a partnership Po1yMASC have found it essential that the people with
whom they negotiate have sufficient authority to commit their firm to both the
financial resources necessary to pay Po1yMASC and also the internal resources and
capabilities necessary to complete their parts of the project in a timely manner. Dr.
Charles states that:
"My goal is to get the right level of people involved so that we can have a
meeting that would change the course of the project without having to refer to
someone who is outside the meeting. I can see that kind of a problem could
occur. The wrong people could be at the meeting. You can spend a lot of time
developing the relationship and shaking hands on the deal and all that but, {in
the end), you don't actually get the deal {signed}. So you have to be very
careful to make sure that you talk to the right people
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I develop fairly good relationships with the President, the VP of Business
Development and the Research Director during the negotiation of a deal.
Usually I get to know the Business Development Director and the Research
Director extremely well. During the negotiation, of course, the President has to
sign off."
The level of commitment required by both Po1yMASC and, most critically, by its
partners varies according to the type of alliance. When dealing with either an out-
licensing or strategic alliance contract there are typically three phases, which vary
according to the depth of commitment imposed on both partners.
The first phase is a feasibility study. This involves the partner assessing Po1yMASC's
technology and services to determine its suitability to the R&D projects in which the
partner is currently involved, or how Po1yMASC's technology could enhance the drugs
which they currently have on the market. According to Po1yMASC's web-site this
phase typically takes nine months. Their goal is to recoup R&D expenses incurred at
this stage and convince the partner to enter phase two.
Phase two is when both companies have determined that they can work together for
mutual gain. This typically triggers a licensing deal where PoIyMASC licenses some
of its technology to the partner and works with them to translate the promise of this
license into practical clinical trials and thence drugs. This is where the serious
negotiation takes place. Dr. Charles notes that:
"When you have done the feasibility study, you get to the licensing trigger.
This is where you reach the decision to go {or not}. This decision involves the
partner in a lot of expense {namely} launching a project which would lead to a
product. {The principal expense which they would incur is that of) going
through the various clinical processes. Then they will start to look {more
carefully at the deal}. Once you have triggered that, it is a whole different ball
game."
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According to Po1yMASC's web-site, during this phase the company's main task is the
supply of clinical trial materials and the development of techniques for production of
the PEGylated protein, peptide, or liposome pharmaceutical. Again, the web-site
reports, Po1yMASC expects to cover R&D costs during this phase.
Phase three involves a drug actually entering clinical trials. As yet this phase has not
occurred in PoIyMASC's history. Entry into regulatory clinical trials would trigger
milestone payments from the partner to Po1yMASC (though in the case of the Oxford
Molecular deal it is Po1yMASC who pays milestones). As the drug progressed through
various stages of clinical trials Po1yMASC would receive pre-specifled payments from
its partner and may be required to provide some data and input into the work of its
partner in moving the drug through the clinical trials. Were the drug to enter the
market then Po1yMASC would obtain some royalties based on sales.
As can see from the above it is the goal of Po1yMASC, at a minimum, to recoup its
expenses from phases one and two of the licensing process. The key to breaking even
is an understanding of what are the costs incurred by each partner. Dr. Charles sums up
the method of costing a project and negotiating a fee, as follows:
"l'he relationship starts with Po1yMASC producing a project plan of what is
required to PEGylate the client company's protein. It is very nice because you
fully cost the project from the bottom. You sit down with the Scientist and
figure out who exactly is going to do the work and how much it is going to
cost. We come up with a plan which you {the client) can't argue with. One
company said to me well OK it takes nine months, it's going to cost £170,000
that's too much and too long. I want it to cost £90,000 in six months. I said
well OK you want a six month plan, you want it to cost £90,000, what do you
want me to chop off it? Because it won't happen. And that is that. This is a
very good negotiating tool to get the price right at the start. You are covering
your R&D monies. Part of breaking even, of course, is to made sure the work
you are doing for other companies is paid for. That is how you break even."
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Operational Man ageinent ofAlliances
Once a deal has been signed it is essential that the alliance be pro-actively managed.
Po1yMASC's management style with regard to projects involving external partners is
not dissimilar from the management style of internal projects. Again at the heart of
Po1yMASC's approach is communication within and across teams and use of project
management techniques. Dr. Charles explains this communication process as follows:
"Once the deal is signed and they have paid the up-front money and we have
started working we put into place three levels of communication.
Communication is what it is all about ... One (level of communication) is the
chap doing the experiment. He will get to know his, or her counterpart in the
other company, so that there is good dialogue between the chaps running
around on the ground. Secondly, we appoint a senior scientist as the project
manager within Po1yMASC. They will have regular contact with the project
manager from the other side. Thirdly, I will oversee the whole program from
the commercial perspective. I will be free to speak to who ever I like in the
other organisation."
Alliances are micro managed using a project management system. The project is
monitored against key milestones. If work is progressing slowly Po1yMASC's project
management system flags this up and communication is triggered at the appropriate
level to determine what is causing the delay and how it should be addressed. Dr.
Charles describes the workings of this system as follows:
"What we are trying to do is to put in place communication at all levels in the
organisation to flag up issues quickly and nip them in the bud. The Project Plan
does that as well. We track it. We have a nice big blue bar which says there is
the task. That's how long it is going to take. This is the guy who is going to do
it. This is when it is going to fmish. It is three weeks long, so here we are
today. Within a week we have a black line which the program draws along this
blue one and the black one should stop at the end of the blue one and then it
starts somewhere else. Of course if the black bar goes past the blue one I can
see where it is going and swing it up on the computer. I just look at these
things. I am there really to ask the hard question: what's going wrong?"
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Once problems have been identified people on the ground devise and enact solutions.
As and when necessary these staff can draw upon the advice of the Project
Management Group or the more senior 'Science Management Team', in the re-
appraisal of the project plan. During this process the alliance partner is kept informed
of progress at the appropriate level.
Po1yMASC's success is inextricably linked to its alliance partners. As can be seen
from above the firm seeks to pro-actively manage the process of identification of
partners, the negotiation of partnership contracts and the operational management of
projects with external partners. The foundation upon which alliance projects are based
is on-going multi-disciplinary work inside Po1yMASC to develop and deepen its
technical and commercial strategies, as outlined earlier in this case. As Po1yMASC is a
listed company the ability of the firm to formulate and implement a profitable strategy
successfully may be reflected in its share price, therefore this case now turns to a brief
overview of the relationship between Po1yMASC, its shareholders, and the
performance of its stock since flotation.
MANAGING THE PIPER
Why did city shareholders invest £ 5 million pounds at flotation for around a 30%
share of the firm? Commenting on the company's first year interim accounts Dr.
Francis offered an insight into the motivations of such shareholders observing that:
"Po1yMASC's ability to add clinical and commercial value to pharmaceutical
products through its enabling technology means that it continues to represent
an excellent means of investing in the biotechnology sector without the risk
associated with the development of new chemical entities" (Po1yMASC web-
site, Press Release)
From this quotation it is clear that Po1yMASC was designed as a relatively low risk
vehicle for investors to access the potential high capital gains associated with start-up
biotechnology firms. During 1996 PoZyMASC began to broaden its range of contracts
from out-licensing to strategic alliances in which it co-developed drugs. Shareholders
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were aware that such a strategic option might be enacted by the management as it was
flagged in the flotation Prospectus. Dr. Charles suggests that the relationship between
the city and the management is a dynamic one in which they have an oversight role in
determining if such strategic alliances will flourish in the future. He observed that:
"The Oxford Molecular, Hydro Med Sciences, and NOF alliances are able to
give our shareholders an opportunity to decide to invest more money to enable
Po1yMASC to take those special cases {strategic alliances as opposed to out-
licensing projects) further down the development path to command higher
royalties in the end, or they may decide no we don't want to do that - license it
straight away."
Feedback between the external shareholders and the management occurs through a
number of avenues, each of which to some extent can be pro-actively managed by
PoIyMASC. The principal feedback processes are the Annual General Meeting, analyst
meetings, press releases, and share price movements. Dr. Charles, in his capacity as
Commercial Development Director, actively monitors Po1yMASC's share price
movement and keeps the market informed of developments within the firm. This has a
clear effect on the company's share price, and thence its value. He stated that:
"Our stock is not traded very much, because the institutional investors who are
involved with Po1yMASC tend to think of us as a higher risk (relative to their
non-biotechnology portfolio). When investing in Po1yMASC they purchase a
block of shares and they hold onto them. This is good at one level, but it
doesn't do the share price any good because if nothing happens it drifts down,
because that is the default setting. It drops. So that is why we live and die on
Press Releases. Every time we issued a Press Release this year the share price
has jumped."
Figure One maps the relative performance of Po1yMASC's share price against a basket
of all biotechnology companies listed on the Official London Stock Exchange since
Po1yMASC's formation in December 1995 up to the end of February 1998. All share
prices were indexed at 100 on the first day of trading of Po1yMASC's shares. The
basket of shares incorporates one of each of the following shares: British
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Biotechnology, Cantab, Celitech, Chiroscience, Cortecs International, ML Labs,
Oxford Molecular, Peptide Therapeutics, Proteus International and Scotia Holdings.
The basket was calculated using a simple arithmetic mean of the indexed shares. As
can be seen from the graph both Po1yMASC and the basket have experienced
considerable volatility. Both indexes rose during the first five months of 1996, with a
decline through to November 1996. The first two months of 1997 led to a considerable
capital gain in the basket of shares, while Po1yMASC had a more modest gain, which
continued into April. Both experienced a sharp decline in their value from April/May
up to August 1997, however Po1yMASC recovered more strongly and as at February
1998 its relative performance remained above the basket of shares.
INSERT FIGURE ONE HERE
Readers who are interested in mapping the performance of PoIyMASC's share price
movements against announced events may do so by referring to Table Six, in which
these events are listed. Matching Figure One with Table Six lends credence to the
assertion of Dr. Charles that Po1yMASC's share price can be effected by
announcements of events. It is worthy of note that Po1yMASC's share price did
outperform some individual shares incorporated in the basket. One should, however,
compare PoIyMASC's performance against this basket with some caution. Po1yMASC
is listed on AIM, whereas the basket shares are quoted on the Official listing, hence
they are likely to be traded more often. Biotechnology firms quoted on the Official
listing are also exposed to a considerable amount of reporting in the Financial Times,
which may amplify the effect of announcements on their share prices. Additionally
several of these firms are quoted in the FTSE mid-250 index, which means that they
are subject to automatic inclusion in some institutional investors portfolios. Finally the
business which these firms are in varies from that of Po1yMASC. Few are following
the strategy of developing a platform technology to be applied to another firm's drug
portfolio; most are primarily engaged in drug discoveiy and development.
CONCLUSION
Po1yMASC has achieved a lot since it spun out from the Royal Free Medical School in
Autumn 1995. It has obtained a listing on AIM, attracted a growing portfolio of
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external partners, successfully defended its patents in the European Patent Office,
deepened its technological competency, and created a distinct organisational culture
and management style. The financial position of the firm is rapidly improving, with
break-even achieved in the month of November 1997. Dr. Francis concluded in a
recent press announcement that:
"We expect the Company to grow rapidly this year on the foundations laid in
the first two years" (Po1yMASC Web-site Press Release February 1998).
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TABLE ONE: MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS
Shareholder	 Minimum %
	
% Shareholding
(Ordinary Shares) 	 Shareholding on March 24 19982
day of Flotation1
Freemedic (controlled by Royal Free)
	 26.00	 18.48
Dr. Gillian Francis (CEO) 	 15.10	 15.08
Dr. D. Fisher (Director of Biochemistry) 	 8.20	 7.97
Dr. C. Delgado (Director of
Pharmacological Research)	 6.80	 6.46
Po1yMASC ESOP (Employee Share
Scheme Trust)	 6.30	 6.25
Bank of Scotland (Stenhouse) 	 NA	 5.55
Bank of Scotland	 NA	 4.22
Medical Marketing	 5.00	 3.30
Taylor Young Investment Management	 NA	 3.10
Other Directors	 2.60	 2.40
Under Control of Royal Free &
PoIyMASC Employees/Directors 	 65.00	 56.64
Total	 70.00	 72.81
Source: Po1yMASC Flotation Prospectus
2 Source: Hemscott Publishing, http://www.hemscott.com/eguities/company/
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TABLE TWO: OVERVIEW OF A SELECTION OF POLYMASC'S PATENTS
Patent Family	 Overview of Progress
PEG Proteins	 One patent granted in USA
One patent granted by European Patents
Office
One patent pending in Japan
Liposomes One patent granted by the European
Patent Office and successfully defended
in an opposition challenge.
Patents pending in the USA and Japan
Polymer Modification	 One patent pending in the USA
One patent pending under the
international Patent Co-Operation Treaty
One patent application made in January
1997
One patent confirmed by the European
Tumor Targeting Lipsomes	
Patent Office
PoIyMASC and partner Genzyme apply
for a gene therapy and cancer patent in
1997.
Sources: Prospectus; 1996 Annual Report; P01yMASC Web-site; Extel March 1998.
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TABLE THREE: FINANCIAL SUMMARY OF POLYMASC PLC
1997
	
1996 (17 months)
£ '000
	
£ '000
Turnover'
Cost of Sales2
Gross Loss
Administrative Expenses
Interest Income
Loss Before Tax
Fixed Assets:
Intangible3
Tangible4
Cash at Bank
Cash burn years5
528
(661)
(133)
(981)
139
(975)
390
347
1,956
1.76 years
117
(371)
(254)
(1,020)
203
(37)
520
184
2,938
2.31 years
'All turnover relates to income received from collaborative agreements.
2 Cost of sales includes R&D expenses which are fully charged to the P&L account.
Intangible assets consist of Intellectual Property Rights, Know-how and Patents. All
are charged 20% depreciation per annum.
' Tangible assets consists of Laboratoiy Equipment, Furniture and Fittings, and
Computer Equipment. All are charged 20% depreciation except computers which are
charged 33.33%.
Cash burn is calculated as cash in bank divided by losses before tax. It is a proxy for
how long the firm could continue at present levels of income and expenditure
without recourse to the capital markets.
Source:	 Po1yMASC Web-site and 1996 Annual Report
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TABLE FOUR: POLYMASC'S ALLIANCES
Company Announcement Type of 	 Details of Alliance
Nameof Alliance	 Alliance	 _________________________________
Cangene	 Transferred at
	
Licensing	 PEGylation of Cangene Blood
(Canada)	 foundation.	 Growth Factors.
Hydro Med June 1996	 Strategic	 Hydro Med Sciences brings "a
Sciences	 Alliance	 hycirogel parental drug delivery
implant to the development of
cancer vaccines" (Po1yMASC
web-site). P01yMASC brings
polymer coupling. Combined the
partners will develop "a drug
delivery system for the inoculation
of cancer patients." (P01yMASC
____________ ________________ ______________ web-site).
Genzyme	 September 1996 Licensing	 Evaluate the application of
(USA)	 Po1yMASC's PEGylation
techniques to Genzyme's gene
____________ ________________ ______________ delivery systems.
Oxford	 March 1997	 Strategic	 Oxford Molecular to provide drug
Molecular	 Alliance	 design services to enable
(UK)
	
	
Po1yMASC to develop a blood
growth factor free of third party
___________ _______________ _____________ patent hindrances.
Shearwater March 1997	 Outsourcing	 Shearwater are specialists in the
(USA)	 of	 manufacture of PEGs. They will
Manufacturin manufacture Po1yMASC's PEGs
g	 to enable production of clinical
__________ ______________ ____________ grade activated PEGs
Onyx	 June 1997	 Licensing	 Onyx are developing novel cancer
Pharmaceut	 therapies. Po1yMASC's
icals (USA)	 PEGylation techniques will act as
a complement to Onyx's products.
NOF	 June 1997
	 Strategic	 NOF is engaged in the discovery
(Nippon	 Alliance	 and development of oral drug
Oil and	 delivery systems. Po1yMASC's
Fats of	 PEGylation offers many benefits
Japan)	 _______________ ______________ in oral delivery.
T.K.T.	 November 1997 Licensing
	 TKT are developing a PEGylated
(USA)	 protein. Po1yMASC are supplying
the activated PEG species to
manufacture the protein.
Shearwater will do the
__________ ______________ ____________ manufacturing.
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TABLE FIVE: POLYMASC COMPARED TO SOME BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS
LISTED ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
Company	 Founded in	 R&D Spend Number of 	 Number of
in 1996	 R&D	 Staff in 1996
Alliances
Po1yMASC	 1995	 £119	 One(withfour 10
thousand	 more formed
in 1997)
British	 1986	 £ 29.1 million One	 350
Biotechnology
Cantab	 1989	 £ 6.3 million Two	 91
Pharmaceuticals
Cortecs	 1985	 £ 12.1 million Six	 166
International
Chiroscience	 1987	 £ 5.9 million	 Three	 170
Proteus	 1987	 £ 5.5 million	 Three	 65
International
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TABLE SIX: LIST OF POLYMASC EVENTS TO MARCH 1998 (as per Extel)
Date
12/19/95
06/03/96
06/07/96
06/2 8/9 6
07/04/96
07/26/96
08/28/96
09/26/96
09/20/96
10/11/96
10/11/96
12/04/96
01/27/97
02/04/97
02/05/97
02/10/97
02/11/97
02/17/97
02/17/97
02/25/97
02/25/97
03/25/97
03/25/97
03/26/97
06/25/97
06/25/97
06/25197
06/25/97
06/27/97
09/25/97
09/25/97
11/24/97
11/26/97
02/05/98
02/06/98
Event
Change in number of shares to 20 million ordinary shares
Director, Lomax, disposes of 6,000 shares at 169 pence
Freemedic's interest is now at 24.27%
European Patents Office accept patent relating to PEG proteins
Bank of Scotland Nominees hold 3%
Bank of Scotland no longer has an interest in the company
Interim results released
European Patent Office Opposition Board re-assures the Company that
its patent will hold. Patent relates to tumour targeting of anti-cancer
agents and diagnostic products.
AGM. Losses £214 thousand lower than projected in Prospectus
Batten resigns as part-time Commercial Director
Stephen Charles appointed full-time Commercial Development Director
Director, Lomax, sells 14,000 shares at 128 pence
Patent irrevocably upheld
Freemedic now holds 21.475%
Newton UK Smaller Companies Unit Trust now holds 3.5%
Freemedic now holds 18.475%
Newton Investment Management now holds 12.6 1%
Hydro Med Sciences deal commenced in June 1996 now extended
Bank of Scotland now holds 3.5%
Preliminary results announced
Chairman concludes that the Company is well placed to conduct deals
with third parties
Strategic Alliance to investigate Blood Clotting Agents announced with
Oxford Molecular
Manufacturing agreement announced with Shearwater of the USA
Dr. Francis sells 12,500 shares at 136 pence. Now holds 15.08%
Strategic Alliance announced with NOF of Japan. Will focus on oral
peptide and protein pharmaceuticals.
Strategic Alliance announced with Onyx Pharmaceuticals. Will focus on
development of a novel anti-cancer system.
In the final stages of extending an agreement with Cangene Corporation
into PEGylation of Human Growth Factors
Director, Rees, acquired 25,000 shares at 112 pence, now holds 125,000
Director, Hams, acquire 25,000 shares at 112 pence, now holds 175,000
Director, Dutton, acquires 25,000 shares at 115 pence, now holds 25,000
Interim results announced. Turnover has risen and losses reduced
Board continues to be optimistic about the future of the Company
Licensing agreement with TKT of the USA is announced
Henry Ansbacher and Company appointed as an advisor
Preliminary results announced. Group expects rapid growth.
Taylor Young Investment now holds 3.099%
Source: Extel Card
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Appendix Three
THE OXFORD MOLECULAR CASE STUDY:
Managing inter-organisational collaborative drug discovery projects
INTRODUCTION
"We saw the rush into biotech a bit like the '49 Gold Rush in California. We
realised it wasn't the peop1e who rushed into the hills with the picks and
shovels like British Biotechnology to try and get the nuggets out who did well,
it was Stanfords who built the railroads, the Levi Strausses who sold the tents.
We want to be the Levi Strauss of the biotech industry. These guys are up there
speculating with their own molecules, but we sell them the tools with which to
speculate"
Dr. Tony Marchington, CEO of Oxford Molecular (From Evamy 1998)
Oxford Molecular was founded in 1989 and obtained a London Stock Exchange listing
in 1994. The firm has its roots in Oxford University. It was founded by the current
CEO Dr. Tony Marchington and his former biochemistry tutor, Professor Graham
Richards of Oxford University. Oxford Molecular was one of the first companies to
receive seed capital, and sole intellectual property right licenses, from the university's
Isis Innovation, a company established to commercially exploit Oxford's research.
The firm has four quite striking features. First is its close links with academia. Second
is its Collaborative Discovery division which identifies innovative discovery projects
and both brings together and manages virtual teams of scientists from universities and
pharmaceutical firms to co-develop individual projects. Third is its leading position in
software solutions in drug discovery. Fourth, Oxford Molecular is virtually unique in
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the UK biotechnology sector because it achieved a net profit in 1997, albeit on the
back of 1 million interest receivable.
The firm was originally established to develop and market software to manage the drug
discovery process. The drug discovery process is briefly outlined in Table One.
Computer technology had become increasingly important in the discovery of new
drugs in the late 1980s and its importance has become even more crucial in the 1990s.
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE
Informatics63 is particularly important to the future of the pharmaceutical sector. Jan
Leschy, the CEO of SmithKline Beecham, commented at a public lecture at City
University in June 1998, that informatics, along with molecular and genetic
diagnostics, are key to the future of both his company and the industry as a whole. At
the heart of Oxford Molecular's current range of software products are Bio-
informatics, Chemo-informatics and Computer Aided Molecular Design, which are
central to the informatics revolution (see Tables Two, Three and Four for more
details).
iNSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE
Oxford Molecular has been described by some commentators as the Microsoft of the
drug discovery sector. It certainly has ambitions to become the industry standard in
this sector and has developed a considerable installed base inside both pharmaceutical
and biotechnology firms. Dr. Marchington recently observed that:
63 For the purpose of this case we defme inforrnatics as the application of computer tools to the drug
discovery process. Oxford Molecular's tools aid researchers in the identification of targets to tackle an
illness, the process of finding "lead compounds shown to be active against a biological target" and the
process of refining a lead into a compound which enters regulatory clinical trials (Annual Report 1997).
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"We (Oxford Molecular} want to make our software and services the industry
standard through close alliance with large international partners" (Gracie 1998)
and that "You would be hard pressed to find any pharmaceutical research
establishment anywhere in the world that does not have Oxford Molecular
software at some level" (Ernst and Young 1998).
In fact the company has developed much of its software products through on-site
development with leading pharmaceutical firms such as Astra Arcus, Glaxo-Weilcome
and Wyeth-Ayerst.
Success in software is only one aspect of Oxford Molecular's goal to be an industry
standard. The other critical aspect is provision of drug services. It is to this end that in
1995 Oxford Molecular formally established its Collaborative Discovery division. This
division brings together a diverse range of skills that it offers, under contract, to
phannaceutical and biotechnology companies. The goal of this division is to play a
central role in the strategic development of the firm "by winning and managing drug
discovery projects" (Annual Report 1997).
The Collaborative Discovery division is of critical importance to Oxford Molecular,
and is viewed by its head, Dr. David Ricketts, as the future of the firm. Commenting in
1997 he observed that:
"This group is seen to be the future. Over the next couple of years, within two
to three years all being well, we will split the revenue half and half between the
two divisions (software and collaborative discovery) ."
An intriguing aspect of this division is that while it only had seven full-timers by the
end of 1997 it generated 17.3 % of the firm's revenues in 1996 and 15.4% in 1997.
This is despite the fact that the company employed 175 people in 1997 (Annual Report
1997).
{} indicates an translation from the verbal to the written word. It provides the context in which the
interviewee was speaking.
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One of the reasons why the division is seen to be so critical to the long term success of
Oxford Molecular is because of the projected size of the markets that the firm is
targeting. From Table Five it can be seen that the potential size of the outsourced
research market, which the Collaborative Discovery division is targeted upon, is
considerably larger than the outsourced IT market, which the software division is
attacking. Collaborative Discovery have access to a £900 million market, which is
projected to grow some 144% over five years. The software division believes that only
75% of the £500 million pharmaceutical IT market is available to its products. This
gives that division a target market of £ 400 million, which is projected to grow by
150% over the next five years.
INSERT TABLE FWE ABOUT HERE
Another important reason for interest in the Collaborative Discovery division is that it
has long term upside potential. In the case of the software division products are sold to
customers at a once off profit margin. In the case of the Collaborative Discovery
division not only is there a build in profit margin in each contract, but there is also a
profit sharing element. Should a drug which the division was involved in discovering
make it to the marketplace, then the customer is required to give Oxford Molecular a
small royalty payment on each sale. Commenting on the software division Dr. Ricketts
observed that,
"as far as I am aware there are no deals done that involve royalties on drugs that
may reach the market. So they develop software and sell software products for a
good deal." He later noted that "It is very important to our shareholders to know
that we have a deal that involves royalty payments, they don't know what they
are because the partner does not like that to be disclosed."
Hence one of the reasons why this division is worthy of interest is because of its long
term potential to generate not only a half of the company's turnover, but also the
possibility of achieving considerable royalty payments. This would be bottom line
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revenue, and while the royalty would be a single digit, it could still represent a sizeable
return. As Dr. Ricketts noted:
"If you find a new asthma treatment, or a new obesity treatment, which is
something for Alizyme which we are working on, you are talking at least a
billion dollar drug, so a few percent is a few tens of millions of pounds."
The firm believe that they can obtain a considerable share of the outsourced research
market. They state that:
"Oxford Molecular believes that the market for outsourced services (both IT
and research) could reach £2.2 billion per annum within 5 years. Oxford
Molecular, in a synergistic alliance with its recently established partners,
Cambridge Combinatorial Ltd and Cambridge Drug Discovery Ltd is well
placed to take a significant share of this market" (Annual Report 1997).
According to a report in the Sunday Times, Dr. Marchington is aiming for Oxford
Molecular to capture between 15% to 20% of the total outsourcing market, which he
predicts will have grown to £ 5 billion by the year 2005 (Gracie 1998). This would
equate to corporate-wide sales of between £ 750 million to £ 1,000 million per annum.
Were Dr. Rickeus' prediction that Collaborative Discovery will make up half of group
revenues within three years to occur then this division would have increased its
turnover from £ 1.6 million in 1996 to between £ 375 million to £ 500 million per
annum by 2005.
The company believes that to attack this market effectively it is essential to move
forward on both the software and services front. The 1997 Annual Report states that
the overall strategic intent of the firm is:
"to be the world's leading supplier of drug discovery solutions through the
integration of information technology and drug discovery services including
combinatorial chemistry, high throughput screening and genomics"
This case study will focus on the Collaborative Discovery division because of the
fascinating insights the operation of this division offers into the new wave of
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knowledge based competition which has as its focus inter-organisational co-ordination.
The division seeks to integrate multiple forms of knowledge from within Oxford
Molecular, its network of partner companies, and university research sub-contractors to
deliver high value, knowledge intensive, drug discovery services to pharmaceutical
and biotechnology firms. In the context of Oxford Molecular this division is of
particular importance due to the rapid internal growth predicted by Dr. Ricketts, the
size of the potential external market, and the low levels of staff required relative to
turnover. The case will explore what the commercial logic of this division is and how
it organises itself to deliver value to its customers. Throughout the case Oxford
Molecular's strategy of collaborative discovery it illustrated through two alliances, one
with a large Japanese pharmaceutical firm, Yamanouchi, and the other with a small,
virtual, UK biotechnology company, Alizyme.
COLLABORATIVE DISCOVERY'S STRATEGIC DIRECTION
Unlike most of the Entrepreneurial Life Science companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange, Oxford Molecular does not directly invest shareholder's .funds in the
independent discovery of novel therapeutic compounds. As outlined earlier it seeks to
provide services to other companies in the pursuit of this activity. Provision of
software services is one root. The other is a more direct, hands on, participation in the
drug discovery process, through provision of managerial or specialist services.
The division can provide customers with specialist technical services such as protein
analysis, antibody engineering, high throughput screening and quantitative structure
activity relationship services, to mention but a few. These projects are normally of a
short duration and are
"aimed at over stretched Drug Design Departments within Pharmaceutical
companies who are looking to sub-contract specific projects or companies that
currently do not have access to these types of skills and expertise in-house"
(Oxford Molecular web site).
The division can also service higher level bespoke research projects in which it plays
both a managerial and technical role. These projects may be initiated by either the
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customer or Oxford Molecular. For example in the case of their collaboration with
Yamanouchi Pharmaceuticals of Japan, it was Oxford Molecular who came up with the
initial novel drug target, focusing on Ion channels. It then sold this initial idea as a
project to Yamanouchi. Oxford Molecular manage the project on Yamanouchi's behalf
in return for contract fees, milestone payments65, and a share of future royalties. In the
case of its collaboration with Alizyme, it was Alizyme who came to Oxford Molecular
with a novel drug target and contracted the company to manage a project to identify
and optimise lead compounds that Alizyme could then be taken into the clinical trials.
Again Oxford Molecular receives research fees, milestones and future royalties.
In such projects the Collaborative Discovery division brings with it a "wealth of
experience and expertise in target identification, screening, synthesis, molecular design
and informatics" (Annual Report 1997). More importantly it brings with it a network
of contacts through which it can access the skills of leading edge researchers. There are
two strands to this network. The first is access to university researchers. This is a key
element of the division's original guiding principal.
"The guiding principal for the Drug {Discovery} division is to build a bridge
between successful university research projects and the needs of commercial
research and development organisations involved in pharmaceutical and
biotechnology R&D" (Oxford Molecular web site).
The second important network is its two partner firms, Cambridge Combinatorial and
Cambridge Drug Design. Dr. Marchington sums up the importance of these strategic
partners, noting that:
"The combination of Oxford Molecular's software and drug design expertise,
Cambridge Combinatorial's chemical synthesis skills and Cambridge Drug
Discovery's advanced screening capabilities will provide customers with a
highly cost effective method of accelerating the drug discovery process"
(Oxford Molecular web-site).
65 Milestone payments involve a collaborative partner making staged cash payments to Oxford
Molecular upon the achievement of specific research milestones.
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Oxford Molecular has built up its expertise in drug discovery software through internal
growth and over a dozen acquisitions. These acquisitions have brought with them new
products, markets and expertise. The Collaborative Discovery division seems to be
emulating this strategy to a lesser extent, concentrating more on organic growth and its
web of university sub-contractors. Nevertheless, during 1997 the company helped
found Cambridge Combinatorial (see Table Six) and Cambridge Drug Design (see
Table Seven) taking a minority stake in both firms, with options to buy outright.
INSERT TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE SEVEN ABOUT HERE
The central importance of these firms in the long term success of the Collaborative
Discovery division is stated in the 1997 Annual Report. It notes that if the company is
to achieve its aim of being a full drug discovery service provider, then it is important
that it have four core capabilities, namely informatics, chemical librarjes, biological
screening and genomics.
Inforrnatics the central capability around which the others are presently organised. This
capability has been internally developed by Oxford Molecular. The Annual Report
(1997) notes that the
"Oxford Molecular group provides the essential informatics infrastructure that
co-ordinates the scientific team. The Collaborative Discovery division provides
multidisciplinary research project management and expertise in lead
identification and optimisation."
Expertise in chemical synthesis and combinatorial chemistry libraries is provided by
Cambridge Combinatorial. Expertise in biological screening is provided by Cambridge
Drug Design. The final key capability is genomics. When discussing the impact of
genomics in an press interview Dr. Marchington predicted that:
"about 60% of the new drugs targets will emerge from these disciplines. We
will be held back if we can't offer these as well" (Gracie 1998).
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Clearly this is an area that the company needs to address in the near future. The 1997
Annual Report echoes this sentiment, noting that:
"at an appropriate stage, genomic capability, will be added to augment the
combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening services"
COLLABORATIVE DISCOVERY'S FINANCIAL STRATEGY
The overarching fmancial strategy of Oxford Molecular as a whole is risk aversion. A
strong profit margin is sought on each software transaction, or collaborative project.
This strategy has played a strong role in the company achieving profitability in 1997.
The 1997 Annual Report sums up its financial strategy as follows.
"The company's low risk strategic principal is to provide solutions targeted to
assist in all stages of pharmaceutical research. All products and services are
supplied to customers in a way that generates attractive margins for Oxford
Molecular, together with, if applicable, milestone payments and future
pharmaceutical royalties."
This risk aversion is mirrored in the Collaborative Discovery division. All projects
involve payment of research fees by the collaborative partner (client) to cover not only
the division's costs but also a minimum profit margin. Additional profit may be
obtained through the attainment of milestones, and/or though a single digit royalty
payment should the customer's drug eventually make it onto the market. Research fees
are paid for the management of the project, regardless of whether milestones are
achieved. In a business which had made losses since its inception up to 1997 a key
financial imperative is cash. Dr. Ricketts commented that "our reemit here is always to
get money in as quickly as possible." This reduces both the risk of default by a
customer, and the cost of financing debtors.
The emphasis on a low risk, profit per deal strategy, is reinforced by the division's non
reliance on milestone payments and royalties as a route to profitability. Dr. Ricketts
noted that:
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"For us royalty and milestone payments are really just the icing on the cake.
We never risk, or speculate {on collaborative projects). We always make a
very reasonable profit on just doing the research project {by ensuring that
research fees exceed costs and include a profit margin) ... for the foreseeable
future cash is critical both for the company and for my group."
The method by which the financial structure of a project is negotiated with a
collaborator reflects this aim of achieving a healthy profit margin from research fees
alone. In an interview with Dr. Ricketts he outlined how the level of research fees was
negotiated with Yamanouchi one of the first large deals concluded by the
Collaborative Discovery division. The pricing of the deal started on the premise that
Collaborative Discovery did not want to risk any of its own shareholder funds on the
deal. First, the division calculated what were the internal overheads it would incur in
the management of the collaboration. Second, it established what would be the fees
that it would need to pay to its university sub-contractors to complete the task assigned
to them. This gave Collaborative Discovery an estimate of the cost of the project. To
establish the level of margin to charge, the company compared these costs against
those that Yamanouchi would have incurred if it did the project independently. Dr.
Ricketts says that he
"then went to get an estimate of what their costs would be to do this thing in-
house, assuming they had all the know-how. That was a lot more than ours,
because we are keeping overheads low by out-sourcing via virtual teams ... You
can set the price somewhere in between the two to ensure you get a reasonable
margin. You could also argue it is going to cost Yamanouchi X to do this, if
they have the know-how. You can say they don't have the know-how so it is
going to cost them a premium. So it is going to cost them two times X, which
in general terms doesn't fly at all. Then you actually ask yourself how do you
want to make money on this. What is the nature of the project. Are there going
to be very well defined milestones with a value to the partner good enough for
them to pay you a lot of money and if so how do you value them?"
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The task is then to negotiate with the partner the split of research fees (which must
always exceed costs, a safety margin for error in cost calculation, and a profit margin),
milestones and royalty payments. Royalties are of the least importance given the
length of time to market of a drug and also the high probability that the compound may
not make it to market66 . When referring to the Yamanouchi deal Dr. Ricketts said:
"royalties are very much non-immediate. They are not going to happen for ten
years and by and large they are beyond our control . . ."
Having established the broad strategic direction of the firm and its financial logic this
case will now turn to the questions of why do pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms
come to the Collaborative Discovery division, rather than conduct a project in-house,
how does the it deliver its services to the customer, and how successful is the division?
WHY COLLABORATIVE PARTNERS COME TO THE DIVISION
The Collaborative Discovery division has engaged in many major drug discovery
projects. Nine of these projects (for which there were public details) are outlined in
Table Eight. An important question to ask is why do such firms choose to outsource
part of their research to Oxford Molecular? In the case of the small biotechnology
firms the answer is simple. It is due to a lack of financial, or physical, resources andlor
a lack of technical, or organisational, capabilities. As Dr. Ricketts put it:
"a small biotech {comes to us} because they don't have the know-how to do {a
particular element of the discovery process} internally and they don't have the
cash to buy in that know-how internally at their current resource level. They
don't want to spend money on hiring somebody full time and buying a
computer and software to do it. It is cheaper to come to us and they can get to
{the next stage of the discovery process} quicker."
iNSERT TABLE EIGHT ABOUT HERE
Estimates on the likelihood of a compound that enters clinical trials making it to the market vary from
one in five upwards.
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The reasons why a large pharmaceutical firm would be attracted to the Collaborative
Discovery division are more complex. It is not a question of a large pharmaceutical
firm lacking knowledge about Rational Drug Design, Combinatorial Chemistry, High
Throughput Screening, or management of projects across universities and commercial
organisations. Large pharmaceutical firms have all these skills and where there are
gaps in their knowledge pools it would be possible to buy them in, given their vast
financial resources. Many of the larger firms spend over $ 1 billion per year on
Research and Development. Instead Dr. Ricketts identifies three broad reasons. The
first two reasons essentially conform to the concept of strategic focus, while the third
confirms to the concept of technology options.
First are spillovers. A unit within the pharmaceutical firm may have an area which they
wish to research, but due to other projects lack time to commit internal resources to the
project. Dr. Ricketts provides the following hypothetical example of this effect.
"If I speak to a biologist at Glaxo-Weilcome and 'say why would you come to
me to get some chemistry?', he would say 'well because I can't , ever get some
of the time from the guys in my lab because they would be working on
something else.' So they never have any time to do something {outside the
direct realm of their current project} to test something out, to do a little bit of
{ additional} work because they are working on something else."
Second, there are technological gaps which the pharmaceutical firm is aware of and
decides it needs to fill. These may be specialist techniques which the firm needs to
complete a single project, or alternatively which it needs to acquire and absorb into its
future drug discovery methodologies. To this end it may seek out a specialist firm,
such as Oxford Molecular, from which it can fill the gap for a single project, andlor
engage in technology transfer. Examples of this kind of collaboration would be the
Dainippon Pharmaceuticals and Yamanouchi projects where the Collaborative
Discovery division is not only managing the project, and providing specialist drug
discovery services such as Computer Aided Molecular Design and Combinatorial
Chemistry, but is also enabling these capabilities to be transferred to its clients through
intensive reporting and on-site training of the customer's staff.
347
Third is the search for new technologies. Essentially the large pharmaceutical firm
engages in a diverse range of alliances to explore new and emerging drug discovery
technologies and methodologies. Technology is moving very quickly and can be costly
to implement. Through these alliances the pharmaceutical firm is able to see the
technology, or methodology, in action and then decide whether it needs to develop this
capability internally, or whether it is peripheral to the company's strategic focus and
can therefore be out-sourced. When referring to these kind of technology search
alliances, Dr. Ricketts commented that the pharmaceutical firm:
"will want to hedge their beats and make sure that they go for the right
{technology or methodology} and that is another reason for making sure that
they ally with someone like our group" {who is involved at the frontiers of
Rational Drug Design, Combinatorial Chemistry, and High Throughput
Screening}.
So essentially collaborators choose Oxford Molecular to fill gaps in their technological
capabilities, with the aim of applying these to an individual project, or engaging in
technology transfer.
MANAGING THE VIRTUAL FIRM AT COLLABORATIVE DISCOVERY
Virtual Company
The Collaborative Discovery division operates very much as a virtual firm. It has a
small staff, with limited resources, therefore to manage large scale discovery projects it
relies on its network of partner firms and university sub-collaborators. An immediate
benefit of such a system, as previously noted by Dr. Ricketts, is that the division "...
keeps overheads low by out-sourcing via virtual teams."
This virtual structure should not be confused with the concept of a broker. As noted
earlier the guiding principal of the division is to act as a bridge between university and
commercial R&D, however, while a broker pays a passive role bringing interested
parties together and then withdrawing from the day to day operation, the Collaborative
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Discovery division plays an active role in the design and management of each
discovery project. This distinction between broker and virtual firm is strikingly
captured in an encounter with Yamanouchi, which Dr Ricketts recalls.
"When we signed the deal {with Yamanouchi} people came here and said 'well
where are your labs', and we said 'well we don't have any because it is all out
sourced.' And they said 'well you are just a broker then aren't you', and we
said 'we are not a broker. We are a lot more involved in turning an idea into
something that is real.' Our role is essentially having put the couple together, to
co-ordinate it. On the scientific level and on the commercial level."
The method by which ideas are converted into reality by the Collaborative Discovery
division is illustrated by Dr. Ricketts when he outlined the operation of the Alizyme
project. Tasks are sub-divided and co-ordinated by the division as follows.
"We do the design work in-house, that is the moieea1ar des'igff work. We oat-
source the chemistry and the biology. The chemistry is done at Cambridge
University and the biology, the screen work, is done at • Southampton
University. We basically identified the people who knew the right chemistry,
the people who knew the right biology to do the work. In the end we have a
contract for a certain level of staff, for certain lengths of periods to do that
work."
Inter-disciplinary team work
The nature of the Collaborative Discovery division, as a virtual firm, requires that it
embraces an inter-disciplinary approach. To manage projects the division brings
together a diverse set of skills from within the company itself (expertise in design and
software), its partner firms (expertise in HTS and Combinatorial Chemistry) and
university sub-contractors (diverse range of chemistry and biology expertise) to deliver
its discovery services. This reliance on inter-disciplinary team work is, in part, born
from disappointments of the Rational Drug Design approach during the 1980s. It has
been realised that a drug carmot be first designed in theory without regard for the
practical problems of chemical construction and biological compatibility, rather it
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needs to be integrated with other key functional approaches. Dr. Ricketts noted that
such integration is present in the division's approach.
"One of the historical criticisms of Rational Drug Design is that you can design
things that nobody can make and so people started writing big software
programs that were actually turning out to make something which was, I think,
pretty much nuts. The way we manage the process is that we will get somebody
who will look at a structure and start the design process, but we also work with
a lot of chemists as well, because quite often you get to a conflict where you
have your Rational Design saying that this fits perfectly and your chemist
saying 'OK but I can't make it, not in a million years.' It is very much a co-
operation. It takes months to get to the point where you get something that is
going to have the right shape and properties to interact with your target and
something that you can make in a reasonable way."
For an interdisciplinary approach to work it is necessary for the division to pro-actively
manage its relationships with sub-contractors, who provide critical skills which the
division, or its partner finns, lack.
Management of sub-contractors
Once a project has been identified the Collaborative Discovery division determines
what resources and capabilities will be needed to deliver a successful outcome. This
involves deciding what tasks will be conducted in-house and what will be sub-
contracted either to its two partner firms or university sub-contractors. In identif'ing
suitable university sub-contractors the division draws upon its knowledge of, and
relationships with, academia. Many projects can involve sub-contracts with more than
one university. In the case of the Yamanouchi project sub-contracts for services exist
with the University of Oxford and AMU in Cambria, Australia. There are three
important aspects to these relationships which should be of interest to the reader,
namely, the broad nature of the contract, the responsibilities of the contractor and the
managerial interaction between the sub-contractors and the division.
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Contacts are drawn up between academics who have the required expertise and the
company. These academics are referred to as the principles. The practicalities of the
contract process were outlined by Dr. Ricketts as follows:
"In terms of a contract, we have an agreement with each university to provide
the correct number of people, who are suitably qualified, to work in the right
department to work on this project full-time and we have consulting
agreements with the principles."
Oxford Molecular does not micro manage these sub-contractors, charging them with
the responsibility of day to day operation of their part of the project. The scientific
progress of the sub-contractors is reviewed by a project manager weekly. When
outlining the responsibilities of the chemistry sub-contractors in the Yamanouchi
project Dr. Ricketts observed that:
"They are really charged with just getting on and doing it. The chemists know
chemistry. There are regular internal meetings that involve our partner where
we agree on a more weekly scientific basis where to go next S and what has
happened and review the data. I don't get involved in telling them what to
make, or how to make it."
One of the reasons for this hands off approach is that these sub-contractors are experts
in their field and are contractually charged with delivering specified outcomes, thus
negating the need for operational management on the part of Oxford Molecular.
Another reason is that often these university sub-contractors are actually involved in
the initial design of the project. In the case of the Yamanouchi project Dr. Ricketts
outlines his role, and the role of the division as follows.
"I attend the {weekly review} meetings and I contribute to the science where
appropriate, but the actual day to day management of the chemist is left to the
principles, and the originator of the whole project, who is a pharmacologist, 1i
charged with the overall scientific management, scientific direction. So he will
look after his team of managers, who are essentially the principles, who then
individually manage the people who do the bench work."
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Thus it can be seen that the role of sub-contractors is very much in the mode of
dedicated experts who are part of a wider virtual firm, tied together by legal contracts,
but also a bond of scientific expertise and partnership in the delivery of an integrated
drug discovery service.
Customer Relations and Interactions
Oxford Molecular provides an additional critical link in this web of partners, making it
the central partner in the web. It is Oxford Molecular who provides the communication
and managerial systems which link the sub-contractors, partner firms, and the
collaborative partner (client) together. As has been outlined earlier in the case there are
compelling reasons why collaborative partners come to Oxford Molecular. The
communication process between the Collaborative Discovery division and a
collaborative partner does not end once agreement to fund a project has been signed.
The partners continue to play a pivotal role in the overall strategic management of the
project. It is also critical to the success of a project that the collaborative partner be
kept informed on the progress of the project. Thus the division pays particular attention
to the management of communication with the client.
The level of day to day communication varies from project to project. This is a
function of nature of the project, and both the proximity and managerial style of the
client. In the case of the Yamanouchi project there is extensive communication. This is
because an integral part of the project is technology transfer, which requires intensive
communication. It is also a function of the fact that Yamanouchi are based close to the
Oxford Molecular Headquarters, and the desire of the Yamanouchi management to
receive regular reports on the progress of the project. Formal objectives are agreed
between Oxford Molecular and Yamanouchi regarding the progress of the project
every six months at strategy meetings. Between these meetings Yamanouchi is kept
informed of progress. Dr. Ricketts notes that
"There is a lot of communication (between Yamanouchi and Oxford
Molecular}. Yamanouchi have a group that is based not far from here. There
are about half a mile from this office. They act as an interface with Japan.
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Objectives don't get formally changed between strategy meetings. They may
get changed at a meeting, and they may not. There is always {interaction}, it is
really a communication process between them and us. They want to know
where we are {relative} to the objectives we agreed at the last meeting."
The six monthly meetings are more in-depth. Progress for the previous six months is
discussed and directions for the future outlined. Central to these meetings is the
transfer of technology and processes. A crucial aspect of the successful management of
the project is that Oxford Molecular clearly communicates to its client how it is
progressing towards the achievement of the project milestones. If a milestone has been
achieved then the firm needs to clearly communicate to the client that this milestone
has been achieved and that the results are replicable (where required). This may
involve multiple meetings. Dr. Ricketts offers a detailed insight into thIs process.
"We have the six monthly meetings in which we give a very detailed report of
all the work that has been going on and all the descriptors, chemistry, biology,
pharmacology, screening, and there is usually a report about {one to two
inches} thick. They will usually take about a month to digest that and come
back to us with questions. Once those are addressed then part of the process is
complete. We also have the strategy meetings. The occasional video
conference. So in a way the technology transfer process is implicit within the
communication process. Also there are defined milestones on technology
transfer, i.e. once they have succeeded in getting something working in their
lab which works in our lab then we have success. That covers the whole breath
of disciplines. Something else we like doing is to have staff work in our labs
from Japan, or send our staff to work in Japan. So they will be sending staff
over to work within certain departments for a few months to learn techniques."
The client also plays a role in determining the strategic direction of the project as
research results emerge. The partner may wish one research path, which emerges
during the discovery process, to be pursued in preference to other options. This
scenario is practically illustrated in the design of screens as part of the Ion channel
project funded by Yamanouchi. Dr Rickets noted
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"That's very much a collaborative effort (development of screens). There
again we are pursuing a number of different approaches to these screens
because high power screens are very tricky to do and the problem is non-trivial.
So we are pursuing a number of different approaches and at our last meeting we
had basically pretty much assumed that one of them was going to be the right
one to use and we made that recommendation to Yamanouchi. But of course
they have different criteria. They are in general not very keen on using anything
that is radioactive but it turned out that that was probably the best way to go.
So it is always a case of aligning what we have with what we need."
It can be seen that that for a project to succeed it is necessary for the Collaborative
Discovery division not only to initiate projects, manage a web of sub-contractors and
partner firms to physically work on various aspects of the project, but also to manage
relationships with the client clearly indicating progress, managing expectations, and
managing the volution of the project to the overall strategic direction of the
collaborative partner.
Before turning to an assessment of the determinants of success for the division a brief
summary of the Yamanouchi and Alizyme collaborations are provided. These alliances
have formed the back bone of this case.
YAMANOUCHI AND ALIZYME COLLABORATIONS
These two projects commenced in 1996, soon after the formal establishment of the
division in 1995. They are fascinating examples of the work of the Collaborative
Discovery division because together they illustrate the breath of the projects which the
division co-ordinates. Key features of these collaborative projects are compared in
Table Nine.
INSERT TABLE NiNE ABOUT HERE
The first thing to note is the vast size difference between the collaborative partners.
Alizyme is a small virtual UK biotechnology firm. This project is an interesting
example of one virtual firm out-sourcing a critical aspect of its business to another.
354
Yamanouchi, on the other hand, is one of the larger pharmaceutical firms in Asia.
These initial differences in size may partially help to account for the contrasting nature
of each project.
As a virtual firm itself Alizyme initiated the outsourcing of the discovery process to
Oxford Molecular. It is not interested in technology transfer from Oxford Molecular,
rather it seeks to access and apply the division's capabilities in drug discovery to its
goal of tackling obesity disorders. Given that it does not have a substantial internal set
of drug discovery and development resources and capabilities it makes sense to out-
source, rather than internalise. Yamanouchi is a large organisation with consilera1the
experience in drug discovery and development, thus a key aspect of its relationship
with Oxford Molecular is to learn new drug discovery techniques and internalise them
for future use. As a large firm it had many project options which it could have pursued
internally, thus it was Oxford Molecular who initiated the first contact regarding
collaboration, attracting the larger firm's interest and eventual commitment to the
project.
The focus on technology transfer in turn explains why Yamanouchi is more actively
involved in the communication process with Oxford Molecular than Alizyme. To
transfer new knowledge and capabilities it is necessary for the employees of
Yamanouchi to interact closely with Oxford Molecular so that they can learn and
internalise the new technology.
The differences in project focus account for the differing methodological approaches.
This in turn may account, in part, for the different contributions of the collaborative
partners. The financial arrangements are similar, except that the Alizyme project
involves one milestone payment, while the Yamanouchi project involves nine. The
greater number of milestones in the case of Yamanouchi is due to the existence of
milestones related to scientific goals, such as discovery of an active compound, and
technology transfer milestones.
355
The differing nature of these projects is not a problem, rather it is an opportunity for
the division. The division offers tailored drug discovery solutions, thus its managerial
systems are designed to manage diversity. Each project involves different sub-
contractors, a different goal, and different degrees of communication. To date the
division has successfully obtained research fees from both partners and the projects
continue to progress well. The success of these projects illustrates the ability of the
division to deliver its services as a virtual firm by managing a diverse web of partner
firms, sub-contractors and clients.
THE SUCCESS OF COLLABORATIVE DISCOVERY DIVISION
Essentially there are three interconnected levels of success for the division. The first is
that the project attains its underlying scientific goals. These goals will have been
determined at the start of the project, though they may evolve through a process of
negotiation with the collaborative partner during the evolution of the project.
Having achieved the basic scientific goals of the project the second and third metrics
of success are essentially outside the control of Oxford Molecular and are in the hands
of the client. The second metric of success is to take a compound from discovery and
into drug development. Drug development is an expensive process and for many
reasons a client may decide not to enter a compound into clinical trials. These reasons
may not be due to a failure in the project on the part of Oxford Molecular. As Dr.
Ricketts notes:
"There are different goals of success. For the Yamanouchi deal, success is
getting compounds that are active and selective and they may fail in
development for a million reasons and that wouldn't be down to our project
work or the science we use ... You appreciate that any drug that makes it into
development it is a success. {To enter clinical trials you need) a compound that
is not just active and selective, but has also got all the usual animal type
properties. There are lots of different levels of success for us. A partner's
failure doesn't mean that we have failed."
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The third metric of success is if a drug makes it through the discovery and
development processes and into the marketplace. In this scenario Oxford Molecular
would obtain single digit royalties. When considering this possibility Dr. Ricketts
remains mindful that the basic metric of success for the firm remains attainment of the
underlying goals of the initial discovery project. He comments that:
"if we meet our goals in a project, and that may be more than just designing an
active compound, then it is a success for us. There is another tier of success,
where we get a drug to market and we get a nice big royalty stream."
So has Oxford Molecular been successful to date? On the first metric of success the
answer is yes. Collaborative partners are consistently paying Oxford Molecular
research fees for the work it does on their behalf. They would not do so if the
Collaborative Discovery division did not meet the scientific goals of the project.
On the second metric the firm also seems to have had some success. Its collaboration
with NeoRX Corp. on a radioimmunotheraphy product was a success t the discovery
stage. The product is now in phase II clinical trials. Given that the discovery phase can
take many years (PhARMA, 1999, estimated that on average it takes 6 years) it is not
surprising that few of the division's projects have entered clinical trials to date. By the
turn of the century there should be a clearer picture on the success of the division in
discovering compounds which enter clinical trials.
It is probably fair to say that the long term success of the division hinges on managing
projects which enter clinical trials. After all the reemit of the division is drug discovery
and the immediate goal of that process is to discover compounds which enter clinical
trials. The third metric, namely a drug entering the market, is not as critical to the long
term success of the firm. The reasons why a drug can fail clinical trials are varied, and
where these can be managed they are largely in the hands of the developer not the
discoverer.
The financial success of the division is masked in the accounts by the consolidation of
the results of both the software and discovery divisions in the annual report. As noted
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previously the Collaborative Discovery division is delivering an increasing proportion
of the company's turnover, while consuming only a small number of the company's
internal staff resources. It is not publicly known how much of Oxford Molecular's
expenses are attributable to the Collaborative Discovery division. For this reason the
case cannot detennine the precise profitability of the division. However it can be
observed that the Collaborative Discovery division is likely to be profitable in of itself
given the earlier comments of Dr. Ricketts on the pricing of collaborative contracts.
CONCLUSION
The Collaborative Discovery division has prospered since its inception in 1995. It has
managed to attract an impressive portfolio of collaborative partners. It has
successfully enlarged its access key resources and capabilities necessary to deliver a
broad range of drug discovery services via a web of partner firms and university sub-
contractors. A major threat to the commercial success of small biotechnology firms,
identified in the Ernst and Young European Life Sciences 98 report, is that of
technology consolidation. They warn that firms which rely on a single technological
expertise will have grave difficulty in continuing to attract pharmaceutical partner
firms, from which they can extract high profit margins.
The Collaborative Discovery division has successfully expanded its technological
expertise in informatics to a broader range of technological capabilities through its
virtual network. The future of the division appears bright if it can build on its current
technological capabilities, manage its network, and expand its technological base to
include a genomic capability. As Ernst and Young observe:
"Oxford Molecular has helped establish and nurture daughter companies in the
high throughput screening and combinatorial chemistry areas to complement its
in-house informatics expertise - it just needs to link up with a genomics
company and it will be able, through its network, to offer potential big pharma
partners a comprehensive array of discovery tools."
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Oxford Molecular remains on track to becoming a one-stop provider of drug discovery
services and thus fulfilling its goal of capturing a significant share of this rapidly
expanding market.
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TABLE ONE: THE DRUG DISCOVERY PROCESS
The goal of the drug discovery process is to create a drug compound, targeted at a specific
disease which can enter regulatory clinical trials. Should the drug successfully pass through
the regulatory process then it can be marketed. At the heart of the Oxford Molecular approach
to drug discovery is an embrace of both traditional drug discovery and computer based
Rational Drug Design. The difference between the two approaches is that Rational Drug
Design seeks "to model the molecular structure of the target of a drug, and then design a drug
molecule which will fit it. This contrasts to the alternative, which is to screen a large number
of compounds for drug activity, choose the most promising and make a whole lot of variants,
choose the most promising of them and repeat until a suitable drug is found" (Bains 1993).
In practice it is not possible to create a drug compound employing computer methods alone,
thus Oxford Molecular offers its customers a combination of software to facilitate Rational
Drug Discovery, in addition to managerial skills and experience in the blending of this
technique with traditional methods of screening and discovery.
There are four broad stages to a drug discovery process, three of which Oxford Molecular are
actively involved in. The first is the identification of a target disease. Targets may be selected
on the basis of specialist knowledge about the disease within a firm, the potential market
rewards of pursuing a treatment, and/or new advances in technology which offer potential
application in a targeted disease area. Targeting a disease is generally the domain of Oxford
Molecular's clients.
Second is identification of biological targets. These are proteins or genes which the
researchers believe play an important role in the spread of the target disease. The researchers
seek to understand what form of compound would be needed to interact with the protein or
gene which is causing the disease and thus mange or cure it.
Third is lead compound identification. This involves identif'ing compounds which are
biologically active against the biological target.
Fourth is lead optimisation, or refinement. Having identified a number of biologically active
compounds it is necessary to determine which of these has the best mix in terms of activity,
with the lowest level of toxicity.
360
TABLE TWO: BIO-ll'JFORMATICS - IDENTIFICATION OF BIOLOGICAL
TARGETS.
"Bio-informatics is the use of software, databases and on-line resources to store,
retrieve and analyse genomic information (e.g. information on human genes). Analysis
of genomic information enables suitable biological targets to be identified in order to
discover new drugs which may halt the disease or control the infection" (Annual
Report 1996).
Bio-informatics software produced by Oxford Molecular is used by researchers as
"tools for the analysis of DNA and protein sequence data." (Oxford Molecular web
site). Bio-informatics tools play a central role in the identification of biological
targets.
Examples of Bio-informatics products offered by Oxford Molecular include: AbM
(for humanising anti-bodies), MacVector r (DNA and protein sequencing), and
OMIGA (a set of sequence analysis tools which operate under Windows 95 .
Details on these and other products available from Oxford Molecular may be obtained
by referring to the company's excellent web site: http://www.oxmoLco.uklprods
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TABLE THREE: CHEMO-INFORMATICS - THE IDENTIFICATION OF LEAD
COMPOUNDS.
Chemo-informatics, builds upon the process of identif'ing biological targets (central
to which is Bio-informatics) with the goal of identif'ing lead compounds.
Chemo-informatics software tools enable researchers to "capture, analyse and
communicate the increasing volumes of biological and chemical data available in the
search for new lead compounds and drug candidates" (Annual Report 1997). These
tools are used for "selecting, comparing, relating, mining data for databases of
chemical compounds, structures, properties and biological assay results." (Oxford
Molecular Web site).
Examples of Chemo-informatics software available from Oxford Molecular include:
RS3 IM Discovery (which is used for "storing, searching and retrieval of chemical
structures in addition to chemical and biological properties, experimental data and
registration" Oxford Molecular web site), and DNA IM (a spreadsheet based product
to facilitate the visualisation and analysis of chemical structures).
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TABLE FOUR: COMPUTER AIDED MOLECULAR DESIGN (CAMD) - LEAD
OPTIMISATION
Lead optimisation involves analysing the compound to discover its potential biological
activity and toxicity. When a lead compound is identified it still remains to be proven
whether this compound can be safely applied to humans, and whether it successfully
tackles the disease. The compound may well need to be structurally modified to enable
it to both safely and effectively combat the disease. Once the researchers have
modified the lead compound it must then be entered into clinical trials before it can be
marketed. These trials can costs hundreds of millions of pounds. If the compound fails
in trials then it cannot be sold to the public. It is therefore vital that the process of lead
optimisation discovers potential problems with the compound, and solves these, prior
to entering into clinical trials. CAMD greatly enhances the efficiency and effectiveness
of the lead optimisation process when compared to older, conventional screening
techniques.
"In the past this {lead optimisation} involved random chemical synthesis around a
particular lead structure with know, but inadequate, biological properties .... {CAMD}
allow {s} a more rational approach whereby a research scientist can visualise a
compound's structure through molecular modelling and explore structural
modifications to improve its desired properties" (Annual Report 1996).
CAMD tools are "used both by computational and experimental chemists to predict
reaction mechanisms and explain interactions, speeding up the identification of
compounds with desirable properties" (Oxford Molecular web site).
Examples of CAMD tools available from Oxford Molecular include: Tsar 'M(chemic
spreadsheet to analyse structures and properties of compounds), TOPKAT
(computational toxicology tool), and Unichem (molecular modelling package).
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TABLE FIVE: MARKET FOR OUTSOURCED SPECIALIST DRUG DISCOVERY
IT AND SERVICES
Market	 1996	 2002	 % Growth
Out-sourced IT	 500	 1,300	 160
75% of IT outsourcing	 400	 1,000	 150
available to Oxford
Molecular
Out-sourced Research	 900	 2,200	 144
projects
Total Accessible Market
	 1,300	 3,200	 246
Source: Oxford Molecular Annual Report 1997
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TABLE SIX: CAMBRIDGE COMBINATORIAL LTD (PRIVATE, UNLISTED,
COMPANY)
Foundation
The company was founded in February 1997 by a group of former Pfizer scientists and
professors from Cambridge University and the University of Southampton. Oxford Molecular,
invested £ 2 million for a 19.99% shareholding. The other shareholders are the senior
management, including Allan Marchington as CEO (the brother of Tony Marchington, CEO of
Oxford Molecular), and Cambridge University, who provided intellectual property rights. In
August 1997 Oxford Molecular invested a further £ 2 million in the form of preference shares.
The firm has the option, through to December 1998, to purchase the company's equity
outright.
Technology
The company takes a medicinal chemistry approach to drug discovery, providing chemical
synthesis services. It specialises "in the design, production and supply of chemical structures
for the drug discovery industry" (Oxford Molecuar web-cte). It can pccdsc '&caty
sized libraries of up to 20,000 compounds in a pure, well characterised reproducible form.
Milligram batches of each component in a library will be produced at the same time to provide
the end user with sufficient material for every stage of testing" (Oxford Molecular web site).
Such libraries play a crucial role in generating a pool of compounds from which lead
compounds can be identified.
Commercial Offering
Combinatorial chemistry services, consultancy, and technology transfer.
Collaborative Relationship with Oxford Molecular
Cambridge Combinatorial plays an important role in Oxford Molecular's long term aim of
providing one-stop-shopping for drug discovery services. This goal requires four capabilities,
one of which is chemical synthesis and combinatorial libraries (Annual Report 1997). The
Collaborative Discovery Division manages projects which identif' novel drug targets to which
Cambridge Combinatorial's technology can be applied to generate a library of potential lead
compounds. In turn Oxford Molecular's (and partners') capabilities in screening chemical
libraries and rational drug design enable these leads to be optimised before entering clinical
trials.
Deals to Date
Cambridge Combinatorial has combined with the Collaborative Discovery division in
three important alliances. The first aims to provide combinatorial library designs and
synthesis, including technology transfer, to Dainippon Pharmaceuticals of Japan. The
second alliance is with Oxford Glyco Sciences. This is targeted on "carbohydrate
processing enzymes which have potential therapeutic use for diseases such as fungal
infections" (Oxford Molecular web-site). Cambridge Combinatorial provide synthesis
of libraries, which are designed using expertise from Oxford Molecular, while the
libraries are screened by Cambridge Drug Discovery. The third collaboration seeks to
"identif' novel lead compounds for the treatment of metabolic disorders" for
Mitisubishi Chemical Corp. (Oxford Molecular web site).
Sources: Oxford Molecular: http://www.oxmol.co.uk , the 1997 Annual Report, and
Cambridge Combinatorial's profile - http://www.xenseo.com/confrence
/hsw/camb_ comb.html
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TABLE SEVEN: CAMBRIDGE DRUG DISCOVERY LTD (PRIVATE,
UNLISTED, COMPANY)
Foundation
The company was founded in December 1997 by four former Pfizer scientists. £ 5.25 million
was raised from investors, primarily Oxford Molecular, who invested £ 5 million: £ 2 million
in return for a 19.99% shareholding, £ 2 million as a secured loan, and a £ 1 million in
preference shares. If Cambridge Drug Discovery is floated, or sold, then the preference shares
convert into a 10.1% shareholding. Oxford Molecular has the option, exercisable between
2000 and 2002, to purchase the remaining Ordinary Shares for the greater of 3 times of
turnover, or 15 times net profit.
Technology
High Throughput Screening (HTS), the firm's core technology, enables researchers to screen
libraries of molecule compounds against biological targets (e.g. proteins) to determine how
potentially potent, selective and bio-available the compounds are as a hew drug candidate.
Biological screening, using HTS, is central to the task of identifying lead compounds.
These libraries can contain millions of compounds, hence automation is essential in the
screening process. Cambridge Drug Discovery has invested in robotics systems which enable
the firm to "screen up to 100,000 compounds a day from customers own libraries of chemical
compounds against either novel or non-proprietary targets" (Oxford Molecular Web Site).
Commercial Offering
The company can screen libraries for customers in addition to the design of chemical assays
and HTS consultancy.
Collaborative Relationship with Oxford Molecular
Much of the firm's products will be sold via collaborative projects with Oxford Molecular.
Third party sales will be through Oxford Molecular's distribution system, for which
Cambridge Drug Discovery pays a percentage of the overheads. As outlined in the Oxford
Molecular Annual report (1997) HTS is one of the four capabilities needed to achieved the
firm's goal of becoming a one-stop-shop provider of drug discovery services. The
Collaborative Discovery division manages projects which identify novel drug targets to which
Cambridge Drug Discovery's HTS technology can be applied to generate lead compounds. In
turn Oxford Molecular's capabilities in rational drug design enable these leads to be optimised
before entering clinical trials.
Deals to Date
The Drug Discovery Division of Oxford Molecular, in co-operation with Cambridge Drug
Discovery and Cambridge Combinatorial, is managing a drug discovery programme targeting
fungal infections for Oxford Glyco Sciences. Cambridge Drug Discovery will screen the
libraries which Oxford Molecular design and develop, with Cambridge Combinatorial
conducting the synthesis of those libraries.
Sources: Cambridge Drug Discovery web site - http//www. camdd. co.uk/
 Oxford Molecular
web site: http//www.oxmoLco.uk and OM's Annual Report 1997.
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TABLE NINE: COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF YAMANOUCHI AND
ALIZYME
_______________________ Alizyme	 Yamanouchi
Project initiated by	 Alizyine	 Oxford Molecular
Proj ect focus	 Obesity lipase inhibitor.	 Novel compounds based on
Ion channels.
Goals of Project	 Discovery of an active	 Discovery of an active &
compound.	 selective compound.
_________________________ ________________________ Technology transfer.
Size of Collaborator	 Market Cap. £ 11.9 m in	 Market Cap. £3,147 m in
July 1998.	 July 1998
Sales (1997) £ 0
	
Sales (97) £ 1,335.78 m
______________________ Profit (1997) £ - 3.14 m
	
Net Profit (97) £ 134.26 m
Contribution of Partner:
Financial	 Research fees.	 Research Fees.
A single milestone.	 Nine milestones.
Single digit Royalty. 	 Single digit Royalty.
Other	 Overall monitoring and	 Prestige collaborator.
target identification.	 Compound library
(1 0O,000s of compounds).
Interaction on best
approaches to screening.
Drug development
___________________________ ___________________________ expertise.
Intensity of Partner	 Active	 Very Active (due to
interaction	 additional technology
________________________ ________________________ transfer goal).
Overall methodological 	 Almost a classical form of A mix of classical drug
thrust of project
	
Rational Drug Design.	 discovery and Rational
_______________________ ______________________ Drug Design methods.
Sources: Interview with Dr. Kicketts, Reuters on-line, Annual Report 1997, Oxtbrd
Molecular web site
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Appendix Four:
Sample of Events Included and Excluded from Event Study
EVENTS INCLUDED IN STUDY
Company Name
	 Event Type Event Date Details of Event
	 Percentage
(monthl	 Abnormal
day/year)	 Returns on
Event Day
(mean AB across
____________________ _____________ _____________ ____________________________ all six models)
Biocompatibles 	 Phase 11/ifi	 12/29/97	 EMA marketing approval of + 5.59
__________________ Trials	 heart disease stents
Cambridge	 Regional	 03/23/98	 R&D alliance with	 + 1.18
Antibody	 Alliance	 Progenitor
Technology Gain 	 ___________ ________________________ ________________
Cambridge	 Discovery/P 05/26/98
	
Monoclonal antibody enters 	 + 1.02
Antibody	 I Trials	 P1 trials
Technology _____________ ____________ ___________________________ _________________
Cantab	 Regional	 02/27/97	 Research Joint Venture with + 2.94
Pharmaceuticals	 Alliance	 Marie Currie Cancer Care
___________ Gain	 _______ ________________ __________
Cantab	 Regional	 01/14/98	 R&D alliance with	 + 2.56
Pharmaceuticals 	 Alliance	 Kakestsuke (Prophylactic
Gain	 vaccine for chickenpox and
____________________ ______________ ______________ shingles)	 ___________________
Ceiltech	 Regional	 10/16/97	 R&D alliance with	 + 2.78
Alliance	 Zymogenetics (coronary
________________ 
Gain	 ___________ heart disease)	 _______________
Celsis International Regional
	 09/15/97	 Five year distribution	 ^ 0.04
Alliance	 alliance with Becton
Gain	 Dickinson (systemSURE -
portable rapid hygiene
_____________________ _______________ ______________ 
system)	 ____________________
Chiroscience	 Prestige	 06/27/97	 R&D alliance with Schering 	 + 6.33
Alliance	 Plough (Oral Asthma)
____________ Gain	 ________ __________________
Chiroscience	 Prestige	 02/11/98	 R&D alliance with Bristol 	 ^ 2.06
Alliance	 Meyer Squibb (MMP cancer
Gain research)	 ___________________
Chiroscience	 Prestige	 03/31/98	 License Chirocaine to Zeneca +20.35
Alliance	 outside the UK
____________ Gain	 ________ __________________ ___________
Chiroscience	 Regional	 04/09/97	 R&D alliance with Alcon 	 + 1.52
Alliance	 Laboratories (small
Gain molecules)	 ___________________
Chiroscience	 Regional	 09/15/97	 Joint Venture with Geron
	
+ 1.84
Alliance	 Corp. (genetic R&D into
_________________ Gain	 ___________ ageing)	 ________________
Chiroscience	 Phase 111111	 12/04/97	 Files for EMA marketing
	 - 1.99
__________________ Trials	 ____________ approval for Chirocairie
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Company Name	 Event Type Event Date Details of Event 	 Percentage
(month!	 Abnormal
day/year)	 Returns on
Event Day
(mean AB across
all six models)
Chiroscience	 DiscoveryfP 01/05/98	 MMP inhibitor enters P1 	 + 5.98
__________________ I Trials 	 ____________ trials	 _________________
Cortecs	 Prestige	 07/21/98	 Marketing alliance with Astra - 2.87
Alliance	 (One Step)
____________ Gain	 ________ __________________ ___________
Cortecs	 Prestige	 05/18/98	 Distribution alliance with	 + 0.05
Alliance	 Glaxo-Weilcome (Macritonin
__________________ Gain	 ____________ in Greece)	 _________________
Cortecs	 Phase 111111	 10/30/97	 Osteosal point of care test 	 + 8.31
International	 Trials	 launched on market
KS Biomedica	 Prestige	 10/14/96	 R&D alliance with Hoffman- + 6.18
Alliance	 La-Roche (subsidiary of
Gain	 Roche Holdings) (antibody
____________________ _____________ _____________ development) 	 __________________
KS Biomedica	 Phase Il/Ill	 02/03/98	 Positive PH Rheumatoid	 +35.3 1
__________________ Trials	 ____________ Arthritis trial 	 _________________
Medeva	 Discovery/P 12/16/98	 Positive P1 results from	 + 9.18
__________________ I Trials 	 ____________ Hepagene Hepatitis B trial 	 _________________
Oxford Biomedica Prestige 	 01/12/98	 R&D alliance with Rhone- 	 +14.58
Alliance	 Ploulenc-Rorer (Gene
Gain	 research into Heart Disease) __________________
Oxford Biomedica Prestige 	 12114/98	 Alliance with Rhone-	 +21.04
Alliance	 Ploulene-Rorer to explore
Gain	 application of Oxford
Biomedica's Gene
_________________ ___________ ___________ technology to RPR. 	 _______________
Oxford Biomedica Discovery/P 11/17/97	 P1 cancer trial to begin	 + 0.03
________________ ITnals	 ___________ _______________________ _______________
Peptide	 Prestige	 12/04/98	 R&D alliance with Novartis 	 + 2.33
Therapeutics	 Alliance	 (Protease inhibitors -
Gain	 application of Peptide
Therapeutics' RAPID
__________________ _____________ ____________ technology) 	 _________________
Peptide	 Prestige	 0 1/05/98	 R&D alliance with Pfizer 	 + 3.12
Therapeutics	 Alliance	 (Veterinary Allergy vaccine)
_________________ Gain 	 ___________ _________________________ _______________
Peptide	 Prestige	 02/1097	 R&D alliance with	 +11.24
Therapeutics	 Alliance	 SmithKline Beechain
__________________ Gain 	 ____________ (Allergy vaccine) 	 _________________
Peptide	 Regional	 0 1/23/97	 R&D alliance with Medeva 	 +17.72
Therapeutics	 Alliance	 (vaccines)
___________ Gain	 _______ ________________ __________
Peptide	 Regional	 04/28/98	 R&D alliance with OraVax	 + 3.42
Therapeutics	 Alliance	 (anti-ulcer vaccine)
_________________ Gain	 ___________ ________________________ _______________
Peptide	 Phase 11/Ill	 05/14/97	 Approval granted by FDA to + 7.28
Therapeutics	 Trials	 conduct P11 Typhoid vaccine
______________ trials	 ___________________
Phytopharm	 Prestige	 08/24/98	 R&D deal with Pfizer	 +10.43
Alliance	 (Obesity drug)
____________ Gain	 ________ __________________
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Company Name	 Event Type Event Date Details of Event
	 Percentage
(month!	 Abnormal
day/year)	 Returns on
Event Day
(mean AB across
____________________ _____________ _____________ _____________________________ all six models)
Phytopharm	 Phase Il/Ill	 05/06/98	 Osteo-arthritis enters phase II + 2.54
__________________ Trials 	 ____________ trials	 _________________
Phytopharm	 Phase 11/Ill 	 03/25/98	 Positive Pill European trials
	 + 15.30
_________________ Trials	 ____________ for Zemaphyte (eczema drug) ________________
Phytopharm	 Discovery/P 10/13/98
	
Appetite suppressant enters	 + 4.48
___________________ I Trials 	 _____________ P1 trials	 __________________
Po1yMASC	 Regional	 03/25/97	 R&D alliance with Oxford 	 +14.26
Alliance	 Molecular (blood growth
___________________ Gain
	 _____________ factor)	 __________________
Po1yMASC	 Regional	 11/25/97	 R&D alliance with	 + 7.54
Affiance	 Transkaiyoic Therapies Inc
__________________ Gain
	
____________ (PEGylated protein) 	 ________________
Powderject	 Prestige	 03/04/98	 R&D alliance with Giaxo-	 +28.58
Alliance	 Welicome (DNA vaccines)
_____________ Gain
	 ________ ___________________ ____________
Powderject	 Discovery/P 09/16/98
	
Positive laboratory results on + 1.95
I Trials	 mice for cancer vaccine
Proteus	 Phase lI/Ill	 02/20/97	 BSC diagnostic approved for +35.53
International	 Trials	 ___________ marketing in Ireland	 ________________
Proteus	 Discovery/P 03/05/98
	
High blood pressure vaccine - 0.03
International	 I Trials	 passes 'proof of concept' 	 __________________
Scotia Holdings	 Phase H/Ill
	 09/12/96	 PH cancer trial succeeds	 + 1.08
______________ Trials 	 _________ _____________________ _____________
Scotia Holdings	 Phase 111111	 11/06/97	 Amelorad radiotherapy drug + 3.16
Trials	 submitted to EMA for
___________________ _____________ _____________ approval	 __________________
Shield Diagnostics Prestige 	 0 1/23/98	 Development and Marketing + 14.33
Alliance	 alliance with Abbott
Gain	 Laboratories (AFT -
Activated Factor Twelve -
___________ ___________ heart disease diagnostic)	 _______________
Shield Diagnostics Regional	 10/12/98	 Distribution agreement with + 0.09
Affiance	 Hitachi Chemical Co. (in
_________________ Gain 	 ____________ vitro allergy blood test)	 ________________
Shield Diagnostics Phase 11/111	 0 6/04/97	 AFT heart diagnostic test 	 + 9.03
Trials	 submitted to FDA for
________________ ___________ ___________ marketing approval
	 ________________
Shield Diagnostics Phase Il/ifi 0 1/05/98 	 Launches CAG. A assay on	 - 1.55
Trials	 market
Shield Diagnostics Phase lI/Ill 	 09/01/98	 Clearance to market AFT	 + 4.90
_________________ Trials
	 ___________ heart diagnostic test by FDA ________________
Shire	 Phase H/Ill	 06/17/98	 Positive PHI Hyclinda trial
	 - 0.16
PharmaceuticalsTrials	 __________ _______________________
Shire	 Phase 11/Ill	 07/20/98	 Positive Pill Alzheimer's 	 + 9.94
Pharmaceuticals 	 Trials	 _____________ disease drug trial
	 __________________
Stanford Rook
	 Phase 11/Ill	 06/17/98	 Plans to commence Pill lung + 14.59
Trials	 cancer trials
Therapeutic	 Regional	 10/13/97	 Licensing agreement with
	 + 4.95
Antibodies	 Alliance	 Altana (Venom treatment)
___________ Gain
	 ________ _________________ ___________
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Company Name	 Event Type Event Date Details of Event 	 Percentage
(month!	 Abnormal
day/year)	 Returns on
Event Day
(mean AR across
all six models)
Vanguard Medica
	
Regional	 10/12/98	 Elan named commercial 	 + 4.50
Alliance	 partner (Frovarriptran)
_________________ Gain 	 ___________ ________________________ ________________
Xenova	 Prestige	 02/18/98	 R&D alliance with Eli Lilly	 +15.1
Alliance	 (Blood clot drug)
_____________ Gain	 ________ ___________________ ____________
Xenova	 Regional	 12/11/97	 Joint Venture with Wallac 	 + 3.67
Alliance	 (drug discovery)
____________ Gain	 ________ __________________ ___________
Xenova	 Regional	 0 1/15/98	 R&D alliance with the	 +17.58
Alliance	 Institute of Grassland and
Gain	 Environmental Research
________________ ___________ ___________ (Phytochemistry)
	 _______________
Number of Events Included in Event Study:
Prestige Alliances	 = 15
Regional Alliances	 = 16
P11/Ill trials
	
= 16
DiscoveryfPl	 8
Total	 55
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EVENTS EXCLUDED FROM EVENT STUDY DUE TO CONFOUNDING EVENTS
(Confounding events occur within -5 to +5 trading days of the main event)
Company	 Event Type Event Date Details of
	
Date of
	
Details of
(monthI	 Event	 Confound	 Confound
day/year)	 (month/
__________________ _____________ _____________ _______________ day/year) 	 ________________
Alizyme	 Prestige	 07/22/98	 Development	 07/22/98	 License drug
Alliance	 licensing deal	 delivery from
Gain	 with	 BTG
SmithKline
Beecham
Alizyme	 Discovery/P 10/21/98
	 Discovery of	 10/21/98	 Interim results
I Trials	 obesity	 announced
_________________ ____________ ____________ compound	 ____________ ________________
Biocompatibles	 Regional	 05/30/98	 Distribution	 05/22/98	 Several
Alliance	 deal with	 distribution deals
Gain	 ____________ Wesley Jessen
	
announced
Biocompatibles	 Phase Il/ill	 04/10/97	 FDA	 04/14/97	 Acquisition of
Trials	 permission to
	
Bio Polymerix
market contact	 completed
lens
British	 Phase 11/ifi 03/05/97	 Files Zacutex	 03/06/97	 Announces third
Biotechnology	 Trials	 for EMA	 quarter results
__________________ _____________ ____________ approval
	 _____________ ________________
British	 Phase 111111	 05/12/97	 Positive results 05/12197 	 Series of
Biotechnology	 Trials	 from Zacutex	 marketing
Pifi trial	 appointments
also announced
Cambridge	 Regional	 12/18/97	 R&D alliance	 12/16/97	 Announces
Antibody	 Alliance	 with ICOS	 discovery of
TechnologiesGain	 ___________ Corp.	 ___________ ProAb assay
Celsis International Regional 	 02/12/98	 World-wide	 02/12/98	 Announces
Alliance	 distribution	 expected record
Gain	 rights assigned	 profits for year
to	 Becton	 end
Dickinson
(system
SIJRETM)	 ____________ ________________
Chiroscience	 Regional	 05/20/97	 R&D alliance	 05/13/97	 Phase I asthma
Alliance	 with Powderject 	 clinical trial
Gain	 (local	 commences
___________________ _____________ _____________ anaesthetic) 	 _____________ _________________
Chiroscience	 Phase 11/Ill	 0 1/23/97	 ADD drug	 0 1/23/97	 Agrees with
Trials	 enters P11 trials	 Medeva to
continue alliance
to purify
__________________ _____________ ____________ _______________ _____________ Methylphenidate
Chiroscience	 Phase Il/Ill	 04/29/98	 Files NDA with 04/29/98	 Announces
Trials	 FDA for	 preliminary
Chirocaine	 results
Chiroscience	 Phase lI/Ill	 09/29/98	 Drug delivery	 09/29/98	 Discovery of
Trials	 systems moves	 on/off gene
__________________ _____________ ____________ to P11 trials
	 _____________ ________________
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Company	 Event Type Event Date Details of 	 Date of	 Details of
(month!	 Event	 Confound	 Confound
day/year)	 (month/
___________________ _____________ ____________ _______________ day/year) 	 ________________
Chiroscience	 Discovery/P 12/20/96
	
P1 heart disease 12/18/96	 Complete
I Trials	 trial begins	 acquisition of
Darwin
Molecular
Chiroscience	 Discovery/p 05/13/97
	 P1 Asthma trial 05/14/97	 Chris Evans (co-
I Trials	 begins	 founder) resigns
as Director
Cortecs	 Prestige	 06/12/98	 Boehringer	 06/08/98	 Cortecs CEO
International	 Alliance	 Mannheim	 resigns
Gain	 (subsidiary of
Roche
Holdings)
(rights deal for
_________________ ___________ ___________ H-Pylon)
	 ___________ ______________
Cortecs	 Regional	 06/12/98	 Distribution	 06/08/98	 Cortecs
International	 Alliance	 alliance with	 International
Gain	 Dickinson & Co	 CEO resigns
____________________ _____________ _____________ (Link2 test) 	 _____________ _________________
Cortecs	 Regional	 08/03/98	 Distribution	 07/28/98	 2 members of
International	 Alliance	 alliance with	 remuneration
Gain	 Ferrer	 committee resign
Intemacional
SA (Macritonin
__________ _______ ______ 
TM)	 ______ ________
Cortecs	 Phase 11/Ill 	 06/30/97	 Macrulin to	 06/26/97	 Issue £125,000
International	 Trials	 enter Phase 11	 shares to
trials	 exercise share
________________ ___________ ___________ _____________ ___________ options
Cortecs	 Phase 111111	 08/12197	 Bronchitis	 08/07/97	 Confirms
International	 Trials	 Phase II trial	 positive Pil/ifi
results positive 	 Pan-European
Macritonjn trial
results
Cortecs	 Phase Il/lU	 06/12198	 Helicobacter 	 06/08/98	 CEO resigns
International	 Trials	 Pylon rapid test
kit approved for
marketing by
_____________ ________ _________ FDA
	 ________
Medeva	 Phase 11/lU	 10/01/98	 Marketing	 10/01/98	 John Ferguson
Trials	 approval for
	 joins Medeva as
Bladder Cancer	 a Director
drug given by
_____________ ________ ________ FDA
	 ________ ___________
Medeva	 Phase 11/ill	 10/28/98	 Applies for	 11/03/97	 License granted
Trials	 EMA approval	 by UK medical
for Hepatitis B	 authorities for
vaccine	 dry powder
______________________ ______________ ______________ _________________ ______________ inhaler
Phytopharm	 Regional	 11/03/97	 Distribution	 11/03/97	 Distribution
Alliance	 agreement with	 agreement with
__________________ Gain	 ____________ Rallis of India ____________ Heska Corp.
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Company	 Event Type Event Date Details of	 Date of	 Details of
(monthl	 Event	 Confound	 Confound
day/year)	 (month/
____________________ _____________ _____________ ________________ day/year) 	 _________________
Po1yMASC	 Regional	 02/17/97	 Extension of	 08/24/97	 Results
Alliance	 Hydro Med	 announced
Gain	 Sciences R&D
____________________ _____________ _____________ alliance 	 _____________ __________________
Po1yMASC	 Regional	 06/25/97	 R&D alliance	 06/25/97	 R&D alliance
Alliance	 with NOF Corp.	 with Onyx (anti-
Gain	 (oral drug	 cancer)
__________________ ____________ _____________ delivery) 	 ____________ _________________
Powderject	 Prestige	 06/09/98	 R&D alliance	 06/09/98	 Announces
Alliance	 with Zeneca	 undisclosed deal
Gain	 (drug delivery)	 with Japanese
partner and
losses up by
__________________ ____________ ____________ ______________ ____________ 45%.
Powderject	 Discovery/P 12/07/98	 Hepatitis B trial 12/02198	 Awarded
I Trials	 passes P1 trials	 European patent
coverage for
____________ ________ ________ __________ ________ DNA vaccine
Powderject	 Discovery/P 04/20/98	 Passes P1 trial	 04/20/98	 Also announces
I Trials	 for needless	 acquisition of
version of
	 minority interest
Alpoostadil	 of Psiox joint
venture from
__________________ ____________ ____________	 Pharma Sciences
Proteus	 Regional	 05/02/96	 Licensing	 05/02196	 Licensing
International	 Alliance	 agreement with
	 agreement with
Gain	 Enfer Science	 Janssen
(BSC)	 Pharmaceutica
(veterinary
___________________ _____________ _____________ ________________ _____________ vaccine)
Proteus	 Discovery/P 04/29/98	 Hypertension	 04/23/98	 Launches rights
International	 I Trials	 vaccine passes	 issue
'proof of
__________________ ____________ _____________ concept' 	 ____________ ________________
Scotia Holdings 	 Phase 111111	 0 1/20/98	 Swedish	 0 1/20/98	 Swedish
Trials	 regulatory	 regulatory
authorities	 authorities
approve	 approve
reformulation	 reformulation of
of eczema drug	 madtalgia (breast
________________ ___________ ___________ _____________ ___________ pain) drug
Shield Diagnostics Prestige	 07/22/97	 R&D alliance	 07/16/97	 Expects to
Alliance	 with Abbott	 receive approval
Gain	 Laboratories	 for AFT test
_____________ ___________ within 6 months
Shield Diagnostics 	 Regional	 10/28/98	 Distribution	 11/04/98	 Distribution
Alliance	 agreement with	 agreement with
Gain	 BIOSTAR	 BIOSITE (rapid
(point of care	 immunoassay
____________________ _____________ _____________ diagnostic kits) _____________ diagnostics)
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Company	 Event Type Event Date Details of - Date of 	 Details of
(monthI	 Event	 Confound	 Confound
day/year)	 (month!
__________________ ____________ _____________ ________________ day/year)	 ________________
Shire	 Discovery/P 05/06/97	 P1 trials of ME	 05/06/97	 Also announces
Pharmaceuticals	 I Trials	 drug to begin	 progress of a
number of other
____________ __________ trials
Trinity Biotech	 Phase lI/Ill	 09/05/98	 FDA clearance	 09/05/98	 FDA clearance
Trials	 for 2 infectious	 for 2 infectious
disease markers	 disease markers
Vanguard Medica	 Prestige	 09/07/98	 R&D alliance	 09/14/98	 Psoriasis drug
Alliance	 with Roche	 fails phase II
____________________ Gain	 _____________ (Kidney failure) _____________ clinical trials.
Vanguard Medica	 Regional	 12110/98	 R&D alliance	 12/10/98	 Failure of Phase
Alliance	 with 3M	 H kidney drug
Gain	 Phannaceuticals	 trial.
__________________ ____________ ____________ (liver infection) ____________ _______________
Vanguard Medica	 Regional	 03/16/98	 R&D alliance	 03/16/98 - Earnings report
Alliance	 with Stiefel
Gained____________ Laboratories	 _______________
Number of Confounding Events
Prestige Alliances	 5
Regional Alliances	 = 17
PH/Ill trials
	 = 17
Discovery/PI trials	 9
Total	 48
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EVENTS EXCLUDED DUE TO LACK OF ESTIMATION WINDOW DATA
(Estimation window = -20 to —160 days prior to event day 0)
Company	 Event Type	 Event Date	 Details of Event
_____________________ _____________________ 
(month/day/year) 	 ______________________
Alizyme	 Regional Alliance Gain 06/11/96 	 R&D alliance with
Oxford Molecular
_______________________ ________________________ ________________________ (obesity)
British Biotechnology 	 Phase 11/111 Trials 	 05/2 1/96	 Marmistat passes PH
trial
British Biotechnology 	 Phase 111111 Trials	 06/20/96	 Marmistat enters PIll
trials
Cambridge Antibody	 Prestige Alliance Gain 01/08/97	 R&D alliance with Eli
Technology____________________ ____________________ Lilly
Cambridge Antibody	 Discovery/PI Trials 	 12/15/97	 Unveils ProAb
Technology____________________ ____________________ discovery technology
Cambridge Antibody	 Discovery/PI Trials	 08/08/97	 Eye disease PT trial
Technology____________________ ___________________ begins
Cantab	 Prestige Alliance Gain 03/18/97 	 R&D alliance with
Pharmaceuticals	 Glaxo-Wellcome
________________________ ________________________ ________________________ (Herpes vaccine)
Cantab	 Prestige Alliance Gain 07/19/96 	 R&D alliance with
Pharmaceuticals	 SrnithKline Beecham
_____________________ _____________________ _____________________ Biologics (vaccine)
Cantab	 Discovery/PT Trials	 07/15/96	 Begin DISC trials
Pharmaceuticals
Celltech	 Prestige Alliance Gain 02/01/96 	 R&D alliance with
___________________ ___________________ ___________________ Merck
Celltech	 Phase 111111 Trials	 02/02/96	 Asthma drug fails P11
trials
Ceiltech	 Phase 111111 Trials	 01/26/96	 Septic Shock drug
_______________________ _______________________ _______________________ passes P11 trial
Celsis International	 Regional Alliance Gain 05/18/96 	 R&D alliance with
Millipore (rapid
____________________ ____________________ ____________________ microbiology)
Chiroscience	 Regional Alliance Gain 03/05/96 	 R&D alliance with
Knoll (BASF)
Oxford Asymmetry 	 Prestige Alliance Gain 02/17/98	 R&D alliance with
____________________ ___________________ ___________________ Bayer
Oxford Asymmetry 	 Regional Alliance Gain 08/07/98 	 R&D alliance with
Monsanto
Oxford Asymmetry	 Regional Alliance Gain 08/26/98 	 R&D alliance with
Vertex Pharmaceuticals
(identification of lead
____________________ compounds)
Oxford Asymmetry	 Regional Alliance Gain 10/30/98 	 Ares-Serono granted
access to compound
library (fees and
__________________________ _________________________ _________________________ royalties)
Oxford Glyco Sciences Prestige Alliance Gain 	 04/06/98	 R&D alliance with
Pfizer (Proteomics
______________________ _____________________ _____________________ diagnostics)
Oxford Glyco Sciences Regional Alliance Gain 0 1/13/98 	 R&D alliance with
Incyte (includes
_____________________ ____________________ _____________________ technology transfer)
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Company	 Event Type	 Event Date	 Details of Event
_____________________ _____________________ (month/day/year) 	 _____________________
Oxford Glyco Sciences Regional Alliance Gain 09/22/98 	 R&D alliance with
Pioneer Hi-breed
(agricultural
________________________ Proteomics)
Oxford Glyco Sciences Phase ilhTrials
	
06/10/98	 Orphan dn.g
designation for OGT
________________	 ________________ 918 in Phase Lull
PoIyMASC	 Regional Alliance Gain 06/03/96	 R&D alliance with
Hydro Med Sciences
________________________ ________________________ ________________________ (cancer vaccine)
Powderject	 Prestige Alliance Gain 09/10/97	 R&D alliance with
_______________ _______________ _______________ Boehringer Mannheim
Powderject	 Regional Alliance Gain 12/11/97 	 R&D alliance with
InSite Vision (dug
___________________ ___________________ ___________________ deliveiy)
Proteus International	 Regional Alliance Gain 3c2<M96	 R&) iante wii
Laboratories (prostate
and breast cancer)
Shield Diagnostics	 Regional Alliance Gain 0 1/09/96	 R&D agreement with
Surface Active
Vanguard Medica	 Phase 111111 Trials 	 11/19/96	 Pifi migraine drug
(VML 251) trials
commence
Xenova	 Prestige Affiance Gain 01/28/97 	 R&D alliance with
__________________ __________________ __________________ Bristol Meyer Squibb
Xenova	 Prestige Alliance Gain 03/20/97	 Compound libraiy
development deal with
Zeneca
Xenova	 DiscoveryiPl Trials	 05/12/97	 P1 cancer trial to begin
Number of Events Excluded due to lack of Estimation Period Data
Prestige Alliances 	 10
Regional Alliances	 11
P11/Ill trials
	 6
Discovery/ P1 trials
	 4
Total	 3l
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FAILURE EVENTS
Company	 Event Type
	
Event Date -	 Details of Event
______________________ ______________________ (month/day/year)	 ______________________
Biocompatibles	 Prestige Alliance Loss	 09/10/97	 J&J announce that
expected alliance will
not proceed
British Biotechnology 	 Phase 111111 Trials 	 12/16/98	 Drops Marmistat from
_______________________ _______________________ _______________________ Phase III trial
Celitech	 Prestige Alliance Loss	 05/20/97	 Bayer alliance
collapses after failure
of P111 trial (Septic
_____________________ _____________________ _____________________ Shock)
Ceiltech	 Phase Il/Ill Trials 	 05/20/97	 Failure of Pill septic
shock trial (Bayer
_______________________ _______________________ _______________________ alliance terminated)
Medeva	 Phase H/Ill Trials	 06/02/9 8	 FDA refuses marketing
___________________ ____________________ ____________________ application for AD 32
Quadrant Healthcare	 Discovery! Phase I	 10/02198	 Abandons development
Trials	 ot anti-viral drug
Aciclovir (Confound:
acquisition of Andris
______________________ ______________________ _____________________ Group)
Scotia Holdings	 Regional Alliance Loss 11/27/98	 Boehrinher Inglheim
cancels licensing
_______________________ _______________________ _______________________ agreement
Scotia Holdings	 Prestige Alliance Loss 02/27/96	 Alliance with
Pharmacia Upjohn
terminated.
Scotia Holdings	 Phase ilIffi Trials	 12/23/97	 EMA permanently
blocks approval of
____________________ ____________________ ____________________ Tarbetic
Scotia Holdings 	 Phase 111111 Trials	 03/12197	 UK medical authorities
reject approval of
_____________________ _____________________ _____________________ Tarbetic
Vanguard Medica 	 Prestige Alliance Loss	 05/14/98	 Negotiations with
SinithKline Beecham
______________________ ______________________ ______________________ for marketing deal fail.
Vanguard Medica 	 Phase 111111 Trials
	 12/09/98	 Failure of PH kidney
drug trial (confound:
_______________________ _______________________ _______________________ 3M alliance)
Number of Failure Events
Prestige Alliances 	 4
Regional Alliances	 = 1
P111111 trials
	
6
Discovery! P1 trials	 = 1
Total	 12
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